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Introduction
While researching the stay of the Stanhope family in Geneva 1764-1774, I became aware
of a 'problem' of Genevan history. The Geneva at the time of the Stanhopes' stay which
emerged was different from that normally depicted. The views expressed by many
historians concerning Geneva's history did not do sufficient justice to the importance of the
city's very special nature and history. This thesis is an attempt to show that Genevan
history cannot easily be accommodated with the theory of the Atlantic Revolution. Geneva
appeared to have a much longer history, amongst those who had political rights, of
questioning where the sovereignty in the state lay, or should lie, while at the same time
there was no desire to alter the constitution of the state, no wish to remove the govern-
ment, no thought of breaking or acting in any way against the established law of the land.
The confidence and trust in the government and those who were members of it remained
largely intact until 1782.
The 'Atlantic Revolution' theory of R.R. Palmer,' seconded by Godechot, 2 and of which
Geneva is considered to be an integral part, provides a coherent explanation for the
various upheavals encountered throughout Europe and the United States in the second
half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, Geneva is considered as one of the first countries to
suffer 'revolution' in 1768. Palmer seems to have been unaware of Genevan history before
1734 which is vital to an understanding of later events in the city. For Palmer especially, a
'revolutionary situation' is 'one in which confidence in the justice or reasonableness of
existing authority is undermined ... the sense of community is lost...'3 From this position
there need be no actual revolution but 'some new kind of community must be formee
The importance of Rousseau's Social Contract is emphasised as one of the markers of the
beginning of the Atlantic Revolution. The influence of the American War of Independence
and the ideas which arose within and from that war are held to have further influenced
groups and events in Europe.
Godechot agrees with Palmer's arguments, but like Palmer, did not consider Geneva
before the mid-eighteenth century. He also considers that the example of the United States
had a profound effect upon the city as well as the propaganda of the philosophes. which
'opened the eyes' of those in opposition to the government.5 His arguments that economic
difficulties may have lain behind the political difficulties has been overtaken by later work!'
Furthermore, the lack of understanding of the Genevan political scene leads Braun' to
claim, quite erroneously, that after 1707 there was no real calm in the city throughout the
century. Thus, inevitably, these historians give only a limited picture of Geneva.
R. R. Palmer The Age of the Democratic Revolution. A Political History of Europe and America, Vol. I The
Challenge, & Vol. II The Struggle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 8th Princeton Paperback, 1989.
2	 Jacques Godechot France and the Atlantic Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, 1770-1789, London: Collier
Macmillan, 1971, (Translated by Herbert H. Rowan).
3	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 21.
4	
/0C. cit.
Godechot, op. cit., p. 53.
Anne-Marie Piuz and Mottu-Weber L'gconomie genevoise, de la Reforme a la fin de l'Ancien Rágime XV1e.-XVIlle.
sigcles, Geneve: Georg pour la Societe d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de Geneve, 1990.
7	 Rudolf Braun Le &kiln de l'Ancien Regime en Suisse. Un tableau de l'histoire gconomique et sociale du 18e.
siècle, (Traduit Michel Thevenaz), Lausanne: Editions d'en bas, 1988.
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What emerged from the research was a Geneva difficult to fit into any general pattern. In
order to understand the political unrest in the city in the eighteenth century, it was
necessary to go back to the creation of the modem state of Geneva at the time of Calvin.
The political questions which troubled and divided Geneva in the eighteenth century all
revolved around the central question of sovereignty and where it lay. The question of
sovereignty was not one that emerged as important in Geneva in the last forty years of the
eighteenth century, it had been a constant within the city almost since the constitution of
1543 : This constitution also introduced a system of governance of the state which enabled
the rapid development of an oligarchy, with an interest in weakening and if possible
marginalising the Conseil General. It was awareness of this that caused the initial sugges-
tions for reform in 1578, when the question of sovereignty was first raised, within thirty-five
years of the creation of the independent Calvinist state in the city. The enduring and
unchanging belief amongst all those in the city with political rights that sovereignty lay in
the Conseil General, with it alone and went back to the creation of the commune in the city
in the fourteenth century. The Conseil General was the assembly of all those in the city
with political rights. The incorporation and continuation of this Conseil General in a
weakened form within the constitution of 1543, but with smaller councils enjoying, in reality,
the powers of sovereignty, ensured that in securer times when the city was not under
serious military threat or the stresses of frequent visitations of the plague in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, there would be conflict. Even the terms used by both sides in
1578, or 1605 or 1698 were the same as those used in the eighteenth century. More
surprising still was the clear concept of the sovereignty of the Conseil General which the
politically empowered in the state had developed by 1718, well before such problems
began to seriously disturb American-British relations in the 1760s.
By 1718 those who supported of the sovereignty of the Conseil General had formed a
loosely organised 'party' organisation with its own political manifesto and meetings. In part
this was due to the late introduction of guilds in the city, together with the fact that they
were strictly under government control. Guilds in Geneva never attracted the loyalty and
following and power they managed in other cities. The claims of the sovereignty of the
Conseil General replaced the guilds in Geneva as the referent for the Bourgeois. In its
turn, this led to the creation of a government 'party' opposed to the sovereignty of the
Conseil General. The level of organisation of those in opposition to the government was
remarkable and effective, and had to operate outside the existing political structure of the
state. The writing of two letters by Antoine LAger, in 1718, clearly setting forth the argu-
ments for the sovereignty of the Conseil General pre-date the more sophisticated and
amplified arguments of Rousseau found in the Social Contract.
Efforts over many years to find a compromise between the two parties in the state
ultimately failed in 1782. Until that late stage, there was little withdrawal of confidence or
trust in the government, as the attempts to negotiate with and trust in the good faith of the
government until April 1782 clearly demonstrated. There was certainly no desire for a new
basis for society. Indeed, the determination to do nothing to damage the constitution of the
state and the patience displayed by those in opposition are surprising.
The position of the majority of the population in Geneva without political rights, the Natifs
and Habitants, mirrored that of those with political rights. By the 1730s, the Natifs especial-
ly were divided between those who accepted the sovereignty of the Conseil General and
those who did not. The Natifs continued to be divided when a group of them, discontented
with their lack of rights, took to the streets in 1770. The division continued until 1781, when
they supported the party in the state willing to make the greatest concessions to them.
Genevans were notoriously introverted. In the myriad of pamphlets during the 1770s
there is no mention of the war across the Atlantic, nor the arguments of principle which
helped cause the war, perhaps because, for the Genevans, these were not new or startling
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arguments; sovereignty and who had the right to it were old friends in Geneva. The one
contemporary country mentioned is Britain and that sparingly. This apparent introversion
may account for the non-revolutionary tone and attitude of those in the city. Some of them
were mildly conservative, but were willing to accept an element of evolution within the
existing parameters of the constitution, others were truly conservative, wishing to see no
change in the state or society, still adhering to Calvin's injunction to change nothing in the
state. The Genevan politicians' insularity meant that for many their own problems were all-
absorbing (to the exclusion of much else), certainly until 1789.
The difficulty for historians also revolves around the much-used word 'revolution' and the
changes that the meaning of the word underwent in the last twenty years of the eighteenth
century, a confusion which affected people at the time in the same way. D'Ivemois entitled
his history of the political unrest in Geneva Tableau Historique et Politique des Revolutions
de Geneve dans le dix-huitierne siecle,8 the first part of which appeared in 1782. The
revised version, which brought matters in Geneva right up to date, was published in 1789,
after the early stages of the French Revolution. At no time in his early career did d'Ivernois
wish to see the system of government in Geneva overthrown. He, together with many of
his political colleagues, wanted a restoration of the sovereignty of the Conseil General as
the one palliative which would restore the harmony and balance of the constitution and
which would contain the power of the oligarchy.
Much of European history has been judged on the basis of the changed attitudes which
occurred as a result of the French Revolution. Geneva seems to have suffered more than
most from this attempt to read history backwards. There is a considerable difference
between limited adaptation of an existing constitution and its overthrow and replacement
with something radically different. Not until 1782 was there violence and change in the city,
which was rapidly crushed by external force. Compromise in 1789 and 1791 still, paradoxi-
cally, maintained the old foundations of the Calvinist constitution, based on privilege.
It was from France that Geneva caught the contagion of violence and the violent
overthrow of the existing constitution within the state in 1792. During the previous sixty
years and particularly after 1768, it was France that had made it impossible, by regular
interference in Geneva's internal affairs, for the state to settle its internal problems and
develop politically. The support and encouragement given by France to those in the city
who were determined never to make the compromise of 1768 work was an important
factor in the unrest of April 1782, culminating in the removal of the government. The
weakness of France in 1789, as in 1768, enabled a compromise to be forged between
Genevans that, in the event, was to be overtaken by the new idea of equality which
emanated from France as a result of the French Revolution and which proved fatal for the
old 1543 constitution. Diaries and letters from the eighteenth century would perhaps give a
clear idea of what happened in the city.
The vast majority of original manuscript sources are in the archives of the Bibliotheque
publique et universitaire (hereafter BPU) in Geneva, which contains a great deal of
material from the eighteenth century, including letters and diaries. It was clear that these
letters and diaries, written during the events they discussed could give a clear picture of
the reality of contemporary opinions and actions. Until well into the 1760s, most of the
material is from one side of the political arguments and disagreements, that of the pro-
government group but, later on, there is more available from those who were opposed to
the government party. In much of this material, there are at least three numbers on the
pages, sometimes a number in red ink - but not always - and often two different numbers
in black ink. In this work, I have taken the number nearest the corner of the page as the
a	 Sir Francois d'Ivemois Tableau Historique et Politique des Revolutions de Geneve dans le dix-huitierne siècle, Vol.
I, Geneve: 1782, Vol. II, Londres: 1789, Vol. III, Londres: 1789.
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reference number of the document quoted.9
Attempts to find any correspondence between Genevans whose letters are in the BPU
and any of the leaders of the American Revolution drew a blank. The odd letter that exists
is from a later date and refers to legal matters.
The Archives de l'Etat de Genave (hereafter AEG) were also used, especially with
regard to the Registres des Conseils, the official records of the two smaller councils in
Geneva and the collection of pamphlets contained in the Girod and Janot collections. The
Regis tres, written up after the meetings, can give a sanitised version of events and are
therefore not a reliable tool, although the way certain events are treated can give an indi-
cation of the attitude of those in power. The difficulty for the historian concerning the
political argument that went on in the two smaller councils was that no-one except the
council secretary was allowed to take notes of what was said. Thus all reported comments
in the letters and diaries in the BPU, are at best remembered and written after the event,
while those of the Registres des Consefis always reflect the current thinking of the
government and, on occasions such as the Sarasin affair in 1667, are totally silent and
therefore not reliable.
The Stanhope Archives in the Kent County Archives at Maidstone also contain some
interesting letters between Charles, 3rd. Earl Stanhope and some of his old Genevan
friends. Such correspondence, meagre though it is, throws up questions concerning the so-
called 'revolutionary' activity of men such as Du Roverary.
The use of French in the Middle Ages and Calvin's time also raises some problems. The
individual system of transcribing early French used by Roget has been much criticised.
Even in the eighteenth century, however, the French contained in some Genevan letters
and diaries is far from the French that was standard at that time. I decided that it was
interesting to retain the French as written by the authors of letters and diaries in the
eighteenth century as it appears in the originals. This gives a greater understanding of the
level that French culture had attained in Geneva at this time, than transcribing quotes into
impeccable modem French.
Needless to say, the whole language question was further complicated by the difficulty
on some occasions of trying to decipher what had been written. Where the text was
illegible, I have made this clear if I have quoted from such a passage. The papers of
Horace-Benedict de Saussure come into this category; with the best will in the world, they
are for the most part totally illegible, and there is a considerable collection of his papers,
some of which would surely be of interest to the historian.
The printed sources for Genevan history, although varied, are not extensive. The
standard history is by P. E. Martin i ° and is the only detailed history of the city from its
beginnings through to modem times. This two-volume work is far from exhaustive in
attribution of source material, often using uncited material, but it does cover in some detail
the events of Geneva's history and is often the only source available, hence, at the risk of
seeming a plagiarist, I have had to cite it relatively frequently. The other disadvantage of
Martin is his reluctance to express an opinion, added to the fact that the work was written
before the emergence of Palmer and Godechot's concept of an 'Atlantic Revolution'.
Geneva is thus examined from a mainly Genevan viewpoint, almost as an isolated island.
They are in the process of re-titling the manuscripts, so that all manuscripts in French will have the designation
FR., those in Italian I, etc.
10
	
P. E. Martin (Ed.) Histoirs de Geneva des origines A 1789, Geneve: Societe d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de
Geneve, 1951.
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A second book, edited by Paul Guichonnet," covers much the same period, but in one
rather than two volumes, and goes into little detail concerning many of the important
events of the eighteenth century.
The numerous Bulletins de la Societe d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de Geneve have some
articles concerning Geneva, but surprisingly few for the important period of the eighteenth
century. Articles by air on various events in the eighteenth century are excellent, but tend
not to be put in the overall context of the century. The same is the case of the Revue
Suisse d'Histoire. 12 The earlier works by Henri Fazy" are both interesting and informa-
tive, but only cover parts of the eighteenth century. The vast amount of work carried out by
ArnedOe Roget concentrates on the earlier period of Genevan history, although his articles
on the councils and the Syndics in Geneva are useful." Modem works relating to Geneva
tend to cover specialist areas, e.g. Barbey," or are intensely detailed works on one
aspect of the century, such as Sautier."
The excellent work on the economy of Geneva edited by Piuz and Mottu-Weber, for the
period 1543-1792 is a source of up-to-date information, which makes it clear how pros-
perous Geneva was until the very end of the period." The general histories of Switzer-
land, such as Martin and Bèguin, Oechsli and Favez, 18 have small references to Geneva,
but little of length. Antony Babel's work still provides an excellent source of information
concerning the watch and jewellery industries." Bergier has additional information.20
11
	
Paul Guichonnet Histoire de Geneve Univers de la France et des pays francophones - Histoire des Villes,
Lausanne: Payot 1974, Troisierne edition, 1986.
12
	
Andre GOr 'La negotiation de l'edit du 11 mars 1768, d'apres le journal de Jean-Andre De Luc et la correspon-
dence de Gedeon Turrettine, Revue Suisse d'Histoire, 1767, [hereafter 'La negotiation de l'edit du 11 mars 17681.
Secondly, 'Les lettres -seditieuses- anonymes de 1718, etude et texte', Bulletin de la Societe d'Histoire at




Henri Fazy Les constitutions de la Republique de Geneve, Geneve et Bale: H. Georg, Librairie-Editeur, 1890,
[hereafter Les constitutions]; Geneve de 1788 a 1792 La Fin d'un Regime, Geneve: Librairie KOndig, 1917,
[hereafter Geneve de 1788 a 1792].
14
	
Amedee Roget 'Le Conseil General de l'Ancienne Republique', Etrennes Genevoises, 1879, 3, [hereafter 'Le
Conseil General]; 'Le Petit Conseil', Etrennes Genevoises, 1877, [hereafter 'Le Petit Conseil']; 'Les Syndics de
Geneve', Etrennes Genevoises, 1778, 2, [hereafter 'Les Syndics'] and many others, all published in Geneva by J.
Carey, lmprimeur-Editeur in the year already quoted.
15
	
Paul Barbey Etat at Gouvemement Les sources at les themes du discours politique du patticiat genevois entre
1700 at 1770, These presentee a la Facultê de Droit de Geneve No. 687, Geneve: Universite de Geneve, 1990.
is	 Jereime Sauter La Mediation de 1737-38. Contributions a l'histoire des institutions politiques de Geneve, These
pour le doctorat d'Etat 1779.
17
	
Anne-Marie Piuz and Mottu-Weber, op. cit.
11
	
William Martin & Rene Beguin Switzerland from Roman Times to the Recent, (Translated by Jocasta Innes),
London: Elek, 1971; W. Oechsli History of Switzerland 1499-1914, (Translated E.& C. Paul), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1922; Jean-Claude Favez (Editor), Nouvelle Histoire de la Suisse at des Suisses,
Lausanne: Editions Payot, 1983, (Edition francaise).
is Antony Babel Histoire Corporative de l'Horlogerie, de l'Orfévrerie at des industries annexes, Geneve: A. Jullien at
Georg at Co. Librairies-Editeurs, 1916, Tome )00(111 Deuxierne sane - Tome Treizieme, Memoires et Documents
publies par la Societe d'Histoire at d'Archeologie de Geneve.
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Because the internal structures of Geneva are so vital, I have put some important facts
and information in Appendices. Of the various Edicts issued during the eighteenth century
in Geneva, the most important was that of the Mediation of 1738, as it is constantly
referred to thereafter. The main text of the document I have therefore put into Appendix II,
rather than inserting it into the main text. I have also given, in Appendix I, the full text of
the Edicts of 1543, as it was to remain the base of the state until 1792, in that subsequent
Edicts adapted aspects of it, but the basic structures remained untouched. I have also
used different Appendices for additional information, especially Appendix IV, which
contains the family trees of several of the main patriciate families involved in political life in
the city in the eighteenth century, to give an idea of how long-term and extensive their
influence could be. There is also more information in the same Appendix concerning one
of the leading families opposed to the government, as well as details of the individuals
mentioned in the text.
By their nature, archival sources focus on the political. Modern historians also want to
explain the social and economic roots of events as well, and there are two problems with
this aspect of Geneva. The authoritative volume on the Genevan economy by Piuz and
Mottu-Weber shows that seeking socio-economic strain as a cause of unrest is doubly
misplaced. This is because, compared with many other countries, Geneva was prosperous
throughout the eighteenth century, hence depression was not a causal factor, and
economics do not figure very prominently. Secondly, it is not easy to link political figures
with economic causes, primarily because sources such as the early medieval Edicts and
Genevan political motives do seem to have been the main determinant of events.
This thesis, therefore, is a political history, based upon the politics within the city. This is
particularly the case in the eighteenth century, when politics and rights were the dominant
factor in life. Aided above all by the tremendous and rapid development of the watch
industry and those industries associated with it, from jewellery to woodworking, the city
was prosperous and successful until difficulties began to intrude in the late 1780s. This
perhaps explains the dedication of so many in the city to politics, which appears to have
been a hobby, a passion and a replacement for the missing theatre, forbidden by the
church.
In the structure of the thesis, I have followed a basically chronological narrative form,
mainly because of the complications of the situation and the various changes that were
made to the constitution during the course of the century. Constitutions in Geneva are very
important; it is difficult to appreciate the political divisions within the city except in terms of
previous constitutions and political events connected with them. To some extent, this
approach and organisation is a function of the archival material. The writers are concerned
with the political, not the social identification of their opponents. Part I examines the origins
of the Genevan commune and the struggle for independence from Savoy it becaming
necessary to trace the medieval city's attempts to establish itself as independent, since
Calvin did not work in a void when he was involved in the creation of a constitution for the
state in 1543. The results of the influence of Calvin are examined especially in the sphere
of government and the creation of a new constitution to replace that of the old commune.
This is important since throughout the eighteenth century, all sides to the disputes in
Geneva made frequent references to the time of Calvin or before and to the different edicts
which came from that period. The reactions and consequences of the 1543 constitution,
together with the emergence of opposition to the developing oligarchy, are also examined
through to the year 1700. There is a chapter explaining Geneva's political and social
20	 J-F. Bergier Histoire economique de la Suisse, Lausanne: Payot, 1983; le dynamisme des structures sociales a
Geneve du XlVe. au XVIle. siecle% Melanges publies par la Facuhe des Sciences Economiques of Sociales de
l'Universite de Geneve a l'occasion de son cinquantenaire, Geneve: Georg et Cie. S.A., 1965.
foundations from the late middle ages to 1792 as these are essential to an understanding
of the events in the city. In Part II, the six chapters examine and analyse in detail events
as they unfolded through the eighteenth century, terminating with the abandonment of the
1543 constitution in late December 1792.
In this way it will be made clear that because of its own history, it is very difficult to
make Geneva a part of the Atlantic Revolution before 1782. The history of the city
indicates that peaceful evolution in difficult circumstances was possible, but only if there
was no interference from outside, a luxury, unlike Britain in 1832, Geneva was not
permitted to enjoy in 1781-2.
It is perhaps best to begin with Geneva's first struggles to establish its commune and the
endeavours of the commune and its leaders to establish the city's independence from both
the Bishop of Geneva and the Duke of Savoy.
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Continuity and Conflict The Struggle for Political Rights in
Eighteenth Century Geneva
Presented by Angela C. Bennett for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Abstract
This work examines the accepted idea that in the eighteenth century the city state
of Geneva was a proto-revolutionary state and formed part of what Palmer and
Godechot call the 'Atlantic Revolution'. In fact, Geneva bears little if any relation-
ship in its history to the experience of the Thirteen Colonies, to that of the United
Provinces or even to France. Rather, as examination shows, the unrest and
troubles that occurred in Geneva throughout the eighteenth century were the
continuation and elaboration of problems that had existed in the state since the
introduction of the Edicts of 1543, in part inspired by Calvin, which did considerable
damage to the rights which Genevan citizens had enjoyed in the previous century.
The trouble in Geneva between 1700-1790 was very similar to, and part of, a
continuing process first seen in 1578 with Boutilier, continuing with Combe, Sarasin
and Gallatin in the seventeenth century. The eighteenth century saw the drama
increase greatly with the Fatio affair in 1707, and the involvement of France, Bern
and Zurich in the Mediation of 1738. A period of apparent calm was followed by
further acts of unrest in 1766-68 and the military intervention of France, Bern and
Sardinia in 1782. The subsequent suppression was ended in 1789, but the end of
the state established by Calvin came in December 1792.
Close examination of archival material makes it clear that those with political
rights in Geneva had no desire to overthrow either the government or constitution
of the state, but merely wanted the government to allow them to play the part in the
political process to which their legal rights entitled them. Compromise and negotia-
tion were the weapons used in this process, with the citizens of the city holding fast
to a legal, totally non-violent approach. Genevans of different parties continued to
agree new changes to the constitution by negotiation even as late as 1790. The
desire for radical, revolutionary change in the state developed only after the French
Revolution and particularly after 1790-1. Thus, the Genevan experience was
unique, non-revolutionary and set against an economic background which until the
very end of the period covered by this study was one of considerable success.
Part One
Chapter I
From Imperial Episcopal City to Independent
Calvinist State 1300-1564
The political divisions, language and practices of eighteenth century Geneva have their
roots in the early history of the commune. This chapter starts with the emergence of the
commune in the disturbed times of the fourteenth century. Geneva differed in several
respects, socially and politically from other towns in similar circumstances. The Charter of
the Franchises, gave the citizens considerable say in the day-to-day running of the state,
and institutions such as the Conseil General, were to continue into the newly-created
independent state of Geneva. The Conseil General was to have great importance in the
shaping of the new, independent state of Geneva. No sooner had the city established a
precarious independence with the help of Bern and Fribourg than it was confronted by the
difficulties and the divisions of the Reformation. The arrival in Geneva of Calvin led to an
important new constitution heavily influenced by his ideas concerning the governance of
states. Opposition to Calvin's ideas was overcome with the arrival of the first wave of
Huguenot refugees in 1550, some of whom rapidly became Bourgeois of the city. It was
Calvin's rapid promotion of such men into government that enabled him to ensure that the
government was one that agreed with most of his ideas concerning the governance of the
state.
The Early Years
Geneva was an old city. This was due to a favourable geographical position at one end of
Lac Oman, as can be seen on Map 1, controlling the crossing point of both the lake and
the river RhOne at the point where it exits from the lake. The city was the meeting-point of
a number of routes which connected Northern Europe with the Mediterranean either down
the Rh6ne to Lyon, Vienne and Marseille or through the Alps to Venice, a route which
reached Geneva via Carouge and was known as 'la Tarentaise', passing via Annecy to Ita-
ly,' and continued either into the Swiss plain or into southern Germany and central and
northern France. The goods most in demand in Europe were silks and spices, which came
via the Red Sea and the Indies. It was Italian, especially Venetian, merchants who carried
most of these goods, notably to the fairs in Champagne. Returning to Italy, they took with
them woollen cloth woven in Flanders which could easily be sold in the Levant. 2 Geneva
was on the Italian merchants' route and was also a fortified episcopal city, around which
the merchants tended to congregate.
By the mid-thirteenth century the city's local market expanded into a larger, international
market, possibly because of the decline of markets in Champagne. Thus, Geneva, in
addition to being on the routes that merchants used to traverse Europe to attend large fairs
such as Frankfurt or Beaucaire, became home to four sizeable international fairs of its
own, at Epiphany, Easter, 1st. August and 1st. November (All Saints' Day). There was also
considerable financial dealing at these fairs:
Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 79.
2	 Maurice Keen The Pelican History of Medieval Europe, London: Pelican Books, 1969, Reprint of 1988, pp 89-90.
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'sous la forme de trafic de monnaies, d'operations de credit, de réglements de toute
espece,'3
with Geneva able to vie with some of the Italian cities as an early banking centre.4 The
Medici bankers were only lured from their base in Geneva in 1475 after Louis XI of France
offered them special privileges at Lyon and because of the problems posed by Savoy,
which was allied to the Burgundians. By 1500, Geneva was the largest city in the exten-
sive lands Of Savoy, as well as being the largest diocese.5
It was in the chaotic times of the twelfth century that Geneva was made an Imperial city
by the Bishop in 1162,6 the city maintaining the Imperial double-headed eagle as one of
its symbols ever since. This should have meant the town could claim status and protection.
Unfortunately, the Imperial connection did little to help Geneva against the continued
fighting between the various lords and bishops for control of the city.' Hence the Bishops
of Geneva had to spend large sums on defences for the city itself and for their other
possessions in its environs. Given this and the continuing unrest, it is not surprising that
the city reacted against the Bishops. This took the form of creating a commune for the city.
The Genevan Commune
Communes were sworn associations of adult males, and were formed
'to get, guard and exercise rights of self-determination:9
The first mention of a group of citizens coming together was in a document of 1263,9
which made it clear that the commune had put themselves under the protection of Pierre,
Count of Savoy. This was a late date in the context of similar communes in both Germany
and the Swiss cities such as Bern and ZOrich and equally in comparison with the agricul-
tural communes such as the three inner Swiss cantons Schweitz, Glarus and Uri.
In all cities which had communes, it was merchants who tended to be the motivating
force behind the creation of the commune."' Geneva, in addition to creating its commune
later showed its originality in the leading spirits in the move to create it. Families such as
the Saint-Aspres, Saint-Germains and Tavels, who were associated with the early
commune, were not merchants but minor nobility with at least a fief outside the town and
$	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 104.
Ibid.
5 Population numbers are extremely difficult, if not impossible to calculate at this early period. However, by looking at
the tax on hearths, Genevan historians have produced the following figures: 491 hearths in 1356, 564 in 1371, 653
in 1377, 858 in 1407. If one multiplies these numbers by 4 or 5 (taken from the measurements of other cities of the
number of people 'attached' to each taxed hearth), the figure for 1407 is 3,950 (x4) or 4,950 (x5), including an
arbitrary figure of 15% (of the multiple) for those not paying tax. Guiciluunet (Ed.), op. cit., p. 100.
1	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 85.
7 The Bishop of Geneva fought the Comte de Geniive, while the latter was also fighting the Bishop of St. Jeoire. The
slow decline in the power of the Comte de Genêve did little to help the Bishop in Geneva. The Comte was quickly
replaced by a new power, that of Savoy.
8	 Thomas A. Brady, Jr. Turning Swiss Cities and Empire, 1450-1550, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985, pp.28-29.
•	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 93.
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were considerable landlords within the city itself and not merchants."
By 1285, after the occupation of Geneva by the Savoyards, the commune benefited from
the support of Count Amedee V of Savoy, who, in a letter, promised to take the citizens of
Geneva under his protection and provide the merchants travelling to and from the fairs
held at Geneva with protection. The Savoyards further strengthened their influence in
Geneva by taking and holding the old episcopal castle on the island in the RhOne between
the main part of the city and St. Gervais on the other bank." Within a year, in 1288, they
had also obtained the right themselves to exercise the powers of the Vidomne from the
Bishop."
The 'new' commune was highly organised and managed to take over a number of the
powers and sovereign rights of the Bishop, as he complained in a letter:
'us ont constitue une commune, soit une association nouvelle et insolite; fait et Olu,
de leur propre autorite des chefs de la vile; fabrique pour la premiere fois un sceau
commun... ils ont construit dans la ville aussi sans notre consentement des murs,
des tours et autres ouvrages defensifs, ils ont decrate de nouvelles tallies et
contributions.'"
The influence of Savoy in the commune can be judged by the fact that, once the Savoyard
forces were withdrawn, negotiations between the commune and Bishop Guillaume de
Conflans led to its dissolution in 1293. Certain rights, however, were allowed to the citizens
by the Bishop. The most important was the the continuation of some form of Conseil
General, as long as it refrained from agitating against the Bishop. This was proof of how
important these meetings were to the people of the city. It may also have been a means of
maintaining the essential spirit of the commune. The speed with which the commune re-
established itself when the opportunity arose would appear to indicate that it remained in
some kind of shadow existence, though there is no hard evidence for this.
Further fighting in the area in 1305 saw the commune taking back all the powers it had
renounced aided by the fact that the Bishop had to leave the city for two years. His return
in 1307 led eventually to a reconciliation between him and the commune, with the
commune able to keep all its rights, including those listed above which had so scandalised
the previous Bishop. As Monter states, this may have been politic on the part of the
Bishop. He needed to be reconciled with the people of Geneva if he was to preserve the
independence of his see and that of the city. 15 It was Bishop Adhemar Fabri 16 in 1387
who gave his consent to the Franchises, a written form of the compromise agreed earlier
in the century - in which the commune, with its own leaders, the Syndics and institutions,
was accepted.
It had taken Geneva well over a hundred years of struggle to achieve the written charter
of rights, demonstrating that the early commune in Geneva was relatively weak. Nonethe-
less, it is eloquent of the long-standing determination of the people of the city to persevere
Edouard Mallet Du pouvoir qua la Matson de Savoie a exerce dans Geneve, quoted by Guichormat, loc. dt
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Ibid., p. 95. See also Map 1, p. la.
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The Vidomne was the Bishop's judge in civil matters, juvenile criminal cases and was also the Examining
Magistrate. All these civic powers continued to be held by the Chfitelain of the Château d'Ile until 1528. Guichon-
net, loc. cit.
Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 95.
Monter, op. cit., p.32.
He was Clement VII's confessor and made a brief visit to his see from the Pontifical court at Avignon.
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until they had obtained what they wanted. The struggle to establish the commune was
never forgotten, and, during future troubles in Geneva in the succeeding centuries, the
various parties would constantly refer back to the rights obtained by the commune as
found in the charter.
The charter or Franchises was a hotchpotch of articles with no reason for their following
one upon the other. The Franchises contained the right granted to the Genevans to unite
in a General Council to name their Syndics. Fabri had also agreed to accept:
'tous les autres droits dont il apparaftrait que la commune et les habitants ont
l'usage.'17
The very vagueness of the statement above was to be unfortunate for the future in
Geneva, since those who could find no justification for their arguments in the actual
content could fall back on this generous but by then meaningless phrase. It was this
phrase that ensured that Geneva developed a legal system which consisted of a mixture of
Roman law with the well-used local customs or 'usage'.
Geneva entered the fifteenth century with one of its problems solved. The city had its
commune recognised by the Franchises," and a state of relative peace existed between
it and its sovereign Prince-Bishop. Moreover, it was at the peak of its prosperity. Yet unlike
many of the cities in Germany and Switzerland, it had no craft guilds as there was no
manufacturing in the city to necessitate their existence. This lack of guild organisation is an
interesting aspect of Geneva.
The Franchises make no mention of guilds. In Geneva the exercise of a trade was not
connected to the need to be a member of a guild or a 'mastership'. While there were were
Confreries in the city, they were very different from the 'ZOnfte allemandes et les maitrises
frangaises'. 19 In Geneva the confreries were not single occupation, members of the same
occupation were members of different confreries, indeed some of these religious groups
were organised on the basis of quarters of the town e.g. 'St. Esprit de St.-Gervais' or 'St.
Esprit de St-Germain'.2° There was loose organisation of some trades, but this was
principally to fight the scourge of wooden medieval cities - fire. Geneva was not like
Fribourg, her ally, where trade organisations also acted as the basis for military organisa-
tion. As a result Geneva:
'n'a jamais connu les conflits, si frequents dans les villes jurees, mettant aux prises
les hautes professions et les petits métiers se disputant le pouvoir, comme ce fut le
cas par exemple a Zurich et a Bale.'21
Although Geneva thus lacked the political dynanism that the guilds provided in other cities,
a replacement impulse was provided by the Conseil General. Indeed, one point which
emerges throughout the history of the city is the loyalty of the people to the Conseil
General. It is this meeting of all the members of the commune that came in a sense to
replace the guilds. At the same time, the absence of the guild structure enhanced the
sense of self-involvement and concern of the individual within the city, there was no-one
else to whom responsibility could be delegated.
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The commune faced a serious threat when Arnedee VIII of Savoy was created Pope
Felix V in 1439. 22 The ruler of Savoy had already been created Duke by the Pope (1424),
in recognition of the growth of his power and lands. 23 Although he did not remain Pope
for long, Amedee VIII was able to ensure that his son Louis de Savoie received from Pope
Nicolas V special privileges concerning the appointment of bishops to bishoprics within the
state of Savoy, including Geneva. No Bishop was to be appointed to the city by the Pope
until he had received the agreement of the Duke.
Consequently, all future Bishops in Geneva were either members of the House of Savoy
or their trusted retainers. 24 Between 1444 and 1522, six different members of the Savoy-
ard dynasty occupied the Bishop's throne. Only eight of those years saw a non-member of
the family as Bishop.25 The additional benefit to the House of Savoy in being able to
choose the future Bishops of Geneva must have led many to conclude that Geneva would,
enentually, fall under the total control of Savoy.26
However, one difficulty which Savoy faced was the problem of the considerable military
power of the Swiss, especially Bern. With the defeat of the Burgundians by the Swiss in
1477, Geneva was in some danger as the Bishop, and thus the city, had supported the
Burgundians on the orders of the Savoyards, who were stalwart supporters of Burgundy. In
1475 Geneva had to pay a large ransom of 28,000 ecus to a sizeable Swiss army to pre-
vent itself from being attacked. Bern, then at the peak of her military power, was sorely
tempted by the pays de Vaud, which belonged to Savoy. Geneva lay at the far end of this
land, which was bounded on one side, by Lac Leman. If Bern were to force Savoy to
relinquish Vaud, it was militarily logical to include Geneva in the whole, especially as,
though nominally independent, the city was under the overall de facto control of Savoy.
Leaving the city 'independent' would permit Savoy to use it as a base for any attempt to
recapture lands lost to Bern. Guichonnet makes the point that it was in 1476 that the
expression 'Geneve, cle de la Suisse' first appeared.°
It was the unique geographical position of Geneva that was to be another of the causes
that helped her to escape the fate of her fellow city states. The Bishop at the time of the
Burgundian defeat was Jean-Louis de Savoy, i.e. someone who was only too well aware of
the danger to Geneva resulting from the inability of Savoy to protect her. Savoy, with inter-
ests in both France and Italy as well as in Burgundy, was overstretched and unable to
protect the city. Yet one of the ways that Savoyard rule would become acceptable to the
citizens was the ability of that power to ensure the protection of the city. It was the need of
the city states of Germany for protection, especially against the desire of local princes to
incorporate them into their lands, and the control exerted by the same princes in the Diets,
that eventually led these cities to seek Imperial protection. 28 This ability to protect was
one of the factors which contributed to the extinction of the German city states' inde-
pendence throughout the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire.
22	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p.115.
23	 Monter, op. cit., p.32.
24	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 116.
25	 Monter, op. cit., pp. 31-2. The exception was Antoine Champion, Bishop in 1490 'thancelier du duche et creature
des Savoie', Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 116.
24	 In 1401, the Duke of Savoy had obtained the Countship of Geneva, the old holders of the title having died out.
27	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 118.
21	 Brady, op. cit., p. 44.
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To replace Ducal aid, the Bishop in Geneva turned to the cantons Fribourg and Bern in
an attempt to obtain greater security for his city. In 1477 he concluded an alliance with
them in which all sides agreed to give mutual assistance in the case of any one of them
being attacked. This treaty was however limited to the lifetime of the Bishop and, with his
death in 1482, it ceased.29 This was the first treaty to exist between any Swiss canton
and Geneva and it is surprising that it should have been entered into by the Savoyard
Bishop of Geneva. In doing so, he gave the Genevans pause for thought. It was an
admission of the weakness of Savoy. Those in Geneva who wished to avert the increase
in Savoyard control had been given an indication of how to succeed and where to seek
assistance. It would also enable the Genevan commune to return to a situation in which it
would be able to exert greater pressure on the Bishop. If any of the Swiss cantons could
be persuaded to ally with the city through the commune rather than with the Bishop, then it
was possible that, in return for continued loyalty to the Bishop, the commune would be
able to gain even greater concessions. Alternatively, it was possible that the commune in
Geneva would be able to persuade Fribourg or Bern, two of the nearest Swiss cantons, to
support its attempt to free itself from the tutelage of the Bishop and Savoy and 'to turn
Swiss', as had been the aim of such cities as Constance and Strasbourg. 3° In either
event, it was unlikely that the commune would be the loser.
The possibility of military defeat coincided with the difficulties that Geneva faced over the
decline in the importance of her fairs. The international fairs at Lyon at the same times as
those in Geneva led to a decline in the number of international merchants attending
Geneva's fairs, though the city had been able to retain the interest of the Swiss merchants,
especially the Fribourg drapers, and it was their support that enabled Geneva's fairs to
continue. Savoy held land which extended nearly to Lyon (Montluel), and it could have
prohibited the passage of merchants going to Lyon unless they had been to the Genevan
market. In 1512, Duke Charles III, in an attempt to win support in Geneva, agreed that he
would return the Genevan fairs to their previous glory but under certain conditions:
'2. Que la ville ferait tous les ans un don gratuit au duc; 3. que la garde des portes
de la ville appartiendrait au duc durant les foires; 4. quo les syndics preteraient au
duc serment de fidelite, au nom de la ville;'31
The offer was too late, and the inclusion of point 4. revealed the real motive behind it. In
1482, such an offer might have been pushed through the Conseil General. This was the
time when one of the Syndics, Pierre Braset, is recorded as having told Swiss Ambassa-
dors to Geneva that:
'Les syndics, citoyens et bourgeois ont a obêir aux ordres du duc de Savoie,
auquel ils ne veulent clOplaire en aucune maniére.'32
In Geneva, the only person or group which did not have to swear an oath to another
was the commune. The Syndics were appointed by the commune, assembled together in
the Conseil General for that purpose once a year, and took their powers from that body.
Any attempt to suggest that the Syndics should swear an oath of loyalty to the Duke on
behalf of the town would be to place the commune and its officers under the control of the
Duke with the consequence of the decline and death of the commune. The determination
of the city to maintain its commune and its rights was strong enough to overcome the fears
21	 Guichonnet, op.cit., p.118. It is interesting that little comment is made concerning the implications of this action by
the Bishop.
30	 Brady, op. cit., p. 3.
3 I	 Amódifie Roget, Les Suisses et Gendve, op. cit.. Tome premier, p.87, my emphasis.
$2	 Guichonnet, op.cit., p.117.
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of the continuing decline of it's fairs. It made it even clearer that the interests of the city lay
in turning to the Swiss for some kind of assistance. In the final analysis, it was the Swiss
who had economic strength and military power. This fact was to become increasingly
apparent in the crisis which gripped Geneva at the turn of the century.
The Swiss connection and the move to independence in the early
sixteenth century
Toward the end of the fifteenth century, Geneva entered a phase of conflict and division
which was to allow the citizenry to gain full independence. In this attempt to gain its free-
dom from Savoy, Geneva was by no means unique. Across Switzerland and Germany
there were a considerable number of episcopal cities within the Holy Roman Empire which
had already travelled along the path Geneva was attempting. The two-hundred-year
period, roughly 1300-1500, had seen great concern and considerable efforts in these cities
to create and then protect communal values against the increasing power of the cities'
feudal rulers, either princes or Bishops, and to centralise power in their own hands. Moeller
is quoted as stating that such cities:
'perceived themselves as sovereign sacral communities and were very jealous of
their civic rights and freedoms.'33
The history of Geneva in the last quarter of the fifteenth century and the first quarter of
the sixteenth century makes it clear that, whatever else, the city's commune was deter-
mined to hold onto the rights that it had acquired. This was particularly so in the face of
the determined efforts of the Savoy Bishops to abrogate them.34
1490 saw two claimants to the Genevan episcopal throne (Charles de Seyssel and
Antoine Champion, the candidate of the Duke) which brought the Conseil GOnaral back
into full active life as both sides vied for the support of the commune for their claims in the
city. Indeed, in 1491, a Conseil Gëneral called to impose a tax went so far as to decree
with regard to the new Bishop, Champion:
'qu'il ne se fasse rien de quelque importance concernant la cite (non fiat aliquid
magnoe, importantioe civitatem concemens), sans en r6fOrer au Conseil G6n6-
ral.'35
Almost the same words were to appear in the eighteenth century, when the Bourgeois
demanded a return to the rights of the Conseil Genëral so long held in abeyance. The
election of Champion as Bishop had seen the battle between the Bishop and the commune
develop. He tried to control the Conseil Genëral by claiming that it could not assemble
without his permission. Bishop Champion may have hoped, like one of his predecessors,
Jean-Louis of Savoy, that, by refusing to call any Conseil GOneral except those for the
election of the necessary officers of the state, he might
'tout doucement faire passer aux Genevois l'habitude du Conseil Gënera1:36
The similarity with events in the eighteenth century is startling,_in both the claims of the •
Steven E. Ozmet The Reformation in the Cities The Appeal of Protestantism to Sixteenth Century Germany and
Switzerland, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, p.6.
In 1473, 1474, 1480, 1481 the Conseil Gênáral only met to elect the necessary officers. The same occurred in
1485, 1488-1490 inclusive. The Conseil Gênáral had a temporary resurgence in 1482 with the death of the Bishop
and his successor.
35	 Amikk3e Roget, 'Le Conseil Gönkar, op. cit., p. 117.
!bid, p. 114.
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Conseil Genáral and the desire to make it redundant.37 	
Geneva was edging toward complete independence from Savoy. The Bishop, a Savoy-
ard nominee, became the clear antagonist of the commune, a central authority which was
clearly seen as a threat to the commune and its rights. As Pirckheimer had stated at the
time: 'the bishops were the cities' greatest foes.'
The Genevan diocese was not in the same situation as the forty-six Bishops who sat in
the Diet kir the other ecclesiastical cities of the Empire. The emergence of the control,
both lay and ecclesiastic, of the Dukes of Savoy made it theoretically unnecessary for the
city to look elsewhere than the House of Savoy for protection to ensure the peace and
order necessary for its development. Unlike cities in Germany, Geneva had already
managed to obtain the protection of what was her 'local' lay ruler. However, cities of
Germany were in a more difficult position. According to Brady, they looked to the Swiss
Confederation as a possible example of how to achieve the kind of security they craved.
Much of the Swiss Confederation had once been nominally Austrian lands or Imperial cities
such as Zurich, but by the end of the fifteenth century, the Swiss were reaching the pinna-
cle of their military power. Paradoxically, the very success of the Swiss Confederation was
to drive some of the cities into the arms of the Emperor.
Geneva was unique in that, by chance, the enemy of the commune, the Bishop or rather
the office of the Bishopric, had been 'captured' by the lay prince whom the commune had
previously enlisted in its battle against its internal enemy, the Bishops. The city was
confronted by a situation where the intentions of the House of Savoy could not have been
clearer. In 'capturing' control of the Bishopric as well as becoming the Counts of Geneva
and holding the Vidomnate,39 Savoy was well on the way to taking over the city entirely.
Whatever the weaknesses of Savoy after the defeat of her ally Burgundy by the Swiss and
the distractions which quickly followed in Italy, where she was fighting France, it was
almost certain that eventually Savoy would prevail against the commune in Geneva and
succeed in incorporating the city wholly into the Duchy, thus ending the commune and its
rights.
In 1517, the Bishop of Savoy suddenly acted to assert his rights by arresting a number
of citizens for allegedly insulting him, two, Navis and Blanchet, after being found guilty of a
vast plot to assassinate the Bishop, were beheaded. The departure of a group of Genev-
ans to Fribourg, where they were made full citizens of that city, led to the negotiation of the
first treaty between Fribourg and Geneva that did not involve either the Bishop or the
Duke°. But within three months (March), Savoy had persuaded the Swiss Diet to annul
the pact, and, in April, Charles III of Savoy entered Geneva where on April 11th., a Conseil
General was held which renounced the Fribourg alliance. As far as Savoy was concerned,
Geneva was still an integral part of the Duchy and had no right whatever to make treaties
with external powers.
In August, after the election of Charles as the Holy Roman Emperor, Bishop Jean de
Savoie entered Geneva and was able to execute the leader of the Fribourg alliance,
Philibert Berthelier, who had returned to the city under the terms of the Duke's General
Amnesty of April 1519. He then called another General Assembly, in which he listed the
citizens' rebellion and the infractions of their privileges which they had committed and
37
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punished them by dismissing Geneva's four Syndics and naming four replacements.° In
doing this, he was attempting to severely limit the powers of the Conseil General. At this
time, the commune and its rights came under attack from both the Duke and the Bishop. It
was a clear demonstration of the kind of pressure Geneva could come under if both the
ecclesiastical and the temporal powers in and around the city worked together towards one
objective. If the successor to Jean de Savoie had been another close member of the
Duke's family, the rights and privileges of the city of Geneva would have been severely
restricted if not completely overridden, and Geneva, like so many cities in Germany, would
have ceased as an 'independent' city and become a wholly Savoyard town.
Cowed by the execution of Berthelier, the council accepted the Bishop's actions, but at
the next election it reverted to its normal practice, and the Bishop did not attempt again to
enforce his choice of Syndics on the commune. The decree which claimed that only
Syndics who had the Bishop's approval could be elected by the Conseil General was
important for Geneva's later history. Although it was a decree which was subsequently to
be ignored, in part at least because the Bishop had no physical power to enforce it, it was
to prove useful later in the city's history. In the eighteenth century, the Petit Conseil was to
argue that it had inherited the rights of both the Bishop and the Vidamne, and could thus
deny the absolute sovereignty claimed by the Conseil General and the right of that council
to refuse to vote for Syndics.42
The conflicting pull of the Bishop and cantons began to split the town. By 1520, the min-
utes of the councils were talking in terms of Eyguenots and Mammelus.43 In order to be
clearly identified both groups resorted to wearing their identifying emblems in the streets,
the Eyguenots their Swiss-style cock feathers, the Mammelus their holly." Not all the
people in the city supported those who wanted to see Geneva more closely associated
with the Swiss. Mammelus were often officials attached either to the episcopal or the ducal
systems of administration within the city, they were not merchants and had social status,
living in the upper part of the city around the town hall and the cathedral. The decline in
the power of the Bishop after 1527 caused many of these Mammelus to leave Geneva
withdrawing to their lands outside, abandoning the city to their rivals."
The Eyguenots, or at least those who left the city in 1525, were all working merchants
who owned no land outside the city and were 'en pleine ascension sociale1 .48 The advan-
tage the Eyguenots had was that their leaders were determined; they had to succeed or
become permanent refugees from their home town. Charles had clearly shown his hand
when he had tried very hard to capture all 22 of the Eyguenots as they fled Geneva before
his arrival in late 1525. There was little doubt as to their fate if they had been captured.'"
Basically, in attempting to establish closer links with the Swiss, especially Fribourg, these
41
	
Monter, op. cit., p. 36.
42	 See Chapters iv-vii.
42	 Eyguenots were those who wanted a treaty between Geneva and Fribourg and Bern. Mammelus were those who
preferred to remain connected with Savoy. Eiguenot = alteration, par attraction de Hugues, de l'allemand ,
Eidgenossen, confederes; employe d'abord a Geneve, vers 1520-1524, pour les patriotes hostiles au Duc de
Savoie (et dont le chef etait Hugues Besancon), et vers 1532 pour les Reformes - Huguenots. Albert Dauzat,
Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Frangaise, Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1938, p. 394.
44	 Monter, op. cit., p. 37.
45	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 132.
46	 Ibid., p. 130.
17	 Ibid., 'les agents de la Savoie les avaient poursuivis jusqu'en Franche-Comte.' p. 131.
9
22 leaders were trying to push the city into independence. As such, the Duke considered
them as traitors. Most of these men were all fairly recent members of the Bourgeois. The
father of Berthelier had come originally from Virieu-le-Grand in Bresse and been admitted
to the status of Bourgeois in 1464; the grandfather of Besancon Hugues was from
Caponex and became a Bourgeois in 1429.48 It was often the case in Geneva that the
impetus for action in the body politic was to come from families admitted to the status of
Bourgeois in fairly recent years.
In 1522 the fact that the new Bishop, Pierre de la Baume, was neither a member of the
Ducal family, nor in any official capacity attached to Savoy may have helped calm the
situation although he had been imposed against the wishes of the Chapter. In agreeing to
the appointment of de la Baume (1477-1544) as Bishop, the House of Savoy made a
surprising mistake. The de la Baume family were vassals of Burgundy, France, and Savoy,
and the young Pierre had impressed Charles III by his 'remarkable qualities'. 48 The new
Bishop was as concerned to strengthen his powers as the episcopal ruler of the city as the
Duke of Savoy was determined to make Geneva an integral part of his territory. Yet he
was to be the last Bishop to exercise temporal jurisdiction.
De la Baume showed how crucial it was, if any control was to be exercised over Geneva
by the Duke, that the Bishop should be a member of the ruling house of Savoy. It was de
la Baume who began a complicated political game of trying to play the various factions
against one another, the city against Duke Charles, the Duke against the Swiss, and
finally the city against the Chapter, all in order to divide and rule the city to his own benefit.
De la Baume stated to the Syndics in 1526:
Val bien dit a Monseigneur le Duc que quant a moi je suis son humble
serviteur et subjet, mais tant qu'evesque de Geneve je ne suis point son subjet et
qu'il n'a rien en ma cite de Geneve.'5°
All to no effect, for in the final analysis he, unlike either the Duke or the Swiss, had no
military power. That the two were not working together can be seen by the fact that during
Charles' long residence in the city, the Bishop was absent, which hardly improved his
standing in the eyes of the Genevans.51
A visit by Charles in December 1525 led to another Conseil General, known as the
Conseil des Hallebardes. During this it was agreed that the election of the Syndics was
subject to his veto. His imposition of this and other concessions 52 on the Genevans
underlined the fact that:
'Le peuple de Geneve, pris au depourvu, avait en quelque sorte signe l'abdication
de son independance.'53
Charles hoped that this beginning would soon lead to a clear acceptance of Savoy's
sovereignty over Geneva. Until the commune could find allies who possessed military
forces, it would be in constant danger of losing all its privileges.
The intimidation of the people, or some of them, was short-lived. On 22nd. December,
116 citizens:
AmOdOe Roget, Les Suksses et Geneve, op. cit.. Tome premier, p. 107.
4* 	 Monter, op. at, p. 38.
5 o	 AmOdifie Roget, Les Suisses et Geneve, op. cit.. Tome premier, p. 224.
51	 See Appencix IV B11/1. Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 130.
52	 The Genevans would make no treaties with the Swiss and there were declarations of loyalty to Savoy.
Amedêe Roget, Les Suisse's at Geneve, op. cit., Tome premier, p. 217.
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'se rendirent en corps a l'hOtel-de-ville pour y declarer publiquement par devant
notaire qu'ils faisaient cause commune avec les fugitifs et approuvaient ['les fugi-
tives] dernarches.'54
This action by a considerable number of important citizens in stating publicly their support
for the actions and ideas of the 22 fugitives marked a turning point. At no point in the
future in the battle for Geneva's independence did the Conseil General show any weak-
ness. The 116 had also, as was to happen in the following centuries, elected one of
themselves, Jean Bandiere, to speak in their name to the Petit ConseiI. 55 The right of the
citizens to seek redress or to demand action from the government was to become a
greatly-prized action. By the eighteenth century, the government and the patriciate were
extremely unhappy with this right of Representation. The determination of the Genevans to
uphold the rights of the Conseil General, together with their determination to express their
feelings publicly to the government had thus come into existence while the city was still
Catholic and while there was no religious issue in the air. The results of Luther's teachings
were not to be felt in the city for another four years.
Those who had left Geneva in 1525 to avoid Charles' anger had gone to Bern, where
they heard that one of their number, Jean Philippe, had been elected as a Syndic in
absentia (4th. February 1526).The Conseil General, re-establishing its independence,
insisted on electing Jean Philippe although his name was not on the list of the eight
candidates submitted.56 This made it clear that the Conseil General had the right to
choose whom it wished and not to be restricted to pre-selected lists. This gave Philippe
official status, which he used to negotiate a treaty of combourgeoisie with Bern (7th.
February 1526). He and the others then returned to Geneva, where they insisted on a
meeting of the Conseil General, which ratified the treaty with few dissenting voices. This
alliance with Bern was to hold uninterruptedly until the end of the independent state of
Geneva. Monter claims that this meeting of the Conseil General was as rigged as the
Conseil des Hallebardes had been:
'One man who attempted to speak against the treaty was checked by the swords of
his neighbours.'57
While Monter appears to be the only one to mention this intimidation, there seems little
reason to doubt that it could have been the case. There was still a party in the city that
was pro-Savoy and there may have been many in the city who leaned to the devil they
knew rather than the Bern they did not. The reputation of the Swiss was that of victorious
conquerors, looking for areas of expansion.
De la Baume was extremely unhappy with the ratification and decided to appeal against
the Treaty and its negotiation to both the Emperor and Rome. He also stated that, if the
citizens of Geneva really had the legal right to make such alliances without the consent of
their Prince, he would make no further opposition, and his remarks were carefully inserted
into the official minutes. De la Baume cannot have been unaware of the danger of such a
treaty; assistance from the Swiss to small cities like Geneva in the past had often led to a
permanent association and the considerable weakening of the powers of the local ruler. It
had happened in Schaffhausen before 1454 and at Mulhouse in the 1460s. 58 To have a
54	 Amêdês Roget, 'Ami Porral Le Patriote Eidguenot, op. cit., p. 149.
5'	 Amedêe Roget, Les Suisses of Geneve, op. cit., Tome premier, p. 219.
55	 Amedifie Roget, 'Ami Porral Le Patriote Eidguenot, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
57	 Monter, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
5,	 Brady, op. cit., p. 55.
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treaty with Bern was, at the least, to give encouragment and added strength to that part of
the commune which was most opposed to having any ruler over it, whether Bishop or
Duke. In truth, the General Assembly had no right to act as it had, since Geneva was still
not an independent state, and it is clear that the few dissenting voices were not a true pic-
ture of the feeling within the commune. The insertion of the Bishop's words into the
minutes was to provide yet another precedent for those in the future who sought grounds
for the support of their opinions in the charters and Edicts of this period.
De la Baume failed to re-establish his power in Geneva and, by August 1527, fled to his
family stronghold in Burgundy, thus leaving Geneva's citizens to take into their hands his
remaining episcopal prerogatives. At the same time, the city's rulers were gradually
reducing the remaining powers of the Vidamne until the office had ceased to exist by mid-
July 1528. The gap left in the administration of justice in the city was filled by the creation
of a civil Tribunal to be presided over by an official, who was given the name of Lieu-
tenant, and who was to be elected by the people of the city after his name had been
submitted to the Conseil GenOral. The Cathedral Chapter continued until 1535 though
effectively neutralised in 1528, only Genevans or Bemese or Fribourgeois being appointed,
with the Eyguenots making sure they controlled the appointments. Bemese were accept-
able because they were allied to the Genevans and Fribourgeois because of their close
association with Besancon Hugues. 59 By his leadership, Hugues had emerged as leader
of the commune.
He was both the First Syndic and Captain-General 60 of the citizens' militia, and by
these means had made himself virtual dictator of Geneva in 1528. Geneva had apparently
thrown off the tutelage of Savoy and her Bishop. Yet there were still many in the city who
continued to support Savoy. It was their misfortune that Savoy was at war with France in
Italy with Geneva being, for the Duke of Savoy, a side-issue. Geneva had been fortunate:
with the appointment of de la Baume as Bishop, rather than a member of the Savoy family,
the Duke had unwittingly re-created the situation which had allowed the commune to
emerge in the fourtheenth century. It was the weakness of de la Baume which enabled
Geneva to contrive to escape from his control, at a time when the other contender to rule
the city was otherwise engaged, and be associated with the Swiss to achieve a precarious
independence. If the Bishop had been content to work with the Duke of Savoy, the only
escape for the city would have been to seek the aid of the Swiss to prevent Savoy swal-
lowing it. But there were inherent dangers in seeking Swiss help, and Geneva, attractive to
both Fribourg and Bern, might well have found herself a vassal of either or both. The
conflict in Italy and the coming storm within Switzerland were to allow Geneva to survive
as an independent state.
At the moment that Geneva obtained her independence from the Court of Savoy, her
two Swiss allies, Bern and Fribourg, 6' were estranged because of the Reformation.
Fribourg remained a Catholic canton, while Bern was Protestant by 1528, and it was possi-
ble that Geneva might well become a point of conflict between the two faiths. Fighting
between Catholic and Protstant cantons led to divisions in the Swiss confederacy. 62 It
34	 See Appendix IV B II/2. Monter claims that he was responsible for Geneva being able to retain relations with both
Bern and Fribourg after 1528. Monter, op. cit., p.48.
.0	 Ibid., p. 34. Geneva had a citizens' militia, which had been revitalised by Canon Malvenda in 1491. It was the com-
mander of this militia who was given the title of Captain-General. Its motto was 'what touches one touches all'. p.
34.
GI	 See Map 2, p. 12a.
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also made it clear to Bern that any imperial ambitions it might have would be best directed
at areas that were not Catholic cantons, and this was the lands on the Bemese frontier
which were held by Savoy. The Bernese could appear as the saviours of Geneva while at
the same time, assuming their success, greatly extend their own possessions, including
possibly Geneva.
In Geneva during the 1520s, the majority were still clearly unaffected by the ideas of the
Reformation. Given the religious situation in the city, it is a surprise to see how quickly the
people went over to the Protestant faith, but the fact that their powerful ally, Bern, had con-
verted to Protestantism cannot have been without influence.
Events in Geneva after 1532 reveal a high degree of Bernese interference. This was
especially the case after the premature death of Besangon Hugues in 1532. 63 Until that
point, the influence of Fribourg was as great as that of Bern. He had close connections
with Fribourg and remained that city's loyal friend. 64 Hugues may not have been unaware
that it was in Geneva's interest to have two allies rather than one, especially when one of
the allies was large and powerful (Fribourg in comparison with Bern was smaller and
weaker). For Hugues, there was little point in Geneva's escaping from Savoyard control to
be immediately taken under the Bern's control. Equally, while Hugues was alive, Geneva
had been rigidly neutral concerning the religious question which was plaguing the Swiss
and dividing Geneva's two allies.
The attempts by Savoy to force the return of Geneva under its control were all unsuc-
cessful so that, in 1534, Savoy resorted to a blockade of the city. Not unnaturally, Geneva
appealed for help to Bern. Initially reluctant, Bern eventually granted the request for help in
January 1536, after the suggestion by Francis I of France that Geneva put itself under
France's protection, 65 a suggestion which was made at some point after 24th. December
1535.66 Bern declared war on Savoy on 16th. January 1536. The whole of Vaud, the Gex
region, Chablais, part of Faucigny and the Genevois were rapidly taken by the Bemese.67
Geneva was reached on 2nd. February."
On 5th. February the Bernese commander, in a meeting of Geneva's Petit Conseil,
demanded that Geneva should surrender to Bern:
'the old authority, jurisdiction and preeminence of the Bishop, together with the old
judicial office of the Vidomne.'69
The council was given ten days to consider its answer to this 'request'. When the Petit
Conseil refused the request, the Bernese insisted on a meeting of the Deux Cents. This
council was equally firm:
'nous ne croyons pas qu'ils soient venus pour nous mettre en sujettion, mais pour
a	 Amedae Roget, Les Suisses et Genêve, op. cit., Tome premier, p. 390.
4'4	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 133.
85	 Francis was the nephew of Charles Ill of Savoy and had some legal claim to a part of the Savoy lands. Francis had
assembled an army of 40,000 men for his fight with Charles.
GI	 Captain Verey, a French cavalry officer, arrived in Geneva on this date, with Francis' officer. Oechsli, op. cit. p.
146.
87	 See Map 3, Chapter III, p. 48a.
68	 William Martin op. cit., p.95.
s9	 Monter, op. cit., p.55.
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nous rendre notre liberte;'7°
Geneva was able to avoid becoming a Bemese dominion because of the presence of
ambassadors from other Swiss cantons travelling with the army and who had been as-
sured many times by the Bemese that they were coming to assist Geneva not to conquer
her!' France had also demanded sovereignty over Geneva three days after Bern. The
Genevans wisely ignored this demand, but it was a useful tool to use against Bern if the
. necessity were to arise.
All Swiss and Genevan historians are remarkably silent about whether or not Geneva
used this second attempt upon her sovereignty to protect herself from Bern's intentions,
citing only the presence of the ambassadors from the other Swiss cantons in Geneva at
that time. Oechsli does suggest that the use of force by Bern would merely have driven
Geneva into the arms of France.72 It is unlikely the French demand was not used diplo-
matically against the Bemese, as well as the presence in the immediate vicinity of Geneva
of a French army under Francis I. To all intents and purposes, Geneva was defenceless in
the face of Bern's demand to hand over power to it. Neither was it likely that any of the
other cantons would have been powerful enough to come to the aid of Geneva. It was
Bernese nervousness concerning France and her possible conquest of the Savoy lands
around Geneva, as well as French interest in the city itself, that had pushed Bern into war
with Savoy. Geneva was to escape absorbtion by Bern in part because it moved to
embrace Protestantism, thus opening a new phase in the city's development.
Calvin and the creation of the new Geneva
The next thirty years were to see independence maintained but new internal conflicts,
influenced by Protestantism and representing emerging democratic tendencies, were re-
pressed after 1543. The decision of the Conseil General to live henceforth according to the
law of the gospel and the word of God and to abolish all papal abuses was taken on 25th.
May 1536. It led Farel, the Protestant leader, to appoint Calvin in August. The latter had
arrived in Geneva in 1536, and, persuaded to stay, become a preacher at the Cathedral.
Geneva's troubles, though, were not at an end. Between 1536 and 1541, there was a
power struggle in the city, between those who supported Farel and Calvin, the Guillermins,
and those who supported Jean Philippe, the leader of the opposition, known as Arti-
chauds.73 Much of the trouble lay in the differences that had occurred between Farel and
Bern over religious practice, and anger over continued attempts by the Bernese to seize
lands belonging to Geneva. As a result of this, Calvin was expelled from Geneva by the
Conseil General in 1538 when his supporters lost control of the government, and Calvin
refused to be censured in the pulpit. During Calvin's absence, the battle between those
who supported him and those who were opposed was fought out in the Conseil General. in
such circumstances, the Conseil General came into its own, as each side appealed to it for
support. In 1540, in a period of five months, there were twenty sometimes raucous
meetings. This was to be the highest number of meetings in any year in Geneva's entire
70	 Ameclite Roget, Les Suisses of Geneve, Tome II, op. cit., p. 217.
71	 Guichonnet, op.cit., p.135.
n	 Oectisli, op. cit., p. 149.
n	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 137.
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history.74
Calvin returned reluctantly, at the city's request, in 1541, aware that Geneva was still
divided into factions. On his return, he found himself not only expected to establish the
church and its regulations but also involved in political matters too. Having offered his ser-
vices to the Petit Conseil, he was immediately drafted onto the committee considering a
revision of the Edicts, and little seems to have been done without his approval.
Although the political Edict of 1542 created by this committee was to incorporate many
of the old Genevan practices, the 'constitution' was to be given an orientation heavily
influenced by the man responsible for the reformed church in the city. Calvin had already,
in his Institutions of the Christian Religion, set out his ideas on both the governance of the
church and the governance of a Protestant state. A revised edition of this book in Latin
came out in 1543, at almost the same time as Calvin's involvement in the revision of the
Genevan edicts.
In the book, Calvin sought to calm fears concerning the Reformed faith's teaching on
Christian liberty. The theory contained in the book rested on the basic premiss that all
authority derives either directly or indirectly from God, although precisely how is left vague.
There is a double, parallel 'ministry', that of the pastors on the one hand and the magis-
trates on the other. Both rule the same people and both receive the authority to govern
from God. They exist in a state of mutual cooperation, working together for the good of
those they rule.
There was no concept in Calvin's mind of any sort of 'contract' between the Magistrate
and his subjects. The Magistrates did not have power from the people because the people
were not sovereign:
l'autorite n'est point une delegation du peuple. Le magistrat a charge et commis-
sion de Dieu. ... On ne voit d'ailleurs pas pourquoi le magistrat tiendrait son pouvoir
du peuple puisque celui-ci n'est pas le souverain.'75
Magistrates had to be respected and obeyed because of their position of authority, a
position they had obtained because it pleased God that they should do so, as Calvin made
clear:
'...it is impossible to resist the magistrate without resisting God.'76
The basic belief in predestination helped to reinforce the position of the Magistrates and
the smaller councils. For Calvin, it was perfectly logical that the reins of power should be in
the hands of those who were 'des meilleurs'. The members of the church had to believe:
'a l'origine surnaturelle du magistrat comme ils doivent croire a l'eglise ou aux
sacrements.'n
This was repeated in both the Catechisms and the Confession of the Faith. Even the worst
type of magistrate or ruler had the right to be respected by his subjects because of his
position of authority, while:
'The correction of tyrannical domination is the vengeance of God.'78
Calvin's ideas concerning the sovereignty of the people were therefore set upon a
74	 Monter, op. cit., p. 69.
75	 Marc-Edouard Cheneviere, La Pens& Politique de Calvin, Geneve: Editions Labor, 1737, p. 162, my emphasis.
76 John Calvin 'On Civil Government', translated from the Latin text Institutio Christianae Religionis Book IV, Chapter
20, quoted in Harro HOpfl, Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,.1991,
p. 75.
Ibid., p. 126 and footnote. The quote is in fact taken from Le Catechisme de Geneve, 1537.
75	 Edith Simon, The Reformation, Netherlands: Time-International N.V., 1972, p. 61.
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collision course with the reality of the position of the Conseil General in Geneva. If the
people were not 'sovereign' in Calvin's eyes, because only God was 'sovereign', then it
was clear that the claims of the Conseil General must be suspect. While it was right that it
should, in accordance with his ideas, 78 have some kind of overview over the Magistrates,
it should have no real control over them. The idea of sovereignty that the people of
Geneva had was much nearer to that expressed by Spinoza that:
'absolute sovereignty is the sovereignty held by the whole people.'8°
In the new constitution of 1543, the Conseil General, when choosing the new Syndics,
was to be restricted to a choice of four from a list of eight submitted to it by the Petit Con-
seil. Rejection of all names would result in a second list of eight from which the Syndics
would have to be chosen. The election of men whose names were not on the list was
forbidden. In this manner restricting considerably the maxim: 'que nul ne soit regeu qu'il
n'ait este approuve du peuple'. Before 1543, the Conseil General had on occasion rejected
the names on the list submitted to them and chosen another not on the list. The restriction
introduced in 1543 was to have important repercussions in the eighteenth century, since, in
effect, it introduced a latent contradiction into the constitution: what would happen if none
of the names put forward were acceptable to the Conseil Genera!? The Conseil General
would be permitted to discuss matters submitted to it by the Deux Cents, while the Deux
Cents was only permitted to discuss matters which had been submitted to it by the Petit
Conseil. Thus it was only after both the other councils had discussed a matter that it could
be taken to the Conseil General, which could then only either accept or reject the matter.
What had been removed from it in 1543, in other words, was the right to raise matters on
its own initiative, as had previously been the case. It could only react to those questions
that were put before it by the other, 'higher', councils. Thus, it had been shorn of one of its
most important powers, and the consequences of this were to echo ever more loudly
through the ensuing centuries.
The new Edicts of 1543, 81 however, did create certain clear regulations with regard to
administrative matters. The Conseil General was to meet every February to elect the four
Syndics. It was also the task of the Conseil General to elect the Tresorier for a period of
three years and the Lieutenant. 82 In both cases, the sole candidate put forward to the
Conseil General was chosen by the Deux Cents from a list of fifty names put forward by
the Petit Conseil, (two per member). If the Conseil General rejected the name put forward
for either position, the procedure began again from the beginning in the Petit Conseil. The
Syndics, as previously, remained judges in criminal cases, and, together with the Petit
Conseil, they formed the government of the state. 83 The Syndics met every day, and nor-
mally the Petit Conseil three times a week. Each Syndic was assigned special areas of
responsibility, whether it was in the courts of justice, the Chambre des Comptes or even
the Consistoire. The Syndics were responsible for the defence of the city and had under
their command a militia. The town was divided into areas under the control of dizeniers,
the smallest unit, through to quartiers, which had their own militia captains, the whole
being under the command of a Captain-General. The same force also had a police func-
'qu'on no pout pas avoir une confiance absolue, memo dans le gouvemement des meilleurs.' Cheneviere, op. cit,
p. 190.
SO	 Henry Kamen European Society 1500-1700, London: Routledge, 1984, p. 300, citing Tractatus Politicus, 1677.
11	 For text of the Edicts of 1543, see Appendix I.
£2	 See Diagram 3, Chapter II, p. 27a.
a	 For details concerning the (Afferent councils and the Syndics, see Chapter II.
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tion within the state.
To attempt to claim, as most Swiss historians do, that Calvin bears no responsibility for
the later troubles in Geneva because the 'constitution' was already in existence before he
arrived is to miss much of the real story. Nor is it evidence to quote, as Amedee Roget
does, examples of the consultations of the Conseil General at the time of Calvin as proof
that Calvin did not use his influence to restrict severely the legislative power of the Conseil
General of its legislative power." Roget also gives few details of the Edicts of 1543 in his
Histoire du Peuple de Geneve, but goes into great detail concerning the Edicts of 1568
and gives the impression that it was only in the latter that the power of the Conseil General
was curtailed. 85 As P. E. Martin clearly states:
'Les Edits de 1543 ont donc êtabli en cette matiere [re. le Conseil General] une
regle constitutionnelle qui sera de grande consequence:"
Fazy argues, correctly, that with the Edicts of 1543:
'le regime aristocratique est en voie de formation et il suffira de quelques annees
pour la constituer de toutes pieces:"
The 1543 Edicts are dismissed by Monter who, quoting the 'best political historians' (but
not identifying them) says that the 1543 Edicts in no way modified 'Geneva's fundamental
political dispositions'.88 That this view is incorrect is shown by the fact that in November
1539, the following article had been rejected by the Conseil General:
'Que nul citoyen, bourgeois, jures ni habitans de Geneve n'aient a proposer chose
en Conseil General que premierement n'ait este proposee en Petit et Grand
Conseil [Deux Cents] sus poinne d'estre prive de la bourgeoisie:88
In accepting the Edict the people of Geneva clearly turned their backs on their recent
history. By 1543, the Genevans had experienced two years of reform and yet were
persuaded to vote away some of the rights they had so doggedly defended. Why this
should be is not clear, though the powerful influence of the church under the influence of
Calvin's leadership doubtless played a role. Nonetheless, the consequences of the
acceptance of these new restrictions on the Conseil General were to have a profound and
permanent effect on the city until 1792. The limitation of the Conseil General to a basically
rubber-stamp (Ole fitted better with Calvin's ideas and aims than a free-wheeling, trouble-
some Conseil General, which would have continued to act as a source of open opposition
to his religious and political desires for Geneva. Nonetheless, the people were never to
forget what they had lost, even through the difficult and dangerous years that were to
follow, as the Boutiler affair, the Combe affair, the support for Fatio and all the attempts to
return unquestionned sovereignty to the Conseil General in the eighteenth century were to
show." It is no coincidence that, once Geneva began to emerge from the dangers and
S4	 Amedee Roget, Le Conseil General, op. cit., pp. 120-121: '... on accuse Calvin d'avoir use de son influence pour
deposseder le Conseil General du pouvoir legislatif.' II suffit pour refuter cette opinion de considerer qu'on
rencontre awes la mon de Calvin plusieurs Conseils **aux votant sur des propositions quo lour font les
ConseilsImy underlining] See also Monter op. cit., p. 72.
85	 Arnedee Roget, Histoire du Peuple de Geneve, op. cit., Tome II, pp. 68-70, including Ft. 1, p. 69-70, & Tome VII
pp. 250-251.
U	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3erne parte, Jacques Courvoisier, Ch. III, p. 243.
87	 Henri Fazy, Les Constitutions, op. cit, p. 51.
SS	 Monter, op. cit., p. 72.
99	 Amedee Roget, Histoire du Peuple de Geneve, Tome I, op. cit., p. 197.
90	 Boutilier and Combo, see Chapter III, Fatio see Chapter IV.
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difficulties of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, serious attempts would be made to
return its lost rights to the Conseil Gèneral.
The political/religious factional in-fighting did not stop until 1555. In part, this internal
strife was connected with the influx of Huguenot refugees. Many of them came from edu-
cated and qualified backgrounds and were avid supporters of all that Calvin was trying to
do in the state. Their arrival excacerbated the existing anti-French feelings of many in the
town and 'the increased desire to see them leave, as shown in 1546 by a man named
Gentilis, accused of having said:
'A la S. Martin, en Conseil GOnëral, tous les Francais sortiront dehors.'91
The implication being that the French would be forced to leave the city by the Genevans.
This francophobia was due to the fact that many of the clergy were French, Calvin having
had difficulty in finding sufficiently-qualified Genevans to act as pastors. The influx of
Huguenots also worried those who were still in control of the two smaller councils, such as
the Favre, Vandel and Sept families, as well as Ami Perrin. 92 For Perrin, it appeared that
Geneva, having escaped the control of a Bishop, was in danger of falling under the far
stricter tutelage of Calvin. The Huguenot refugees nonetheless brought to the city, apart
from their obvious religious zeal 'capital, reseau commercial, techniques de production'.93
The rioting in the streets during 16th. May was a popular reaction to the fact that the
Calvinists had gained control of the government. In a letter Calvin wrote to Bullinger, he
made it clear that there was a deliberate ploy of the Petit Conseil to create as many new
Bourgeois from pro-Calvin French refugees as possible:
'Parmi les Francais qui avaient etabli leur domicile dans la ville, il en choisit pres de
cinquante qu'il adjoignit au corps des citoyens.'"
There were 43 admissions in a matter of three weeks before Perrin and his followers
realised what was happening. 95 Clearly Calvin was determined, having obtained a pro-
Calvinist government, to ensure that it survived, thus confirming the fears of Perrin and his
supporters. Popular discontent with the increasing strictness of life, combined with an
inherent anti-clerical feeling in the city, had caused a violent reaction.
If, as Ozmet claims, the Reformation set out to make 'society's sacred institutions and
religious doctrines social', there was a danger that a situation could be created in
which the second generation of reformers would attempt to regulate the whole of the
congregation's life. It was a reaction against what appeared to be a faith and government
which desired 'to stifle all personal freedorre. 97 Calvin and those like him re-created the
very fears the earlier reformers had wanted to relieve - fear of sinfulness followed at death
by hell. Genevans had always been noted for their delight in dancing, drinking and a
strong tendency to reject the impositions of their rulers. In such circumstances, it was
hardly surprising that Calvin and his followers stirred anti-clerical feelings.
AmêdOe Roger, Histoire du Peuple de Gonave, Tome II, op. cit., p. 249.
See Appancix IV B II/3.
Jean-Frangois Bergier Histoire konomique de la Suisse, Lausanne: Payot, 1984, p. 138, (hereafter 'Histoire
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The rioting was seized upon and magnified by the government as an attempt at revolt,
and was used to exile and destroy all serious opposition to Calvin and the government.
Perrin fled, together with a hundred other old Genevan families. Twelve Genevans were
sentenced to death, eight in absentia, for what was claimed to be a plot to destroy eccle-
siastical discipline and the Reformation, as well as a plan for the abolition of the Consi-
stoire.
The firm stand taken in 1555, together with the passing of time, meant that by 1558
none of the Magistrates who had sat in the Petit Conseil in 1536 were sitting there any
longer." In the Deux Cents, twenty-two young men, supporters of Calvin, were brought in
to replace those who fled as a result of the trouble in May 1555. The Calvinists were in
complete control of the government by 1558, much as had been feared by men such as
Perrin, their position reinforced by exemplarary punishments against opponents. 99 The
restrictions of the powers of the Conseil General clearly caused a feeling of resentment in
the Bourgeois due to a realisation that the casting of a vote in the Conseil General had
become a futile exercise. In 1562 it was reported:
'qu'aucuns ne tiennent compte de venir en Conseil General et qu'il y en a mArne,
qui encore qu'ils soient dans le temple, ne se daignent approcher pour banter leurs
voix, ce qui demonstre un grand mespris qu'ils ont.'1"
This passive resistance was the only way left open to those who were clearly unhappy with
what had happened, and continued to be used until the end of the eighteenth century. The
minutes of the Councils go on to state that it was announced throughout the town that:
'tous les citoyens et bourgeois estans chefs de maisons se doivent trouver au
Conseil General A peine d'encourir l'indignation de la Seigneurie."01
Despite this, a reluctance to attend meetings was to be a frequent reaction in the future.
Reluctant though the members of the two smaller councils were to change the Edicts as
given in 1543, there was some tidying up of them in 1568. The first was that the Procur-
eur-General 102 was to be elected for a period of three years rather than one. This could
be interpreted as a deliberate move in the direction of calling fewer Conseil General
meetings, even for election purposes. The second was that the Deux Cents were to have
the right of grace in the case of a criminal who admitted his crime (this allowed them to
commute the death sentence to life imprisonment or banishment). It was also decided that
the Consistoire would no longer be presided over by a Syndic, which was a first step in a
clearer separation of the church and the state. Ibis was not a move that would necessarily
have been possible in Calvin's time. It marks the beginning of the slow decline in the
pastors' power in the state, and made it easier for the government to escape their censure
as well as to ignore their often-tendered advice. Finally, it was decreed that there was to
be a restriction in both the Petit Conseil and the court of the Lieutenant with regard to who
could sit there. A father and son, a father and son-in-law, or two brothers could no longer
sit together, thus allowing more people to be brought into the government bodies.
Two years later, in 1570, there was to be a far more profound change. In that year, the
es	 Monter, op. cit. p. 88.
••	 Gruet's execution in 1547 for lese-majeste, particularly his criticism of Calvin, the banishment of Ankrie Bolsec in
1551 and the death of the heretic Michel Servet for his ideas on the Trinity.




The Procureur-Gendral was a member of the Deux Cents, elected to his post by the Conseil General. He was
responsible for all legal matters within the state and was, if necessary, expected to represent the interests of the
Bourgeois and the Deux Cents to the Petit Conseil and the Syndics.
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Conseil General accepted the demand of the other two councils that existing taxes on the
entrance of wine into the Market at Geneva or the creation of any new taxes should be
decided and applied when necessary without first having to consult the Conseil General.
The demand was tactfully formulated:
's i lls voudraient s'en mettre a leur [les Deux Cents et le Petit Conseil] prudence et
a leurs soins sur ce qu'il y aurait a faire a cet egard."3
In effect, this_took control of taxation, a useful tool for control over the government, away
from the Bourgeois in the Conseil General and placed it in the hands of the increasingly
powerful government. The need for flexibility with regard to adjusting the taxes on foreign
wine entering the city was clear. However, it was less clear why it was necessary to
introduce new taxes without any consultation, except that the government sometimes
appeared to be chronically short of money. The greater part of the state's finances passed
by TArche', the name given to the secret treasury of the Syndics. Although the accounts of
this treasury were checked by the Chambre des Comptes, they ceased to be submitted to
the Deux Cents and were never revealed to the Conseil General.
The power given by the Conseil General to the two smaller councils meant that they had
to give no justification for the introduction of new taxes or for increases in existing taxes.
By the end of the century, few people in Geneva outside a very small circle had any
knowledge of the financial position of the state. It was an effective way for the ruling elite
to keep power in their hands. The disadvantage and danger of such a system was that
those who decided and raised taxes were accountable only to themselves. Taxation and
the right to raise it was to be a further area of bitter conflict in Geneva between the two
smaller councils and the Conseil General in the eighteenth century.
There was, however, an important omission in the Edict of 1570: it did not contain any
clause which specified that it was eternal and irrevocable, as the earlier Edicts, such as
those of 1568, had carefully done. This difference was to be seized upon in future
arguments in the eighteenth century as proof that the Edict of 1570 was only a temporary
abandonment of its rights by the Conseil General, and had never been intended to allow
the Syndics and the Petit Conseil to take permanent and non-accountable control of the
state's finances without consultation with the Conseil General.
The creation of Geneva as the Protestant Rome, contrasted with the creation of another
'Protestant' state in Europe. The United Provinces became independent to defend their
civil and religious liberties from Spain. But unlike Geneva, the United Provinces had a far
less centralised government as the only way to enable the disparate parts of the country to
come together. Sovereignty was divided, each of the seven states104 having its own
administrative machinery, with the seven states electing their own Stadtholder as head of
their state. It was thus possible for the head of the House of Orange to be chosen by all or
some of the states and become the General Stadtholder of the federation, as a quasi-
monarch with strictly limited and carefully scrutinised powers. It was an uneasy compro-
mise between monarchical and republican forms of government, created at a time of war
by a loose alliance of Republicans in Holland, the most powerful province, the merchants
of Amsterdam, and the most powerful town in Holland and the country, amalgamating with
those forces that were led by the Orange family and were monarchist. The initial success
of this marriage of convenience could not long hide the inherent contradiction and was to
lead to swings when the Republicans gained control of the state, followed by control by a
strong Prince of Orange, often in times of war. Like Geneva, the United Provinces'
existence was under military threat since Spain had no intention of abandoning her
t"	 P. E. Martin, op. cit., 341rne partie, Jacques Courvoisier, Ch. III, p.274.
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possession, nor allowing the continuation of the Calvinist faith there. Calvinist Geneva had
the additional advantage of having a common, undivided inheritance of the commune and
had already won their struggle for independence from Savoy.
To sum up, Geneva between 1200 and 1580 had developed from a small, dependent
city to an independent centre for Reform. Due to fortuitous circumstances, the struggle of
the commune in Geneva had led to the creation of a weak, independent city state. The
arrival of the Reformation in the company of the combourgeoisie treaty with Bern, together
with the settlement of Calvin in Geneva, changed the fortunes of the city. Calvin had been
instrumental in creating a city which was the nearest to a theocratic state ever to be
achieved in the Protestant world. The Edict of 1543, with the changes it introduced, where
the sovereignty of the people in the Conseil General had been diverted into the 'safe'
hands of the smaller councils, was to provide the perfect ground for the seeds of oligarchy
to germinate and grow. Before studying this process, it is necessary to examine the social
and political structures found in the Genevan state.
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Chapter II
The Foundations of Genevan Public Life
Understanding the evolution of Genevan politics, particularly in the conflict ridden eigh-
teenth century, can only be done by coming to terms with the special social and political
structure in the Genevan city state, examined in detail below. These structures were to be
an element both of continuity and confrontation throughout the three centuries which
followed the creation of the Calvinist state. They provided both the arena of public life and
the actors, and their characteristics and interactions help to explain the nature of political
conflict in Geneva throughout its existence as an independent state.
The underlying fabric of Genevan political life was provided by its social structure.
Geneva had a complex social structure based on a myriad of factors, political rights,
occupation and wealth. Thus political, social and economic rights became contained within
one stratum of the population and attempts were made, unsuccessfully, from the second
half of the sixteenth century to make it increasingly difficult for those outside the Bourgeois
to join the privileged circle. This attempt by an emerging oligarchy in the city was never
entirely successful. The emerging oligarchy was nonetheless able to exploit the Calvinist
constitution and gain control of the main organs of the government, with the important
exception of the Conseil General. This council, originally the assembly of the whole
commune, retained its independence and always remained the focus of Genevan sover-
eignty and identity. The legitimating role of the Conseil Gôneral, accepted, at least in
theory, by all the parties, should never be underestimated.
The social structure
The basic social structure in the city state remained unchanged until the end of the
eighteenth century. The city became wealthy only in the eighteenth century. This wealth
though blurring the distinctions between the different groups within the social structure
nonetheless still left untouched the political and some of the economic divisions within the
people in the state. Society was divided into four groups.
1. Sujets
These were the lowest group in the social hierarchy. They lived on the old seigneurial
lands outside the city and had few rights. The small amount of territory belonging to the
city encompassed, in 1797, 9,264 people, the majority of whom were sujets.1 In 1797,
they were 30.3% of the state's population. 2 They were of no real political importance until
the post-1789, when they supported the most radical of Geneva's politicians and were a
factor in the overthrow of the 'old' constitution.




Habitants had come to Geneva and obtained permission to work and reside in the town.
During the period before 1500, many of these newcomers came from the adjacent lands of
Savoy, but (and it was an important but), before the 1540s, the Habitants had the right,
together with the Bourgeois, to attend and to vote at the meetings of the Conseil General.
Membership of the commune was therefore extended to include the Habitants. During the
sixteenth century, this was to change, with the Habitants being excluded from the Conseil
Genera1. 3 By the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the Habitants were often household
servants or did manual and generally heavy, dirty work or worked in the large-scale silk
and cotton factories in the city. But they were able to obtain master-craftsmen status in
trades such as building, carpentry, hat-making, cobbling, etc., the trades abandoned by the
Bourgeois during the seventeenth century. Apart from the right to live and work in the
town, they had no other privileges.
3. Natifs
These were the children of Habitants, who had been born in the city. Subsequently, the
children of the Natifs, who were born in Geneva, were also Natifs. By the eighteenth
century, there were many Natifs whose families had been in Geneva over three or four
generations. This group was originally the semi-skilled part of the population, but gradually
in the seventeenth century and early eighteenth centuries the Natifs became skilled
workers, especially in the jewellery and watch industries, but because they were Natifs
they had to obtain permission after the 1680s to become apprentices and qualify as master
craftsmen and thus become employers. The professions were barred to them. In the eigh-
teenth century, this was to be a source of considerable anger, especially as many of the
sons of Natifs of that period had had an excellent education and had also obtained profes-
sional skills abroad yet they were not permitted to practise them in the state of Geneva. As
the Habitants, the Natifs paid higher rates of taxation than the Bourgeois at the Halles,4
and they also paid one-third more taxation on estate transfers. On marriage, they also had
to pay a 'quit deposit' to ensure that they did not become paupers and a burden on the
state.5
It is important to understand that for Genevans throughout the period of this study the
differences between Habitants and Natifs were significant. It is a mistake to treat them as
single group as Palmer suggests.6 It was the Naffs alone who were offered limited
concessions in 1768 and limited political rights in 1781, not the Habitants.
4. Bourgeois
The Bourgeois were full citizens of Geneva and members of the Conseil General,
originally because they had been members of the commune or because they had pur-
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chased this status. These people were at the top of the social hierarchy and, after 1543,
they alone had all the rights of citizenship, including political rights as well as paying lower
taxes at the Ha/les and on transfer of land, etc. They had the right to attend and vote at
the annual Conseils Generaux, were the only people in the town who could sit in the Deux
Cents or Petit Conseil and they alone could become officials of the commune or be chosen
as Syndics or members of the councils. They were also the ones who could, in the
eighteenth-century, be craftsmen in la Fabrique,7 own shops, factories and be pastors,
doctors and lawyers.
During the hundred years before Calvin, Geneva had acted as a magnet to those who
lived in the countryside. Many had come to live in the city, to share in its relative prosperi-
ty. At this time it was easy to become a Bourgeois:
'[1409] Bourgeois regus en grande quanta pendant cette armee presque tous
pour le prix de cinq florins a la ville et un au Conseil:... [1461] Bourgeois ... pay-
oient la plupart sept florins et une arquebuse valant quinze sous, laquelle se payoit
comptant et le reste en quatre termes assavoir aux quatre foires de Geneve.'8
There were a number of advantages in becoming a Bourgeois. It meant that those who did
could negotiate and trade whenever they wished whereas foreigners and Habitants were
limited to the city's market days and three days during each of the four Genevan fairs. The
Bourgeois also had the right to buy wine. They were also expected to do their utmost to
buy a house in the town and a vineyard or share in a vineyard on the outskirts of the town.
They also had to defend the state, as it was the Bourgeois who had to serve in the militia
in times of danger and had therefore to be able to equip and arm themselves for such an
eventuality.
Throughout Geneva's history, until 1789, the number of those with political rights in the
city, the Bourgeois, was always greater than the equivalent groups in the other Swiss
cantons, as diagram 1 shows, g while at the same time the number of positions in govern-
ment and government service was appreciably less in Geneva than other Swiss cantons
because of the smallness of the state of Geneva. This was not a recipe for tranquility in
the city.
5. Citizens/Nobles
By the seventeenth century, the Bourgeois were themselves sub-divided, there being a
small group at their top which was actively involved in the day-to-day running of the state.
This group were often referred to as Citizens, sometimes as Nobles, although the latter
title was usually reserved for those who had served on the Petit Conseil. One had to have
been born in the town of Citizen or Bourgeois parents to merit the 'title' of Citizen. The
demands on the time of the individual Syndics and the members of the Petit Conseil made
it inevitable that before the end of the sixteenth century only the wealthiest could afford to
take part in government The demands on the members of the Deux Cents were less
onerous, but even in Calvin's time there was a trend towards membership of that body
becoming the preserve of certain families, although with some other families still gaining
entry. By the eighteenth century, the oligarchy was so successful that there were only
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Diagram 1	 Those with the right to take part in government in
Geneva, Zurich, Bern and Lucerne.
No. of families
Figures from Braun, op. cit. p. 132.
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ninety different families either Nobles or Citizens sitting in the Deux Cents, with brothers,
fathers, sons and cousins of the same family all sitting together to the exclusion of others.
In Geneva's history, there were 682 families which were Bourgeois:
'pour quatre-vingt-onze families dans la distribution des charges: pour quatre-vingt-
onze families en place et reprësentees dans le Deux Cents en 1734, cinq cent qu-
atre-vingt-onze Otaient ecart6es du gouvernement de la Republique.'
In 1734 there were 91 families with a place in the Deux Cents, ten of these same families
monopolised 63 seats in the Deux Cents." Moreover, by 1734, in the Deux Cents, there
were 9 Trembley members, 9 Lullins, 8 Rilliets, 8 Pictets, 7 Gallatins, 7 Buissons, 6 de la
Rives, 5 Du Pans and 5 Favres. The narrowness of the power base in Geneva was
clearest in the Petit Conseil, where, in 1734, six families had two members each, thus
controlling 12 of the votes for the election of the Deux Cents.12
Not all the families who sat in the Deux Cents necessarily took a close interest in the
politics of the state in the same way as others. And gradually, because of restrictions intro-
duced in the eighteenth century, it was not always possible for all the male members of a
family to sit in the councils. While some sons went to serve as officers in foreign armies,
as in the Pictet and the Prevot families, others had in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, looked increasingly to the Church.
The political power enjoyed by the ninety families in the eighteenth century was
reinforced by their financial position vis-à-vis other Bourgeois. Families such as the Lullins
were the highest tax payers in 1690 and 1716, second highest in 1789 and tenth in
1765.13 The names of such families as the Turrettinis, the Tronchins, and Saladins
appear repeatedly as amongst the wealthiest families, paying the Grandes Gardes, a tax
on fortune, 14 there often being several members of the same family on the lists.
Post 1707, many of the rest of the Bourgeois paid tax under the Petites Gardes, which
was a capitation tax, but which also took into account any wealth accumulated under the
105,000 florins which placed a person on the Grandes Gardes list. Thus a middle mer-
chant, according to O'Mara, would pay around 32 florins, a pastor with capital funds of
94,000 florins would pay 44 florins.15
6. Areas of residence
The social and financial structure was further emphasised by the location of the groups
within the city. By the eighteenth century, the Habitants had tended to accumulate in St.
Gervais, which lay across the lake from the main part of the city, as can be seen in map 1.
The Natifs, lived mostly in St. Gervais, a few in the lower parts of the old town of Geneva.
The Bourgeois lived in the lower reaches of the old town, some in St. Gervais, while the
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Nobles lived in the upper area of the old town, at the top of the hill around the Cathedral
and the Town Hall, a trend begun before Calvin and accentuated with time thus creating a
physical metaphor of the social structure of the state. The use of stone rather than wood at
the beginning of the eighteenth century and the town 'palaces' of the patriciate, construct-
ed in this area during the early part of the eighteenth century gave a further strengthening
to the differences between the oligarchy and the majority in the city. In this respect, the
patriciate iri •Geneva differed little from the Amsterdam patricians, who lived clustered
around the Town Hall of that city." Many of the patriciate, yet another term for the ruling
group of families in Geneva, were, with their increasing wealth, purchasing estates in the
countryside outside the city, and these, though small in comparison with the estates of the
French or English nobility, nonetheless increased the differences between them and their
fellow Bourgeois.
7. Becoming a Bourgeois
It had always been possible for the Natifs and even the Habitants to apply for Bourgeois
status. In the period before Calvin, this had been used as a handy way of raising money,
as Roget makes quite clear:
'une des measures auxquelles on recourait le plus volontiers consistait a contrain-
dre un certain nombre d'habitants a postuler la bourgeoisie; on se procurait ainsi
quelques ressources au moyen de la somme a laquelle cheque nouveau bourgeois
eta taxe.'17
In 1547, there were 138 new Bourgeois; this high number was to provide money for work
in progress in the city. The register of 21st. June 1547 states:
'[II a ate] ordonne qu'on trouve moyen d'avoir argent pour payer les ouvriers
travaillant vers le belloard du Pin et ce qu'on pourra avoir des bourgeois qui seront
faits de nouveau soyt employó au dit belloard.'18
1555 was a watershed for acceptance into the Bourgeois. Before that date, it is calculat-
ed that 22% of Habitants, i.e. new arrivals or arrivals of only a few months, had acquired
Bourgeois status. Yet as early as 1572, the figure was 3.8% and this dropped to 2.5% in
1573-4 after the massacre of Huguenots in France: 8 reflecting the fact that, by 1572, the
financial situation, though far from satisfactory had eased, the two smaller councils having
obtained the right to impose taxation without having to obtain the consent of the Conseil
General. It became easier for the government to cope with its daily financial needs without
having to insist that some in the city became Bourgeois in order to raise money. Hence if
the patriciate so desired, it could begin the process of limiting the number of those
becoming Bourgeois.
In Geneva, political, social and economic power and position had become interwoven at
a very early stage. It was difficult but not impossible for any Nat/I to progress in one field
while ignoring the other two, and every advantage accrued to the Bourgeois, none to
anyone else. This system was to be mainta ined until the 1790s. The honour of Bourgeois
status was rarely a gift but a privilege which had to be bought. At the beginning of the
eighteenth century the fee was 4,400 florins, by 1740-49 it was 8300 florins, and in the
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1750s some paid 20,000 florins for the privilege. 20 The number of new admissions before
1770 had dwindled to a maximum of three per year.
Geneva, however, never stopped admission to Bourgeois status, as had been the case
in Bern, where access to Bourgeois status was forbidden in the seventeenth century. In
Geneva, as a result of the new Edict in 1768, between 1770 and 1779, there had been
459 new Bourgeois, of whom 250 were male children. 21 In Bern, however, due to natural
decrease, the number of Bourgeois families dropped from 542 in 1650 to 243 in 1784. 22 It
might have been better for Geneva to have completely stopped the creation of new
Bourgeois, but Geneva was not Bern. There were only a few official government posts in
Geneva, unlike the many posts available and necessary in Bern, especially the Sheriff-
doms (bailliages), which were well-paid and allowed the patriciate of Bern to devote them-
selves to politics without having to soil their hands with earning money. The Genevan patri-
ciate families were deeply involved in trade, there being no social stigma against it in the
city. Some beginning as merchants became international financiers able to amass fortunes,
thus freeing them to dedicate their time to running the state. The 'salaries' paid to the
Syndics and other government members were not great, certainly no incentive to those
without reasonable personal wealth. Geneva was also able to benefit, by continuing to
offer the opportunity to acquire Bourgeois status, from the entry of highly-skilled Hugue-
nots, both in the sixteenth century before the Edict of Nantes, and in the seventeenth
century after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
A further complication of the eighteenth century, was that the Bourgeois no longer con-
stituted a majority of the population within the state. In the middle of the seventeenth
century, nearly half of the male married population took part in public affairs and only 20%
of the male population were without civic rights even though Genevans by birth, while of
the remainder 30% were recent arrivals in the city, and thus classified as Habitants. The
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the settlement of refugees dramatically changed the
situation in Geneva:
'en moms de dix ans, les Habitants passent de 27% a 42%, puis a 50% dans les
annees 1720; dans le marne temps le nombre des Citoyens [Bourgeois] rêgresse
en proportion inverse, de 46% a 28%.23
By the 1740s the number of Nat/Is exceeded the number of Bourgeois, and by 1760 the
Bourgeois formed only 20% of the adult population.24 Further confirmation of this shift can
be found in the marriage statistics for the years 1770-1774, which give 190 Nat/Is for 100
Bourgeois.25 With the increase in survival of children, even allowing for smaller families,
the Bourgeois were clearly going to be pushed into the position of being an ever-decreas-
ing percentage of the population. This demography was a clear indication of trouble.
Amongst the group of early Huguenot arrivals in the 1550s, who were able to become
Bourgeois, were families who were quickly to become part of the oligarchy of Geneva, e.g.
Normandie, Colladon, Sarasin and Tronchin. The early arrivals from France were nearly all
people of social standing, some of them noblemen, and with skills and education missing
20	 Puiz et Mottu-Weber (Eds.) op. cit., %me. partie, Liliane Mottu-Weber, Ch. XV., p. 394, quoting A. Perrenoud.
21	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. II. (Tome l), p. 230, f. 1.
22	 Favez, op. cit., Francois de Capitani, 5, 'Vie et mon de l'Ancien Regime 1648-1815', p. 459. See also Diagram 1.
23	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit., ame partie: Alfred Perrenoud, Les ReaRes humaines p. 71. See also Diagram 2.
24	
IOC. cit.





in Geneva since the departure in 1525 of the ruling elite which had no desire to live in
Geneva under the control of Hugues 26 and his party. Doctors, lawyers and printers were
desperately short in Geneva before the arrival of the French and Italian refugees. Some of
the French refugees brought printing and mechanical skills as well as the fine art of
working in gold, all of which were to be important to the future prosperity of the city. There
were also a number of Italians who were leaving their respective cities for the safe haven
of Protestant Geneva, families such as the Turrettinis, the Diodatis and Michelis, bringing
with them skills in silk manufacture and marketing. The Edict of Nantes saw many Hugue-
nots happy to return to France, while those who had gained Bourgeois status remained,
but few Italians were able to return because they faced persecution.
By the eighteenth century, a number of the families that had come to Geneva as
religious refugees in the sixteenth century had become the leaders of the patriciate in the
city. All had made a great deal of money in the seventeenth century through manufacture
and trade in cloth - the Saladin, Turrettini and Lullin families are three of the foremost.
While cloth was the most common provider of wealth, others such as the Gallatin family
made their fortune from hardware and haberdashery goods, while the Mallet family owed
their fortune to tobacco and connections in the trade in Holland.
8. Banks and commerce
Geneva is full of contradictions throughout its history. Thus, in the eighteenth century, it
was a city of great wealth, but one which possessed no recognisable state bank. Due to
the city's Calvinist inheritance and the influence of the pastors in the late sixteenth century,
it nonetheless managed without accepted, official banks until after the period covered by
this work. The creation of the Chambre des BIOs in 1628 was to lead to this institution
becoming the equivalent in some way of an official state bank. Created from money lent to
it at an annual interest of 6.66%, its main task was to buy grain and to store it in order to
provide grain when needed in times of shortage to the people of the city. After initial
difficulties, the Chambre prospered and found that, within 10 years, after the payment of
interest to those who lent to it, there was a surplus of 25,000 f1. 27 In an arrangement with
the government, the Chambre agreed to lend it money in exchange for the right to farm
salt in the state. From this point onward, the Chambre became, to all intents and purposes
the state treasury.28 By the second half of the seventeenth century, the Chambre had
become 'une veritable banque publique', and by the 1770s, it:
'se lance dans les operations plus risquees, dont la souscription, en 1777, de billets
qui auraient d0 etre rembourses, entre 1778 et 1792, par le Tresor frangais...'28
The manner in which the Chambre developed meant there was no necessity for the state
to worry about establishing any official bank, since it had one in all but name.
By the late seventeenth century, there were a number of patriciate families who, having
been international merchants or manufacturers or both, were moving into private banking
in connection with their business and religious contacts, becoming, in effect, merchant
bankers. From importing cotton and then exporting the finished goods from the seven-
teenth century onwards, the Genevan merchants had become well-known throughout
28	 See Chapter I. p. 12.





Europe and some of the European colonies. Capitani claims that 'le nom de "Genevois"
deviendra synonyme de commergant et banquier. 3° Creating offices and banks outside
Geneva, in Marseille, Paris and London firms such as Cazenove in London or Cazenove et
Claviere and Plantamour & Cie in Paris, they were able to use credit facilities and move
considerable sums of money from Geneva into all kinds of uses outside the city. They
were equally important for individual travellers:
'[I called] on my bankers, Cazenove, Claviere et fils, from whom I received payment
of a bill granted me by Splitgerber and Daum, and on Chappuis et fits, to whom I
was addressed by Messrs. Herries and Cochrane.'31
The increasing need for money in both France and England to finance wars and their
colonial expansion meant that the Genevans were in an excellent position to benefit from
this constantly expanding demand for money. Necker 32, by becoming Louis XVI's Minis-
ter with responsibility for finance, ensured that the Genevans after 1770 also moved
heavily into the loans raised by Necker to solve the financial difficulties of France.
The importance of the Genevan bankers was due to the fact that they had maintained
relationships with their co-religionists who had gone to Holland, England, India and the
Thirteen colonies, to name a few. The Huguenots, driven from France, had by the eigh-
teenth century formed an extensive international network of trade and banking, and
Geneva was particularly well placed to benefit from it. The city was compact, and the work
ethic of the Calvinists, together with the simplicity of lifestyle led to there being consider-
able savings. It was this unused wealth that was to be the basis of much banking activity
in the eighteenth century. The wealth of the city was in part due also the efficient working
of the government within the city, helping to ensure there was no corruption, unlike many
other states which had emerged from medieval communes.
The commune and its structure.
The creation of the commune of Geneva in 1307 was legally recognised by Bishop
Adhërnar Fabri in 1387, with the granting of a charter called les Franchises.33 This per-
mitted the Genevans to unite in a Conseil General. The initial structure of the commune in
Geneva was fairly simple, there being three main elements: the Conseil General, the
Syndics and the Petit Conseil. The Syndics were elected to hold office for a year. There
was also a Petit Conseil, which consisted of the current year's four Syndics, plus the previ-
ous year's four Syndics and other members elected to the council by the Conseil Gen-
era1.34 It is important for this study that, from an early date, the Genevans' loyalty to the
commune was expressed through the Conseil General, which became, over time, for many
in the city, the very essence of what Geneva meant and what the city stood for, being both
a source of identity to the Genevans and a legitimisation of their city's existence. It was
30	 Favez (Ed), op. cit., Capitani, 5, p. 439.
31	 Frederick A. Pottle The Yale Edition of the Private Papers of James Boswell - Germany and Switzerland, London:
Heineman, 1964, Fourth Edition, Journal, 23 December 1764, p. 272.
32	 See Appendix IV B1/1. O'Mara, op. cit., p. 91.
33 Les Franchises was the Charter issued in 1387, whereby the Bishop confirmed all the laws, both written and those
of usage, already in existence in the city. It was a confirmation of the existence and of the rights of the commune in
Geneva. See Chapter I.
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also the only place where those who were unhappy with what was happening in the city
could express their frustration and anger and be heard. This was in contrast with the
apparently more advanced Swiss cities of Basle, Zurich and Bern where the equivalent of
the Genevan Conseil General was, to quote Monter, 'already a moribund curiosity.'35
1. The Conseil Gënëral
The Conseil General was the meeting place for the members of the commune, where
they discussed any matters they wished, voted and took decisions which were then acted
upon by the Syndics. It was in the Conseil Genera/ that once a year the members of the
commune chose four of its members, called Syndics, to carry out the tasks of running the
city and administering justice. This was particularly the case when there were divisions
between the people on the one side and the Bishop or the Counts/Dukes of Savoy on the
other. Equally important was the need for the Conseil General to be consulted on financial
matters:
'Iorsque le concours arme ou financier de la cite est reclame ou lorsque la commu-
naute se trouve dans l'obligation de se procurer des fonds.'36
It is clear that at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century the
Conseil General was an important and powerful body. This can be seen in the amazingly
wide-ranging variety of matters put before it for decision. 1457 was a particularly busy
year,37 and in the same year the Conseil General gave its consent for the Council of Fifty
to borrow money in the city's name. In 1429 there had been five additional meetings of the
Conseil General. All these meetings were apart from the two which were held annually for
the election of the Tresorier and the Secretaire at one meeting and the election of the
Syndics at the other.
In 1459, the Conseil General decided that it would meet on a monthly basis on the first
Sunday in the month. The following year this was amended to four extra meetings, in
which all other matters would be discussed in addition to the two meetings for the annual
elections. Clearly, throughout this period, there was considerable experimentation with
regard to the number of meetings deemed necessary for the Conseil General, while
continuing attempts were made to find the right balance between it and the government.
The Conseil General at this period, was an independent body which was not under the
domination of either the smaller councils or the executive branch of the government, the
Syndics. It was to this period in the city's history that appeals were to be made throughout
the future, when the Conseil General had become a mere shadow of its original self.
Those wishing to limit or reduce the oligarchical powers which the smaller councils
acquired by the eighteenth century based a major part of their argument on the period of
the Conseil Generals most effective power, between 1450-1540.
The partisans of a vigorous and powerful Conseil General were to appeal to this period
in order to show how the powers of the council had been increasingly attacked and
restricted in contradiction of the clearly-laid-down conditions of the Franchises, which
remained one of the foundation stones of Geneva's system of government until 1792. This
was the case both for its normal powers but also with regard to the regularity of both its
36	 William Monter, Calvin's Geneva, New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1967, p.31.
34	 Amackle Roget, 'Le Conseil Ganérar, op. cit., p. 110.
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25th March 1457 concerning the construction of a chapel by the Duchess of Savoy, four meetings to answer
demands for subsidies by both the Bishop and the Duke (11th. April, 19th. June, 31st. August, 16th. September,
1457).
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extraordinary meetings and the breadth of matters brought before it. It is clear during this
period that the Conseil General was acting as a form of legislative power, where no
decision of any import was taken without consultation with, and the agreement of, the
commune and its members. As Guichonnet proudly but correctly states:
'A Geneve, jusqu'a la fin du XVe siècle, le Conseil general, ouvert a tous, reste
l'autorite supreme.'
The numbers of those voting in important meetings of the Conseil General indicate that,
at the beginning of the sixteenth century, there were between 200 and 300 men attending
meetings and voting.39 These numbers, although small compared with the numbers taking
part in the important meetings of the Conseil General in the eighteenth century, where
1200-1500 were often present, still show a sizeable number of Genevans taking part in the
political life of the city.
Attacks on the rights of the Conseil Gëneral
The Conseil General had to fight to retain its rights against the Bishop, particularly after
the House of Savoy was able to 'capture' the Bishopric. In 1478, a list was presented to
the Conseil General on behalf of Bishop Jean-Louis of Savoy, on which were listed the
names of those whom he wished to see elected to the council. The response of the
Conseil General, though polite, was firm:
fut decide de repondre que les syndics ont le droit et le pouvoir d'elire leurs
conseillers et le secretaire, et qu'ils iraient, aussittit apres le Conseil, montrer les
Franchises a Mgr. l'eveque et le supplier, au nom de toute la communaute, de les
vouloir observer comme ii l'a promis:49
Even before the arrival of Bishops loyal to the House of Savoy, the commune had had to
ensure that they did not interfere in its working. The attempt by Bishop Jean-Louis of
Savoy to turn the clock back to the earliest days of the commune might well have been in
the hope of causing divisions within it from which the Duke of Savoy might benefit. In fact,
by the period 1519-1526, the rights of the Conseil General had come under serious attack
from the Duke of Savoy, who claimed overlordship of the city:"
By the use of threats, execution and force, he forced the Conseil General to abrogate a
treaty it had signed without his consent (April 1519), overrode its choice of Syndics. The
Conseil General twice agreed to his right to veto its choice of Syndics in August 1519 and
December 1525. These three meetings of the Conseil General, where its sovereignty was
overridden by the Duke were to cast a long shadow forward. The actions of the Duke
strengthened the argument of those who, in the coming two hundred and fifty years, were
against accepting that the Conseil General had any real sovereignty and who argued that
the smaller councils and the Syndics, as inheritors of the power of the Duke and the
Bishop therefore had the right to overrule the Conseil General, as had happened in 1519
and 1525.
It was forgotten by those who used these arguments that these meetings of the Conseil
General were not the normal 'free' meetings of the commune, but were held under the
threat of the Prince's military might. However, it is undeniable that the actions of the three
Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 115.
as	 Approximately 300 in July 1512, 405 for the election of Syndics in 1521, 282 in December 1525. Roget, Le Petit
Conseil, op. cit., p. 121.
40	 Amedee Roget 'Le Petit Conseil', op. cit., p. 3.
41	 The Count of Savoy had originally taken the city under a form of 'protection' in 1263. For details, see Chapter II.
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unfortunate meetings42 of the Conseil General were to be extremely useful .to the mem-
bers of the oligarchy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to support their claims to
hold all power in their hands.
The meetings of the Conseil General continued to be of great importance until the
1550s, after the establishment Calvinism in Geneva. 43 But, by the 1570s, it was increas-
ingly ignored by the government of Geneva, able to achieve what the Savoy Bishops and
Dukes had been unable to do, namely bypass the commune and its members by ignoring
their rights and refusing to consult the Conseil General, except in the matter of the election
of the Syndics.
The ability of the Conseil General to control the election of the Syndics was important
since the four men elected were the executive arm of the commune and later the govern-
ment of the city. It was one of the few important powers of control, however limited, over
the government which the Conseil General was able to retain through the coming centu-
ries. However, when a Syndic died in office, the Conseil General was never consulted
about the appointment of a replacement.
2. The Petit Conseil
The Petit Conseil was responsible, together with the four Syndics, for the day-to-day
running of the city, see diagram 3. Although not mentioned in Adhemar's edict, an act of
1364 "shows that the Petit Conseil (or Ordinary Council, as some historians such as
Amedee Roget have called it) was established, with certain clear attributes such as
allowing new members to join the commune, carrying out the repairs to the city's walls
and, importantly, the right to levy taxes, but only after approval had been given by the C-
onseil GeneraL45 There is no clear indication as to how this Ordinary Council developed,
but it was initially only consultative, an adjunct to the Syndics, and was elected by the
Conseil General at the same time as they were. By the end of the fourteenth century, it
was the Syndics themselves who chose the members of the council, not the Conseil
General. The numbers of the Ordinary Council or Petit Conseil varied from 12 to 20,46
sometimes reaching 30. 47 It was only in 1544 that the number was reduced and fixed
forever at 25. The Petit Conseil also contained the two other elected officials the Tresorier
(responsible for the finances and accounts of the commune) and the Secretaire (responsi-
ble for keeping the records of all meetings of all the councils)."
The ending of episcopal power in Geneva in 1535 gave a boost to the powers and
position of the Petit Conseil. All administrative tasks still in the hands of the Bishop, the
remaining legal powers both criminal and civil then passed to it. In fact, little was to be
outside the competence of the Petit ConseiL Roget is moved to comment, justly, that one
1. The encing of the original combourgeoisie with Fribourg, April 1519; 2. the acquiescence by the Conseil Gêneral
with regard to the acceptability of Syndics to the Duke, August 1519; 3. the Consel! des Hallebardes, December
1525.
See Chapter I.
44	 Anu3difie Roget 'Le Petit Conseil', op. L. p. 8.
46	 /cc. cit.
41	 Guichonnet, op. cit. p. 115




'frappê de l'accumulation de besognes diverses concentrdes entre les mains des
personnes appelees A former le Petit Conseil:49
If the Petit Conseil had been an open body accessible to all this concentration of power
might not necessarily have been dangerous. But the city was in the process of changing.
In Geneva in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the circle of rich, successful
families had been far from closed. Any merchant or family or any recent immigrant who
had obtained Bourgeois 50 status could with ease move into this upper echelon and
therefore, into the Petit Conseil.51 By the end of the sixteenth century, the council was
becoming far more restricted. In part this was due to the introduction of the Edicts of 1543
which led to the members of the Petit Conseil being chosen by the members of the Deux
Cents. The reason for this was expressed in a meeting of the Conseil GOneral in 1537,
where it was stated:
'que le Conseil des Deux Cents peut mieux connaftre que 4 personnes les citoyens
les plus propres:52
This apparently more broad-based system for choosing the members of the Petit Consefl
was not what it looked. The Deux Cents being itself chosen by the Petit Conseil, it was
actually a form of self-recruitment, each of the smaller councils electing the other from
within their own ranks. Thus, both councils began the process of making themselves self-
perpetuating bodies, difficult for anyone outside to join them. Members of the Petit Conseil
were chosen from amongst those who sat in the Deux Cents, and their election to the
council was for life.53
In fact, the Petit Conseil was a static body changing its composition only on the death of
a sitting councillor or the forced retirement of one who was too sick to continue. Many
members of the Petit Conseil died in office. In such a situation, it would send two names to
the Deux Cents, one of whom would subsequently be elected. It was only as a result of
political crises such as those of 1540, 1555 or 1782 54 that there was any noticeable
change in the composition of the councils. The families whose members sat in the Petit
Conseil formed the oligarchy which dominated Geneva during the seventeenth century.
There were attempts by the Petit Conseil, working with the Deux Cents, to limit the
number of candidates from which the Conseil Genëral could choose the Syndics, even
though there were great objections to the practice. These objections to the constraint
placed on the choice of men for election to be Syndics were well-founded. The creation of
a pre-prepared list of eight names from which the commune could elect its leaders was to
be merely the beginning of a process by which the commune's choice would be increas-
ingly limited. The restriction to a list of eight prepared by the Petit Conseil was to be
enshrined in the new constitution that the city received in 1543, a constitution which as
already noted was greatly influenced by Calvin.
The powerful position that the Petit Conseil obtained in Geneva made it inevitable that at
some point in the future there would be conflict between it and those who wished for some
a	 Ibid., pp. 26-7.
50	 See p. 26-28.
51	 Guichonnet also states that entry to the ruling elite of families was 'trills ouverr. op. cit., p. 115
'	 Arnedee Roget 'Le Petit Conseil', op. cit., p.4.
53	 See p. 32.
u	 See Chapters I and VIII.
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restraint of its powers. The additional power that it was to acquire by the Edict of 1738,
enabling it to ignore the complaints of the Bourgeois, added to the strains within the state.
Neither was the existence of the other council, the Deux Cents, any restriction on the
power of the Petit Conseil.
3. The Deux Cents
In the fifteenth century, an additional layer was added to the commune, with the creation
of a second permanent council, initially called the Council of Fifty, introduced because of
the increased workload of the government.
The creation of a Council of Fifty (1457) was an innovation. How far this was the result
of the influence of Swiss cities such as Bern or Fribourg is impossible to tell. It raises the
question whether the introduction of this additional council was possibly a move to transfer
the sovereignty of the Conseil Uneral to a smaller, more restricted council like the Grand
Council in Bern, or whether it was a realisation that it might be in the interests of the
commune to have a council that could meet more regularly and easily than the Conseil
Genèral. The latter had previously, on several occasions, elected a small number of its
members to examine a particular question and act for the commune, always in the context
of disagreement with the Bishop or the Duke. Such powers to act in the name of the
commune were however strictly limited, never exceeding a year in duration and were
carefully restricted by the inclusion of the instruction 'de ne rien aliener.'55
The Council of Fifty came into being at a time of intense political activity in the city and
shortly after the Savoy family had gained the right to appoint the Bishops. Possibly the
commune, aware of the danger it faced from the fact that it could no longer use the
disagreements between the Bishop and Savoy to bolster its position, felt it needed a more
stable body to guard its interests on a regular basis. It was acutely afraid of any move by
the Savoy family to trespass upon and destroy the commune's rights and considered it
wise to have some group appointed by the commune having a watching brief over such
matters. Nor did such motivation exclude the consideration that the Fifty might take over
some of the powers of the Conseil Genèral.
The Council of Fifty ceased to exist in 1491 in response to the concern of the Bishop at
its existence. It reappeared in 1502, at a time when the Bishop was far less powerful. By
1527, the Council of Fifty lost its political preeminence and was superseded by a new,
larger council called the Deux Cents. The Council of Fifty became the Council of Sixty,
usually referred to as LX, and continued until 1792.58 It was the council which dealt with
diplomatic matters and its members were drawn from the Petit conseil and Deux Cents
and sat for life. Consulted frequently in the sixteenth century, it gradually became less
important.
The Deux Cents, a larger council was created, according to one historian, because:
'II est probable que dans les moments difficiles par lesquels Geneve passait alors,
on voulut compromettre dans les decisions qu'on prenait tout ce que la ville pouvait
compter de gens importants; c'est pour cela sans doute qu'on appelait tant de
monde a l'oeuvre gouvemementale.'57
The creation of this new council was assisted, according to Oechsli, by envoys from Bern
and Fribourg, the new council therefore being modelled on those that existed already in
Amdidite Roget, 'Le Conseil gOnerar, op.cit., p. 122.
Fazy, Les Constitutions, op. cit, p. 37.
37	 AmOdifte Roget Les Suisses at Geneve, op. cit., Tome premier, p. 278. Roget is quoting from J. Fazy Precis de
l'histoire de Geneve.
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those two cantons.58 The new council consisted of approximately 200 members. Once
elected, a member sat for life. Resignation was not encouraged, only being allowed where
a councillor was bankrupt, or in very poor health. The expulsion of members from the Deux
Cents was normally as a result of political matters, not inappropriate or corrupt behaviour,
both of the latter being very rare in Geneva's history. The Deux Cents, unlike its predeces-
sor the Council of Fifty, was not a council nominated by the Conseil General but was
nominated by the Petit ConseiL This was one of the first steps in the slow decline in the
power of the Conseil General, by allowing the Petit Conseil to choose the members of the
Deux Cents, rather than as previously the Conseil General. Unlike the case in many of the
Swiss cities which possessed Great Councils, the Deux Cents in Geneva did not have
sovereignty, sovereignty remained in the hands of the Conseil GeneraL At the same time,
the members of the Petit Conseil were, in their turn, chosen by the members of the Deux
Cents.
By the second half of the sixteenth century, the families who sat in the Deux Cents were
creating an oligarchy, since the death of a father or near male relative sitting in that council
usually led to the election of another male member of his family as his replacement.
Importantly, however, the Deux Cents was not able to take control from the Conseil
General of the election of the Syndics.
4. The Syndics
The Syndics were the leaders of the commune, first mentioned in 1289, 59 they had,
some time before 1364, acquired the right to try criminal cases." To carry out their task,
they were assisted by the members of the Petit Conseil, in which the four Syndics sat. The
administration of justice was normally one of the most important components of seigneurial
power and it was a considerable gain for the commune that the Bishops had handed part
of the responsibility for it over to them, although it was:
'a cOte de l'eveque et tout en demeurant subordonnes...'81
The Syndics had the right to arrest people at night in the city and hand them over to the
Bishop's officials for punishment in the morning.
Before 1458, there would appear to have been no regular system of choosing of the new
Syndics by the Conseil General, the only limiting factor being that the Syndics had to be
accepted by the people:
'que nul ne soit regeu qu'il n'ait este approuve du peuple.'"
This phrase became deeply imprinted on the minds of the Genevans. Yet, after 1458,
however, there were attempts by the Petit Conseil, together with the Council of Fifty, or the
Deux Cents, jointly to recommend to the Conseil General a list containing tour names,
sometimes eight, of those citizens they had chosen by vote to become Syndics. The Con-
seil General in no way considered itself bound by this list and telt free to accept or reject
all or some of the names put forward and to vote others not on the list to office. This was
always accepted by the two smaller councils.
By 1518, restrictions were being placed on the Syndics. The Conseil General decided
53	 Oechsli op. cit., p. 135.
59	 Arrukifie Roget 'Les Syndics', op. cit., p.1.
ea	 Guichonnet op. cit., p. 100.
61	 Roget, 'Les Syndics', op. cit., p. 4.
.2	 Ibid., p. 10.
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that no man could be re-elected as a Syndic until three years after the end of his previous
mandate, and there were restrictions on the money that the Syndics could spend without
authorisation from the Conseil General. The Syndics had been powerful in the fifteenth
century, but the increase in the importance of the Petit Conseil in the sixteenth century
served to weaken them.
In the Edicts of 1568, each of the Syndics was given a specific area of government to
supervise. The first Syndic was the eldest and was guardian of the city's seal; the second
was President of the Chambre des Comptes and was therefore responsible for the
government's finances; the third was President of the Appeal Court and the fourth was the
Administrator of the Hospital. Although the Syndics were paid for the office they held, it
was never a great sum of money. By 1707, it had been fixed at 3,000 florins, with the first
Syndic receiving 4,000 florins. They carried a baton as a sign of their office, and gradually
during the sixteenth century they acquired special rights which increasingly separated them
from the rest of the community, as in other oligarchical cities, whether it was in their
clothing, their 'titles' or later in their right to wear elaborate wigs. With the development of
such outward symbols of power, it was as well that the Bourgeois, constitutionally equal as
members of the political class with the right to vote in the Conseil General, had already
developed a method enabling them to express their views to the government
Political Processes
The political organisation of Geneva remained mostly unchanged until 1792. It was a
strange hybrid, not a Rechtsstaat, defined as s system where:
'theoretically all the actions of the government ...[and] private individuals, were
subject to precisely defined laws administered by qualified judges,'63
because judges were neither qualified nor independent - all civil and criminal courts in
Geneva were presided over and decided by the Syndics, who acted as both judge and
jury, as in the case of Rousseau." Appeals for clemency in criminal cases were heard by
the Deux Cents. The same council was also the place of final appeal in civil legal matters,
although clearly, by the seventeenth century the Petit Conseil was unhappy with this
right.65 Yet there was a constitution with clearly defined laws, which was applicable to all
the people in the state, regardless of their position within it, as well as a mass of usages
built up over a period of several centuries. Thus there was an inbuilt conflict between the
diversity of law and custom necessary to a societe d'ordres and the uniformity of a
'bourgeois' society.66 Neither was Geneva a pure societe d'ordres, except in the political
field. Many of the regulations which were supposed to protect the Bourgeois and their
privileged position within the state were remarkably flexible. The most glaring cases were
to be seen in the eighteenth century with regard to the watch and jewellery trade, where
there was considerable Natif entry. Indeed, there had been unrestricted entry into these
guilds until the last quarter of the seventeefiiii century. Equally, the Bourgeois had great
difficulty in accepting that the patriciate was anything more or less than Bourgeois.
Nonetheless, the Natifs and Habitants paid higher taxes if they wished to act as mer-
C.B.A. Behrens Society, Government and the Enlightenment. The experience of eighteenth century France and
Prussia, New York: Harper & Row, 1985, p. 200.
64	 See Chapter VII.
" See Chapter III, pp. 61-63.
Ibid., p. 20.
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chants, an additional tax on marriage and a higher rate on transfers of property, but in all
other respects they were on the same legal footing as the rest of society. They could buy,
sell and own property in the city; it was not a monopoly of the Bourgeois. The patriciate
continued to trade, run their merchant banks and work, even when they had bought small
estates outside the city. There was considerable mixing amongst most Genevans in their
living arrangements, many were educated together, even at the Academy, if they were
able enough. Freedom of speech was considerable, especially at the daily collection of
water from the wells, where the company would be very mixed with Habitants, Natifs and
Bourgeois, and there was equal freedom of speech in the cercles.67 The willingness of
the Bourgeois to make concessions to the Natifs in 1738, 1768, even to a section of them
in 1770, and finally in 1781 throws further doubt on the city as a true societe d'ordres.
Indeed, the insistence upon the sovereignty of the Conseil General (though it was non-
elected) by the non-oligarchical Bourgeois implied that the government was an executive
responsible to it which made Geneva unique for most of the eighteenth century."
1. The right of Representation
Upon the withdrawal of the Duke of Savoy and his soldiers from the city, in late 1525,
some members of the commune made public their discontent with what they had been
forced to do in the Conseil General. They decided to go as a group to the Town Hall and
make a legal declaration of support for those opposed to the Duke. At the end of the year
1525 in Geneva, the members of the commune who disagreed with certain aspects of the
government's policy had devised a method of expressing their beliefs directly to the
Syndics and members of the Petit Conseil publicly at the seat of government in the city's
town hall. The right of Representation, as this type of action came to be known, whereby
citizens (i.e. Bourgeois) could go together to the Syndics to make a statement, or demand
government action concerning a particular matter, was to be of profound consequence.
The use of this device in the eighteenth century enabled those who had political rights to
act together and to give cohesion to their demands and actions. By that period, the Repre-
sentation became the only way in which the citizens could express their disagreement and
discontent over what the government was doing. By the eighteenth century, the number of
citizens who went together to the town hall to make their peaceful representations was
often 1,000 or more, compared to the 116 who went in 1525.69 The disadvantages to the
government of this procedure of citizens massing to voice their demands meant that
throughout the eighteenth century serious attempts were to be made to curtail or, if
possible, to abolish this right.
2. The Church and the Pastors
The Reformer and Pastor Jean Calvin had indeed played a considerable role in the
development of the city in the sixteenth century. Calvin, deeply involved as he was in
helping to create a new constitution was unable to ensure that the church remained free of
the control of the politicians. However willing to accept the teaching and ideas of Calvin,
Genevans were not prepared to see political control of the state limited by the pastors.
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Thus, although Calvin's Geneva was one of the closest to a theocratic state to exist at the
time, it was the politicians who retained overall control, even in religious matters. The
Church could examine and condemn, but it was left to the secular state to punish offend-
ers or to ignore the recommendations of the pastors. The pastors were organised in a
Consistoire, the ruling body of the church together with the Elders of the Church. The latter
were laymen chosen by the two smaller. councils, initially presided over by one of the
Syndics. BdSically, it was a collegial organisation, meeting once a week. When the
presiding Syndic was replaced, a pastor was chosen to preside for a week (1580). He was,
in theory, primus inter pares. After the death of Calvin, the eventual rotation of the
leadership of the church weakened the pastors vis-a-vis the temporal power.
The threats to the faith of the city which were so clear well into the seventeenth century
doubtless helped to reinforce the strength of most citizens' faith. Acceptance of the
teaching was profound, and obedience to God and the Magistrates (i.e. the Syndics) was
an integral part of that faith. In such circumstances, it was easy for the government and
the two smaller councils to turn away from the origins of the community which was the city
and to take more power into their hands as the trusted 'fathers' of the people, who had
been elected at the annual meeting of the Conseil Genaral. The attempts made by
Jacques Boutilier " to draw government's attention to what the Bourgeois thought of what
was happening was successfully smothered by the politicians, while the church preached
obedience from the pulpit. The last quarter of the sixteenth century saw the pastors
working closely with the government, watching apparently benignly as the rights of the
Conseil General were ignored, except in the election of the Syndics.
Support by the pastors for the people
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, however, several pastors on a number of
occasions spoke up for the people against the government. Their expulsion from their
churches and from the city for their refusal to refrain from criticising those in positions of
authority was perhaps not so surprising. In the seventeenth century some of the foremost
pastors came from the most important families in the town, families such as the Tronchins
and Turrettinis.71 Even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were still some
pastors who came from the leading families, the most well-known and important being
Jean-Alphonse Turrettini.
The very public divisions between the pastors over theological matters in the last thirty
years of the seventeenth century may also have had some influence on their relationship
with the people of the city. The pastors had, at the time of the Sarasin affair (1667), been
trusted as a neutral element between the Petit Conseil on the one hand and the Deux
Cents on the other, but this was because they were acting as a neutral body between what
was, in effect, the ruling families of the state. 72 Gradually, over the remainder of the
century, they began to lean increasingly towards favouring the government position.
By the eighteenth century, the pastors supported the government over the Fatio case,"
rather than support the aspirations of the Bourgeois. The ability of some of the lesser
Bourgeois to become pastors meant as the eighteenth century progressed, the pastors
were to become as divided as the former. This made attempts by the pastors to intervene
70	 See Chapter III, pp. 56-58.
71	 See Appendix IV 8 1/1.
72	 See Chapter III, pp. 60-61.
73	 See Chapter IV, p. 65 ff.
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between the government and the Bourgeois increasingly difficult. Much of their efforts in
the crisis of 1766-68 were carried out by individuals rather than the pastors attempting to
act as a body. In 1782, they had to go to the assistance of two of their members, one
attacked for being pro-government, the other for being anti-government. What emerges
over the period covered by this study is of a gentle but steady decline in the moral
authority and real neutrality of the pastors in Geneva, a trend which was accentuated,
almost certainly, by the more liberal religious atmosphere which the eighteenth century
engendered. Even Boswell was surprised at the Genevan clergy, who danced and played
cards, even on a Sunday.74 The pastors were the group in the city which reflected the
complete range within the Bourgeois, drawing their members from the complete spectrum
of the political class, making it inevitable that the political divisions within the city would
also divide the pastors.
The Church in Geneva had been successful in one particular area - that of the theatre.
The existence of the theatre in Geneva was forbidden in 1620. This ban remained in force
except for short durations until 1782. As much else in Genevan life, the question of the
theatre had become, by the eighteenth century, almost inextricably bound up with political
matters. The permitted existence of a theatre in the city at times when the French were
involved in attempting to solve Geneva's internal difficulties added to the problem, as sup-
port for a theatre became intertwined with support for France and French ideas, all of
which were considered inimical to the Bourgeois cause.
3. Pamphlets, brochures and newspapers
The insistence that the people should be able to read the scriptures meant that by the
eighteenth century most of those living in the city who had grown up there were able to
read. Serious efforts were made to ensure that most children received some primary
education, ensuring that they could read. A great number of pamphlets appeared in the
last fifty years of the eighteenth century, but the creation of the first Genevan newspaper
was in 1787, late in comparison with England, France and the United Provinces. Para-
doxically, the Journal de Geneve appeared at a time of strict censorship, not in the
freer period before 1782. Until 1792, the government of the city was still publicly burning
those brochures and pamphlets it considered to be seditious, although, on the whole, such
actions did little to stem the tide of pamphlets before July 1782, when severely enforced
censorship was introduced. There has been no detailed study made of the many pam-
phlets which showered over the city in the last forty years of the eighteenth century, of
which there are at least 6,000 waiting to be studied.76 The government tried hard to con-
trol what was printed within the city, and it was most successful in the period 1782-1790.
Many of the pamphlets had to be bought, which may explain why it was often the case
in the cercles of the both the Bourgeois and Naffs that meetings centred around the
reading of a pamphlet followed by a discussion of its contents. Discussion was an
important part of the cercles. Some pamphlets cost as much as 5-7 sols, making it
relatively expensive, especially if several pamphlets were needed to keep abreast of the
current arguments. Hence the strengthening of the oral tradition in the Bourgeois circles.
Some pamphlets were also 40-50 pages long, requiring considerable time to read. The
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vast majority of these political tracts are closely argued and were often part of a long chain
of responses to a previous pamphlet?' The seriousness with which the same ground is
covered time and time again from the different points of view is very Genevan. The
question of the sovereignty of the Conseil General and whether the smaller councils had
sovereignty was discussed time and time again, each writer referring to previous pam-
phlets, previous eras in Geneva and interpreting them to support his viewpoint. The
contemporary country mentioned by all parties was England and the rights of Parliament,
even as early as 1718, but otherwise there is the impression that Geneva existed in a
strange limbo, untouched by the stirring events elsewhere. As one writer complained:
Ton s'est vu inondes d'une foule de petites productions de ces redoutables
Champions, qui n'ont crainte d'entrer en lice...'n
During the period 1782-1789, there would seem to have been a number of samizdat-
type works circulating. Often written on small pieces of paper (easier to secrete and
smuggle out of the city?), they are satirical and quite different from the pamphlets above.
All the pieces in this archive attack the government and those that support it, and the tenor
is typified by what is claimed to be an extract from the register of the Petit Conseil of 6th.
July 1782, where the First Syndic, Barabann says:
'...par le bonheur que j'ai de voir sous mon Syndicat une aussi brillante
Whether the papers in this volume are the sum of this type of material to circulate is
impossible to know.
The lack of specifically Genevan newspapers led to the import of papers such as the
Gazette de Leyde, though there is surprisingly little reference to them in the pamphlets,
one being in the second dialogue appended to Lettre d'un solitaire, 81 where there is
reference on p. 7 to what had been printed about Geneva in the Gazettes of Amsterdam
and Paris. It is startling to see how self-absorbed the Genevans could be, with equally little
mention of the conflict between the Americans and the British. Rumour and false informa-
tion was common as instanced in a letter from Lady Stanhope to Lady Chatham concern-
ing a tale circulating in Geneva about Lord Chatham and George III. The latter had
escaped and gone to Hanover, while the former had been beheaded!"
Geneva and the Swiss
Geneva throughout the period of this study was an independent state. At no time was
the city part of the Swiss nation. Although allied to Bern and Zurich for most of the post-
Calvin period, Geneva was unable to join the Swiss because of the religious divide within
the Confederation. Attempts, in the eighteenth century, to be associated with Swiss
AEG Rivoire 2024 'Seconds reponse aux deuxiilme, troisiérne et quatrillime Lettre d'un representant qui cease de
paroftre modere', Genêve le 18 decembre 1780.
AEG A6711 bis Collection Janot Vol. 10, 26 Lettre d'un Citoyen a un de ses Amis, 1781, p.3.
Andre-Jacques Baraban, Syndic 1774, 178, 1782, 1786.
10	 BPU Ms. fr. 2480 Papiers De Luc, Ecrits satiriques 1782-1789, 32.
I I	 AEG, MS. hist 268, 7, pp.7-9.
12	 Kent County Archives, Maidstone (hereafter KCA, Maidstone), Stanhope Manuscripts 111590 S15 C11 1, Letters of
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neutrality were more successful. Geneva had obtained its independence from Savoy at a
much later date than the Swiss achieved their independence from Austria and had not
experienced the successes that Swiss arms had enjoyed in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. Thus the city had no military tradition, except in her town militia, and memories
of the struggle for independence were fresher and more compelling. The achievement of
independence shortly before the arrival of Calvin and the creation of an independent,
Calvinist Geneva gave the city a distinct identity and passionate belief in itself which might
well have made it difficult for it to become Swiss. The differences between Geneva and the
Swiss were further accentuated by the incorporation and continued use, however attenuat-
ed, of the Conseil General, the medieval gathering of the commune, which had died in
cantons such as Bern, although it still continued in cantons such as Appenzell, Uri and
Schweitz. The smallness of the state, the lack of military service overseas, together with
the late introduction of the guilds and their weakness, added to the strictness of life in the
Calvinist state, all these factors may well have played a role in the Bourgeois concern over
their rights, which was one of their sole distractions. It was the long, determined refusal of
the Bourgeois in Geneva to allow the loss of their rights to go unchallenged which also
separated them from many of their Swiss allies and friends.
Geneva was an urban society which, unlike Venice, Bern or Zurich, had very little
countryside. Geneva was also unlike Amsterdam in that it was a small isolated city-state
and not part of the Swiss confederation. Amsterdam was a wealthy city in Holland, one of
the seven provinces of the United Provinces, paying 25% of the taxes of the whole nation.
Such economic power gave the city a powerful voice in the United Provinces. 83 In
comparison, Geneva was a minuscule urban city-state of religious importance in the
second half of the sixteenth century.
The pre-1543 development of the early commune with the creation of the Petit Conseil
and the Deux Cents unwittingly laid the foundations of a system on which oligarchy could
flourish. The Edicts of 1543 saw an amalgamation of the rights of the medieval commune
with Calvin's ideas of governance giving further impetus to and strengthening of oligarchy.
The Conseil General, the centrepiece of the old commune continued post-1543 to be of
prime importance to the Bourgeois, the political class of which the oligarchy were but a
small minority. The dichotomy between the rights of the Conseil General and the smaller
councils, where the oligarchy alone held power, were soon to cause political disagree-
ments within the state.
13	 Peter Burke Venice and Amsterdam A Study of Seventeenth Century Elites, London: Temple Smith, 1974, P. 42.
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Chapter III
Geneva after Calvin and the Emergence of
Opposition 1564-1700
Calvin's rule had consolidated a new system of government. Over the next 150 years the
structure of the state was to remain largely unchanged. However, there was no stasis as
new factors within the state emerged especially in politics and international politics. The
influence of the pastors began to decline after the death of Calvin. Secondly, the demands
of the city's international position, increasingly exposed it to French influence and forced it
into new measures. Thirdly, the arrival of considerable numbers of refugees placed
considerable strains upon the city. The emergence of political discontent over the sover-
eignty of the Conseil General was the constant backdrop to whatever else happened within
the city. The strengthening of the position of the Petit Conseil at the expense of the
Conseil Ganeral served both to strengthen the criticism of the new order and to divide the
oligarchy. All this was to pave the way for the eighteenth century confrontation.
During the same period, the inability of Savoy to reincorporate Geneva into its lands
saw it gradually becoming less of a danger. This was balanced by the mounting influence
of France, a European military power with extensive lands agiSacent to tie t:ity ant
particularly after the estabtishment at a French Resident in The city. The	 ol refugees
in Geneva after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) caused social problems
within the city, but also tensions between Geneva and France, the latter desirous to
prevent the large-scale settlement of Huguenots on the frontier of France. Fear of French
power heightened because of the apparent weakness of Bern and Zurich vis-à-vis France.
Criticism of the government emerged shortly after Calvin's death emphasising the aware-
ness of some of the Bourgeois that there needed to be reforms to the system to act as a
curb on the emerging oligarchy. Initially, criticism came from the pastors as protectors of
the people; but as the period of the chapter progressed the church was, to a certain
extent, 'captured' by the oligarchy, with many pastors coming from the ruling families. The
sovereignty of the Conseil GenOral was seen as the medium for achieving reform, and the
actions of Boutilier, Combe and Gallatin over this period made it clear the question of
sovereignty was not going to fade away and that politically the Bourgeois were not in the
state of stagnation and apathy that the oligarchy had hoped. The attempt to override the
constitution by the government in attempting to silence the Deux Cents over a legal matter
led to a serious confrontation within the state. Thus, although the difficulties and dangers
of the seventeenth century were to make changes difficult, the various demands for
change which were made were, nonetheless, to prepare the ground for all subsequent
suggestions for change in the eighteenth century.
The Pastors and Guilds
The pastors were a source of considerable annoyance to the Magistrates and the
members of the Petit Conseil on numerous occasions in the second half of the sixteenth
and early seventeenth century. The pastors intervened where they believed Calvin's
teaching was being ignored. When called to account for their actions in front of the Petit
conseil, the pastors then took refuge behind the confidentiality that existed between a
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pastor and the individual members of his flock, and refused to elaborate.'
Although the two smaller councils were gradually able to ensure that the Conseil
General became an easily manipulable tool used only for the election of the Syndics, they
found much greater difficulties in coping with the Compagnie and its members. Theodore
Beze was chosen to succede Calvin as the senior pastor or Moderator of the church in
Geneva, in addition to the Chair he held at the Academy. Beze, unhappy at the responsi-
bility and work-load and concerned about a possible cult of personality, repeatedly asked
the Petit Conseil to allow him to retire as Moderator (1573, 1576, 1577 and 1578). This
was finally permitted in 1580.2 The subsequent introduction of a weekly rotation of
Moderator was from the government's viewpoint ideal, making it unlikely that any strong
leader would emerge.
There was continuing conflict between the pastors and the government over interest to
be paid on loans. The government, as always, was short of cash, especially to repay loans
to Basle and Bern. Some merchants in 1580 suggested the establishment of a bank in
Geneva, but this was blocked by the Consistory. The pastors feared that a bank would
bring riches to the town which would corrupt the morals of the people and weaken their
faith.
Extensive discussions between the Petit Conseil and the pastors attempted to distin-
guish between personal loans and commercial credit. The former were deemed to be
blameworthy while the latter were accepted as necessary for trade. The official rate of
interest in the city was fixed at 8.3% in 1572. 3 The government, however, attempted, after
1568, to create loans at 10% over three months via the public exchange. The pastors were
able to carry their point, and the state's rate was made the same as the officially agreed
rate. Ami Varro,4 a magistrate lending at rates between 10-15%, was convicted and forced
to pay a heavy fine, for as the pastors said: 'Quand la tete est malade, qu'en sera-t-il du
reste?'6
The church also took to task those it claimed were buying grain at low prices and
holding it until prices were high, thus forcing up the cost of bread. The pulpit was being
turned into a quasi-political force, with the pastors taking the part of the people and trying
to force the government and its members to follow the highest standards of public service.
Such actions by the pastors were increasingly necessary as the century wore on because
of the lack of any medium for the people in the city to express their views. The Conseil
General was not allowed to discuss such matters meeting after 1584, only to elect the
Syndics.
The pastors in the city were more closely in touch with the people than were the
councillors. They were aware that the people continued to murmur against some of the
practices of the government. In October 1626, a Remonstrance 6 was sent to the Petit
Conseil by the clergy on behalf of the people complaining that places in the government
had been passing to certain families which had more relatives than others, thus excluding
people of both ability and virtue. The same arguments were to be repeated in 1737. It was
See Appendix IV B III/1.
2	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 153.
Ibid., p. 155.
4	 See Appendix IV B III/2.
3	 P.E. Martin, op. ciL, 36me partie, Jaques Courvoisier, Ch. III, p. 271.
•	 This was a formal complaint on the part of the pastors to the government.
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suggested that, when elections took place in the two councils, it would be better if the
relatives of the candidates were not permitted to vote. After several discussions the
Remonstrance was rejected, the Petit Conseil declaring that:
voulaitj s'en tenir a l'edit et fuir toute nouveaute.'7
This constantly-repeated theme was to the fore in the religious celebrations of the
century of Reformation in Geneva, which were held in 1635. In a small work printed to
celebrate the anniversary, Jacob Laurent actually included the following:
'il est d'un bon citoyen de ne pas demander de changements dans l'Etat.19
The necessity to repeat and repeat the government's desire to adhere completely to the
Edicts as they were given must raise doubt as to how many others in Geneva held the
view that some changes were desirable.
Between 1564 and 1591, the sumptuary laws were revised eight times. By 1642, a
se"parate body to deal with such matters was created. The Chambre de la Reforme
consisted of a Syndic, two councillors, an auditeur (a junior official), the Procureur-Genáral
and a member of the LX. An ordinance of 1621 had already divided the people in the
republic into those of 'quality', those of 'middling condition' and those of low' condition.
The criteria on which the divisions were made were unclear, although members of the
councils were in the first category, the Bourgeois were in the second, together with the
artisans and Habitants, while the lowest category were the labourers and domestic
servants.9 Geneva was not unique in having such regulations, but the seriousness with
which they were imposed was unusual. The attempt to placate God and banish the
obvious manifestations of sin did little, however, to save the city from plague.
The plague struck Geneva in 1565 and then again from 1573 to 1578, when it never left
the city, returning in force each summer. Plague returned in 1615, 1629-1631 and in 1636-
40 . 10 Alfred Perrenoud states that in 1615 the plague began a period of decline in
Geneva, which continued until 1645:
'Onze annáes de peste, des disettes repetees interrompent le commerce, ralentis-
sent la production et entrainent un depeuplement important. 	 la population a
atteint son plus bas niveau, 12,3000 habitants, entre 1640 et 1645.'11
The recurrence of the plague, beyond the understanding of contemporaries, led to an
element of fatalism in many. For the pastors, it was the punishment of God on the people
of Geneva because of their wickedness."
There was economic decline throughout Europe, where countries like France increased
Customs duties and limited the sale of wool and linen fibre. This had serious repurcussions
on the wool and worsted (serge) trades, in Geneva and Zurich. In Geneva, the successful
Grande Boutique, founded in 1593 had ceased production in 1627. Even the linen trade of
St. Gallen encountered difficulties during the period 1620-1650. Neither was Geneva able
to benefit from the Domestic system (Verlag System) because she had no agricultural
hinterland, the lands of Savoy, France and Bern which surrounded Geneva, were all
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protectionist. Nor could the city benefit from mercenary service, the selling of soldiers to
foreign rulers as Lucerne and Schweitz."
Simaltaneously, the pastors were involved in maintaining the strictness of Calvinism in
the face of the Lutherans. Two Genevan pastors, Jean Diodati and Theodore Tronchin, 14
attended the Synod at Dordrecht during 1618. The Synod's declaration condemned those
who rejected the Calvinist teaching on predestination as heretics and established punish-
ments for those guilty of heresy. One result was the prohibition of the theatre in 1620, as
well as severe restrictions on any intellectual criticism. 15 But, by the 1660s, there was a
gradual lessening of this rigid orthodoxy. This led the Swiss Protestant cantons to agree
the Formula Consensus Ecclesiarum Helveticarum Reformararum in 1672, " dealing with
the dogma of original sin, of election (predestination) and of eternal punishment.
The introduction of the Formula was not universally welcomed in Geneva and was only
enforced in 1679 after considerable debate in the Consistoire. The Formula had been the
orthodox reaction to the increasingly rationalist approach to faith, associated especially
with the Protestant school for pastors at Saumur, France, and brought into Switzerland by
Huguenot refugees. Liberal elements, supported by some French pastors, resisted the
imposition of such a rigid statement of faith. Though less strict than the Declaration of Dor-
drecht, it was sufficiently orthodox to cause some to leave Geneva rather than accept its
principles, speaking of:
'L'inquisition de la foi [qui] fleurit tellement a Geneve, que l'on considere comme
heretique ...celui qui, lots d'entretiens prives en presence d'un seul ternoin, affirme
qu'une plus grande moderation serait souhaitable dans la fixation des regles
[theologiques]: 17
All those studying theology with the aim of becoming pastors had to sign the new
document. Bishop Burnet" was unhappy with the severity of the Formula
'but they would needs ... enter into people's consciences ... impose a test upon
them, [applicants to train as pastors] which perhaps some have signed not without
strugglings in their conscience:19
The Bishop, gives an interesting insight into the strictness of Geneva's religious leaders, as
well as their limitations, when he adds:
'Yet some that set on this test, or consent, are men of such extraordinary worth,
that I am confident they have acted in this manner out of a sincere zeal for that
which they believe to be the truth; Only I wish they had larger and freer souls.2°
Geneva abandoned the application of the Formula consensus helvetica in 1706. In part,
due to the influence of Jean-Robert Chouet, who, as Professor of Philosophy, introduced
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Cartesian philosophy into the Academy,21 with the separation of reason and faith, and
Jean-Alphonse Turrettini, Professor of Theology to accomplish for theology what Chouet
accomplished for philosophy.22
In some ways the seventeenth century was a rehearsal for the eighteenth in the city,
since disagreements concerning theology amongst the pastors were not kept private.
Pierre Bayle witnessed this when, in Geneva as a student, he noted:
'... les disputes de la Grace UniverseIle ont etrangement partage les esprits. La
division commenga par les Professeurs....Des Professeurs elle passa dans les
autres Ministres. De ceux-ci elle se repandit dans toutes les maisons de Geneve,
chacun se rangeant a l'opinion d'un tel Ministre, son parent ou son ami. Cela alla si
avant que jusques aux gens de metier se demandoient s'ils etoient pour la Grace
UniverseIle ou pour la particuliere. De-la naquirent cent factions et cent Ca-
bales,...'"
This extract gives a fascinating insight into everyday Geneva at the time. The idea that
the artisans ('Ies gens de métier) were busy discussing the question of God's Grace is an
interesting prelude to the intensity of their political discussions which were taking place
within forty years and were noted by Vallette in his book.24
Unfortunately, at this juncture, the death of the French Resident, a Genevan citizen
representing France in Geneva led France to insist upon the appointment of a Frenchman,
and catholic to the post. Thus Mass would be said within the city, for the first time in one
hundred and forty-four years. A similar problem in 1574, concerning the dispatch of troops
for the Genevan garrison from Fribourg and Soleure had faltered on the difficulty of what to
do concerning the need for the soldiers to say Mass. In 1574, though desperate for
additional soldiers, it had been impossible for Geneva to accept Catholic troops, 25 the
Compagnie objected strongly to Mass being said in Geneva.
By November 1679, Laurent de Chauvigny, the French Resident had presented his
credentials to the Petit Conseil and mass was being said in his chapel, Geneva having
accepted the appointment of a Frenchman as the French Resident, with the result:
'ces Peres [deux Jesuites] n'etaient point absolument &rangers a Geneve ... [ils]
pourraient y habiter et s'y montrer publiquement sous la qualitë d'aurnOniers du
Resident de France.'"
The unwillingness of the Compagnie to protest concerning the public saying of mass in the
city reflected the division that existed within that body at this precise moment over the
Formula consenus helvetica. It also reflected of the fact that during the seventeenth
century, it had become common for some of the sons of the patriciate to join the church:
'I'admission de Genevois de vieille souche dans la Compagnie des Pasteurs,
institution totalement frangaise du vivant de Calvin.'27
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Their attitudes were, on the whole, those of their background and began a process
whereby they ceased to be the spokesmen of the people in its dealings with the govern-
ment but moved into a position of trying to use their religious authority to bolster the
government. By the eighteenth century, to add to their difficulties, the pastors were to be
as divided as the rest of the people of Geneva.
The inability of the government to do anything other than accept a French Resident also
manifested publicly its weakness vis-à-vis the French. The city, with Savoy still a lingering
menace, could not afford to offend Louis XIV and French military power. Nonetheless,
there were a number of minor riots in Geneva, so that the government ordered that the
gates of the city should remain closed on Sunday until after midday. In this way the influx
of Catholics from outside the city was prevented from attending mass within Geneva's
walls.28 A coexistent tension for the Bourgeois was government action over the guilds.
It was only post-Reform that Geneva developed a guild structure, when the new political
structure of the state was established. This may explain the unusual position of these
guilds or corporations in the city. In Flanders, the Dutch towns like Antwerp, many of the
Imperial cities, Germany and England the guilds had extensive political rights and took an
active part in political and municipal life. Sometimes the guilds worked as a kind of
electoral college which chose from amongst its members those who would be able to
exercise municipal rights and from whose members councils, aldermen and bourgemai-
stres were elected. 29 There is nothing similar in Geneva. The guild regulations were as
strict as anywhere, but ultimately, it was the Petit Conseil which controlled the guilds with
members of the Petit Conseil sitting in the guild councils. The most telling examples are
found in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Petit Conseil would admit
to the guilds as apprentices or artisans those specifically excluded by the guild regulations
frequently against the advice of the guild itself. This was especially the case after the
watchmakers' guild excluded all but the Bourgeois from joining it (1673). From that
moment:
'Le Conseil, des lors, a sans cesse a statuer sur les requetes de natifs, d'habitants
ou d'êtrangers, qui veulent s'occuper d'horlogerie...'3°
In Geneva, unlike Zurich or Basle, it was the government which controlled the guilds, not
the guilds which provided the members of the government. In Geneva, there was to be no
competition for the government from the guilds, by encouraging guilds but bringing them
under its overall control, the government saw them as 'un instrument de contrOle sociar.31
Thus the energies of the Bourgeois came to be increasingly focused on their sole 'political'
outlet, the Conseil General.
Geneva and International Relations
The Duke of Savoy, restored to his lands in Savoy by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis
(1559), was determined to take Geneva under his control. In the hope of finding safety
2$	 P.E. Martin, op. ciL, 36me partie, Bernard Gagnebin, Ch. VII, pp. 379-380.
29	 Babel, 'Gengwe a-t-elle ête au Moyen Age une vile jurdoe?', op. ciL, p. 415.
90	 Antony Babel Histoire corporative de l'horlogerie, de l'orfévrerie et des industries annexes, Gendive: A. Jullien &
Georg & Co., (Mamoires et documents publias par la sociffitê d'histoire et d'archtiologie de Genêve), 1916, Tome
XXXIII Deuxibme thrie - Tome Treizidime, pp. 187-188, quoting cases of Isaac Dufour, Gilbert Renaud both
refugees and a Nat/f in 1705 De la Planche.
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David S. Landes L'heure gull est. Les horloges, la mesure du temps et la formation du monde modeme,Paris:
Gallimard, 1987- (Translated by Pierre-Emmanuel Dauzet & Louis Evrard), p. 302.
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from Savoy and the power of the Counter-Revolution, Geneva tried three times to join the
Swiss Confederation (1572, 1573 and 1584). The renewal of her treaty with Bern in 1584
(August) and its extension to include Zarich did little to boost Geneva's confidence. 32 The
city could not become part of Switzerland because of the treaties that the Catholic cantons,
which formed the Borromeo League in 1586, had signed with Spain in 1587, 33 in addition
to the treaties that they had already signed with Savoy in 1577 and in 1581. In these
treaties with Savoy the cantons promised to prevent any alliance between the evangelical
Confederates and Geneva, although this breached existing federal law.34 The Catholic
cantons had also agreed with Savoy not to recognise Bern's possession of the Pays de
Vaud.
In desperation, Geneva looked for help. The only possibility seemed to be, paradoxically,
in turning to France. The latter had the virtue of being an enemy of Savoy. It was clearly
not in French interests to allow Geneva to fall inio Savoy's hands. Bern had already
signed, on 8th. May 1579, the Solothurn Treaty with France and Solothum. 35 The moder-
ate policies which were at that time being followed by Henri III of France enabled the
negotiation and the signing of this treaty, whose main aim was to protect Geneva from
Savoy.
Following this lead, in April 1589, Geneva signed a treaty with France 36 which, apart
from seeking greater protection, also promised Geneva territorial gains which would end
her encirclement by Savoy. The city, by careful manoeuvering, managed to overcome the
military difficulties of the situation that faced it in the second half of the sixteenth century,
but at considerable cost. From this point onwards, Geneva had constantly to look over her
shoulder, at the attitude of the French with regard to any attempt by the city to extend its
allies. In order to survive the threat from Savoy and to counter the weakness of both Bern
and Zurich, tied as they were into the increasing weakness of the Confederation due to its
religious divisions, Geneva turned to France, the country which would eventually destroy
its independence.
In 1586, a complete blockade of the city by Savoy, raised the question of whether, for
the Calvinists, there could be any theological justification for going to war. Twice in this
period (1582 and 1588), the government asked the opinion of the Church. It responded
with a document in 1588, written by Béze and Lect, 37 arguing that a defensive war was
acceptable. Therefore on 2nd. April 1589, the Deux Cents ordered a defensive war against
Savoy. This momentous decision was in contravention of the Edicts, it was the right of the
sovereign body to declare war and peace but, of course, there had been no meetings of
the Conseil General, other than to annually elect the Syndics, since 1584.
France and the Swiss occupied the Gex region as well as Chablais and Faucigny.38
The land Geneva was promised by France, the Pays de Gex, would have given the city
territorial security and improved food supplies, especially grain. France, however, once the
territory had been taken, quickly withdrew from the area. Bern also abandoned Geneva in
32	 Ibid., p.396.
William Marlin, op. cit., p. 97.
34	 Ibid.
as	 Favet, op. cit., Martin Kamer, 4, p.405.
"	 William Marlin, op. cit., p. 97.
37	 Jacques Lect, Professor of Law at the Academy.




















































October and signed a treaty with Savoy. 39 Ultimately, Geneva found herself fighting the
war alone for three years. Hostilities calmed in 1592, and in 1594 a precarious truce was
agreed, renewable every three months.
It was a time of great difficulty for the city, which was constantly short of cash, forced to
resort to copper coinage and to levying additional taxes on both wheat and wine.43
Geneva was to lose the Pays de Gex as a result of the Treaty of Vervins, which, as far as
Geneva and Savoy were concerned, effectively re-established the situation as it had been
in 1559 at the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis.
Geneva had until 1562 been closely associated with the French Huguenots. The city had
done its best to answer the call for pastors for the many new churches in France, creating
the Academy to train them. The outbreak of the religious wars in France added to the
discomfort and dangers for Geneva. The same wars were also to bring considerable long-
term benefits to the city. The influx of Huguenots introduced watchmaking into Geneva as
well as boosting textiles in the city, while the arrival of a number of printers and booksell-
ers fostered the book trade in the city:"
The Edict of Nantes, 1598, was negotiated and agreed while France and Spain were
negotiating the Treaty of Vervins.42 The Edict marginalised the Huguenots, and created
numerous problems of interpretation because of its ambiguous text. The Huguenots had
been allowed a meagre existence. If that were the compromise offered by a King who
claimed to have sympathy for his Protestant citizens, what could Geneva expect from the
Catholics surrounding her?
The greater danger - Savoy or France?
Catholic Savoy ensured that the seventeenth century began dramatically for the city. The
Savoyards, determined to retake Geneva, came dangerously close to succeeding on the
night of 12th. December 1602, when some of their men managed to climb over the walls of
the city in an attempt to take and then open the gates to their army. The Treaty of St
Julien, which ended the war with Savoy, did little to restore confidence in Geneva with
regard to Savoy's intentions:*
The danger to Geneva lay in a coming-together of France and Savoy. The signing of the
Treaty of Suze, which ended the war between France and Savoy, meant that, by 1629,
both countries were in consultation concerning the 'problem' of Geneva. 44 France needed
Savoy to attempt to counter the power of Spain in Italy. Plans to conquer the city and
divide it between them came to nothing, because Savoy wanted to reconquer the Pays de
Vaud, which had been lost to Bern in 1564 by the Peace of Lausanne. France, aware that
the strength of its armies depended on existing treaties with the Swiss cantons, including
3.	 Accord of Nyon, 1st October 1589. Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 162.
40	 P. E. Marlin op.cit., 3gime partie, Jaques Courvoisier, Ch. III, p.276.
41	 Kamen, op. cit., p. 88.
42	 Peace of Vervins 1598 between Spain and France. Thomas Munck Seventeenth Century Europe State, Conflict
and the Social Order in Europe 1598-1700, London: Macmillan, 1990, Reprinted 1991, p. xxvii.
43	 The Treaty of Saint Julien, 1603, confirmed the existence of Geneva as a free city, theoretically within the Holy
Roman Empire, but in reality fully independent.
44	 Treaties of Cherasco, 8th. February 1631; the first created an offensive alliance between the two countries, the
second concerned the position of the fortress town of Pignerol.
49
Bern, was unwilling to find itself at war with Bern and other Swiss cantons over Savoyard
desires concerning the Pays de Vaud, especially as France needed the support of the
Swiss to resist the progress of the Swedish army in the Grisons."
The Genevans, aware of the precariousness of their position, attempted once again to
join the Swiss Confederation. The whole question of enlarging the Confederation had
become a complex matter of having to maintain the balance between the religious
protagonists, or at the least not to upset the existing balance within the Diet. It was hoped,
in 1641, that Geneva could join at the same time as the Imperial city of Constance. France
formally opposed this attempt and encouraged the Catholic cantons to vote against the
suggestion in the Diet. The Genevans had omitted to inform the French Ambassador to the
Swiss Confederation of their intention to seek this 'alliance'. For France this omission was
in contravention of the terms of the Treaty of Soleure, with which Geneva was associated.
Hence the French reaction that the approach to the Swiss Confederation had been made:
'a l'insu de Sa Majeste et contre son service.'"
It was a convenient excuse that the French were able to use to keep Geneva isolated and
therefore more amenable to French control than would have been the case if the city had
joined the Swiss.
The French veto was the first instance of what was to prove more than a century of
French manipulation and interference in Genevan affairs. The continual care that France
took to keep Geneva within her sphere of influence and control was to create an interest-
ing paradox, after 1685, when the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the serious
attempt by Louis XIV to eradicate Protestantism in his French domains was to be counter-
balanced by the French preservation of Geneva, at a time of considerable French expan-
sion in areas close to and religiously close to Geneva such as Franche-Comte or Stras-
bourg. The seizure by the French of Franche-Comte from Spain had brought French
territory much closer to Geneva, 47 and the fact that the Swiss had not gone to the aid of
Franche-Comte, even though they were allied to the area, cannot have increased Gen-
eva's feeling of security."
This was especially true after the military occupation of Strasbourg by Louis in Sep-
tember 1681, an event that went far in encouraging the belief amongst some in Geneva
that the city must do nothing whatever to upset the French King if it wished to retain its
independence and its faith. The refusal of Bern and Zurich to resist Louis' incorporation of
Strasbourg, their ally, into France heightened Geneva's fears since they were also
Geneva's allies. There emerged in the city a faction within the government and especially
the Petit Conseil which argued that Geneva's continued existence had to be based on not
upsetting the French. Such attitudes were further strengthened in 1684 by the French
attack on Genoa. Although neutral and not involved in war with France, the Genevan
government felt sure that if they bent to the French wind the state could survive, especially
if it could retain a reasonably functionning system of government. As a result, many in the
government of Geneva and many in the oligarchy were to be pro-French, leading to the
a	 William Martin, op. cit., pp.106-7. There was fighting in the Grisons for thirty years. Protestants led by the Salis
family, supported by the Franco-Venetian party, were opposed by Catholics led by the Plants family, which sided
with the Empire party. French interference under Richelieu led to further complications, with the French being used
to eject the Spanish and the Spanish being called back to remove the French.
P. E. Martin, op.cit., 3eme partie, Bernard Gagnebin, Ch. VII, p. 371.
47	 Confirmed by the Treaty of Nijmegen, 1679.
William Martin, op. cit., pp. 113-114. The Swiss had been responsible for the defence and protection of Franche-
Comte since the time of Philip II of Spain. The retaking of the area by the French in 1674 led to its final incorpora-
tion into France by the Treaty of Nijmegen 1679.
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Illustration 1
additional irony of Protestant Geneva being allied to Catholic, anti-Protestant France.
The harassment by Savoy over the territories dependent on Saint-Victor and Chapitre,
concerning the faille and questions of faith reinforced Geneva's desire to be friendly with
France. It also made clear the need to improve and extend the defences of the town 49
which continued throughout the seventeenth century, regardless of the burden it placed on
the city. Major additions to the fortifications were finally finished in 1668, 5° the garrison
was kept up to strength, and the city remained on the alert, watchful and nervous. Such
feelings were accentuated by the treatment under which the Huguenots in France were
suffering. Before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, there had been a steady stream of
refugees arriving in Geneva. With the Revocation, the stream became a flood which placed
Geneva under severe strain. This was to interact with religious uncertainties to encourage
political conflict and opposition.
Refugees and reactions
The arrival of considerable numbers of fleeing French refugees in Geneva after the
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the persecution by Savoy of the Piedmontese
Protestants coincided with a series of bad harvests, from which Geneva was suffering as
was much of the rest of Europe. The Chambre de ble, although releasing bread made from
its reserves, had been unable to bring the price of wheat down, so that bread remained
expensive. By 1698, wheat had reached 44 florins at the market, 51 and there was general
discontent at the high cost of other foods, especially wine, where it was believed that the
Nobles enforced an extremely protectionist market to benefit from the sale of wine made
from their grapes, as the only wine permitted to enter the town without paying a heavy tax
came from grapes grown by the Bourgeois. It was believed by many in Geneva that this
led the local Savoyard peasants not to sell their wheat and barley to Geneva in retaliation.
By 1697-8, there was considerable disagreement between the two councils over what, if
any, measures should be taken to deal with the difficulties over the price of grain for
bread-making and the particular rights of those Genevans who owned vineyards. It had
been suggested by Pierre Fatio 52 in the Deux Cents in 1698 that all the regulations with
regard to the sale of wine in Geneva should be reviewed. The local production of wine had
been sufficient for demand during much of the seventeenth century, 90% of wine sold in
the city coming from a region that was no greater than 15 kilometres wide around it.53
Wine was imported when there was too little available for normal needs; otherwise,
imported wine was severely restricted and taxed. In order to calm the situation, the Petit
Conseil had abolished the customs duties on French wines and suppressed some of the
restrictions on the wholesaling of foreign wine.54
The presence of the French Resident, who maintained constant pressure on Geneva
The extensiveness of the defences of Geneva can be seen in Illustration 1, p. 50a.
50	 Guichonnet, op. cit., p. 222.
51	 Jean Ferrier 'Une tentative de revolution A Geneve en 1698 (Le complot Gallatin)", Revue d'Histoire Suisse., 3,
1923, p.322.
52	 See Chapter Iv, p. 68 for the results of his suggestion.
53	 Piuz, Mottu-Weber (Eds.), op. cit., 4eme partie, Chapitre XI, p. 309. The figure relates to the year 1682.
5°	 Ferrier, op. cit., p.326.
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with regard to the presence of the refugees within the city, placed the Petit Conseil in
difficulties. The government and the people, wishing to assist as much as possible the
Huguenot refugees, could not ignore the possibility that Louis XIV might move against the
city and conquer it. This led to a series of attempts by the government to pacify the French
Resident, while trying to help the refugees. Even the pastors were expected not openly to
criticise the actions of the King, with the Petit Conseil hoping that in their sermons, they
would:
'ne rien dire en chaire qui se puisse rapporter a la personne ou a la conduite du
Roy de France, mais ... se tenir dans les termes genOraux d'adversaire et d'afflicti-
ons.
Not satisfied with that injunction, the council a few days later elaborated, telling the pastors
that they should avoid using such terms as 'tyrannie, cruaute,' and refrain from 'toute
comparaison odieuse'.56
Fear of the military might of France was confirmed when the Genevans looked to what
had happened in the United Provinces, where in 1672 the Dutch had opened their dykes to
prevent the French from taking Amsterdam. The Dutch were larger and wealthier than
Geneva, though they had been seriously weakened by the reluctance of De Witt and
Holland, the dominant force in the States-General, to spend money on an army, because
they feared it would support the Orange family rather than the aristocratic burghers who
had wrested power from the Orange party in 1652. If the United Provinces, economically
powerful and with an Empire greater than Venice's had ever been, could nearly succumb
to Louis XIV desire to make the Rhine the frontier of France, what chance would tiny,
weaker Geneva stand?
The first apparently serious move by the Genevan councils against the refugees
occurred several days before the news of the Revocation reached Geneva. All protestants
who had resided on Genevan territory for less than a year were to be expelled and
forbidden to return." At the end of 1685, the Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents decreed
that the refugees had eight days in which to leave the city, by early 1686, they were also
being forced to leave Genevan territory outside the city gates. 58 Some of the refugees
eventually continued to Brandenburg, where they had been offered a new life by the Elec-
tor. Others passed into the Pays de Vaud, where they settled, or into the other Protestant
cantons of the Swiss Confederation. But many, once ejected from Geneva, waited and
then quietly returned and about whom the government wisely did nothing. Many of the
refugees had skills that would be useful to Geneva, and unlike some Swiss cantons such
as Zurich they were not expelled. Geneva's position was difficult, especially when the
French overran Savoy, thus surrounding Geneva completely.
These difficulties, however, eased with the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in Septem-
ber 1697, where France, despite her many military victories, was forced to return con-
quests. By the late 1690s, it was becoming clear how many of the refugees had been able
to remain in the city. Although it was inevitably a small proportion of the number which
passed through Geneva, it was large with regard to the actual size of the city's population.
33 Olivier Fatio & Louise Martin-van Berchem, 'L'Eglise de Geneve et La Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes." Geneve au
Temps de la Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes 1680-1705, Geneve: Ubrairie Droz, Mémoires et Documents publies
par la Societe d'Histoire et d'Archêologie de Geneve, 1985 Tome L p. 187.
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A census taken in July 1693 showed 3,300 refugees in an urban population of 16,111.59
In 1696, there was a backlash against the continued presence of the refugees and
particularly their integration into the city's commercial activity, where restrictions against
foreigners opening shops and small businesses had been decreed throughout the
seventeenth century. In 1609 and 1630 there were Ordonnances de Police which restricted
trading by foreign merchants, and in the 1660s, there was an attempt to impose a tax or
protection on all foreign traders in the city. All of this was before the flood of refugees after
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.°
In the 1670s, there was disagreement between the Petit Conseil, which wanted the
benefits of foreign merchants trading in Geneva, and the Deux Cents, which was desirous
of protecting Genevan traders, all of whom were Bourgeois. In the 1680s, there was a
general relaxation in the restrictions to accommodate the inflow of the French refugees, at
the very moment of a decline in trade, because of the wars in Europe and a series of poor
harvests. By 1693, it was decided to reintroduce the 'protection' tax. This was insufficient,
for in 1696, a Representation signed by 215 Bourgeois was presented to the Procureur-
Genera1,61 aimed at those refugees who had managed to open shops in the city.
The petitioners denied that they were motivated by avarice or spitefulness, but that they
had been:
'déjà mis eux mernes extrèmement a l'etroit et dans de grandes incommodites et
souffrances, comme chacun le sait assez.'62
They argued that those who wanted, as an act of Christian charity, to allow the refugees to
settle and open shops were not amongst those that subsequently suffered from the in-
creased competition; it was they, the small merchants and shop keeper-artisans, who
suffered, and they made the point that:
'aucun refugie exergant une profession liberate - pasteur, avocat, medicin, apothi-
caire - n'a ete autorise A s'etablir dans la cite.'63
Indeed, the Compagnie had been very restrictive, not appointing any of the refugee
pastors to positions in the Church.
The petitioners added that Geneva was only a small town and could not continue to
have a large number of Habitants. It was this augmentation that had led to a rapid
increase in prices and the presence of people who were unwilling to accept the strict code
by which the Genevans lived and who had encouraged the spread of various immoralities
within the city. The refugees should thus be encouraged to depart and be aided to reach
such places where the rulers had invited them to settle. Equally, some method of compen-
sation would have to be found for those in Geneva who would suffer from loss of rents at
present paid by the refugees.
The Representation was not the only evidence of this strength of feeling in Geneva. One
Philippe Savyon wrote a memorandum which he thought of presenting to the commission
set up to investigate the situation as a result of the petition. Less tactful and more forthright
than the possibly more sober petitioners of the Representation, his report concluded with
Si	 Liliana Mottu-Weber, 'Marchands et Artisans du Second Refuge a Genêve', Geneve au Temps de La Revocation
de L'Edit de Nantes 1680-1705, op. cit., p.385.
a	 Ibid., p. 387.
• 	 The Procureur-Gdneral was the guardian of the law for all the citizens. He acted as a Procurator-Fiscal in Geneva.
It was also his task to represent the citizens to the government
62	 Liliane Mottu-Weber, 'Marchands et Artisans de Second Refuge a Genave', op. cit., p.383.
a	 Fatio & van Berchem, op. cit., p. 270.
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the recommendation:
n'y a donc pas de meilleur reméde que "d'escumer le pot et d'en faire sortir tout
ce qui est de nuisible dont faire un roolle [sic] par les dixaines."'"
The French Resident in a letter had little good to say of the Deux Cents members:
'des petits marchands peu &lakes et capable de prendre la mauvaise partie sans
aucune mauvaise intention, mais par imbecillite et par un faux zele pour leur
religion at pour leur liberte, qu'ils croient en grand danger sun les paroles des chefs
de la Cabale.'"
The Cabale were the group in Geneva favourable to the Prince of Orange (William III of
England) and his allies in the War of the League of Augsburg. According to d'Iberville, the
French Resident in Geneva, the Cabale had considerable popular backing but only
minority support in the government of the city. The majority within the government
remained loyal to the French alliance but was 'relativement depourvue d'assise popu- -
laire'."
The commission found that, of those merchants complained about, 22 had been granted
Bourgeois status between 1685 and 1695. In 80% of cases, the commission was in favour
of allowing the traders to continue, in 10% against continuation and in another 10% of
cases no decision was taken. 87 No one was expelled or forced to leave the city, but those
whom the commission had found to be both Habitants and shopkeepers or merchants
were from 1697 heavily taxed for the privilege. Once they were Bourgeois, they ceased to
pay the heavy taxes imposed on them for trading as Habitants. There were 28 such cases
between 1696 and 1700."
According to G.E. von Haller, Geneva underwent a dramatic change as a result of the
French Huguenot settlement:
'En 1687, elle sentoit sa ville de campagne 	 La sortie des reformez de France, la
guerre de 1688 qui porta le commerce a Geneve, en ont fait pour ainsi dire une
nouvelle ville. 	  Les richesses que produit ordinairement un commerce florissant,
ont contribue a faire abattre la plupart des maisons pour en eleven d'autres
regnent le bon goOt et l'agrement que donne la belle architecture 	 '69
But it was not just the new artisanal skills that the French brought to Geneva. They had
never in their homeland been strictly regulated by such matters as sumptuary laws and
had been scattered communities living amongst other French but Catholic citizens. They
were far more independently-minded than many of their more naïve Genevan brothers.
They were not accustomed to the closed community that was the old Geneva. The fresh
breeze which they created swept through the city, the government and Church, bringing
with it the potential for considerable change. The strategy of the government had been to
permit no change to the existing system, which was, by the turn of the century, already
clearly out of date.
The first wave of religious refugees to Geneva, in the period 1550-1570, had quickly
managed to move into the two smaller councils, especially the children of the first genera-
44	 Lillian° Mottu-Weber Geneve au Temps de la Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes 1680-1705, op. cit., p. 385.
Fatio & van Berchem, op. cit., p.215. Letter to Croissy 17. 2. 1696.
N	 Ibid., p. 254.




tion. By 1604, 3 of the 8 elected members of the Petit Conseil were descended from the
first immigration. There were 10 more sitting as members of the LX and 67 out of the
remaining 138 sitting in the Deux Cents. 7° Several families provided Syndics, de Nor-
mandie 8 times in 1683-1716, Sarasin twice between 1694 and 1698. 7' How far the 'old'
refugee families were in favour of giving as much assistance as possible to the new wave
of immigrants is impossible to say. The virulence of the dislike of the new wave of French
refugees found amongst the Bourgeois small traders may have been increased by fears
surrounding their awareness that this new group of refugees might be able to emulate their
ex-fellow countrymen who had arrived in the first wave in the 1550's and who composed a
sizeable part of the oligarchy ruling the town. If this were to be the case, then those of the
'old' Genevan Bourgeois would be pushed even further from obtaining seats on the Deux
Cents or any kind of government position. The city certainly benefited from the refugees as
far as future trade, skills and wealth were concerned, but they also gave an unconscious
boost to the desire for change within the state, a desire that was to make Geneva
surprisingly unsettled at the political level throughout the coming century.
The arrival of considerable number of French Protestant refugees after 1685, though
posing some strain on the city brought further skills which enabled the city to expand its
skilled base and flourish through most of the eighteenth century. French power had not
been used against the city as it had against Strasbourg, so that despite all its difficulties
and dangers, Geneva had managed to survive, like a number of other old republics -
Genoa, Venice, Lucca and San Marino. Regardless of the many differences between them,
all these republics bordered powerful neighbours which were absolutist states and had
tried hard to incorporate these tiny non-monarchies into their Kingdoms. Genoa was as
much under threat from Savoy as Geneva had been a century earlier and survived in part,
just as Geneva had, because of the protection of a powerful ally, Spain. In surviving, these
republics kept alight the flame of republicanism as an alternative to monarchy. Although
different in religion and constitutional forms, many of these republics, as Geneva, attempt-
ed to remain neutral in the quarrels of their powerful neighbours, seeking solace for their
military weakness in concentrating on commerce and finance. 72 Most laboured under
constitutions which seemed singularly inept and inadequate for the contemporary world,
especially the United Provinces, where the Union of Utrecht (1578), established in war,
seemed unstable, with sovereignty in the seven local estates, and no apparent authority for
coherent policy. The refugees found the Bourgeois in Geneva unhappy with their loss of
rights, which had already caused difficulty for the patriciate and government.
The emergence of criticism
As far back as 1577, an anonymous placard had appeared which had criticized the
ambition of a Syndic called Roset,73 and the behaviour of Bernard, another member of
the government. Some three hundred and fifty Bourgeois were associated with the
complaints:
'Celui qui krit ces choses craint Dieu et honore l'estat de la ville avec 350 homm-
70	 Guichonnet, op. cit., pp. 181-2.
7,	 Amedee Roget, 'Les Syndics', op. cit., p. 26.
Franco Venturi Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 21-23.
7°	 See Appendix IV B III/7.
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es desquels le coeur souscrit au present billet. Pensez-y.'74
The placard complained about the manner in which the Syndics were elected and that it
was always the same people chosen, that such a procedure was valueless and:
'tend a edger une principaute opposee a l'etat populaire.'75
The placard was headed Pro Libertate and had been put up on the Cathedral wall. Hard
though the Petit Conseil tried to discover the author or authors of this tract, they were
unsuccessful. Taken together with the difficulty that the government had getting people to
vote in the Conseil General, it clearly suggests that there were a considerable number of
Bourgeois in the city who were unhappy at the political control exercised by the Petit Con-
seil at the expense of the Conseil General. In 1570, it had been necessary to order the
doors of the Cathedral closed until the end of the meetings of the Conseil General in order
to stop people leaving and not voting, 76 the refusal to vote being the only resistance left
to the Bourgeois and an action that they were to repeat on a number of occasions in the
eighteenth century.
The placard incident was followed within a year by the more serious attempt by a
member of the Deux Cents Jacques Boutilier to introduce reform?' He needed persis-
tence to overcome the reluctance of the Syndics and then the Petit Conseil to obtain a
hearing of his ideas in the Deux Cents. In the introduction to his written suggestions, he
includes phrases such as '[Geneve] constituee en etat de democratie comme celle-ci' and
concludes his opening paragraph:
'il est besoing de dire franchement et hardiment son advis pour le public.'
His first demand was the rescinding of the prohibition imposed on the Conseil General,
preventing it from discussing matters other than those sent to it by the Deux Cents, thus
overturning one of the basic tenets of the 1543 constitution. The second was the demand
for a change in the system of voting at the meetings of the Conseil General; at this time,
voting was carried out by speaking the name of the candidates being voted for in the ear
of one of the two secretaries, who then made a stroke on paper against the names
spoken. This was done in the Cathedral in full view of everyone, and some of those
present, though unable to hear the votes being cast, could certainly see the marks made
by the secretaries and would therefore know who had voted for whom. Boutilier wanted a
ballot, thus ensuring genuine anonymity of voting. He demanded when any post was being
filled, there should be at least two candidates to choose from, which was not the case for
the elected officers of the state. Only in the choice of Syndics was there any element of
choice. He concludes this point:
'Davantage tel ballotement estant bien entendu et practique ceans au gre du
peuple sera pour fermer la bouche a ces compositeurs de cartels, semeurs de
placards, et a ces escrivains de lettres diffamatoires.'79
There were echoes of Boutilier's demands in those put forward by Fatio and his
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followers in 1707, one hundred and twenty-nine years later." The constancy of the
Bourgeois' demands in Geneva is one of the most interesting, but overlooked, aspects of
the city's history. It also clearly indicates that the ideas put forward concerning the
government and the way that it worked in the eighteenth century were not new and
'revolutionary', but had been present in the state for well over a hundred years, certainly
since 1578.81
Boutilier also wanted the addition of 10-12 'silent' councillors in the Petit Conseil, who
would sit in all meetings but be unable to speak or vote, but who could then be sent on
difficult diplomatic missions abroad, fully informed of the situation with which they were
expected to deal. It would also widen the number of people in office and, more importantly
widen the choice for office:
'cela servira que vous ne serez plus ainsi sujets a si souvent remettre les mesmes
personnages doff ice, sans intermission, comme s'il n'y en avait point d'autres aussi
ou plus capables d'entre tous les autres citoyens et qui plus est, il n'y aurait tant de
mescontentemens, d'envies ni murmures, si point il y en a...'"
Once again, Boutilier made a point that was to cause constant complaint in the eigh-
teenth century: it was always the same people in office. They rotated their various tasks,
but there was very little chance for anyone outside the patriciate to join the Deux Cents let
alone the Petit ConseiL Boutilier was here complaining against:
'the possession of government, or any public power, by any established, privileged,
closed, or self-perpetuating groups of men.'83
This is much earlier than the eighteenth century about which Palmer is writing. It makes it
clear that the future difficulties in Geneva in the eighteenth century, such as the hold of
oligarchy on power had been recognised and were resented as early as 1578. The
existence of such an oligarchy in Geneva was responsible for denying what rights
remained to the Conseil General, except those of electing government officials.
Two further points concerned the improvement of justice. One argued that the supreme
courts should be made up half of members of the Petit Conseil and half from the Deux
Cents, because, as the latter had the right of grace, they needed people experienced in
court practice. The second called for a greater ability on the part of justice to act without
delay in criminal cases. Finally, he wanted to ensure that the rights of the Bourgeois were
regularly and correctly observed, especially with regard to primogeniture and prece-
dence.84
The insistence of the Deux Cents that the matter should be considered finally forced the
hand of the Petit ConseiL They consulted Baze and Perrot," both pastors, and Colladon,
a lawyer. A reply was drawn up by the Lieutenant, Michel Roset, the Syndics and several
councillors. At a meeting of the Deux Cents on 23rd. January 1578, both Boutilier's text
and the Petit Conseits response were presented and discussed. The rejection of Boutilier's
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document in its entirety was justified in part by recourse to Xenophon, who states that 'tout
changement en une republique l'expose au danger de la mort'. It was argued that, if the
ideas of Boutilier were introduced, there would be no need for the LX, the Deux Cents or
the Petit Conseil mais U faudroit que le Conseil General eat l'administration de toutes les
affaires', followed by:
'D'ailleurs jamais homme prudent n'approuva une pure dernocratie, c'est-a-dire un
gouvemement du tout attribue a la multitude populaire, puisque jamais ii n'y en a
eu de telle nature qui alt este de longue duree. Et la raison est evidente a savoir
qu'il y a par necessite dans une grande multitude plus de personnes mal propres a
manier un Estat que d'autres.' 88
The term 'pure democracy' was one that was used frequently by all those opposed to
any changes in the existing constitution of Geneva from this point onwards. The word
'democracy' continued to be used as a term of considerable disapprouval whenever there
was any suggestion of lessening the hold of the oligarchy on power. In the Geneva
context, Palmer's claim that 'democracy' at this time replaced the use of words such as
'radical, liberal and progressive' certainly appears to be the case. 87 It had more relevance
in 1578, when a greater proportion of the population were members of the Conseil General
than it would have in the greater part of the eighteenth century, when the Bourgeois were
a very small part of the total population of the city. For those determined to allow no
change in the constitution of Geneva the term 'pure democracy' became the rallying cry to
come to the aid of the state, to defend it against the uncontrolled hordes about to devour
it.
The Deux Cents also rejected Boutilier's suggestions and made him promise that he
would continue to attend meetings of the Council on pain of being fined 1,000 ecus if he
disobeyed. Unfortunately, he seems to have either before or after the reOctiorz, gblerz
copies of his paper to too many people. Arrested in April, he was brought before the Petit
Conseil, where he was forced to confess his 'fault' after which he was allowed to go free,
although he ceased to be a member of the Deux Cents. All matters which were discussed
in the two smaller councils had to remain secret. It is unclear whether the treatment given
to Boutilier was because his ideas were too generally known or whether he was being
punished for the temerity of his suggestions together with his insistence that the whole
matter be aired in the Deux Cents. That he had support among the Bourgeois is proved by
the fact that three years later he was voted to the office of Auditeur by the Conseil
General., this meant that he also returned to the Deux Cents.88
The Boutilier affair has very important implications for Geneva in the seventeenth and
the eighteenth centuries. Many of the points he highlighted in his suggestions were to
recur again and again, well before the Enlightenment. In other words, well before Fatio, the
writer of Lettres seditieuses88 or Rousseau, 8° Boutilier had identified some of the main
structural difficulties of the Calvinist 'constitution' of Geneva. At the same time, he had
provoked a reaction from the authorities which was to be mirrored in the coming two centu-
ries, with greater or lesser violence, depending upon how threatened they perceived their
hold on power to be.
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Unfortunately, for the oligarchy, Boutilier's ideas were shared by others in the city,
perhaps encouraged by the manner in which the smaller councils continued to ignore the
Conseil General except for the necessary elections. Thus, in 1604, the Petit Conseil
accused Abraham de Combe of having spread throughout the town a text:
'tendant a donner l'autorite souveraine de toutes choses au Conseil GenOral.'91
Combe, having confessed his crime - daring to criticise the government and its treatment
of the rights of the Conseil General - was sentenced to three days' imprisonment and
deprived of his right to take part in the Conseil General. The words used by Combe were:
'15ailler l'authorite souveraine de toutes choses au Conseil gáneral.'92
In Geneva in 1604, there were some members of the Bourgeois who were raising the
question of the sovereignty of the Conseil General, and who had the courage to do so
publicly. This gives a clearer picture of the strength of feeling in the city. The demands that
the Conseil General should have sovereign power were not novel to the eighteenth
century; Combe's demand was 101 years before Fatio's. The idea was deeply embedded
in the Genevan Bourgeois as de Combe's text shows. It was over the case of Combe that
the pastors, when pleading for leniency for him, had pointed out to the Petit Conseil that
oligarchy could be as dangerous as ochlocracy. 93 It was a warning that the government
and oligarchy94 were to ignore throughout the coming century.
There had been some talk in the town concerning the need to re-establish 'la liberta et
l'authorita du peuple' as well as the opportunity to be appointed to government posts
without having to be a member of the Deux Cents.95 But it was not the time to spend a
great deal of energy on internal quarrels because of the external threat to Geneva. A
combination of military dangers, plague and poor harvests were to mute the objections to
the political situation in the city until after 1660. However, the battle lines were clear and
had not changed since Boutilier, there was a desire in some quarters to see the Conseil
General returned to the position it had enjoyed before 1543. It was also becoming clear
that the members of the two smaller councils were developing into a self-perpetuating
group, hence the talk about government positions being available to those outside the
Deux Cents. The Bourgeois in Geneva had no desire to allow the development of an
entrenched oligarchy and had at hand an organ that might be able to stem the power of
the ruling families if it could be re-established in its original position in the commune.
The development of the oligarchy in Geneva had been rapid. This was in part due to the
circumstances of the city: restricted within its walls, without much land, isolated and
surrounded by enemies, both religious and military, it was under constant threat. The
necessity for men of substance to have sufficient time to spend on government business
reinforced this trend to oligarchy, since by the seventeenth century the Petit Conseil met
every day and by mid-seventeenth century the Deux Cents met once a week. For many of
the ordinary Bourgeois the necessity to work made it increasingly difficult for them to
participate in government. A further reinforcement of oligarchical development in the city
III	 Amódêe Roget, 'Le Conseil Gèneral', op cit., p. 133.
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rim
was the teaching of Calvinism." Group identity was strengthened by intermarriage be-
tween the families which had places in the two smaller councils. 97 The development of
oligarchy in Geneva was in line with what was happening throughout much of Switzerland
at the same time." The success of the towns in the United Provinces in the seventeenth
century was another example of the successful development of oligarchy, though many of
the towns in Holland were wealthier than Geneva, the Dutch being in the middle of the
seventeenth century at the peak of their economic success, pioneering ideas which led to
their creation of a national bank, the stock exchange and the chartered company.
The United Provinces differed from Geneva in a number of important ways. Calvinism
was in a privileged position with all public offices filled by Calvinists, but other religions
were tolerated. It was the Jewish refugees from Portugal that created the diamond industry
in Amsterdam and men like Pereira of Amsterdam, a Portuguese Jew, was a financier to
William III. Jews were not permitted to enter Geneva. Tolerance extended also to Catholics
and all manner of refugees. It was to Holland that Peter Bayle went, not to Geneva, which
he knew from his student days, while Jean Le Clerc went to Amsterdam to escape from
religious intolerance in Geneva." Thus the United Provinces became the centre of a
flourishing printing industry of books, pamphlets and journals, many in French to be
exported to France and the rest of Europe, and reinvigerated by the Huguenots in the
1680s: 'the newswriter's job was a refugee job par excellence'.'"
The successful move to an entrenched oligarchy, in Geneva as elsewhere, led to
increasing conflict when a proportion of the Bourgeois in the city were themselves
successful, educated and wealthy, and saw no reason for their virtual exclusion from all
political matters. The attempt by the Petit Conseil to weaken the Deux Cents, in 1667, was
to show the strength of feeling of those 'excluded'.
Divisions within the oligarchy?
In 1667, Geneva found itself embroiled in a serious internal political row at the same
time as it was in danger of war with Savoy. The Petit Conseil attempted to override one of
the constitutional rights of the Deux Cents as it had previously managed to do with the
Conseil Genaral, by refusing to call any meetings except for the election of officials and
Syndics. The subsequent division between the two councils provided the Bourgeois with
opportunity to manifest their anger by supporting the Deux Cents and its fight to retain its
rights. At a meeting of the Deux Cents, the Premier Syndic presiding at the meeting was
opposed to the hearing of an appeal by a member of the Deux Cents called Ducom-
mu n101
concerning the application of an Edict from the Parlement de Grenoble with regard to a
civilian matter. The rejection of an appeal to the Petit Conseil could be reviewed in the
.•	 See Chapter II, pp. 15-17.
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Deux Cents before action was taken. The refusal of the Syndic to allow any discussion,
together with the fact that he considered the matter closed, caused great anger in the
Deux Cents. 102 The members of the Petit Conseil then withdrew from the Deux Cents,
which meant that the larger council also ceased to function. However, Ducommun
persisted in his appeal to be heard so the Deux Cents decided to hear the case.
Sarasin the longest-serving junior official of the government in the Deux Cents chaired
the meeting. The first Syndic warned the Deux Cents that they were acting illegally and
declared whatever was decided would be treated by the government as null and void. At a
meeting of the Petit Conseil called for the following morning, Sarasin was summoned:
'pour rendre raison de ce qui se passa le jour d'hier au Magnifique Conseil des
Deux Cents sur le sujet de la requete du Sieur Ducommun."°3
The attempt by the Petit Conseil to question Sarasin only led to an exchange concerning
the question of to whom he considered himself responsible. He considered that it was not
for the Petit Conseil to question him or ask him for any explanation of his behaviour:
'et en persistant a reconnetre V[os] S[eigneuries] pour mes magistrats, je persiste
aussi a leur dire que je ne suis comptable qu'a mes magistrats souverains [le
Conseil des Deux Cents], en tete desquels quand V.S. seront, ainsi qu'elles en
sont la premiere partie sans etre les maitres, alors j'aurai l'honneur de leur repon-
dre article par article sur tout ce dont elles pretendent m'interroger."4
It was decided to hold him in prison, but the compactness of Geneva made it impossible to
do this without its rapidly becoming known. The Procureur-General Lullin, with around 120
members of the Deux Cents, quickly arrived at the Town Hall, where the Petit Conseil and
demanded an audience with the Petit Conseil concerning the imprisonment of Sarasin.
The arrogant and delayed response made to Lullin's demand, together with the Petit
Conseils refusal to release Sarasin, provoked the Deux Cents to remain where they were,
thus forcing the Petit Conseil to stay in their chamber. The Syndic responsible for the
security of the city was allowed to leave the Petit Conseil to change the guard on the gates
and to supervise their closure as normal. Unfortunately, instead of doing so, he kept them
at the Town Hall, thus leading the Bourgeois to become involved, because they feared that
there was some plot to betray the city to the enemy.
An attempt by the pastors to negotiate a settlement between the two councils was
unsuccessful. The pastors' suggestion to the Petit Conseil that it release Sarasin into their
control also failed. The Petit Conseil would only agree if the Deux Cents were to cease
their 'illegal' meeting, which they in turn refused to do until Sarasin was released. At
eleven at night, the Deux Cents agreed to meet at seven the following morning, a Sunday:
'avec l'epee au côte pour marque d'autorite, afin d'aller de le au preche de St.
Pierre prier Dieu du plus profond de nos coeurs, de vouloir bien benir nos delibera-
tions tendantes a conserver l'autorite SOUVERAINE [sic] du Conseil des Deux
Cents et faire rester apres le preche tout ce qui s'y trouverait de bourgeoisie
assemblee, et leur justifier notre conduite....et, sur le rásultat de leur assentiment,
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prendre telle resolution que l'on trouverait convenable:105
After the service, the Petit Conseil returned to its meeting place in the Town Hall, while
the Deux Cents remained in the Cathedral, where the crowd grew ever larger, double what
it was for the yearly elections, according to one eye-witness. w° The small committee of
pastors chosen to act as intermediaries went to see Sarasin in his prison cell, where they
persuaded him to sign a request for clemency to the Petit Conseil. After three attempts at
composition, the council was willing to accept it. In the Cathedral, Lullin addressed the
Bourgeois on the affair to date, rather too successfully, as they wanted to rush, armed, to
release Sarasin from prison.
The support of the Bourgeois for the Deux Cents made it clear to the Petit Conseil that it
was necessary to end the confrontation before there was bloodshed. Only when it was
clear that the government had few supporters amongst the Bourgeois, would they agree to
release Sarasin into the care of the four pastors, who then conductcd him home.107
Passing the entrance of St. Peter's, Sarasin was seized by the crowd, taken into the
cathedral and made to sit in his habitual place. After prayers and the congratulations of all
present, Sarasin was allowed to go home and the gathering peaceably dispersed. A
meeting of the Deux Cents was ordered for the following Friday, where, after explanations
from both councils and the exhortations of the pastors to work in peace and harmony, the
affair ended. It was agreed between the two councils that the Registres of the councils
were to refer to the whole matter in only the most impersonal terms. Since these were
written some time after the meetings to which they related, this proved no difficulty, and
the entry for the Saturday reads:
ne s'est rien traite concernant le public, sinon de ce qui se passa hier en Deux-
Centex'
The meeting of the Petit Conseil on the Sunday following the service at the cathedral is not
mentioned at all. The Registers, carefully kept throughout the period of Geneva's indepen-
dence, were always open to this kind of manipulation. It makes them less than totally
reliable as a complete reflection of what was happening in the city, especially with regard
to events which did not necessarily cast a favourable light on the proceedings of the
councils or their claims to powers which they did not possess under the Edicts.
The Sarasin affair was important because the Deux-Cents were willing to go to the
lengths of 'consulting' and winning over to their side the Bourgeois of Geneva. The
members of the Deux-Cents theoretically had more in common with those who sat in the
Petit Conseil than with the greater number ol Bourgeois who sat in the Conseg Gènéral.
What the Bourgeois grasped is that the Syndics and the members of the Petit Consedhad
acted in an extremely arrogant and high-handed fashion. In a state where so much of life
was strictly controlled by the state, where 'on tracasse, on poursuit, on surveille', 1 °9 any
attempt to flout the power of the Syndics and the Petit Conseil while under the protection
of another part of the government was bound to find sympathy and support. In addition,
there was the existing resentment at the increasingly aristocratic nature of the whole
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with the constant repetition of the claim that nothing should be changed in the system. It
was unfortunate to insist that nothing must be changed in the state, that all had to be
governed by the existing Edicts, when clearly, the Syndics and the Petit Conseil were
themselves not abiding by the terms of the very Edicts they repeatedly mentioned. As Fazy
claims, the events had given:
'au peuple une premiere occasion de mesurer sa force ... il se prononga sans
hesiter contre le Petit Conseil, qui personnifiait a ses yeux le despotisme aristocrati-
que.,lio
The Bourgeois seized the opportunity to manifest their anger toward the government and
demonstrated that in the face of such action the government could be forced to back
down. It was a lesson that the Bourgeois did not forget as events after 1700 were to show.
The government and oligarchy also understood that, should there be further trouble, they
would have to have some means of intimidating their people. This was a lesson they were
to put to good use in 1707.
Relations between the two smaller councils returned to normal and all appeared calm in
the city, struggling to cope with the influx of refugees from France. But during the wine
harvest of 1698, the sole remaining Syndic,'" Jacques Pictet, was informed of the
existence of a plot to overthrow the government. The plotters, according to the informer,
were a group who:
'sous pretexte de faire retablir les privileges des citoyens et bourgeois, se devaient
attrouper .... et "forcer le magistrat a faire ce qu'ils voudraient"."1
The leader of this plot was alleged to be Jean-Antoine Gallatin, a member of the LX and
Deux Cents and of a family which had for many years been one of the leading families in
Geneva.113 Further investigation established that there were three in the plot, apart from
Gallatin himself.'" There was little real evidence against the men except their confes-
sions of talk about an attempt at overthrowing the government, possibly with the help of
some Swiss troops. The one recurring theme in the evidence of the men was that the main
motivating force of the arguments used to gain support amongst the Bourgeois was, as
stated by Bartholoni in his evidence to the Petit Conseil, quoting Gallatin talking to other
Bourgeois:
'enfin nous mettrons les choses sur l'ancien pied et nous aurons nos vieux privi-
leges.'115
Clearly, there was a well-developed idea of 'the old times', when the ordinary Bourgeois
had had a much greater share in govemmeht. People stme we% alialso tws old %)%s‘oll oil
the Consefl General and cognisant of the fact that their rights as citizens in the state had
been systematically overridden for a century.
The reaction of the Petit Conseil was harsh. It sentenced Gallatin to perpetual imprison-
ment, loss of his Bourgeois status, the confiscation of all his possessions to the benefit of
the state, and the need to beg the Council's forgiveness. Bartholoni was condemned to
perpetual banishment, Chevaux to a year's banishment and Arlaud to be severely cen-
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sured. Bartholoni's sentence was never carried out.116
Geneva, at the end of the seventeenth century, thus faced considerable problems. The
question of the rights of the Conseil General was one around which disagreements and
arguments raged. Argument over the rights of the Conseil General that were to be carried
forward into the coming century, assuming ever greater importance. These rights were an
integral part of the constitution which the government and those in it had hoped would fade
and be forgotten If not used. The treatment of Gallatin in 1698 compared with Combe and
Boutilier made it clear that the ruling elite was increasingly unhappy about talk concerning
the 'old' times and the rights of the Bourgeois.
The danger of attempting to by-pass the Conseil General had already been recognised
in 1578, with the proposals of Boutilier. The apparent success of the government in not
calling meetings of the Conseil General for any purpose other than the election of the
Syndics after 1586 was questionable, since, although the Sarasin affair was not one
initially concerned with Bourgeois rights, the latter were happy to grasp the opportunity to
support members of the Deux Cents when they were in conflict with the government and
the Petit Conseil. The high-handed manner in which the government and the Petit Conseil
had acted towards the Deux Cents and what its members understood to be the rights of
their own council was symbolic of the way the government and the members of the Petit
Conseil had habitually acted towards the Bourgeois as a whole.
There was also the danger that the Petit Conseil and the Syndics might well wish to
emasculate the Deux Cents in exactly the manner that they had overturned the rights of
the Conseil General. The inability of the Petit Conseil to override the Deux Cents made
clear the limits of the Petit Conseil's powers. The rapidity with which the Bourgeois had
supported the rights of the Deux Cents and the fact that the Petit Conseil had been forced
to back down in the face of such opposition gave a clear indication to the Bourgeois as to
how they should proceed to right their long-standing grievances concerning the rights of
the Conseil General. The eighteenth century was to see the results of the lessons of 1667.
Equally, the patriciate had seen the dangers of their own divisions and how the Bourgeois
would be quick to take advantage. Such major divisions between the two councils were
never seen again until 1779.117
The early success the oligarchy had had in emasculating the pastors with the weekly
rotation of their leadership and then 'capturing' that body by sending their younger sons
into the church was an indication of their desire to remove all possible opposition. The
reaction provoked by Gallatin from the government with his talk about restoring the rights
of the Conseil General in 1698 showed how anxious the government and the members of
the two smaller councils were about their long-term attempt to pervert the constitution. It
also showed that anyone wishing to cause trouble in the state and obtain support was
aware of the feelings of the Bourgeois, and could be certain of a response.
On balance, however, Geneva, with a constitution established by Edict in 1543, based
on the Franchises was in a better position to face the coming century than other republics
such as the Venice or Lucca, unless the real inheritance of the Calvinist constitution was
examined. The refusal of the Bourgeois to accept the neutering of the Conseil General and
what they considered to be their rights within the state together with the consistency of








The Consolidation of Challenges in the Early
Eighteenth Century
The last years of the previous century had not been entirely happy ones for Geneva. The
city, in 1700, appeared safer from external enemies than it had at the beginning of the
seventeenth century. Despite this, the first twenty years of the century were to see consid-
erable unrest in Geneva with the consolidation of serious opposition from the Bourgeois,
well-organised and determined, this caused considerable concern to the government. The
events of 1700-1720 show that the Bourgeois were able to successfully organise and
extract important concessions from the government. The execution of the Bourgeois'
leaders and subsequent suppression was unable to end the Bourgeois aspirations.
The desire to see the Conseil General regain its lost importance led to concerted action
by the Bourgeois. The rejection of a petition by the government led to large open-air
meetings in the depth of winter. Arranged in less than twenty-four hours and held in calm
these indicated considerable orgainsation. The concessions gained of quinquennial
meetings of the Conseil General to discuss matters in the state was an important gain. It
was the first of a number of concessions that were to be gained by the Bourgeois during
the course of the century, well before the 'positive impression of 1768' claimed by
Palmer.'
So important was the gain made by the Bourgeois that the oligarchy was reduced to
linguistic sophistry in attempting, successfully, to deprive the Bourgeois of their advance at
the earliest opportunity. Followed as this action was by the imposition of taxation for a
large programme of fortification extension served only to increase the anger and determi-
nation of the Bourgeois. The emergence of two letters the Lettres seditieuses in 1718
served notice that the question of the sovereignty of the Conseil General and all that
flowed from it was firmly, whatever the oligarchy and the government hoped, on the
political agenda. The suppression of the letters simply drove the Bourgeois to be extremely
careful in their continuing organisation, via meetings in private homes and through the two
societies societe de l'arquebuse and sociate du canon. th tact, the Lettres sedittieuses %%le
seminal, laying down the arguments concerning sovereignty from the Bourgeois side for
the remained of the century, pre-dating and influencing Rousseau.
Geneva as seen by visitors
Geneva was, according to Andre Le Mercier in a book was published in Boston, Massa-
chusetts in 1732,
'la plus forte place militaire de la Suisse, la forteresse du protestantisme latin et
l'une des premieres villes d'affaires de l'Europe. On voit a Geneve tine chose qui
ne se voit nulle part ailleurs: une place forte possedant aussi du commerce et de
l'instruction.'2
Another French writer gave a further and most interesting view of what Geneva was like:
Palmer, op. cit., p. 112.
2
	
Mercier, Geneve du commencement du dix-huitieme siècle, is cited by Andre Corbaz, Pierre Fatio Precurseur et
Martyr de la Democratie Genevoise 1662-1707, Geneve: Editions Atar, 1923 p.21.
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'Les horlogers de Geneve discutent a perdre haleine sur les affaires de l'Etat et sur
celles du monde entier. us causent le jour dans leur atelier, a la nuit tombante sur
le bas de la place de Coutence 3 autour de la fontaine 00 us se rassemblent
chaque soir.... La on raisonne, on dispute avec ce singulier mélange d'ardeur
passionnee dans la conviction et de froideur logicienne dans l'argumentation, qui
est un des traits les plus saillants de l'esprit genevois.'4
The men described by Vallette 5 were skilled artisans, many of whom were Bourgeois and
thus entitled to vote in the Conseil General. These were the men whom Gallatin had hoped
to attract to his cause, and they were only too aware of how little real power they pos-
sessed within the state. It also gives an indication of the difficulty that faced the Petit
Conseil and the Deux Cents in governing the state. It would be exceedingly difficult to
prevent people from talking and discussing around the fountains or anywhere that people
gathered. It also shows how politically conscious people were in the city and clearly, not all
those involved in the discussions around the fountains were Bourgeois. In the confines of
Geneva, many Natifs would draw water from the same wells quite apart from those Natifs
who worked alongside Bourgeois in the watch and jewellery trades. It is difficult to see
Geneva fitting easily into Palmer's claim that:
'the mass of the population, perhaps the bottom three-quarters of society, was
politically apathetic •••18
Vallette is also very informative concerning the oligarchical tendencies in Geneva:
'Cette aristocratie elective tendait de plus en plus a se transformer en une aristocr-
atie hereditaire. Une vague noblesse s'etait formee, accessible seulement a ceux
dont les ;Ares avaient siege dans les Conseils.17
The system was by the 1700s a closed one. The word 'elective' is technically correct, the
members of the Deux Cents were chosen by the Petit Conseil, while the members of the
Petit Conseil were elected by the Deux Cents. Vacancies on the Deux Cents were always
filled by members of families already serving on either of the smaller councils. The
chances of any of the 'ordinary' Bourgeois being elected to the Deux Cents were infinitesi-
mal. In effect, except for the election of the Syndics and even here all eight names
submitted came from the Petit Conseil, the Deux Cents appeared to have replaced the
Conseil General. That was the case in many Swiss and similar city states. In Bern and
Zurich, to name but two, the equivalent of the Genevan Conseil General had ceased to
exist, sovereignty passing to the Great Council, the equivalent of the Genevan Deux
Cents.° Possibly in Geneva, the Conseil General had been maintained because, as Fazy
states:
'Le Conseil General, autrefois souverain, ne conserve plus que l'ombre de ses
3	 This was in the heart of the St Gervais area of the city, across the Rhane from the old town centred around the
cathedral of St. Pierre. St Gervais was 'le foyer et la boutique de la classe artisanale, cells des metres,
compagnons of apprentis... Patrick O'Mara, -L'affaire des lettres anonymes of l'agitation politique A Saint-Gervais
en 1718." Bulletin de la Societe d'Histoire et d'Archdologie de Geneve, Tome X 1951-55. [Hereafter L'affaire des
lefties anonymes1
4	 Ibid., p. 30.
Identified by Corbaz as the writer. [Valletta seems to be without any traceable details.]
Palmer, op. cit., P. 365.
7	 Corbaz, op. cit., p. 102.
.	 Oechsli, op. cit., pp. 262-277.
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anciennes attributions.' 9
The eighteenth century saw an increase in the importance of the Petit Conseil, which
was in effect the government of the state. This trend was the same in the other city states
in Switzerland, many of which went through periods of restlessness in the years 1680 to
1720 at the same time as Geneva." There were also important differences." As can be
seen by the summary of complaints which caused unrest in Basle and Zurich shown in
diagram 4, in Geneva, there were no accusations of perjury or of illicit enrichment, and
there were no guilds involved in the political processes in Geneva. The Bourgeois in
Geneva had organised themselves to obtain what they believed to be the neglected rights
of the Conseil General. In contrast with Zurich, Geneva had no military organisation except
the Militia and equally, there was no loyalty to guilds to create reaction from members
when the guilds rights were seen to be overruled or ignored by the government. In cities
such as Schaffhausen in 1689, Basle in 1691 and Zurich in 1713, the guilds were deter-
mined to maintain their rights on the cities' councils. Unable to wrest all power from
members of the commercial oligarchy, the guilds representatives nonetheless had an
appreciable number of seats on the ruling councils, at the heart of government. In Geneva,
the corporations were strictly under the control of the government. It was only later that
the cities such as Bern (1749), Fribourg, Soleure and Lucerne (1764-1770), where the
oligarchy was able to grow rich by service to the state, by military service or by living from
investments, that conflicts between those excluded from, but theoretically entitled to
participate in power, and the oligarchy manifested itself. Geneva was different because the
ability to obtain relative wealth was not restricted to the small number of families which
were part of the government. All the Bourgeois were able to trade, some Natifs and
Habitants also managed to gain considerable wealth. Fortune was not tied exclusively to
government office. Bern was the best example of a city where the oligarchy had taken
control, both political and financial. The refusal to accept any new members of the
Bourgeois in the seventeenth century went hand-in-hand with a limitation of those Bour-
geois able to take part in the government. From 542 Bourgeois families in 1650, there
were 243 in 1784, while those families able to sit in the Grand Conseil at Bern went from
120 to 76; it was these families alone that were able to benefit from the rich rewards of
government posts.12 In Soleure and Fribourg, the opposition was unable to show itself
openly at all.
In Geneva, the Bourgeois could not all have seats on the Deux Cents, and even a
rotation of seats on an annual basis would have left many families outside the political
process for long periods. In 1734, there were less than 100 different families serving on
the Deux Cents. In the same year, there were 682 families which formed the Bourgeois.
The continued existence of the Conseil General, established by the original commune in
the thirteenth century, offered a place where all the Bourgeois could, if they desired, take
some part in the political processes of the state. This was precisely what the oligarchy had
been working hard to prevent since the end of the sixteenth century. Godechot's statement
that:
'the Bourgeois ... enjoyed the rights of citizens but did not sit in the councils...113
.	 Fazy, Les Constitutions, op. cit., p. 51.
10	 Favez, op. cit., Capitani , 5, p. 459.
11	 See Diagram , 67a..
12	 Favez, op. cit., Francois de Capitani, 5, p. 459.
13	 Godechot, op. cit., p. 52.
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is not totally accurate. The Conseil General was one of the four councils concerned,
constitutionally with the governance of the state. The refusal to consult the Conseil GenOral
where all Bourgeois sat and had the right to speak was precisely what the complaints were
about.
There were also considerable contrasts between Geneva and the United Provinces in
the eighteenth century. The latter saw economic stagnation and decline." With the death
of William III; the regent burghers seized control and the country came to be governed by
a closed hereditary oligarchy who held offices in the municipal corporations, especially in
Amsterdam. The wars at the beginning of the century caused irreversible damage to Dutch
trade. From 300 Dutch vessels on average each year at Danzig at the beginning of the
century, the figure sank to 91 by 1780.15 The development by nations of their own
shipping led to less trade for the Dutch and the refusal to make Amsterdam a free port in
1738 and 1751 due to commercial rigidity mefely aggravated the situation. The oligarchy,
especially in Amsterdam, had ceased to trade but lent money to banks both in Holland
and abroad, protecting them from the consequences of their insistence on commercial
rigidity. More telling was the near stasis of the population at a time when the rest of
Europe, including Geneva, was increasing. As the Dutch settled into a gentle decline,"
Geneva began an ascent to commercial success and considerable prosperity.
Wine and Political Unrest
The success that a group of both citizens and Bourgeois achieved over the question of
wine, its taxation and sale in Geneva, acted as an educational process and dress-rehears-
al for the Bourgeois. The move was almost totally successful: the Edict of 1699 was
abrogated, and the tax on the import of foreign wine was revoked. It had been introduced
in 1704 and had been felt by the Bourgeois to be an attack on their privileges." A com-
plete list of all the orders issued on behalf of the Chambre des Vins was also to be printed
and made public. It had been a well-organised campaign which had included officers in the
companies of the militia, the dizeniers and the senior master craftsmen of each craft and
trade.
The weakness of the government in the confrontation over wine was not to be disguised
by the comments of the Procureur-Gënëral, who, when a deputation went to thank him for
his efforts on their behalf, urged them:
'a &Ater toutes sortes d'emotions et de cabales particulieres ou autres comme fres
dangereuses au bien public et a la sOrete de l'Etat, qui ne pouvait subsister que
par une parfaite union de tous les membres qui composent son corps.'"
The members of the Petit Conseil learnt little from the wine question. The attempt to
suggest that the state would only survive if its people did nothing to create divisions fell on
14
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deaf ears. Many of the features of this attack on the government's power to tax wine were
to repeated in the political movements of the remainder of the century. The organisation of
smaller units of the Bourgeois, the claim that the government was attacking the group's
privileges, especially the prerogatives of the Conseil Genêral especially with regard to
taxation and the desire to see printed and made available the laws under which the state
operated, all these elements were found repeatedly in the years that followed. It also
demonstrated that the Bourgeois if they organised themselves could obtain concessions
from the government. From reform of the wine tax, it was an easy step to right an old
wrong.
In 1706, a group in the city was preparing a list of suggested reforms to the Edicts.
Francois Delachenaz, a Bourgeois, and Pierre Fatio, a member of the patriciate whose
elder brother was one of the Petit Conseil, together with Jacob de Normandie and Pierre
Gallatin,19 sought the return to the Conseil General of its rights as the sovereign body of
the state. In Pierre Fatio's case, though recognised in Geneva as having political ambition,
he found that, nonetheless:
'[sal vole en politique etait barite par un frere ainee, en vertu du privilege coutum-
ier du primogeniture pour penetrer dans les charges publiques.'2°
The reforms desired were based on four main points. The first was that voting in the
Conseil GenOral should be by ballot, 21 the second that the Deux Cents should elect its
own members rather than their being elected by the Petit Conseil. The third was an
attempt to limit the number of members of the same family within the two councils (a
demand that went back to the sixteenth century). 22 And finally, the Edicts upon which
the governance of the state was based should be published. As had happened with the
wine taxes, these reforms were to be presented piecemeal. The first demand for a ballot
was presented to the Procureur-General on 1st. December 1706. Neither of the councils
as willing to adopt such a procedure, so the proposal was rejected by them, but, to mollify
the petitioners, it was agreed that a curtain should be hung between those voting and
those who registered the vote.
The argument concerning a ballot in the Deux Cents centred in part on the literacy of the
Bourgeois. In the debate, Fatio claimed that there were only about twenty Bourgeois who
could not write, adding that he had asked the dizeniers for the information. Thereupon, he
was charged in the discussions with having:
'fait de grandes cabales parmi le peuple et corrompu les dizeniers.'23
It was at this meeting of the Deux Cents that Fatio, Jacob de Normandie and Pierre
Gallatin clearly took the lead in opposing the policies of the government. Gallatin in a
speech, drew the attention of the council to what had happened in England, where the
English had been in danger of coming under the control of a strong ruler. He then
continued:
'lls ont travaille A affirmer leur liberte, ils ont pris de sages precautions pour tenir
l'ambition de ceux qui sont appelês A gouverner. C'est A Vos Seigneurs A imiter
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This took up the demand that had been made by Boutilier in 1578. See Chapter ill, p. 55 ff.
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cette prudente nation. MA nous voyons le gouvemement de cet Etat partage entre
deux ou trois families seulement, et finalement, au pouvoir de celui de la dite
familie qui sera l'idole des autres.'24
It was a speech which was unlikely to be well received by the government.
The seventeenth century in England had seen the success of Parliament in obtaining
control over the crown through the annual voting of supply, as well as by removing two
Kings and iheir favourites. In the next twenty years in Geneva, there were to be a number
of references to events in England, and especially the need for the House of Commons to
vote supply. This tied in with the belief in Geneva that the Conseil General was the
sovereign body of the state with the right to approve or reject taxation.
The Conseil GenOral in January 1707 for the election of the year's Syndics was relatively
peaceful except for an attempt by Frangois Delachenaz25 to make a speech. Dissuaded
from doing so by Fatio, because the Edicts stated that nothing could be discussed in the
Conseil Genáral unless it had previously been discussed in the other councils, Delachenaz
had his manuscript, which contained proposals for reform, seized and the meeting ended
peacefully. He immediately began, with another copy, to go from house to house collecting
signatures in support of its contents. Stopped from doing this by the Magistrates, he
proceeded to collect signatures from the customers in his shop. This open defiance of the
government led to his case being heard by the Deux Cents, where he was defended by
Fatio. It was decided that he had to appear before the Magistrature and hand in his
petition. This he did, going to the home of the first Syndic, Jean de Normandie, who, on
receiving the petition, threw it into the fire.
Whatever the Syndic might have thought of the contents of the petition, this was hardly
the way to treat the signatures of the 600 Bourgeois who had signed it. As a result, Fatio,
Jacob de Normandie and Gallatin decided to call a meeting for the following day at the
covered, but open-sided, riding school. 400 attended but were finally dispersed by the
Procureur-GOnOral, Du Pan.26 But it was agreed to hold a further meeting the next day. At
this second meeting, more than 600 turned up and Gallatin, sent by the Petit Conseil to
disperse the crowd, had little success. The speed with which Fatio was able to assemble
such numbers was doubtless related to various meetings which had been held at hired
rooms in various inns in the town, and in the Bourgeois militia units. The crowd began to
move toward the town hall, where they were met at the door by three Syndics, accompa-
nied by some councillors. In such situations, the Procureur-General would be expected to
present the demands of the people to the Syndics. However, Du Pan failed to present
these demands, remaining silent, an action which angered those present.
It was agreed that a commission from the Deux Cents would meet a delegation from the
Bourgeois. The delegation consisted of 18 members 27 , with Fatio as the speaker in the
meetings with the commission. The four points already listed above were to form the core
of the delegation's arguments. Fatio, in his speech however, went much further demanding
that a Conseil General needed to be called to overcome 'une infinite d'abus', because:
'car c'est lui le maitre souverain et non les autres conseils.'28
The meetings held in the manege on 17th. and 18th. January 1707 over the burning of
24	 Corbaz, op. cit., p. 133.
25	 See Appencix IV B IV12.
22	 See Appencix IV B IV13.
27	 See APPencfix IV B IV14.
as	 P.E. Martin, op. cit. 3eme partici, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, P. 406.
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Delachenaz's petition were the first in a series of political assemblies that were to take
place in Geneva throughout the eighteenth century. In leaving the second meeting and
moving towards the town hall in a body, the Bourgeois were able to obtain the first
concession from the government, namely the formation of a commission to receive a
deputation from the Bourgeois. They also had a coherent policy to guide them - the desire
to have the Conseil GónOral recognised as the sovereign legislative power within the state
and therefore to have some element of control over the government and the two smaller
councils. In effect, this was to lay down the battle lines for the remainder of the century.
The inherent contradiction contained within the Edict of 1543 had returned once again to
haunt the body politic of the state, as in 1578, 1604 and 1698.
The militia was the organisation through which the Bourgeois had organised themselves.
The Bourgeois met together with the members of the patriciate who were in their unit,
where each had a vote, and the clergy of each district to which the unit was attached also
took part, and it is the ability of the Bourgeois to mobilise and organise political activity that
gives them a 'modem' appearance. The non-existence of any form of outlet for the
exercise of what the Bourgeois considered to be their political rights forced them into
finding ways to organise themselves. Otherwise they would disintegrate into the kind of
cabals and factious groups that the patriciate were convinced they actually were. The
ability to discuss within the twelve militia groups and to come to collective decisions was of
itself a sign of seriousness of purpose and political maturity.
What adds uniqueness to the whole situation in Geneva throughout the greater part of
the eighteenth century is the second component of the Bourgeois concept: whatever they
did had to be done within the existing laws and edicts. There were to be no illegal acts,
and every action and demand had to be acceptable and legally based. It was perhaps a
natural approach for the Bourgeois, who were convinced that they did not desire any
change in the existing constitution, merely the restoration of certain rights which had been
deliberately held in abeyance.
At the end of January, Fatio had added a fifth point to the four already being discussed,
to the effect that:
'Toute proposition, toute demande sera dans un temps determine, examinee et
discutee 1) en Petit Conseil lorsque 3 conseillers le demanderont; 2) en Deux
Cents lorsque 10 conseillers le demanderont; 3) au Conseil General lorsque 50
citoyens le demanderont.'29
By March, with the Petit Conseil and some of the Deux Cents determined not to make any
serious concessions, the discussions were making little progress. Attempts by the Syndics
to exclude Fatio from his seat in the Deux Cents had as little success as their attempts to
detach his followers. It was at this point that the idea of appealing to their two Swiss allies
for some kind of assistance was first mooted. The Petit Conseil wrote to Bern asking for
their assistance on 4th. March and in their letter said:
leurs bourgeois ne tendaient qu'a renverser le gouvernement.'3°
The letter also contained the statement that Bern and Zurich were:
'I'unique moyen que la Divine Providence et nos alliances nous mettent en main
pour ramener et conserver la tranquillite de cet Etat...'31
It was Du Pan who, in a meeting of the Deux Cents on 7th. March, claimed that:
'S'il fallait recevoir la loi de quelqu'un, il aimerait mieux la recevoir de nos Allies
26	 Corbaz, op. cit., p. 140.
30	 Ibid., p. 157.
31
	
Charles Melly Du-Bois 'Genêve en 1706 - Pierre Fatio & les troubles populaires de Vann& 1707', Chronicles,
Genêve: J. Julien, 1870, p. 148.
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que de trois ou quatre particuliers.'32
As later, so in 1707, for some of the patriciate, recourse to their allies was better than
allowing the Conseil General any say in the governance of the state, foreshadowing 1737-
8, 1766-8 and 1782. The attitude of the members of the Petit Conseil was to be consistent
throughout the crisis: the demands of the group led by Fatio were dangerous and had to
be silenced.
While trying to find a way to divide Fatio's followers and offering compromises to end the
stalemate, the government was determined to crush completely all opposition, even if it
involved bloodshed. Three letters written by the secretary of the deputation from Bern to a
colleague in Bern give an insight into the attitude of the Petit Conseil. In the letters, Gros
comments on how the members of the Petit Conseil regarded Fatio and the other leaders
as 'seditieux et des mutins'. Gros also says that:
'Leur systerne est toujours de reduire la bourgeoisie a la sournission par menace et
crainte, pretendant que les Allies les doivent soutenir la dedans.'33
By 14th. March, the Petit Conseil had decided not to call a meeting of the Conseil General
until there was calm and tranquillity in Geneva and
'Iorsque les syndics et le Petit Conseil le trouveraient a propos.'34
The Petit Conseil also decided that it would no longer tolerate any further public
meetings of the kind that had been held at the riding school. They expected the commis-
sioners sent by Bern and ZOrich would without hesitation back the stand that had been
taken by the council. In Geneva itself, they were heartened by the defection from Fatio's
followers of a group led by Antoine Comparet, who begged the first Syndic not to call a
meeting of the Conseil General, and the pastors, who had remained neutral but now
began, with very few exceptions, to take a pro-government stand. According to Corbaz,
Comparet and his group had been won over by bribery:
'les uns d'avoir une place dans le CC a la premiere promotion, d'autres un emploi
vacant, d'autres une pension a vie, 	 d'autres etaient gagnes par la crainte d'être
ruines.'36
The representatives from the two Swiss cantons, more realistic than the Genevan
government, persuaded it to call a meeting of the Conseil General for 5th. May. The meet-
ing opened with a speech by the second Syndic Chouet, considered the least unpopular of
the Syndics, which was why he was given the task of speaking at this meeting. In his
speech, Chouet insisted upon the sovereignty of the Conseil General:
n'y a personne sans exception ... qui ne doive tomber d'accord qu'elle [la
souverainete] appartient uniquement a ce Conseil ici;'36
He added later in the speech:
'que quand merne ce Conseil general ne s'assembleroit jamais, et qu'il ne feroit
jamais par lui merne aucun acte de Souverainete qu'il ne faudroit pas avoir peur
pour cela que sa Souverainete se perdit ou qu'elle receut par le quelque atteinte,
car il n'y a point et il n'y peut point avoir de prescription a cet egard.'37
32	 P.E. Martin, op. cit, 3bme partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier. Ch. IX, p. 407; also Corbaz, op. cit, p. 141.
33	 Corbaz, op cit., p. 163.
'	 Corbaz, op. cit., p. 148.
Ibid., p. 154.
36	 P.E. Martin, op. cit, 3bme. parte, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, P. 407.
37	 Got, 'Les lettres 'sbditieuses* anonymes', q3. cit., p. 189.
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Accepting the sovereignty of the Conseil General, Chouet then went on to claim that:
'II [le Conseil general] en a commis l'exercise a une autre assemblee moms
nombreuse, je veux dire au Conseil des Deux Cents. ... que ce Conseil general n'a
point voulu exercer par luy marne ces grands actes de souverainete, mais qu'il l'a
toujours fait par le ministere des autres Conseils; parce que tout ce que le Petit et
Grand Conseil font ... est cense ate fait par ce Conseil souverain luy mame, lequel
ii representent, et au nom duquel ils agissent'38
In reply Fatio argued of the Conseil General that:
'qu'il faloit qu'il en delierat actuellement ...[Autrement] son droit, sa liberte, et sa
souverainete seroient chimeriques. ... En remettant son droit, on dira qu'il [le
Conseil general] est toujours le souverain, mais II ne sera que in abstract°, et
jamais in concreto, toujours souverain sans l'exercise de sa souverainete.'38
It was clear to Fatio that:
'Tout ce qu'il y a d'autorite de credit et de force coactive dans les Conseils (Petit et
Grand) emane radicalement du souverain qui est tout le peuple en corps ... II faut
simplement ne pas souffrir que l'on fasse des lois sans consulter le peuple?4°
For both the government and Fatio and his supporters in the Bourgeois, the 'peuple' in all
these and future discussions referred only to the Bourgeois, those with the right to take
part in political life in the city, around 1,300 people at this time. In reality, the gap between
the government and Fatio and his supporters was profound. It was an argument at the
heart of all future trouble in Geneva. The concept of the sovereign rights of the Conseil
General and the belief that the smaller councils were only able to act as executives of that
power was to be of prime importance to Geneva. The sovereignty of the Conseil General,
already claimed by Combe in 1604 and again by Fatio in 1707 was that of 'the delegation
of authority' mentioned by Palmer:" The same argument concerning sovereignty and
whether it was divisible, as the smaller councils in Geneva claimed in 1707 but Fatio
denied, was to be hotly debated between the British and the Thirteen Colonies in the
1760s and also in the United Provinces in the 1780s.
All was not lost for the government however, it had been decided by two smaller
councils to spring a surprise at the Conseil General. This was to be presented to the
meeting after the speeches of the Syndics and the response made by Fatio but before
there was any voting. All the Bourgeois should swear an oath of loyalty to the state before
the proceedings continued, it having been some time since this had last been demanded.
This was an astute political move since swearing the oath, a solemn, religious occasion,
would influence some of those present. It was Councillor Antoine Piaget 42 who, jumping
to his feet, explained the significance of this move to the representatives of Bern and
Zurich, attending the Conseil General as observers:
'notre serment promettant fidelite au Magistrats et soumission aux Edits de la
Republique [semble] exclure tout changement dans l'Etat.'43
sa	 Mélanges Wolfgang Amedee Liebeskind 'Le Discours du Syndic Chouet sur la nature du gouvemement de l'etat de
Geneve', Institutions politiques et traditions nationales, Geneve: Librairie de l'Universite, Georg &Cie. S.A., 1973,
pp. 192-193.
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41	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 5.
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De Normandie, on leaving Geneva on the service of the Prussian King (who had been
asked by the Magistrates to order him to Neuchatel) told all those who spoke to him:
'gardez-vous bien de preter le serment.'44
De Normandie may have heard of the idea of the government through his family connec-
tions. The attempt to introduce the oath led to considerable disorder. In addition, the
presence of the Swiss delegations at the Conseil General was also questioned. The wran-
gling only ended when the session was adjourned to 12th. May, after lasting eight hours
and achieving nothing.
At the second meeting of the Conseil General on 12th. May, doctor Chenaud45 sug-
gested a way forward by voting on the current suggestions as a block: voting by ballot,
augmenting the Deux Cents by 40 and the challenging of cousins sitting in the councils,
together with the publication of the Edicts. The latter had already been conceded by the
government. Fatio saw this as a trap, even though the suggestion came from Chenaud,
considered a Fatio supporter. It was enough, however, to give hope to the Magistrates that
they would be able to separate the moderate Bourgeois from the hard-line supporters of
Fatio. Some of the Bourgeois were unhappy at the continued unrest:
'toutes les affaires etaient abandonnees, le mal allait augmentant chaque jour et
l'on apprenait encore que la Savoie allait etre occupee par de nouvelles troupes
etrangeres... Le sentiment dun commun danger et l'amour de la republique dispo-
saient maintenant la plupart des citoyens a ne point trop se rallier contre la Sei-
gneurie.'"
The meeting was adjourned for a fortnight without any decision. There was also a
reluctance among the more moderate members of the Bourgeois to push the government
too far. This offered a useful lever to the government, which it did not hesitate to use to the
disadvantage of the Bourgeois.
A concession made by the government with regard to the Conseil General also helped
the Magistrates' case. In addition to the annual meeting of the Conseil General for the
election of the Syndics and other officials, there would be one held every five years to
legislate. This concession from the government went some way to meet the demands of
the Bourgeois for the restoration of the Conseil General and the right they claimed it had to
be consulted concerning matters of importance in the state.
The crucial meeting of the Conseil General to discuss the proposed concessions took
place on 26th. May. Fatio's supporters attempted to meet beforehand in the Madeleine
church, but found the doors locked, so broke the windows and entered the church, whence
they marched en masse to St. Pierre for the Conseil General. The number of men who
attended and subsequently marched to the Cathedral was some 600-700. At the Conseil
General, the two councils were willing to offer the revision and publication of the Edicts,
voting by ballot, a limitation on the members of the same family permitted to sit in the
smaller councils, and a legislative Conseil General every five years. It was a stormy and
unpleasant meeting which must have done much to confirm opinions concerning the
inadvisability of the Conseil General having any serious political rights. Even the voting
was noisy and disorganised:
'Fatio s'appercevant que la pluralitë des suffrages alloit a l'approbation, il s'est
retire dans le bas du Temple avec ses adherens; il s'y fait (pour interrompre) des
huees redoublees ...Ms. les Syndics ont fait crier pendant environ une heure que
44	 Armidee Roget, 'Les rnembres des conseils adherents de Pierre Patio, 1707', Etrennes Genevoises, Geneve: J.
Carey, Imprimeur-Eciteur, 1880 4, p. 173. [Hereafter 'Les membres des conseils1
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ceux qui voudraient passer s'avangassent, mais les Chefs se tenoient dans les
couloirs pour empècher qu'on ne passat [pour voter].'47
The atmosphere can be judged by the comments shouted by Jean Trembley," a
member of one of the patriciate families:
'que P. Fatio n'etait qu'un nouveau venu dans l'Etat et fils de bourgeois; qu'il ne
faillait pas souffrir qu'un seul gouvernat dont la ballote changerait entierement le
gouvemement.'"
The quiet comment made by the young Turrettini directly to Fatio, who was sifting near
him, that he, Fatio, 'n'etait qu'un tyran' is indicative of the passions stirred by the events,
and the anger generated was still to be found fifty years later. In a marnoire sent by
Francois Rilliet5° to Cramer in 1766, there is the following:
'Notre ville [a] ete dechirOe en l'annee 1707 par une faction et un part! violent
soutenu par quelques ltaliens d'un certain ordre et accraditOs ..•'"
The Fatio family had come as religious refugees to Geneva, acquired Bourgeois status,
and become accepted into the patriciate, where various members of the family had held
high positions in the government. Pierre Fatio, for example, had broken the rules of loyalty
both to the patriciate and his family. Clearly, outsiders remained suspect long after they
had settled in Geneva.
At another point a body of Fatio's supporters walked out of the cathedral, claiming they
had been misled or betrayed. Gallatin decided to accept the compromise that was offered,
and Fatio lost all the votes taken, though the Bourgeois thus gained a certain amount of
what they had demanded.
The session closed, and the members of the two councils withdrew, leaving only Fatio's
supporters in the cathedral, where they were rejoined by those who had left earlier. The
councils wanted to arrest Fatio, who was talking to his followers in St. Pierre, but were
dissuaded by the Bemese delegation, who sent for Fatio and persuaded him to send his
followers home. The government, fearing that those around the cathedral might sound the
tocsin,52 had the cathedral surrounded by troops. Fatio re-entered the cathedral, where,
after singing a psalm, his followers dispersed.
There was however rioting in the town, where the shop of a known supporter of the
government was destroyed and he was lucky to escape with his life. The rioting was not by
the Bourgeois, it was by the Natifs and the Habitants. They were theoretically in no way
concerned with what was happening within the Bourgeois section of the population, yet
they were the ones who reacted violently to the frustration and anger felt by the core of
Fatio's supporters. This kind of rioting was unusual in Geneva, especially in the early years
of the eighteenth century. It was possibly the result of the close connection that there was
in the work place between the poorer Bourgeois and the Natifs and the Habitants as well
as the fact that there was much intermingling in accommodation, especially in the St.
Gervais area of the city.
47	 BPU, Geneve, Ms. Tronchin 281 Memoires commences en janvier 1707, 246.
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The government, at the bidding of the Bemese, announced a general amnesty. Yet,
according to Gros, two months before the introduction of the amnesty, there was already
talk of the necessity for blood to flow:
'Dans les conversations particulieres, us font assez sentir qu'ils ont en vie d'ensangl-
anter la scene, c'est-e-dire de couper quelques Wes. Mais ce sont la des choses
qu'il est a propos de ne pas divulguer...'"
Further trouble erupted on 27th. May, when windows were broken and supporters of the
government were threatened and attacked. Fatio was quickly on the scene to calm matters
and there were no serious injuries, but this time the Magistrates acted severely, people
were arrested and the town was in a state of semi-siege. In the heightened atmosphere,
even the preachers at Divine service were not immune to reaction from members of their
congregation, as the Pastor Despres discovered in the Madeleine on Sunday, 29th. May.
He insisted on the need for obedience to the Magistrates, when a member of the congre-
gation by the name of Lachanas called out in a loud voice:
'II faut obeir au Magistrat quand il nous conservera nos privileges:54
It was a cryptic statement, which would appeal to both sides of the fence, depending on
what the individual interpreted as the preservation of the privileges of the Bourgeois.
With the concessions granted and the Amnesty, the Genevans appeared to have solved
their difficulties, permitting the Swiss delegations to return home. Unknown to the Bour-
geois was the agreement by both Bern and Zurich to send troops to Geneva, ostensibly to
strengthen the garrison against the threat from the occupation of Savoy, but in reality to
strengthen the hand of the Genevan government. Fatio was expelled from the Deux Cents
on 6th. June, though this did little to decrease his popularity with those living in St. Ger-
vais, and the government created a secret commission which consisted of:
'Ms. Rilliet, J.C. Trembley et Sartoris pour observer les dernarches des chefs.'55
Their task was to gather information about every act and word of those perceived as
enemies of the state; a typical example of such 'information' was
'Delorme êtant a la fermature de la Porte de Rive avec sa femme, avoit repondu au
Capitaine de garde qui lui ternoignoit sa joy du retour du calme. ll n'est pas tel que
vous penses, la paix n'est pas encore dans la Vile, le feu couve sous la cendre, on
se plaint de l'arrivee des Suisses:56
Evidence built up that Fatio was meeting with those who agreed with him, both in
Geneva and outside the town, but there was little, solid proof of anything other than talk. It
was however on occasions provocative and very public, as in the report of Fatio's com-
ment to his friend Chouan, made in a street, doubtless for all around to hear:
'on volt bien pourquoi on tient ici des Suisses, nous n'avons pas besoin de Troupes
pour nous garder, ce n'est donc que pour nous opprimer:57
Whatever the intentions of the government with regard to the Swiss troops, there was
considerable unease in the city concerning their arrival, and it was easy for Fatio and his
supporters to play on those fears to increase their own following. The consequences of the
Swiss troops' being in Geneva at a time of repression after September 1707 was to be
ss	 Corbaz, op. cit.. p. 163.
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often referred to in the future and caused an inherent distrust of the government's
intentions whenever they wished to call upon the Swiss for military protection.
The government finally acted on 17th. August, arresting Fatio, LemaTtre 58 and Delache-
naz; Piaget eluded them but was drowned trying to escape. The reports received by the
Petit Conseil that there was still considerable unease and talk amongst the Bourgeois may
have decided them to move. Tronchin reports on 2nd. August concerning the murmurs of
men such as Moudry aine and Badolet:
'il y en a qui disent que dans les prochaines Elections il faut en eloigner les
grandes families, celles qui ont beacoup de parens.'59
This was possibly seditious talk, except that the Bourgeois in the Conseil Genaral were,
in fact, not in any position to carry out the threat. All candidates for all positions that were
elected by the Conseil General were chosen by the two smaller councils and consisted of
names coming from families that sat in those councils. Unless the powers of the Conseil
Gëneral were returned to what it had enjoyed before 1543, the talk of Maudry aim§ and
Badolet was merely discontented muttering. It did make it clear to the authorities however
that under the surface of apparent calm there was seething anger in many of the Bour-
geois.
The legal process against those arrested was carried out in haste and in secret and was
based on the testimony of an innkeeper of questionable reputation. 69 Lemaitre denied
everything, even under torture and up to the moment of his execution. He was hanged in
public and his denial of any wrongdoing immediately before his death made a deep
impression on those who witnessed his execution. Antoine Leger, 61 pastor and Professor
at the Academy, who had accompanied LemaTtre to his execution, was so distressed by
what he witnessed that, on returning home, he withdrew to his room, having said to his
son:
'c'est quelque chose de terrible, si ce pauvre est innocent.'62
Delachenaz, considered by many to be slightly mad, was banished for life. Fatio was
allowed no lawyer for his defence. There was no proof of any plot against the state, but
the government, who were also his judges, were convinced that, if he lived, there would be
no peace in the state. The attitude of the judges was summarized in the statement made
to the Deux Cents by the Syndic Jean de Normandie:
'delivrer la Republique des scelerats qui en troublent le repos, de ne pas tant
s'attacher a la formalite et en la procedure dans les jugements qu'il aura a faire
qu'a la souveraine loi, qui est le salut de l'Etat qui veut que les perturbateurs du
repos public soient cites de parmi nous.'63
The decision for conviction and the death sentence was delivered by the Petit Conseil on
31st. August. The execution was carried out in the yard of the prison by a firing squad on
7th. September. This was against normal practice and was carried out in private to protect
U	 See Appendix IV B IV/10.
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the sensibilities of those members of the Fatio family who were part of the government. It
also had the advantage that another public denial was spared the government, as, clearly,
Fatio would not have gone quietly to a public death. Neither could the government be sure
whether such a public execution might not provoke severe rioting in the city. Fatio, upon
being told by the Petit Conseil that his life was forfeit and that he had lost all fear of God,
asked for a Bible and then read to them Psalm 58," rarely used in church life, the
content of Which made it perfectly clear what Fatio thought of those who had judged and
condemned him. For Fatio, the guilt, if guilt there were, rested upon their shoulders not his.
The two death sentences and the banishment of Delachenaz did not end opposition. By
13th. September, Jacob de Normandie had been forbidden to enter Geneva and then
expelled from the Deux Cents, together with Pierre Perdiau.65 In June 1708, Etienne
Dentrand was denounced for having visited de Normandie at Coppet. He had been one of
the delegation which had attempted to negotiate with the committee of the Deux Cents.
After this, de Normandie decided to leave Geneva permanently to live in Prussia. This
demonstrated that the government was keeping a close watch on those who had been
prominent in the Fatio matter.
The extent of the fears of the Magistrates was demonstrated by the punishment they
meted out to Jacques Despres, a pastor who, in the Madeleine, offered prayers for:
'une famille considerable qui s'est mise a present en voyage.'"
The government decided that:
'Despres, en priant pour des gens suspects, a voulu entretenir l'esprit de sedition,
qu'il doit etre censure grievement, demander pardon A Dieu et a la Seigneur-
ie"
He was punished with temporary suspension. His response was that he had not been
sanctioned by the Compagnie and that, as for the rest:
'ii vaut mieux obeir aux hommes, que sa conscience ne lui reproche rien.'"
So the Council destituted him, forced him to beg their pardon and to plead for their mercy,
whereupon all punishments were revoked. All because of prayers for the departing wife
and children of Jacob de Normandie. 76 It was indicative of the state of control and fear in
Geneva in the post-Fatio period.
The concessions that were made by the government in 1707 concerning the meetings of
the Conseil General every fifth year to discuss any new laws or any other difficulties in the
state had been made in order to calm the situation. These concessions were all that re-
mained to be dealt with by the government, which had, by executions, banishments and
punishments over a period of more than a year, managed to silence all opposition. The re-
maining concessions were dealt with in 1712, when the Conseil General voted by 780 to
271 to end the quinquennial legislative meetings!' The motion proposing this was
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cleverly worded:
'"Whether the opinion of the councils, for abolishing the periodical assemblies,
should pass into law?" The words employed on the billets delivered for that
purpose, were approbation, rejection; so that whichever side was taken it came to
the same point. If the billet of approbation were chosen; the opinion of the councils
which rejected the periodical assembly was approved; if that of rejection then the
periodical assembly was rejected of course.' 72
thus ensuring the end of the one possible check on the power of the two smaller councils
and returning the Bourgeois to their previous state of relative impotence. It also negated
the main gain that had come from 1707. As one historian has correctly said:
'en 1712, la Bourgeoisie a ete effectivement bernee par le Magistrat, et le vote du
20 decembre a ete ressenti comme une veritable escroquerie politique ...'"
The realisation that they had been tricked did little to help the Bourgeois. The situation re-
verted to what it had been since the end of the sixteenth century, with the government, as
Fazy comments, '[qW] se considera comme maitre absolu de la republique'. 74 It remained
to be seen whether the Bourgeois would accept or organise some further attempt to obtain
their goals. They had been consistant in their demands from Boutilier onwards for the
restoration of the rights of the Conseil General. The success of 1707, though lost in 1712,
ensured that the fight would continue, if necessary in small meetings held in homes and
via the militias.
Geneva, democratic action and 1707
Well before the 1760s and Rousseau's Social Contract the disagreement between the
government and some of the Bourgeois in 1707 had already laid down the outlines of the
conflict in Geneva over what precisely sovereinty was and who had the power to rule the
state. Geneva thus saw, as a result of the argument in in 1707, the first concession
obtained from the government. The acceptance that the Conseil Genera/would be called
to meet every fifth year to discuss political matters gave an inkling to what might be
achieved if the Bourgeois could act in concert in the Conseil General. Palmer states:
'The first occasion ... when a movement of modem democratic type made a
positive impression on institutions of government was at Geneva in 1768.'75
It would seem that the date of 1768 should, in effect, be 1707. The Bourgeois were clearly
well organised, they had a clear aim and they made a (to them) positive impresssion on
the government in forcing it to concede the quinquennial meetings of the Conseil General.
Their loyalty to the government remained, but the long ignoring of the Conseil General and
the rule of the patriciate families through the two smaller councils was an aberration which
had to be corrected. 1707 was therefore the first occasion when the action of the Bour-
geois was able to force a concession from the oligarchy which had taken into its hands
powers that belonged to the sovereign body, the Conseil General.
Neither would the Bourgeois in Geneva have seen their action as in any way radical or
revolutionary, merely a return to the Edicts which stated that there should be a meeting of
72	 Rev. William Coxe, Travels in Switzerland in a series of letters to William Melmoth Esq., London, 1789, Vol. II,
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the Conseil General once every five years. 79 Neither does it seem that the the Bourgeois
had lost confidence in the leaders of the state. It was merely a partial return to what was
perceived as the ancient rights of the Conseil General and the Bourgeois. The aims of
men like Fatio and Delachenaz were very similar to the reforms that had been suggested
by Boutilier in 1576. They wished to see the Conseil General recognised as the sovereign
body of the state, through which the Bourgeois would be consulted concerning important
matters relating to the state, especialy the creation of new laws. The Conseil General
would act as a check on the government and prevent further power concentrating in the
hands of the smaller councils.
The long-standing battle between the Bourgeois and the Genevan government was not
ended in 1707, however, but, for a while, the Bourgeois had tasted success. The Bour-
geois in Geneva were traditional and conservative in what they wanted. They were also
consistent over a considerable period of time. Neither were the Bourgeois' arguments
rooted in 'lost, often mythological communal liberties'?' Yet clearly this is how the de-
mands of the Bourgeois appeared to the oligarchy. Even after the changes introduced to
the system of government in Geneva in 1543, the Conseil General had continued to meet
and have control over taxation. The oligarchy gradually allowed the Bourgeois no say
whatsoever, and were, from their point of view, rightly concerned over any attempt to in
any way restrict their power to rule. In the attempt by the oligarchy, aided by the Edicts of
1543, to reduce the Bourgeois to zero political influence was born the long-term division of
the state.
The eighteenth century in Geneva, with its prolonged and profound political problems,
was not a sudden, dramatic phenomenon of the eighteenth century, as Amedee Roget
would have us believe:
'Nue] Geneve avait joui d'une paix interieure profonde qu'on avait ignore l'existence
des partis, si bien qu'on a de la peine A signaler pendant une si longue periode
quelque modification tant soit peu importante effectuee ob merne seulement
reclamee dans la Constitution et les lois de l'Etat.'79
The seventeenth century did not resound with cries of anguish from the politically crippled
Bourgeois, but there had been Combe in 1604, the Sarasin affair in 1667 and the Gallatin
plot in 1698. 79 The eighteenth century saw an easing of the stresses and tensions which
had dominated life before. The resentments which had already shown themselves were
quick to take advantage of this easing of circumstances. The consensus which is neces-
sary if any regime is to maintain itself 99 was nonetheless still intact, even though there
was some concern over the position of the Conseil General. The Bourgeois in Geneva did
not consider their trade organisations 'contrary to national or civil liberty'. 91 They per-
ceived the greatest threat to their liberty to be the refusal of the government to accept the
sovereignty and rights of the Conseil General. The level of organisation shown in the
speed of the response to the burning of Delachanaz's petition also shows that the
Bourgeois were clearly organised and meeting to discuss the situation and their desire for
7V	 Contained in the Ecicts concerning the Church and the pastors, this quinquennial meeting was to have the laws
read to the people. The publication of the Elicts had led to the cancellation of these meetings.
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change efore the 1730s,82 where Palmer places their initial organisation.83
Patriciate victory and miscalculation
Immediately after the promise to consult the Conseil General concerning any important
matter in 1712, the Deux Cents and the Petit Conseil created a commission to examine
the question of the fortifications of the city and what needed to be done to make Geneva
one of the most strongly fortified towns in Europe razing the existing fortifications to build
new ones 'plus &endues et plus regulieres'." One important difficulty was the cost of
such a venture, apart from the advisability or necessity of such a large undertaking. The
government's idea was to finance a type of sinking fund at 7%, which would have required
an annual levy of 105,000 florins,85 but the two smaller councils were divided over the
issue. Rocca implies that it was in part because of this disagreement that the matter of the
taxation necessary to finance any new work was not taken to the Conseil General."
Unable to provide sufficient funds for such a programme, it was decided, after much
discussion in the two smaller councils, to raise a loan and to increase taxes to ensure the
payment of the interest on the loan as well as slowly reducing the debt. Increasing
individual taxation was rejected, but taxes on wine, sold in the hotels and inns were
increased, the tax on imported grain was doubled, the tax on meat was increased, together
with a tax on all legal documents, a sure way of raising considerable sums of money in a
city which owed its life to commerce and trade. All of the taxation decisions were taken
without consulting the Conseil General, in defiance of what had been recently promised.
While the Bourgeois in the city accepted that there was some need to improve the fortifi-
cations around the town, they were unhappy that the taxes needed to achieve this aim had
been introduced without any reference to the Conseil General. On 14th. October 1718, the
Petit Conseil was informed of the receipt by the Procureur-General, Jean Tronchin,87 of a
letter of 24 pages sent from France. It was anonymous and was a letter from a citizen of
Geneva to a newly-created Bourgeois."
The letter dealt with matters of current concern, especially the matter of the right to
introduce or change taxation without the consent of the sovereign power, the Conseil
General. It was decided to make enquiries about the letters. Initially, the Procureur-General
deemed that there were several copies extant, two similar copies having been sent at the
same time to two other Citoyens, Duval and Mourgues.
Called to account for these copies and their part in the affair, they claimed that two
others had seen one of the letters and a brother had the copy of the other. Worried that
the contents of the letter must be well-known throughout Geneva, the government was
nonetheless surprised that initially all seemed quiet. The receipt by Tronchin of a second
letter, theoretically in response to the first letter, but in fact giving further support to it and
u	 See p. 88ff.
xi	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 129.
.4	 BPU, Geneve, Ms. Rocca 12, p. 106.
$.5	 O'Mara, 'L'affaire des lettres anonymes', op. cit., p. 255.
IS	
IOC. Cit.
17	 See Appendix IV B IV/12.
ss	 GOr, 'Les lettres -seditieuses- anonymes, op. cit., p. 141.
81
containing also the text of a Representation to be made to the Syndics, made it clear that
the letters and contents were more generally known.
M. Gaudy, had received the second letter several days before Tronchin giving sufficient
time for any copies to be made of it before it was handed over to the government. Those
who were involved in the organization clearly did not intend that the letters should remain
secret. They deliberately sent copies of both their 'manifestos' to the government authori-
ties in the post, perhaps as a warning of the seriousness of the situation.
The letters, particularly the first, are of seminal importance in Geneva's history. Clearly
written, they both develop the ideas of 1707 and prefigure those of Rousseau in both the
Social Contract and Lettres de la montagne. They clearly set out the ground on which the
Bourgeois were to base their arguments. In the preface to the first letter, the author goes
straight to the point:
'qu'il n'y a pas deux Souverains dans cet Etat, et que la Souverainete reside
entiere dans le Conseil general.'"
In the first letter, he states clearly, quoting words used by Chouet in 1707:
'Mais ii (le Conseil General] a cree ses Magistrats pour en faire seulement les
fonctions en son nom et sous son autorite,... un Souverain, un Maitre qui etablit
des officiers est en droit d'exiger d'eux ce qu'il veut, de retirer d'entre leurs mains
l'autorite qu'il leur a confiee.'"
This statement can be compared to Rousseau in the Social Contract
'and that the holders of the executive power are not the people's masters but its
officers; and that the people can appoint them and dismiss them as it pleases
The author of the Lettres argues that there is a necessity for regular periodic meetings of
the Conseil Generat
'Ces assemblees periodiques etoient un des principaux apuis de sa IfiDerte; Car des
qu'un peuple ne peut pas s'assembler quand il veut, ou qu'il n'a pas un tems fixe
pour cela et pour proposer ce qu'il veut, sa liberte est bien peu de chose.'92
Again what Rousseau writes in The Social Contract is similar:
'there must be fixed and periodic assemblies which nothing can abolish or pro-
rogue, so that on the appointed day the people is rightfully summoned by the law
itself without any formal convocation being needed.' [Bk. III, Ch. 13] "And it is by
this simple means [refusing to allow the General assemblies of the peopfe to
assemble] that all the governments of the world ... sooner or later usurp the
sovereign authority.' [Bk. III, Ch. 1 8]3
In one of his pamphlets written in 1767, the same points were made by Delorme that:
'The Sovereign in Geneva is the General Council The General Council as sover-
eign assigns functions to others; it receives none from any higher source.'"
Yet Delorme was merely repeating what the writer said in the first Lettre and what had also
been stated by Chouet in 1707 - see the first two quotes from Leger's Lettres above.
• Gar, 'Les lettres "seditieusee annonyrnes', op. cit., p. 178.
10	 Ibid. pp. 188-189.
el	 Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Conb.act, London: Penguin Classics, Translated by Maurice Cranston, 1968,
Book Ill, Chapter 18, p.146.
Gar, 'Les lettreeseditieuses" anonymes', op. cit., p. 195.
• Rousseau, 'The Social Contract', op. cit., p. 137 & p. 147.
"	 Purification des trois points de droit souffles par un anonyms, oir Response a l'examen des trois points de droit
bakes dans les Miknoires des Representants du 19 mai et 16 octobre, 1767, cited in Palmer, op. cit., p. 135.
82
The writer of the letter works clearly and logically through the various arguments put
forward by the two opposing sides, but always concluding that the Bourgeois and the
Citizens in opposition to the government are in the right. The crux of the argument in 1718
is put with considerable clarity:
'II s'agit donc de savoir si le Droit de mettre des Imptits apartient au Peuple, c'est a
dire au corps des Bourgeois et des Citoyens qui composent l'assemblee generale,
ou si le Conseil des 200 peut etablir des impOts sans demander qu'ils soient auto-
risez par le Conseil General:98
This posed, in Geneva, in 1718, the question which was to exercise the British and the
Americans in the 1760s. Where did sovereignty lie and where the right of taxation? This
can be seen in Otis' 'Rights of the British Colonies':
'But to have the whole levied and collected without our consent is extraordinary.
...yet if taxes are laid on ... without consent, they cannot be said to be free.'
The Lettres of 1718 argues that the attempt by some in the patriciate to liken the Deux
Cents to the British Parliament (in reality they meant the House of Commons) is shown to
be a false analogy. In the Commons, the writer points out, the 'people' have the oppor-
tunity every five years to change their representatives sitting in the chamber, whereas, in
Geneva:
'Si ... le peuple creoit les membres du Conseil des 200, et les pouvait changer au
bout de quelques temps, il remettroit avec plaisir a ce Conseil le pouvoir d'etablir
des impôts, parce qu'alors il n'aprehenderoit pas qu'il s'y fit la moindre chose
contre sa liberte.'97
Thus, clearly, the claim that, in reality, the Deux Cents is like the House of Commons and
therefore has the right to decide taxation, is a false one. 98 There is also an attempt to
establish that the form of government existing in 1718 is different from that which existed
in the important year of 1570. The author argues that, in 1570, the Conseil GenOrals
decision to allow the smaller councils to decide on questions of taxation was only a
temporary matter, indeed he quotes at length from the Edict itself.99
The interpretation of this same Edict of 1570 was to be a further strand of the disputes
in Geneva. Couched in rather vague language, it could be, and was, interpreted by each
side according to their respective positions. Unlike the Edict of 1568, however, it does not
contain any statement that would clearly make it permanent. A clause of perpetuity having
been so carefully and clearly inserted in the Edicts a mere two years beforehand, the
absence of such a clause in the 1570 taxation Edict would seem to indicate that, at the
time, it was not conceived of in those terms but only as a temporary measure. The
insistence of the Deux Cents that it had the right to tax due to 1570 was to set it and the
government on a road which led to the divisibility of sovereignty in 1738, but such
arguments were inherent but not fully worked out in 1718.
The letters reject the argument that the people would refuse to accept necessary
taxation, be difficult and bring Geneva to a state of crisis. The author states quite clearly
that it was the attack on the rights of the Conseil General that had angered the people. He
NI	 G0r, 'Les lettres -s6ditieuses* anonyme', op. cit., p. 180.
N	 Edward Bailyn (Ed.) Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750-1765, Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of
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then continues:
'Les Conseils, doivent declarer au peuple que dans l'etablissement des
impôts, ils n'ont point eu intention de blesser ses droits; qu i & l'avenir on ne fera rien
de semblable... Ces dernarches de la part des Conseils sont d'une absolue
necessite, car s'ils n'abandonnent pas la pensee oü ils sont,	 il est certain que la
confiance ne se retablira point, parce. que le peuple est trop bien informe de ses
droits et de ses libertes."3
It is noticeable that, when given an opportunity to vote taxation in future years, the
Conseil General was perfectly willing to vote for taxation for the continuation of work on the
defences of the city for a further ten years without any difficulty.' m Nonetheless, there is
also a clear warning to the patriciate in the last three lines above.
The second letter is much shorter than the first and was written, theoretically, to express
surprise at the-attitude taken by the Magistrates to the first letter. The writer finds it
amazing that the initial letter has been treated as a seditious text. He also suggests that it
is not surprising that those who are unable to follow blindly wherever the Magistrates wish
to lead them should take care to avoid detection by those same Magistrates. The shadow
of what had happened in 1707 fell over the events of 1718. Finally, the letter ends on a
threat: the Magistrates, having refused all attempts at conciliation and also refused to
consider all representation as anything but crime, had only themselves to blame:
'et s'il arrive du desordre, on voit bien qui en sera responsable."2
On the basis of the second letter, a series of Representations were made to the Syndics
in early December 1718. There were at least eight different groups including engravers,
merchants and watch-makers, who went to the Syndics with their demands. 103 All asked
for a meeting of the Conseil General to discuss the imposition of the new taxes for the
fortifications based on the text which had accompanied the second letter:
'Nous souhaitons donc que pour faire calmer ce murmure et pour Oteindre cette
funeste division, on assemble le Conseil General, que le peuple y soit prie de
donner son consentement a l'etablissement des impOts pour un temps fixe et nous
promettons que le peuple donnera les mains avec empressement a cet etablissem-
ent.'1°4
The promise was clear: if the government would call a meeting of the Conseil General to
discuss the matter, the people would be willing to agree to extra taxation for a fixed period
to finance the project of strengthening the defences. Unfortunately, the government was
unwilling to concede the necessity of calling the Conseil General for such a matter, since
to do so would be to concede the sole sovereignty of the Conseil General.
The difference between 1707 and 1734 and what was happening in 1718 was that there
were no overt, large political meetings. O'Mara claims that this was the result of consider-
able organisation, but not 'mass' organisation. However, the level of co-ordination that was
required to ensure that so many Representations were actually taken in sequence to the
authorities necessarily implies the organisation of the 'mass' of those with the right to take
part in the Conseil General. While there were no large, open public meetings such as
those in 1707, clearly there were a considerable number of small meetings all over the
I"	 Ibid., p. 200.
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town.
The groups of Bourgeois were well aware that their coming together in large numbers
would anger the Magistrature. They had not have forgotten the severe measures taken
against twenty Bourgeois who were accused of having formed cabals and fomented in-
trigues concerning the annual elections in the Conseil General, some of the accused being
sentenced to life banishment from Geneva (1694). The various trade groupings within the
city provided the ideal method of organising the Bourgeois, and the fact that some of the
most senior members of the watch-making industry were involved indicated the extensive
nature of the organisation and the agreement amongst the Bourgeois over the matter of
the Conseil General and taxation. 105 It was also a continuation of the type of organisation
which had been successful in 1704, when the master-craftsmen of each craft and trade
had, with others, been able to force the government to change the tax on wine in the city.
It indicated to the Petit Conseil that knowledge of the two letters was far more extensive
than they had believed. It decided to declare the letters subversive, ordering the return of
all copies in private hands and forbidding all meetings and caballing. Disobedience would
lead to loss of Bourgeois status, banishment and heavy fines. In submitting this decision to
the Deux Cents, the Magistrates used the old, well-tried comments with regard to the Bour-
geois' demand that there should be a meeting of the Conseil General talking of:
'une partie de notre bourgeoisie, qui parait s'inquieter dans la vue d'obtenir des
changemens a nos Edits (particulierement sur la maniere d'êtablir les impOts) qui
iroient A renverser notre Constitution, et A rendre notre gouvemement entierement
populaire, qui est le pire de tous les gouvernements..."6
The apparent success of the government can be seen in the elections the following
January for the Syndics. There was little trouble, although between two and three hundred
abstained from voting for any candidate, almost certainly in an organised way. Only
seventy-five had the courage to vote against the candidates. The reaction of some of
Geneva's Bourgeois immediately after 15th. December, when they went in considerable
numbers to pledge their loyalty to the government, even though they may have 'listened' to
the arguments contained within the two letters, gives a clear idea of the atmosphere that
existed there at this period. Even some of those who had led deputations presenting
Representations went to beg forgiveness and reconciliation.' w The Magistrates also
used spies in the cafes of the town to listen to and report conversations.w8
The government tried hard to find the authors of the letters. In the document declaring
the letters seditious, they had offered a reward of a thousand ecus 'a quiconque en fera
connaitre les auteurs'.109 A clergyman by the name of Michel Leger was suspected, but
so was his father Antoine Leger. The latter had already, in 1695, and then again in 1704,
been involved in controversy concerning the complete independence of man's spirit and
religious belief from that of the civil power. He had also denounced the establishment of
the Consensus and was one of the clergy who wanted it ignored or dropped.
Gar has shown clearly that the letters were written in great secrecy, and the same
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secrecy and organisation was used with regard to their distribution."° The copies were
made by hand, the Lettres were not printed, and copies were doubtless shared, being read
out loud amongst friends and family. The oral tradition in Geneva was strong'" and was
to remain so well into the 1780s. Giir, in his article Les letrres 'seditieuses' anonyme de
1718, etude et texte, has proved Antoine Leger was their author. Professor Leger, under
suspicion, had already been subjected to the unkind disapproval of his fellow councillors in
the Deux' Cents, who 'Iuy toumoient le dos quand ils le voyoient.' 112 Already very ill, the
stress of being suspected of having written the letters precipitated his death in January
1720. The attitude of the authorities can be judged from the comments made to Antoine as
he lay dying by two members of the Petit Conseil, Marc Conrad Trembley" 3 and Jacob
de Chapeaurouge:
'Ces deux membres du Conseil luy dirent IA dessus au dit Spble. [Spectable]
Antoine Leger ... que la tete de son fils en repondroit s'il en etoit l'auteur.'" 4 	 v
They had attempted to persuade Leger on his deathbed to admit to being the author of the
letters.
The involvement of Leger, a senior and much respected pastor, with the Bourgeois
cause highlighted the difficulties of the Consistoire. The divisions within the political class
were also to be reflected in the Consistoire, which was to find it difficult to avoid the
arguments and disagreements amongst the Bourgeois being reflected among its pastors.
The Importance of the 'Lettres anonymes'
Antoine Leger had, in his two anonymous letters, provided the Bourgeois with a clear
programme. The letters had set out in clear, simple language the basis upon which the
Bourgeois could build their case. O'Mara argues that the organisation of the Represen-
tations made in 1718, apart from being through the medium of the various trade organisa-
tions, was also based on the fact that many of the men who are known to have led
delegations to the Syndics came from the same street in St. Gervais, the rue de Gout-
ance.115 Isaac Rousseau had moved to 17 rue de Coutance in 1717. He lived on the top
floor of the house, while Francois Terroux116 and his family lived on a lower floor."'
While there is no evidence that Isaac was involved in the actions of 1718, he would not
have been unaware of the Lettres and neither would Jean-Jacques. Although only six in
1718, he was to remain in Geneva for another eleven years in the environment of the
watch-making community. He cannot have been unaware of the sentiments of the majority
of the Bourgeois, especially as, according to Duval during his interogation by the court, 'les
trois quarts de la bourgeoisie partageait les sentiments exprimes dans les lettres seditieus-
n ° 	 Ibid., pp. 156-176.
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es'.119 These same men also lived and worked amongst some of those who had been
involved in 1707 and others who were to be involved in 1734. Geneva was densely
inhabited within its old medieval walls and it would not be inconceivable that a few of those
who acted together concerning political matters might live in the same street; nonetheless,
the proximity of so many involved in the movements of opposition to the government is
interesting.
All these men were comfortable, Terroux seemingly was the wealthiest, but the others
worked in their own workshops at home ('cabinotiers') making watches from materials
provided by the large maitre-horlogiers, in return for a high salary. All the skilled work was
done in Geneva by such men, and during the eighteenth century the level of specialisation
in one aspect of watchmaking by each man became greater. 119 It was a perfect system
but it was unable to respond to the increasing demands for ever more watches as the
century progressed, thus allowing competitors in Neuchatel to benefit from their non-
corporative structures in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
The question must arise as to whether the words "faction" or "opponents of the govern-
ment" are the appropriate terms in the context of what was happening in Geneva. What
the Bourgeois had done was to create a secret, well-organised party. They had persuaded
one of their 'converts', Antoine Leger, to write them what amounted to a party manifesto.
The definition given by O'Gorman of what constituted a political party in the British
context is applicable in Geneva at this much earlier period. 129 There was no Parliament
in Geneva, but in the context of the Republic the Bourgeois saw the Conseil General as a
similar body. The Conseil General provided the non-oligarchical Bourgeois with a referent,
a clear sense of collective identity. The Bourgeois were not a factional group, since they
were in their entirety those with political rights within the state. They were more than a
pressure group, since they desired the return of the rights of the Conseil General in order
to return to it control over the government which they believed to be acting in an arbitrary
and unconstitutional manner.
In the context of O'Gorman's definition, the real difficulty with regard to those Bourgeois
who were involved in the 'underground' organisation concerns whether they really desired
to obtain political office. The constant criticism that the two smaller councils were in the
control of a small group of families must lead to the conclusion that, in fact, though not
stated as such, their aim, in widening the people able to sit in these smaller councils to the
generality of the Bourgeois, was that some of them would ultimately enjoy some part of
political power, rather than the current small and closed oligarchy.
For the patriciate, however, the concept of 'party' was similar to that expressed by
Bolingbroke:
'party is a political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties."21
Whether those Bourgeois who supported Leger's view were regarded as a faction, 'the
superlative from of party' 122 or as a party made little difference to the particiate. The aim
was clearly that of destroying the city's constitution.
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The threat made by the government in its declaration in 1718 against the letters did not
stop the continuation of meetings of those committed to seeing a return of the rights of
sovereignty to the Conseil Gèneral. In a note written in 1735, Frangois Rocca gave details
of a group who met regularly on Sunday evenings at the home of Sieur Du Roveray, who
lived in St. Gervais. 123 Amongst the diners were Jacques-Frangois De Luc, 124 and Jere-
mie Bouverot, who was known to have copied the second lettre anonyme, as well as
Michel Leger, the son of Antoine Leger.125
There was a second group which met on Sunday evening, when they dined in turn at
the home of each member and continued their meeting till later in the evening, which was
unusual in Geneva. This group had existed for some years. In it, were men such as
Francois Chevrier the apothecary and Louis Duval a merchant of gilded goods. 126 Michel
Leger was a member of both these societies, which between them contained some of the
more important leaders of the Bourgeois in Geneva. It was inevitable that these ostensibly
social meetings should discuss the situation in Geneva and more than probable that plans
were discussed as to how to organise their followers in such a way as persuade the
government and the two smaller councils of the seriousness of their demands.
Even more interesting is the information which emerged from witness statements as the
result of a criminal case of assault and battery of Michel Leger which was brought against
a junior member of the government, the Auditeur Jean-Louis de Normandie, in May 1720.
The evidence makes it clear that the evening was spent by Michel Leger with Jeremie
Bouverot and Louis Duval at the home of Mestrezat. 127 Thus, although there were at
least two groups or societies meeting on Sunday, there were also other occasions when
members of these different groups came together to dine and talk. 128 All of the men
named above were to play leading roles in the troubles of 1734-38 129 , some of them in
1763-1768 13°, while their sons were to play similar rOles in both 1763-8 and future
troubles in the state of Geneva.
How far such social gatherings and the matters discussed at them could be called
'pratiques secretes' is debatable. 131 Societies, or cercles, which met in the evening were,
and remained, an important part of the social fabric of the town, as there was little else to
do in the evenings. In a society like that of Geneva at this time, it was unwise to speak
about or discuss political matters in public. To debate openly different opinions, concerning
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taxation and the rights of the Conseil General, was to risk severe punishment from the)0
thorities. In such conditions, the Bourgeois were not going to remain silent, but were go
to ensure that their discussions were amongst friends who could be trusted. Their orgz
ation of their followers had to be carefully hidden from official view.
There is therefore some evidence that the 'party' continued to meet fairly regularly at
1718. This evidence also demonstrates that the future, as well as the current, leaders
meeting at organised social events. This amounts to sustained political activity, maint4
behind the scenes, in part because of the danger in Geneva resulting from overt politi
organisation. These regular meetings kept alive the important question of sovereignty
rather than:
'taxes ... commercial policies or individual cases of injustice.'132
These meetings were already taking place 10-15 years earlier than Palmer states. It
should also be remembered that in the Geneva situation taxation was an intergral
the discussion of sovereignty after 1715.
The Bourgeois also had at hand an additional method of meeting, organising and
passing ideas. There were two 'amicales' of a semi-military kind, the Societe de l'arqui
buse and the Societe du Canon. Originally created to maintain skill in arms, they met
regularly and in the summer organised shooting competitions, the winner of which in es
society was elected King for the year. O'Mara demonstrates that a number of the lead
of 1707, 1718 and 1734 were closely connected with these societies. 133 There were as
the regular meetings of the Militia, where all Bourgeois men were enrolled. These aga'
made ideal meeting places and provided a structure which the Bourgeois were to use
the future. Learning from the experience of 1707, the Bourgeois had avoided meetings
Inns which they had used in 1707, much to the chagrin of the authorities, who were ur
to discover any clues as to the real 'leaders' or the authors of the Lettres.
The government encouraged one of its members to write a response to the letters.
Jacob de Chapeaurouge 134 wrote Response a la lettre anonyme concemant les impik
contenue en quatre lettres, in which he attempted to show that 'liberty' and sovereign!)
should not be confused. In opposition to the author of the lettres anonymes, he arguec
that:
1 [1a] liberte ne rend pas souverains les peuples qui en jouissent 	 [qu'ils peuventl
etre libres, sans etre souverains, et plus encore, sans exercer la souveraine
autorite par eux-mernes.'135
He went on to try to prove that the right to tax was the sole prerogative of the two sm
councils. His arguments were based on both historical and legal grounds. In the latter
context, he stated that civil liberty was thus a combination of the rights and duties of
individual in society, but that sovereignty was:
'le pouvoir dont disposent les gouvernants sur la societe par le contrat social de
sujetion.'136
Unlike the letters he wrote in April 1707 concerning the demands of the Bourgeois his
letters of 1718 bring to the fore for the first time arguments based on the theory of so
contract. In Geneva, because of its restricted size, the people had, after concluding a
'32	 Palmer, op.cit, p. 129.
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social contract, ceded their right of summa majestas to the smaller councils. Included in
this secession was the right to levy taxation.
Thus, even though the Bourgeois of Geneva might no longer have the power to decree
new taxes as part of the summa majestas, they nonetheless remained 'free' men, with
their 'liberty'. The appearance of Les lettres anonymes and the four letters written in
response by de Chapeaurouge saw the creation of clear lines between, on the one hand,
the government and those who agreed with them and, on the other, the leaders of the
Bourgeois, which were to be further elaborated in 1734. For the Bourgeois, Les lettres
anonymes was the clear elaboration of beliefs that went back to Boutilier. For the govern-
ment, Chapeaurouge's response was an attempt to justify its belief, position and actions in
response to the continuing troublesome and misplaced claims of the Bourgeois.
A sudden calm
It is surprising that the trouble over the two letters died down quickly. In part this may
have been due to the effects on some Genevans of the crash in France resulting from the
collapse of Law's bank in Paris in 1720. 137 There was also some worry over the resur-
gence of the plague.
The Magistrature and the government party had been able to enforce their interpretation
of the constitution, but all they had achieved was public silence. It was not acceptance and
as 1J-A. De Luc wrote:
'Les Revolutions de 1707 et 1718 laissérent des resentiments dans le coeur des
Citoyens [Bourgeois]."38
Copies of the two letters were secreted away or committed to memory. They were to form
the basis of Rousseau's arguments in his Lettres de la Montaigne more than forty years
later as well as having considerable influence upon the Social Contract. Leger's letters had
sharply exposed the impossibility of a clear and certain resolution to the conflict. The
existence of earlier Edicts on the manner of governing the state, which stated categorically
that there should be no alteration to them, further complicated a difficult situation.
The attempt that the government had made in 1707 to destroy the movement which had
questioned its constitutional validity and some of its actions had proved a failure. Tron-
chin's comments concerning 1707:
'Je n'aime point le sang mais dans ces sortes d'occasions on ne deracine jamais le
mal qu'en en repandant abondamment.
were correct: the roots were deep and they proved impossible to destroy, as future events
were to show and past experience should have demonstrated. The events during the first
twenty years of the eighteenth century in Geneva showed that the old medieval ideas of
the commune and the relative power of the members of the commune had not been lost in
the city. The difficulty lay in attempting to return to such a period when contemporary ideas
were based on a structured oligarchical society with rights and powers concentrated in the
hands of a few.
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Chapter V
Foreign Intervention and the Crisis of the 1730s
The inability of the government to find a modus vivendi with the voters in the Conseil
GOnóral posed a serious threat to the governance of the city and its position within it. The
continuing fears concerning the security of the city also played their part in the political
divisions in Geneva with the desire to undertake ever more extensive fortifications
provoking disagreement and anger concerning the taxes necessary to finance the work.
This was to help turn normal political conflict into a military crisis. The taxation raised
without consultation to finance the project led to peaceful attempts to gain concessions.
The preference of the government for external mediators rather than negotiating with the
Bourgeois created further tensions within the state.
In 1734 an attempt was made by the great majority of the Bourgeois to persuade the
government to accept the right of the Conseil Genëral to decide upon the continuation or
otherwise of the taxation for ongoing fortification work. The well argued position of the
Bourgeois, based on Leger's Letters, in its turn forced the government and oligarchy to
elaborate clearly their own position, that the state was an aristodemocratie. This was an
emphatic slap in the face for the Bourgeois as it argued that sovereignty lay not in the
Conseil GónOral but in the smaller councils. The inability of the two sides to reach a
satisfactory compromise on this issue, and the discovery that the government had decided
to disarm cannon in the depot in St. Gervais and remove others led the Bourgeois to
temporarily take control of the city gates.
Though quickly returned to the government, the exposure of its relative weakness
caused the government to accept, in early 1736, the offer of a volunteer force recruited
amongst the Natifs and Habitants to aid the government when required. Unruly behaviour
by this force in August 1736 led to a second holding of the gates and much of the town by
the Bourgeois militia and an appeal by the government for help to Geneva's two Swiss
allies. The ensuing negotiations which Bern and Zurich arranged were almost complete
when France offered assistance, making it necessary to recommence the negotiations with
France as well as Bern and Zurich..
The Mediation document which emerged from the joint involvement of France, Zurich
and Bern, though accepted by the Conseil Genëral and apparently settling the question of
sovereignty in the city, was, in effect, to introduce further restrictions and difficulties. It also
meant that in future, France would have a treaty right to intervene in Geneva's affairs if it
so desired, as well as Bern and Zurich.
Geneva and her allies in the European context
The fact that, in 1738, the patriciate and government were able to emerge with their
power enhanced was in part due to the intervention of their powerful 'ally' France. Between
the fear of Sardinia and the danger from their own Bourgeois, the patriciate:
'ont besoin de la France pour contenir la bourgeoisie et l'appui du roi leur est
necessaire pour les defendre des enterprises du roi de Sardaigne.'
The involvement of France in Genevan. affairs in 1737-8, though ensuring the reinforce-
ment of the position of the city's government, merely increased the divide between the
•	 Sautier, op.cit, p. 963. Letter of the French Resident Champeaux to Amelot, 21. 7. 1739.
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majority of the Bourgeois and the minority ruling elite. The so-called 'pacification' of the city
aggravated the problem and introduced further future difficulties for the state.
The Bourgeois also learnt that the city's two Swiss allies were almost as in thrall to the
French as the government and patriciate of Geneva had become. Bern, itself a highly
oligarchic city, had little sympathy with the aims of the Bourgeois in Geneva. Bern was
apprehensive that any success on the part of the Bourgeois in Geneva might well carry
over into Vaud, which Bern ruled as a conquered territory, especially since the rulers had
already, in 1723, seen the attempt by Davel to raise the Vaud against Bern's rule. 2 Zurich,
more sympathetic, was far too weak to actually defy France and Bern by standing along-
side the Bourgeois of Geneva.3
The patriciate had little choice in their allies. France was an immediate and powerful
neighbour, allied to Geneva and also had close ties with most of the cantons in Switzer-
land. Few of the cantons could afford to offend the French, quite apart from the 'pensions'
and other remunerations which reached many of the ruling elite from French coffers. Thus
Geneva was unable to play her Swiss allies Bern and Zurich off against the French. Her
other immediate neighbour, Sardinia, 4 had still not completely abandoned her claims to
Geneva.
France, under the rule of the Regent during the minority of Louis XV, had little desire to
see great change and upheaval. There was the ever-present danger of the claims of Philip
V of Spain, the uncle of Louis. The continued attempts by Philip to reverse the loss of
Spain's territories in Italy, caused diplomatic unrest in Europe. Furthermore, the uncertainty
of the Hanoverian succession in Britain gave impetus to both Britain and France to move
together in alliance.
The old alliance between France and all the Swiss cantons had been renewed in 1723.
The Swiss benefited from favourable trading conditions in France, and the use of Swiss
mercenary troops by France, including some from Protestant cantons. In Bern and Zurich,
such employment was important, since it might well have been difficult to find occupation
for the men thus engaged had they remained at home.5
The difficulties caused in European diplomacy by the desire of Austria to persuade as
many nations as possible to sign the Pragmatic Sanction added to the pressures faced by
small, powerless nations such as Geneva. 6 The city was even more isolated when France,
Spain and Sardinia allied to attack Austria in Italy? Neither could Bern and Zürich take
Walpole's offer of a defensive alliance seriously. The British had only shown any real
interest in Switzerland when it served their own purposes, so the value of any defensive
alliance would have to be very high to overcome the power of the French connections.
France, unlike Britain, had never closed her diplomatic mission to the Swiss. This attitude
2	 Oechsli, op. cit., pp. 270-1.
Ibid., p. 263. 'Although Zürich was a "guild aristocracy', ...the nomination of the guild-masters by burghers sufficed.
to prevent the formation of a patriciate •and to preserve legal equality within the town walls.'
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on the part of the two Protestant cantons was proved correct when Britain did little to help
Austria in the war of Polish succession.
Fortifications and finance
Initial work had begun by 1715, but so extensive were the plans that many decisions still
had to be made in the mid-1720s. Micheli du Crest 8 argued that the plan of Desroques
for the extension of the fortifications on the land-side of the city was not the right one for
Geneva. Michell believed that it ignored the city's geographical position, and he proposed
his own solution to the Deux Cents, which contained five main ways of strengthening the
city:
1. par un bon gouvemement, 2. par des alliances, 3. en agrandissant cette ville, la
peuplant, la disciplinant et la bien exergant dans l'art militaire, 4. en y accumulant
un tresor bien rdgi, 5. enfin par des ouvrages bien faits suivant les bons principes
du genie:9
This was a wider-ranging plan than a mere strengthening and extension of the existing
fortifications. There was considerable danger in the third point, as there had been enough
difficulty in absorbing the French and Piedmontese refugees who had sought refuge in
Geneva in the 1680s. Moreover, by implication, the Michell plan could be seen as calling
for new ideas on the way the state was organised and governed.
In 1727, although Micheli was a member of a commission of the Deux Cents created to
examine the whole question, 10 he was not consulted being absent from Geneva on
military duty in France. Present in the Deux Cents for the debate upon the report (1727),
he lost his voice and was advised to submit a written report. He had fifty copies of his
Memoire ll printed to be sent to different members of the two councils eight months later.
The printing of the Memoire led to conflict with the government, which claimed that it risked
giving the enemies of the state too clear a view of the city's defences and especially those
weak points in the fortifications highlighted in the report.
Careful reading of the report makes it clear why the Deux Cents and the Petit Conseil
were annoyed. There is much argument concerning whether it was necessary to build vast
new walls to strengthen the city on its land side. Micheli argued that:
Tennemy passant le RhOne emporte St. Gervais par deffaut de fortifications. ... il
est evident, [pour St Gervais] que sa conservation ne doit pas dtre moms prêtieuse
que celle de l'autre partie de la ville...' 12
The engineers based all their calculations on their belief that no attack was likely to take
place from the direction of the river Rhörie," what Micheli called the 'non-passage du
Rh6ne' and was he argued:
'c'est vouloir s'aveugler que de s'endormir sur une telle supposition et en la
supposant, ... c'est encore derechef mal raisonner, que de vouloir former de
4	 See Appencfix IV B V/1.
*	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3dorne parte, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 415.
' 	 Barbey, op. cit., p. 108.
*Memoirs sur co qui s'est passe au sujet des fortifications de Geneve.-
12 BPU Geneve Ms. Cramer 49, Mcheli memoirs, 3.
13 See Map 3 of Geneva, p. 48a.
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nouvelles fortifications:14
There were two serious implications in Micheli's comments. The territory immediately
adjacent to St. Gervais was French, an ally of Geneva. His insistence upon the need to
fortify St. Gervais implied that there was the possibility of attack from France via the
RhOne. The second was that St. Gervais was the area of the city which housed those
Bourgeois who had already shown their opposition to the government. St. Gervais also
contained a large number of Natifs and Habitants. The former, many of whom had become
skilled workers in the watch trade, had already shown some stirring of political interest
even though they had no political rights within the state. The desire of the government to
leave this area exposed, while spending considerable sums on that part of the city where
they and their followers lived, did little to enhance their standing in St. Gervais.
The attempt by the Deux Cents to try Micheli over his Memoire was illegal, since under
the Edicts it could not act as a court of first instance. Its only power in the judicial field was
to act as a court of appeal. He should have been tried by the Petit Consei1. 15 Nonethe-
less, he was punished by the loss of his Bourgeois status, his fief of Crest taken away
from him and all his goods were forfeited to the state.
Micheli claimed that the Deux Cents did not have the right to judge him and published a
tract explaining his position," some copies being seized by the government, while others
continued to circulate clandestinely. In it, Micheli argued that there had been a serious judi-
cial irregularity, with the wrong council condemning him. There should be a meeting of the
Conseil General, as the sovereign council of the state, which could decide what should be
done about the violation of the Edicts in the legal process against him. It was, however,
one and a half centuries since the Conseil General had done such work."
The inability of Micheli to obtain any large-scale support among the Bourgeois meant
that he remained a fugitive from Genevan justice. His attempt to become involved in the
troubles in Geneva after 1734, with his work Requete, avertissement, placet et memoire,
led to his being convicted of rebellion and sentenced to death. This was carried out in
effigy on 8th. November 1735.18
The episode underlined the sensitivity of the government to any suggestions made
concerning changes to the political system of the state. It also demonstrated that the
government continued to treat harshly, as they had Gallatin and Fatio, any member of an
oligarchical family who appeared to support the Bourgeois and their demands for a more
active and powerful Conseil General.
Peaceful attempts at change
An opportunity to curtail the massive work on the fortifications had been lost in 1725,
when the Conseil General had had to vote on the continuation, for a further ten years, of
the taxes introduced in 1715. This was in part because:
'les affaires du Mississippi et la peste de Marseille ayant derange le commerce,
chacun occupe a prevenir Cu a reparer le naufrage de sa fortune perdit pour le
moment les affaires publique de vue et les Conseils prolongerent seuls sans
Ms. Cramer 49, loc. cit.
Barbey, op. ciL, p. 109.
'Discours en forme de lettres sur le gouvernement de Genêve et l'affaire du sieur Micheli du Crest'
Sir Francis d'Ivemois, op. ciL, Volume I, p.86.
P.E. Martin, op. ciL, 36me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 430.
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opposition les impfits pour un terme pareil au premier:19
As the ten years grant was rapidly approaching its end in 1734, the Bourgeois decided that
it was time to try in a calm and ordered way to persuade the government to consider a
meeting of the Conseil General to examine the question. On 4th. March, over a thousand
Bourgeois, divided into the sixteen Bourgeois militia corps23, led by a delegation of
twenty-six, marched in silence and perfect order through the streets of Geneva.21 In turn,
they visited the house of each of the Syndics and the Procureur-General to present their
Representation, the whole process taking five hours. This was the culmination of years of
work as evidenced by a pamphlet of 1734:
'le placard [la condamnation des lettres de Leger] ... n'a servi qu'e reveiller l'atten-
tion des Citoyens et Bourgeois sur leurs legitimes et importans Privileges. Des
l'annee 1718, us [les Bourgeois] n'ont cesse d'en faire le sujet de leurs conversa-
tions ... que le conduite des dits Conseils tendoit a sapper leur liberte..:."-
The Representation of 4th. March 1734 contained two main points. The first was that the
two smaller councils should 'bien reflechir on the taxes that they had introduced in 1713 to
finance the fortifications without any consultation with the Conseil General. The uncertainty
of 1724 had enabled the government to obtain the renewal of what some of the Bourgeois
considered an illegal impost. It was not that the oligarchy in Geneva:
'[was] subject to popular harangue ... for failing to supply adequate defence for the
state,'23
as was the case in the united Provinces. For the Bourgeois, it was the illegal manner in
which the taxes to finance the work were raised. They hoped in 1734 to obtain a complete
review of the tax and its original illegal imposition done without the authority of what they
claimed was the sovereign body of the state, the Conseil General. The second point was:
'[que] les Magnifiques Conseils aient requite de resoudre que, conformement a ce
que nous avons droit d'exiger, le Conseil general sera assemble aux fins que les
dites resolutions y soient portees pour le maintien de notre liberte, de merne que
pour l'affermissement et l'avancement du bien public qui sera, en tout temps, l'objet
de nos voeux.... 124
All Bourgeois males were enrolled in the Militia in units which were attached to the area
where they lived. The Militia, based on the four main quarters of the town, was periodically
assembled for exercises and practice in the use of its weapons, and its officers were from
the patriciate. In 1734, each Militia unit appointed by popular vote one or two represen-
tatives, who had to report back to it for instructions, all of which were decided by free vote.
All this was done in the absence of the officers.
The existence of the elected 'officials' was intermittent. They appeared at times of crisis,
as in July and December 1734 or February 1736. Those elected had the title of Commis-
sion de la Bourgeoisie, and they arranged to meet at a particular place, appointed a secre-
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tary and kept registers of their proceedings.25 It was through this commission that leaders
such as Michel Leger were able to inform the Bourgeois of what was happening, and it
was from them that they were able to gauge the mood of their fellow Bourgeois. Unlike
1707, there were a number of leaders of the Bourgeois, but no overall leader as Fatio had
been.26
The absolute maximum of Bourgeois voters was 1,500 but, normally, a proportion of
those with the right to vote were not in the city, which reduced the number liable to vote to
around 1,200-1,300. The presentation of the petition on 4th. March saw five-sixths of the
voters on the streets in support of the petition. It was a tribute to the level of organisation
and discussion that the Bourgeois had been able to maintain during the years since
Leger's Lettres of 1718, before the 1730s as mentionned by Palmer.° This was clearly
no faction, but a party action 'authorised by the voice of the country' 28 but the majority of
those with political rights in the state demanding a meeting of the Conseil General. Even
those opposed to the demands of the Bourgeois were forced to admit the strength of their
support. Cramer wrote:
'la Ville entiere fut dans l'action et dans le Mouvement, et il est certain qu'une
grande pate de la Bourgeoisie eat plutOt abandonne sa Patrie pour se retirer
ailleurs que de se desister de cette Demande.'29
It was also a demonstration of the ability of the Bourgeois to organise and control their
followers. This was a:
'a fully fledged political movement in which devotion to a set of political principles is
in greater evidence than attachment to the person of a popular leader.'39
The head of the column was led by the elected representatives of the Militia. There was an
'ideological' content in their demands, as there had been in 1707 and 1718: the right of
sovereignty of the Conseil General. The Lettres of Leger were further reinforced in another
written document in the form of a political catechisme which was doubtless used in the
meetings of the Militia to put across the party line. 31 The extract from the catechism found
in diagram 5 makes the position of the Bourgeois in Geneva clear, both with regard to the
oligarchy they claimed was ruling the state and the rights of the people in the Conseil
General. The answers to the questions posed are straightforward, clear and easy to
understand, exactly as a party's policies should be. The influence of Leger's Lettres are
also clear to see. At the same time. the behaviour of the Bourgeois in Geneva was quite
different from those in America such as the Massachusetts Guy Fawkes crowds or the
Wilkes riots in London. An eye-witness was forced to admit that the whole was carried out:
'avec un ordre, une tranquillite, une cordialite, une decence et un respect qui ont
fait l'admiration de ceux qui en ont ete temoins.'32
23	 Sautier, op. cit., p. 188.
24	 See Appendix IV B V/2.
27	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 129. See also Chapter IV.
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31	 See diagram 5, p. 97a.
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Diagram 5
BPU, Geneve, Ms.fr. 840, 76 Entretien d'un Citoyen avec un
Nouveau Bourgeois en forme de Catechisme, 1734, 78-83.
Extracts taken from Entretien d'un Citoyen avec un Nouveau
Bourgeois en forme de Catechisme.
'Qu'est-ce que "oligarchie"?'
'C'est un Etat gouverne souverainement par peu de person-
nes riches et nobles.'
'Qu'est-ce que Republique Democratique?'
'C'est un &tat libre, dans le quel le Peuple excerce par
luy meme les arts de la souverainite sans pourtant exerc-
er sur sa termes mais remetre le Gouvernement & des Chefs
ou off iciers qui lui font comptables et dont il a le
droit d'examiner l'administration.'
'Vous ne pretendes donc pas que le Peuple alt remis aux Syndi-
cs, Petit et Grand Conseils le pouvoir d'excercer d'autres
droits?'
'Non, car il n'a pas celuy d'etablir des ImpOts, d'alien-
erte le Domaine, ou de charger l'Etat de tr6s grosses
debts, de declarer la Guerre ou de faire la paix ou des
Alliances, d'elire des Magistrats, oil de faire des loix,
car si vous examines leur pouvoir, vous ne decouvrires
rien de pareil dans toute leur etendue.'
'Et pourquoi ont-ils pratique jusqu'a present tous ces arti-
cles reserve l'Election des Magistrats?'
'C'est par abus, et c'est ce qui occasion aujourd'huy les
grands difficultes entre les Conseils et le Peuple.'
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The reaction of the government, as seen in the Register of the Council, was true to form:
'Par rapport au memoire, II a ete remarque que le but des auteurs est de renverser
le gouvemement et d'etablir l'anarchie ... qu'ils (les representants) sont dans le
prejuge qu'etant un peuple libre et souverain us sont en droit de faire tout ce qu'ils
jugeront a propos.'33
This was not a dialogue of the deaf, but of the deaf and the blind. The smaller councils
had no intention of conceding the demand for a meeting of the Conseil Genèral. There
was to be no immediate response, and the petition was to be 'lost' in a series of commis-
sions and committees. The Register of the Councils states:
'qu'il ne faut rien presser dans cette affaire, que les Conseils doivent bien prendre
leur temps pour s'eclairer et s'unir.'34
But there were no concessions that could be made, as the petition had one demand, the
calling of a Conseil Genëral. A further difficulty was that the Petit Conseil was not itself
united. According to letters written at the time there was considerable concern over Le
Fort,35 the First Syndic:
'Tronchin et ... quelques autres dont le Premier Syndic est implacable Ennemi. II
[Le Fort] a trouve le moyen déjà de les rendre odieux au Peuple ...II obtiendra leur
destitution et fera elire en leur place des Gens qui lui sont entierement devoues et
qui accederont avec lui a tous les Attentats du Peuple pour renverser le Gouveme-
ment.'38
This was exaggerated as Le Fort could not decide who sat on the Petit Conseil. Paradoxi-
cally, these apparent difficulties within the government may have strengthened their
resolve to make no concessions to the Bourgeois such as had been done in 1707. After
two months, the petitioners sent a further delegation to demand the councils consider their
petition and refrain from using denigratory terms when referring to the Bourgeois' leaders
in the various papers circulating within the councils.37
The members of the Petit Conseil were convinced that some kind of secret council
existed which was controlling the Bourgeois. Cramer believed that the secret council
contained three: Michel Leger, Dr. LeFort (a relative of the Syndic) and J-Fr. Chevrier.38
Later, the three became five, and they were in turn joined by seven assessors, making a
committee of 12. There appears to be little evidence for the existence of any such 'secret'
body at this time or at any time in the period 1734-8. The Bourgeois were open in their
discussions held in the militia, the elected representatives of the militia met openly, a state
of affairs which D'Ivemois confirms in his claim that people began to meet in public places.
The Petit Conseil considered these meetings to be 'Assemblees d'attroupement' and
wished to attempt to prohibit them as well. 38 They may have been thinking of the various
32	
loc. ciL
$4	 Barbey, op. cit., p. 110.
ss	 See Appencfix IV B V/3.
34 BPU Genilve, Ms. Tronchin 346, Letter written by Tronchin to Bern 16.11.34.
37	 They were called: 'novateurs, ingrats, ... boutefeux, parjures, skitieux, brouillons qui agissent contra our honneur;
leur conscience et tour serrnent.' P. E. Martin, op.cit., p.419.
34
	
Sautier, op. cit., p. 189, ft.1.
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dinner meetings that men such as Leger had held since 1718, but they were hardly
secret.43 In Geneva, anyone going home after dark had to ensure that he had a lighted
candle with him, for security, but also to ensure that he could be recognised.
The Bourgeois had, with their Representation shown an ability to organise and an
agreement on policy which can only have come about with careful and long-term planning.
The use of the militia as the medium of organisation to bring the Bourgeois out on the
streets in discipline and silence was a brilliant and carefully-thought-out action. The action
in Geneva in 1734 must stand as a tribute to the organisers and those who took part in it.
The peaceful action of such a large percentage of the Bourgeois also had another side. It
would be extremely difficult for the government to punish so many people. The execution
of Lemaftre and Fatio was not forgotten, nor the treatment of those who had shown any
sympathy to the de Normandie family. As Cellerier states:
'Les souvenirs de 1707 avaient laisse dans les Ames beaucoup d'amertume, et
merne de vagues terreurs.'41
Some in Geneva thought that the government might have recourse to the soldiers of Bern
and Zurich as they had done in 1707, especially because in 1734, there were still 62 mem-
bers sitting in the Deux Cents who had called for their help against Fatio and his support-
ers in 1707.42
The Bourgeois became increasingly impatient by the delay in the response to their initial
Representation and were dismayed by the claims of the government that they were in any
way expressing 'revolutionary sentiments'. A second Representation was therefore made
to the Syndics in late June 1734, but this was not passed on to the two councils by the
Syndics.
The government prepares its arguments
During the four months that had elapsed since the initial petition, the two councils had
been trying to find some manner of compromise. The legal and philosophical interpreta-
tions of the question of 'sovereignty' were examined in detail and for the first time a state-
ment of the philosophical and legal basis of the position of the government and the two
smaller councils was formulated. 43 The work was carried out by a commission which had
the final responsibility for framing a reply to the Representation of 4th. March. The
members of the committee were Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui,44 Charles Lullin, Gabriel
Grenus, Jean-Louis Du Pan, Jean-Louis Chouet, David Sartoris, Marc-Conrad Trembley,
Jacob de Chapeaurouge, Jean-Louis Buisson, Frangois-Jean Turrettini, Michel Lullin de
Chateauvieux and Pierre Mussard, all councillors.45
Jacob de Chapeaurouge had already been deeply involved in defending the position of
the government and patriciate. In 1707, he wrote La Lettre d'un citoyen de Geneve A un
autre citoyen de ses amis sur les mouvements presents, which was in support of the
40	 See Chapter IV, pp. 88ff.
41
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d'Archeologie de Geneve, 12 1860, p.197.
a	 Ibid., p. 198, ft. 1.
43	 Barbey, op. cit, p.111.
44	 Ibid., pp. 70-4. See Appendix IV B V/4.
45	 See Appendix IV B V/5.
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government In 1715, it was Chapeaurouge who wanted the Procureur-General to be a tool
of the councils rather than the spokesman for the people in the smaller councils." In
1718, he wrote the Reponse a la lettre anonyme concemant les impels, contenue en
quatre lettres. His involvement in the committee in 1734 saw the reiteration of all that he
had previously expounded. The basis of his ideas can be taken from what he wrote in
1707. The people were rather like a minor:
'qui, incapable de se conduire lui-marne, n'est jamais plus sage quo lorsqu'il
soumet sa personne et ses biens a la direction de gens qui aient toute l'affection et
toutes les lumieres nacessaires.'"
In this, Chapeaurouge was merely echoing the ideas held by all those who ruled at the
time. Brought up to believe in their right to govern, that they were by virtue of their
education, training and birth the natural rulers of the state, they had little understanding of
the claims of the 'people' or Bourgeois. In the Age of Reason, it was believed that the
ordinary man, deprived as most were of the benefits of education which enabled the
passions to be tamed, was quite unfitted for the responsibilities of power, as Bolingbroke
warned Swift in a letter:
'this monstrous beast has passions to be moved, but no reason to be appealed
to.'"
The hierachical nature of all eighteenth century states was further reinforced in Geneva by
the teaching of the church and the relative simplicity of life. Fear of the raging mob was
underlined by the examples of Athens and Rome, taken from the classical education that
all aristocrats received. The experience of Geneva in the 1530-1560 fortified the innate
belief that to accept the claims of the Bourgeois that the sole sovereign power of the state
lay in the Conseil General was simply to head the state toward anarchy and its destruction.
As Sautier rightly says of the members of the committee, they were the most determined
opponents of the Bourgeois and their ideals."
The committee needed to find a theory to fill the vacuum created by the denial of direct
divine intervention in the area of the state and its government. It was a problem that was
not unique to Geneva. In England men like Hobbes and Locke, and Pufendorf in Germany
had attempted to find answers to the problems raised by the place of man in God's
universe, which, in turn, raised the whole question of God's creation. If the authority of God
were removed as the controlling force over both the governed and the governors, what
was to replace Him? There was no consultation of the Consistoire over this matter. The
replacement of God as a controlling factor in the political life of Geneva was crucial to the
patriciate's continuing to control the state. They had to establish a theory or philosophy
which could justify their control of the organs of government while at the same time justify-
ing their rejection of the claims of the Bourgeois that the Conseil General was sole
sovereign of the state.
Basically, they developed a concept that was based on the idea that societies were
created by 'la volonta humaine'. The School of Natural Law closely associated with the
a	 BPU Gonave, Ms. Tronchin 282 Mamoire et Lettres de M. de Chapeaurouge concemant la Charge de Procureur-
General 1715 a 1717. The current Procureur-Gentiral, Louis LeFort ensured that the post remained free of the
control of the Syndics and government
a	 Barbey, op. cit, p. 89.
• Issac Kramnick op. cit., citing a letter from Bolingbroke to Swift, 21 July 1721, p. 103, f. 43.
• Sautier, op. ci4 p. 242.
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name of Pufendorf5° was to be used extensively by the patriciate in the elaboration of
their position. Pufendorf had posited that man had renounced his 'natural' state for a civil
state where he agreed to submit himself, by means of a social contract, to government
created for that purpose. The Commissioners claimed:
'que la genese de l'Etat est le fruit de la conclusion d'un contrat social, donc d'un
accord entre les hommes sans aucune intervention divine.'51
Having once established that there was such a 'social contract', it was but a short step
to concluding therefore that:
'la Republique de Geneve a ete creee par la conclusion d'un contrat social,
convention passee entre le peuple et la magistrature, par laquelle les membres du
Conseil General ont remis aux Conseils restreints l'exercise de presque tous les
droits contenus dans la souverainete.'"
According to their report, the political Edicts of 1543-1568 were the social contract on
which the state of Geneva was created.
In following the teaching of Pufendorf, the patriciate was able to accept that the Conseil
GOnOral was indeed sovereign but only in its original state. The origin of all society was
when people came together and decided jointly on a code for their governance and self-
preservation. Resulting from this decision, there would follow the creation of a commonly-
agreed form of government and a pact of submission by which:
'apres avoir choisi une ou plusieurs personnes A qui l'on confere le pouvoir de
gouverner la societe, ceux qui sont revetus de cette autorite supreme s'engagent
veiller avec soin au bien public et les autres en merne temps promettent une fidele
obeissance.'53
This was the ideal solution to their problem. While accepting that the people had once
been sovereign, it justified the transfer of that sovereignty to the magistrates and the two
smaller councils by the political Edicts of 1543, 1568 and 1570. At the same time, there
could be no legal, legitimate modification of these Edicts. Thus, sovereignty in the state
was divided between the different groups within the state, none of which alone could re-
open the question of the division of that authority. It was therefore not possible for the
Conseil Gôneral to demand the prerogative with regard to taxes because:
'cette "partie" [la prerogative des impOts] de la souverainete appartient exclusive-
ment aux Conseils restreints en vertu des Edits de 1543,1568 et 1570.'54
There was a right of resistance against tyranny, though this had never been necessary
in Geneva. Thus the people Geneva were bound by the 'contract' to submission and
obedience to their Magistrates and for good measure:
'tous les mouvements populaires sont condamnables.'55
In the eyes of the government therefore, all attempts by the Bourgeois to persuade it to
agree to a meeting of the Conseil General were against the peace of the state and the
basic tenets of the social contract. The government was attempting, through the elabora-
tion of its theory, to make the claims of the Bourgeois impossible.
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Having set out the Councils' theory at the beginning, the report then works its way
through the manner in which various powers were given to the different councils. The Edict
of 1570 gave a 'titre particulier' to the two smaller councils to raise any necessary taxation,
and they claimed that it was perpetual. Geneva was to call its system of government an
aristdemocratie which was defined as an:
'aristocratie elective mêlée de quelques reserves en faveur de la genáralite du
peuple.'58
The publication of the report at the end of June made it clear that there was no common
ground between the majority of the Bourgeois and the ruling patriciate.
Hence, by mid-1734, there were in Geneva two distinct groups, both with a programme
of political action, a 'manifesto' which set out their ideas and aims, and both with followers
and supporters. For the Bourgeois, the Conseil General was sovereign, the smaller
councils and the Syndics being the appointees of the sovereign power and with no
sovereign power themselves. This had been their constant theme since 1707, carefully set
out in 1718 in Leger's two Lettres, and repeated in another document which circulated in
1731
'que l'usage que l'on veut faire de cet Edit [1570] est d'autant plus dangereux, qu'il
est directement °pose a notre forme de Gouvemement qui ne reconnoit pour
Souverain de cette Republique que le corps des Citoyen et Bourgeois assembles
avec les Conseils suivant nos Loix fondamentales.'"
The Bourgeois in Geneva would have had no difficulty in accepting the argument expound-
ed by Martin Howard Jr. writing of the Stamp Act in 1765:
'The jurisdiction of Parliament being established, it will follow that this jurisdiction
cannot be apportioned; it is transcendent and entire.'58
For the government and the patriciate, sovereignty resided in the smaller councils and
the Syndics, having been handed to them by the Conseil General. Both sought evidence in
previous Edicts to bolster their respective arguments, especially the Edict of 1570 with
regard to taxation. Both could argue that it was the other side which had changed or
desired to 'change' the constitution of the state. Thus in Geneva the rehearsal for the argu-
ments between the Americans and the British between 1762-1776 was being played out
much earlier. The difference lay in the fact that the Bourgeois were arguing along the
same lines as the British government took concerning the non-divisibility of sovereignty,
while the Genevan government was to argue, as did some Americans, for the divisibility of
sovereignty. In Geneva, the Deux Cents could introduce new taxes without the consent of
the Conseil General, which was 'the people' of Geneva, while in the Colonies, the Ameri-
cans argued that their local assemblies established under Royal Charter had the right to
tax locally, not the House of Commons, in London, where they were in no way represent-
ed.
The problem in Geneva lay in the fact that there was no mechanism for debate and
political compromise within the state. The refusal of one side to call meetings of the one
forum where matters could be discussed (the Conseil General) placed the Bourgeois in a
difficult position. They had no desire to replace, or overthrow the Syndics or the Petit
Conseil. They were content to allow the government to govern but this meant, because of
their insistence upon the sovereignty of the Conseil General, that all new taxation, new
laws or changes in existing laws had to be debated and accepted by the sovereign.
Sautier, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 213.
57	 AEG Ms. historique 257 Lettre dun Citoyen a un Citoyen &rite en 1731, p. 77.
5S	 Bailyn, 'Pamhlets', op. cit., p. 538, Pamphlet 10, 'A Letter from a Gentlemen at Halifax'.
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In contrast to Britain, the loosening of religious doctrine in Geneva did not lead to a vast
and embittered debate about the fundamental beliefs of the faith. The patriciate, or many
of them, in the eighteenth century settled gently into their scientific interests without
seeming unduly worried by the problems of Deism and the danger of atheism. Energies
were channeled more into the far more contentious political issues of the division of power
within the state.
In Geneva, the relaxation of the absolutism of God in life and the world was succeeded
by the absolutism of man-made law, i.e. of laws which were to a great extent based on the
Edicts which had created the state. Nothing was to change except that the state was not
one based on God's direct intervention, which looked to the Bible as its textbook, but on a
contract agreed between the rulers and the ruled, buttressed by jurisprudence. Practice
and Law were to be used by those already in power to enable them to remain in power.
The fact that the two smaller councils were both the writers of the law and the judges of
those same laws was immaterial. There was no independent judiciary in the state. By
1734, the oligarchy had moved into modern times by establishing a sound legal basis for
the state and its form of government, which, in theory at least, should not have caused any
difficulty. Law was a logical and unemotional task-master, not open to the myriad of inter-
pretations that a divinely-based state might have to face.
Actions rather than words
The government, because of tension in the city during the long wait for its reply to the
Representation of 4th. March, gave orders for defensive measures to be taken in the town,
especially for the protection of the upper town, where the town hall and the organs of
government were located. Conditions in the city were certainly not normal. A number of
Bourgeois were permanently in the streets, where they discussed amongst themselves, a
situation some claimed 'qui ressemblait fort a une erneute permanente.'
It was decided that the cannons in the artillery store in St. Gervais should be spiked in
case the wilder elements in the Bourgeois should decide to use force to attain their ends.
The three men with responsibility for the safety of the city and its inhabitants, Lullin, de
Carro and Trembley 60 acted in accordance with an order that had been given them by
the Petit Conseil on 4th. June, to prepare a plan of defence according to what Trembley
deemed necessary for the meeting of the Deux Cents on 1st. July. It was at this meeting
that the text of the reply to the Representation of 4th. March would be discussed. Several
smaller cannons were to be taken and stored in the old town. The noise, together with the
need to work around the clock, attracted attention. That night (30th. June - 1st. July) some
Bourgeois gained entry to the fort of Chantepoulet in St. Gervais and discovered that the
larger cannons had been spiked. Later in the morning, one of the carts coming from the
Fort was stopped and inspected by some Bourgeois. It was found to be carrying, well-
hidden, the smaller cannons from the Fort. The tension and anger in the town were such .
that, even though two of the leaders of the Bourgeois, MM. Vaudenet the elder and
Oltramare,61 went immediately to demand an explanation from the first Syndic, the
damage was done.
An attempt by the clergy to calm the growing crowd in the place Bel-Air was without
success, the crowd believing wild rumours the government was about to use the garrison
5.	 Cellerier, op. cit., p. 204.
"	 See Appendix W B V17.
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to crush them. The government was forced to concede to the demands of the Bourgeois
that the guard should be replaced by units of the Bourgeois militia, the small cannons
returned to St. Gervais as well as the spiked cannons de-spiked.
For Genevan historians such as P.E. Martin:
le gouvemement legal, s'il subsiste encore, est sans pouvoir;'62
The statement appears exaggerated. This is borne out by the statements made to a
Commission which was established by the Compagnie des Pasteurs in an attempt to
negotiate between the government and the Bourgeois.° At a meeting with representa-
tives of the Bourgeois on 4th. July," the representatives were asked by the pastors to
speak freely about their proposals and aims. In reply they:
'se boment a exprimer le voeu d'un prompt Conseil General, pour decider de la
continuation des fortifications, et de celle des nouveaux impOts.'65
As the situation in the city had deteriorated in May, the-pastors offered their services to
the Petit Conseil in an attempt to settle the difficulties between the government and the
Bourgeois. A special commission had been formed with four members from the Compa-
gnie and four members from the Petit Conseil, but they rarely met before the beginning of
July. The crises at the beginning of July saw the pastors attempting more actively to
intervene as a neutral force. A new committee consisting of eleven pastors met the
representatives of the Bourgeois. By the time the pastors returned to the Syndic to report
on their meeting, it had already been decided that there would be a meeting of the Conseil
General. The pastors' help had proved unnecessary.
The government and the Syndics continued to function normally and were treated with
the same respect. Nonetheless, it was clearly a chastening experience for the members of
the Petit Conseil to have to deal with the Bourgeois militia committee. Arrangements
agreed to at such meetings were referred back to each militia unit to be voted upon.
Inevitably, agreements reached by the delegates were overturned by the democratic vote
of the militia. Slow and frustrating as such procedures must have been, it is equally
surprising to see P. E. Martin stating that, in part, this was due to the fact that, although
there was the committee with men of a certain stature, there was no leader such as Fatio
had been. 1707 had shown how dangerous it was for an individual to act as leader"
The Conseil General met within a week of these dramatic events, without any unrest.
The Bourgeois voted to continue the taxation for the defences of the city for another ten
years by 1364 votes." It was also agreed to end torture, to improve the position of those
standing criminal trial, and the militia would no longer be commanded by the sergeants of
the garrison, but by Bourgeois officers. The entire meeting was conducted in a calm and
solemn atmosphere, far from the anarchy that many of the patriciate had expected.
The results of this meeting of the Conseil General were mild. The Bourgeois had wanted
to have such a meeting because they believed that it was the Conseil Generals sovereign
P.E. Martin. op. cit, 3erne. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 423.
Cellerier, op. cit. p. 221. Consisted of the Moderator, Theo. Le Clerc, MM. Turrettini, Fatio, Maurice, Bessonnet,
Vial, Vautier, La Fort, Leger, Dentrand and De La Rive.
.4	 loc. cit. Ms. isaac-Ami Marcet, Francois Terroux, Michel Girard, le pere, Jean-Antoine RillieL Nicolas De Lorme,
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right to discuss the question of the fortifications and the renewal of the taxes required to
finance the necessary work. They were, once that right was conceded, willing to accept the
recommendation of the government and to continue the taxation. Yet, before the meeting
of the Conseil General, the Register of the Petit Conseil laments the fact that:
'le peuple est en armes dans tous les quartiers de la ville et ne voulant entendre
aucune raison, les Conseils sont a sa discretion.' [my empasis]
The persistence of such ideas as above concerning the Bourgeois shows how deeply
cultrally rooted the ideas of the patriciate were.
Immediately after the agreement reached at the Conseil General, the Bourgeois handed
back to the garrison guard duties in the city. This, together with the calmness of the
Conseil General did little to persuade the government of the moderateness of the Bour-
geois. The Bourgeois still had a long and difficult struggle ahead to persuade the patriciate
of their fitness to consider political matters.
The Genevan government had informed its allies of the initial Representation on 27th.
March, after they had officially informed the representative of France in Geneva (12th.
March). All seemed calm and peaceful when the Swiss delegates arrived in the city. In the
traditional manner of Geneva, the past and all the actions and words of the last months
were to be forgotten, encouraged by the delegates from Bern and Zurich.
The Bourgeois, however, sought the condemnation and punishment of the men responsi-
ble for the spiking of the cannons. They also wanted an official statement approving their
actions since they had discovered the spiking of the guns. Whether this was a calculated
move by some of the leaders of the Bourgeois, or whether it was the only move that would
satisfy elements in the Bourgeois, it was a situation which was dangerous, since Trembley
and Lullin had acted under instructions from the government.
A declaration described the action of spiking the guns as 'peu convenable' and ended:
'pour affermir la paix et le repos publique parmi nous, il n'y avait pas lieu de faire
des perquisitions ulterieures, mais de defendre au contraire toutes recherches et
tout reproche a ce sujet.'69
After much difficulty, it was agreed by the two councils that the action of Trembley and the
others was 'blamable' but that they were to be 'entierement irrecherchables a ce sujet.'
This was insufficient for the Bourgeois, who were adamant that some action was neces-
sary against the men and were not willing to allow the two smaller councils to permit them
to escape punishment. The situation was aggravated by the fears and rumours that were
circulating in the town. These all centred on a plot by the three men and others in the Petit
Conseil to destroy the liberty of the Bourgeois by using the cannons and the garrison
against them.
The withdrawal of Trembley from the city to his country home led to the cooling of the
affair, but Trembley set out in a letter to the Syndic of 1734, Le Fort, a justification of all
his actions. In a letter to Banderet de Luternau, Trembley put his view clearly:
'Les Conseils sur l'accusation des bourgeois ont reconnu mon innocence, et on les
force a main armee de me declarer coupable.'79
The same justification was sent to various people in Switzerland, one of whom, Escher,71
wrote to Jean-Alphonse Turrettini from Zurich:
'Pour vous avouer la verite, ces deux dernarches de M. de Chapeaurouge et
u	 loc. cit.
se	 !bid, p. 425.
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Trembley me rendent inquiet, je les crams un peu precoces.'"
He reinforced his point in a second letter of 18th. October:
'Les Memoires justicatifs, qui par leur nature deviennent accusatoires, ne font
qu'augmenter le mal. ... cheque parti travaille a se fortifier et cherche des adhe-
rens, la division s'echauffe et le public en souffre.'"
Once the contents of Trembley's original letter became known in the town, the precari-
ous peace-was lost. Wild rumours of patrician plots and highly imaginative and libellous
documents circulated freely. How far the rumours were related to divisions within the Petit
Conseil itself is difficult to be sure. Certainly, there was a belief amongst men such as
Tronchin and Chapeaurouge that others such as the Syndic Le Fort were too favourable to
the Bourgeois.
On 5th. December, the Bourgeois made another Representation to the government
demanding punishment not only for the three original 'spikers' but also for others. 74 The
three additional names were added because, according to the petition:
'les Membres d'iceux sont censes avoir forme ces horribles Projets contre la
liberte publique, et ... ont toujours marque une si grande fiend, hauteur et van-
Re.'"
They ended their petition:
'Declarant qu'en bons citoyens et bourgeois, ils ne peuvent apporter le moindre
changement et manic:3 recevoir aucune proposition qui en [de la presente requi-
sition] peut diminuer l'etendue.' 76
The demands contained in the Representation were nothing short of an ultimatum.
Forced to give way, the two councils deprived the two Trembleys, 77 Charles Lullin,
Chapeaurouge, Tronchin and de Caro of all their appointments and removed them from
the councils, as well as exiling Jean Trembley for life." This was confirmed by a Conseil
General held on 20th. December, and an Edict of Pacification was also passed with 1143
votes in favour of its acceptance." As in 1707, the determination of the Bourgeois had
forced the government to act in contradiction to its position on its own sovereignty.80
The Bourgeois having established to their satisfaction the sovereignty of the Conseil
General in depriving certain 'appointees' of their posts, was content. Their satisfaction,
however, only demonstrated the loss of the claimed sovereignty of the the Syndics and
smaller councils. It was hardly a sure foundation for future peace within the city, as a letter
72	 E. de Budó (Ed.) Lettres inadites adresseies de 1686 a 1737 J-A. Turrettini, Thaologien Genevois, Paris: Librairie
de la Suisse Francaise, Genêve: Ubrairie Jules Carey, 1887, Vol. II, p. 16, 6 ao0t.
73	 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 18.
74	 Marc-Conrad Trembley, Jacob de Chapeaurouge and Jean Tronchin, all hard-line members of the Petit Conseil, as
has already been seen.
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75	 P.E. Martin, op. cit, 341rme. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, pp. 427-8.
77	 Jean Trembley and Marc-Conrad Trembley were cousins.
75 Marc-Conrad Trembley and Jacob de Chapeaurouge had been the two members of the Petit Conseil who had
visited the respected Antoine Loiger on his death-bed in an attempt to make him confess his authorship of Les
lettres anonymes.
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of 11th. December 1734 says:
'le mal me paroit trop grand pour en demeurer la, et il ne faut pas doubter que
chacun ne cherche a se mettre en parfait securite quoy qu'il en coutte.'81
The involvement of the Natifs and Habitants in the quarrel
Further troubles in Geneva in 1735 made it clear that internal harmony had not been re-
established showing that the crisis was still latent. The patriciate had found it very difficult
to come to terms with the attitude of the Bourgeois. Du Pan wrote despairingly to Freu-
denreich:
'le peuple ne craint plus ses magistrats un simple citoyen se croit en dessus d'un
sindic. c'est moy dit-il, qui les fais et qui les defais. ... le peuple est absolument le
maitre ... quelle anarchier82
The inability of the patriciate to appreciate the mildness of the Bourgeois is found in all
their documents throughout this period. The actions of the Bourgeois, their organisation
and their apparent loyalty to their own leaders rather than to the Syndics and the govern-
ment was something completely new and upsetting. The dismissal of members of the Petit
Conseil by the Conseil General was an earthquake in the ordered world of the patriciate.
In response to the uncertainty, in February 1736, Bernard de Bud& seigneur de Verace,
de Ferney, comte de Montreal, ex-officer in the Swiss Guards in France, 83 offered his
services to the Petit Conseil, claiming that there were in Geneva many citizens, Natifs and
Habitants, who were willing to offer their services to help maintain the state and its gov-
ernment. He was willing to put himself at their head and to train them and lead them in the
defence, when necessary, of the government - by implication to defend the government
against the Bourgeois militia. Such an action was unheard of in Geneva, since neither the
Habitants nor the Natifs had any political rights.
There were numerous complaints to the Syndics by the Bourgeois, concerning the
involvement of such people in the state's affairs, all to no avail. The danger of the Natifs
and Habitants being involved in any political activity, even in a volunteer group to protect
the government, was recognised in the Deux Cents, where it was proposed that:
'Messieurs les Syndics soient attentifs a empacher que les Natifs et Habitants et
eux qui n'ont pas le droit de suffrage ne se malent avec Citoyen et Bourgeois.'"
Feelings were running high in the city, and, in May 1737, the Lieutenant, de Saussure,
refused to accept communion from pastor Michel Leger in the Temple Neuf. 85 De Saus-
sure was a member of the patriciate and may well have considered that Leger, as one of
the most prominent leaders of the Bourgeois, was betraying both his calling and his 'pat-
re'. By the summer, tension was mounting with the temper of the Bourgeois clear as they
had rejected the list for the election of new Auditeurs at the meeting of the Conseil Genê-
ral.
The Procureur-General made a formal complaint to the Petit Conseil to inform them of: .
'des me-es que faisaient quelques personnes pour gagner les Natifs & Habitans
si	 BPU Geneve Ms. Tronchin 209, 1. 7, Armand de Sartigny to Tronchin.
$2	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 1536 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich, 1736-1739, 65.
a	 See Appendix IV B V/10.
S4	 Sautier, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 176.
a	 Ibid., p. 312.
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par des repas & par toutes sortes de pratiques."
The council seemed to be little concerned with such matters, even though it was encourag-
ing a spirit of faction within the town. It was the patriciate which was going out of its way to
court the Natifs and the Habitants in this fashion to win their support against the Bour-
geois. Montreal continued to recruit and train, and the members of this private army ac-
quired the name of 'goujons'.87
There was fertile soil to be tilled in that the Natifs and Habitants suffered a number of
disadvantages apart from their total lack of any political rights." However skilled the
Natifs became, they could not normally become master craftsmen without special permis-
sion from the government. This was hard to obtain and was of recent introduction.
Between 1670 and 1720
'la bourgeoisie accumule progressivement ses privileges: droit exclusif au negoce,
acces aux principales maTtrises, entree en apprentisage dans les professions les
plus lucratives.'"
The Bourgeois had become extremely protective of their rights. If the Natifs were allowed
to open their own workshops, as they would be if they were admitted as craftsmen, then
that would increase the competition, to the probable detriment of those in the trade. There
were, therefore, several reasons why the Natifs might well be happy to act against those
they considered responsible for their economic and political disadvantages. The Natifs,
particularly, worked closely with the Bourgeois especially those lucky enough to be
apprenticed and Thorlogie permet au moms des moments de conversation'." Many of
the Natifs were 'des ouvriers specialises, relativement instruits' working on a salary basis
for a patron such as Elisabeth Baulacre in the gilding trade. 91 They also lived amongst
them, drew water from the same wells and were present when groups stood in the street
and discussed, and there had been Natif involvement in the riot in support of Fatio. Over
the years, this close proximity to all matters political was sure to have an effect. They had
seen how the Bourgeois, acting together, had forced the government to grant concessions
in 1707. They were to see the carefully organised actions of the Bourgeois bearing fruit,
eventually, in 1734. It was a risky matter to try to involve them in supporting the patriciate,
as it would only be a matter of time before some of the Natifs would begin to wonder what
they might be able to achieve if they too began to organise and make reasonable de-
mands.
The patriciate, on the whole, had moved from the level of merchant and skilled worker
and were in the process of becoming rentiers. The French Resident, La Closure, wrote in
March 1720:
'on peut dire que Geneve est une des plus riches villes ... par toutes les richesses
d'Ivemois, op. cit., p. 111, ft. (e).
17	 P.E. Martin, op. cit, 3torne. parte, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 432.
SS	 See Appencix I.
••	 Piuz at Mottu-Weber, op. cit, ame. paree: A. Perrenoud, Ch. 3, p. 72.
"	 Rudolf Braun op. cit., p. 108.
91 Francois Bergier 'Le dynamisme des structures sociales a Geneve du XlVe. au  XVIle. siècle, Melanges publies
par la Faculte des Sciences Economiques at Sociales de l'Universite de Geneve a l'Occasion de son cinquante-
naire, Geneve: Ubrairie de l'Universite, Georg & Cie. S.A., 1965, 172.
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qu'ont rapportees ... de ce commerce des actions en France et en Angleterre.'92
They were merchant bankers, international traders, or in the liberal professions such as the
Church, the Academy or medicine. There were also several who were large-scale factory
owners, especially in the production of cloth. In Geneva, the oligarchy were wealthier than
the majority of the Bourgeois and were 'in control of almost all trade and ... industry'." It
was thus not the case, in Geneva, that the Bourgeois were wealthier than the 'nobility' or
oligarchy (in the Genevan context). In the city, it was the inverse of what Godechot claims
the situation to be in Western Europe.
The decrease in the proportion of the Bourgeois in the state " was not without its
consequences, ending what had been according to Bergier:
'On aura pu constater toutefois que les differences sociales reetaient pas aussi
accusees a Geneve qu'elles l'etaient dans la plupart des villes d'egale importance a
la merne epoque. Cela tient surtout a la faible importance numerique d'un groupe
de condition materielle reellement faible. Par ailleurs, la societe genevois, du
Moyen Age ... au debut du XVIlle. siècle, a fait preuve d'une cohesion qui meritait
d'être soulignee.'95
This cohesion was not always as visible as Bergier claims, especially from the political
point of view, as the events of 1578, 1604, 1698 and 1707 had already demonstrated.
At this juncture, the government tried to prevent the Bourgeois from holding meetings in
the Militia over the preparation of a Representation concerning a legal matter" :
'Quatre Syndics s'y transporterent, & voulurent les faire retirer: ce coup d'autorite
reunit tous les Citoyens qui paraissaient divises.'97
This action on the part of the Syndics was seen as a direct attack on the right of the
Bourgeois to make Representations. To do the latter, it was necessary for them to meet
together to discuss what was to be in the petition to the government.
The 21st. August saw matters come to a head, with Montreal and some of his forces
gathering opposite the town hall for a judgement to be given against four Bourgeois
accused of fomenting false rumours. Insults were traded, and there was some pushing,
ending with the traditional cry 'Aux armes'. In response to this, the Bourgeois formed into
their militia. In number terms alone, the government forces were in a minority, the garrison
and the Montrealists numbering about 1,000 men, while the militia were 1,600 men."
The government held the all the upper town, while in the rest of the city, the Bourgeois
were organised sufficiently to arrest those whom they considered supporters of the govern-
ment. By nightfall, after the water supply to the upper city had been cut, the government
disarmed Montreal's 'goujons'. Attempts by the Syndics and others to prevent bloodshed
were on the whole successful, except for a single incident, where soldiers from the
garrison fired on the units of the militia, due mainly to the nervousness of the garrison
	
.2	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 56me. partie, Piuz, Ch. XVIII, p. 589.
	
.3	 Godechot, op. cit., p.11.
84	 See diagram 2, p. 27a.
05	 Ibid., p. 173.
.1	 The new right of an accused person to be represented by a lawyer had been infringed when the government
refused to allow an accused man to have a lawyer. Although eventually settled, it was disconcerting to see the
government openly ignoring a law which had only been agreed in 1734.
07	 d'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 106.
NI	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 36me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 433.
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officers. By nightfall, there was peace throughout the city, with the Bourgeois holding parts
of the upper town and the government and their forces confined to the town hall and its
immediate vicinity.
The following day, negotiations began between the government and the Bourgeois. The
Bourgeois were unprepared for the situation in which they found themselves. They were
interrupted by an emissary from the French Resident, La Closure, asking the Syndics to go
to his -residence. Apparently acting independently, La Closure had been asked by the Petit
Consefl to intervene, but not to be seen to do so at their behest. Shortly afterwards,
Montraal, escorted by the French Resident, left Geneva, together with a considerable
number of others from the patriciate and also Natifs and Habitants who had joined Mont-
Oaf's force and who feared the anger of the Bourgeois. The numbers can be judged by the
fact that the Petit Conseil was reduced to eleven and the Deux Cents to fifty.99
Bern and Zurich, informed of events in Geneva by the govemme5i, hastened to send
deputations to the town, where negotiations were already under way between the govern-
ment and the Bourgeois, in which Bern and Zurich quickly became involved. The latter's
demands were the election of members of the Petit Conseil by the Deux Cents but
needing the approval of the Conseil General, only two people with the same name to be
permitted to sit in the Petit Conseil and four in the Deux Cents. The demand that the
choice of the members of the Petit Conseil should be approuved by the Conseil General
was a new departure which would clearly have reinforced the sovereignty of the Conseil
General as well as giving it and the majority of the Bourgeois a greater control over the
government. If such a programme had been adopted, it might have limited the power of
those families who were able to dominate the Petit Conseil. It would also have enabled a
few more Bourgeois to have places in government. The garrison was to be reduced to
540, with officers and N.C.O.s taking an oath of loyalty to the Genevan govemmentm
A letter from the Genevan ambassador '°' to the court of Louis XV threw this agree-
ment into doubt. Regardless of possible French interference, the representatives of the
Bourgeois were for completing the settlement between Genevans, with the two allied
cantons as mediators and observers, therefore pressed for a meeting of the Conseil
General to vote on the results as soon as possible. This was agreed for 26th. September.
The arrival of a second letter containing an official offer from Louis XV to act as mediator
arrived on the 21st It was not an offer that could be refused, as was subsequently made
clear to the representatives of the Bourgeois by La Closure. The threat of a commercial
blockade of Geneva, together with the expulsion of all Genevans from France and the
ending of all Genevan privileges in France, was only the beginning of a series of possible
threatened actions against Geneva if the King's offer were to be rejected because an
agreement had already been reached.. The meetings of the various companies were
extremely unhappy but were realistic enough to accept that they had no other course of
action. The votes for acceptance were 695, with 155 rejecting Louis' offer and 105
abstaining.102
Le Reglement de l'iflustre Mediation pour la pacification de la Republique de Gen-
••	 Fazy, Los Constitutions, op.cit, p. 117, 'on assure que le nombre des exiles volontaires s'éleva A ores de trois
miller
IN	 Ibid., p. 437.
1°'	 Thellusson. He was a member of the patriciate with ideas lithe cifferent from those of men like Chapeaurouge.
1'	 d'Ivemois, op. cit. p. 120.
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eve103 was finally accepted by the Conseil General by 1316 to 30 rejections on 8th. May
1738. 1 °4 In it, the rights of the Conseil General were both defined and codified. These
were to include the right to accept or reject laws, to vote taxes, to elect or refuse to elect
the Syndics, the Procureur-General and certain other officers of the state from the list pro-
posed to them by the Deux Cents. Foreign treaties, any loss of Genevan territory, any
loan, any further augmentation of the fortifications would all require the consent of the
Conseil General. Such rights were, however, counterbalanced by the fact that, in the
future, only the two smaller councils would be able to propose new laws, taxation and so
on. In simple terms this meant that the government and the patriciate had obtained what
they wanted. Real sovereignty, the right to introduce new legislation was removed from the
Conseil General and placed in the hands of one of the smaller councils.
The only initiative left to the Bourgeois was in the right to make Representations, but,
unlike previously, they would no longer be able to insist that such petitions should be taken
directly to the Conseil General. The wording was precise:
'II ne pourra rien etre pone au Conseil des Deux Cents qu'auparavant il n'ait ete
traite et approuve dans le Conseil des XXV [Petit Conseil] et il ne sera rien porta
en Conseil General qui n'ait ete traite et approuve dans le Conseil des Deux
Cents."05
The Mediation gave the government and ruling oligarchy nearly all they desired.
Although the Conseil General was declared sovereign, the powers of the smaller councils
were confirmed, the Conseil General being able to express approuval or disapprouval only
upon matters that the smaller councils deigned to submit to it.
The acceptance by the Bourgeois and their leaders of clause VI above provoked
considerable disagreement between Micheli and De Luc. The argument was around the
word approuve. For De Luc, it was inconceivable that, in a genuine case where a Repre-
sentation was concerned with an injustice, it would not be approved by both the smaller
councils and passed to the Conseil General. He was willing to believe in the good faith of
the government
'II taut etre persuade qu'ils (les magistrats) se souviendront toujours qu'ils sont les
Peres de la patrie, qu'ils dependent du Conseil General ... et qu'ils agiront en
consequence:106
De Luc was demonstrating that for many of the Bourgeois, their faith in the government
was still intact. If, however, the unthinkable were to happen, then the remedy would be to
call upon the guarantors of the Mediation in order to make the Petit Conseil carry out its
obligations. The objections of Micheli were to be well-founded.
It is also surprising to find that De Luc was so naïve regarding the consequences of
Article VI of the Mediation. It shows how deeply ingrained was the belief that the Magis-
trates were reasonable and just. The willingness of De Luc and the Bourgeois to accept
the terms of the Mediation proves that they were far from being 'revolutionaries'. They had
obtained a statement of the rights of the various councils and a statement of the sover-
eignty of the Conseil General. The recognition and acceptance of this sovereignty had
been one of their main aims.
What they failed to see was that the sovereignty as described in Article III was as
I"	 See Appendix III for the text.
1"	 Amedifie Roget, Le Conseil General, op. cit., p. 137.
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restrictive as Article VI was when one weighed the significance of the word approuve
contained therein. In listing the rights of the Conseil General, the Article was conferring all
unlisted powers to the smaller councils. Article III put the Conseil General in a strait-jacket.
While stating the sovereignty of the Conseil General, real sovereignty remained in the
smaller councils, thus continuing the dichotomy which 1543 had initiated within the state.
The number of members of the Deux Cents was also increased by 25 to 250 107, in an
attempt to bring a few more of the Bourgeois into the council. After the creation of the new
members, no further new members were to be admitted until there were fifty vacancies, all
of which were to be filled at the same time.1°8
The committee of the Bourgeois °° was to cease to exist and there was to be no
replacement for it (Article XXVI). To prevent the use of the Bourgeois militia for political
purposes various restrictions were imposed, including the death penalty for anyone
assembling them without the express authority of a Syndic or the Petit ConseiL This was
an attempt to prevent the Bourgeois from being able to organise themselves as they had
been able to do since 1734. It was to be a failure, as the Bourgeois quickly developed
other existing means of organising.
The Magistrates punished for the spiking of the guns and alleged involvement in a plot
to overthrow the state were to be allowed to return to enjoy their pensions for service to
the state, but could not again be employed in government service of any kind. The Natifs
were to have the right to become master craftsmen in all trades. These rights they retained
from the near-agreement which had been reached before the involvement of France.
According to d'Ivemois, this measure was particularly important for the expansion of the
watch industry in the years after 1738. 110 This measure allowed the prosperous Natifs to
enlarge their work places and sell their own watches anywhere outside Geneva.
The consequences of the Mediation
The agreement which had been reached required the Bourgeois in their entirety, from the
patriciate through to the humbler members, to work together through the three councils if
the government were to function. It also required the denial of the Bourgeois' basic article
of faith, that the Conseil General had absolute sovereign power within the state. It did little
to limit effectively the power of the patriciate, which continued to control both the smaller
councils and for a number of years showed a certain skill in persuading the Conseil
General to accept most of the carefully chosen propositions put to it. Nonetheless, it would
only be a matter of time before further disagreements over the question of sovereignty
would expose the weakness of the Conseil General vis-à-vis the smaller councils and how
the Bourgeois had been cheated. The question of taxation for the improvement of the
defences, which had been continued until 1750 by the Mediation, might well be such an
occasion. Ultimately, the issue of sovereignty which seriously divided those with political
rights in Geneva had not been solved, merely shelved. Its reemergence might eventually
bring the government to a standstill.
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'...chaque partie a regu des coups d'êtriers ... Les Bourgeois ont fait de laides
grimaces a l'ouie de certains articles, et en general us sont beaucoup moms
contents que nous."
Clearly, at the time, some of the witnesses of the events were far from certain as to the
real calming of divisions within the state, although Cramer comes to the conclusion that:
'cette Garantie des Puissances Mediatrices formellement exprimee ne me paroit
pas Si facheuse qu'elle le paroisoit a bien d'autres."12
Some members of the patriciate, such as Ami Lullin," 3 when writing to Jean Tronchin,
could even take an optimistic tone:
'nous avons lieu de croire que nos concitoyens [ne sont] plus sous l'impression
dans la quelle on les a tenus si longtems."14
In fact, Lullin was correct and incorrect. The Mediation had tilted heavily in the direction
of the patriciate, by limiting the rights of the Conseil General to those clearly stated in the
document, and restricting Representations. But the Bourgeois were unlikely to change their
opinion concerning the full sovereignty of the Conseil General. P. E. Martin takes a very
positive view of the Mediation, claiming that the mediators had:
'maintenu ce caractere particulier de la dernocratie genevoise: les Conseils êlectifs
ne peuvent rien sans l'accord des citoyens, qui ne peuvent rien a leur tour sans
l'accord des Conseils."15
The Mediators had certainly maintained the Genevan political system of 1543, but had
made it very difficult for any complaint or suggestion from the Bourgeois to be heard. The
right of the Petit Conseil to reject Representations was a new power that did not fit into the
system.
There can be no doubting P.E. Martin's contention that the independence of Geneva had
received a blow.'" France now held the whip hand, and the government lived in a
constant state of concern. The French Resident had only to mention that an action would
cause offence to his master, Louis XV, to ensure that the measure would be dropped, as
the government in Geneva could not afford to offend His Most Christian Majesty.
By the Mediation of 1738, Geneva had set her face against any serious attempt to adapt
her constitution to the changed circumstances in the state. The position of the government
had been strengthened with the right of the droit negatif 117 , while that of the Bourgeois
had been seriously weakened. More serious, in the long-term, was that there was no
longer any way in which the Bourgeois could take part in political activity. If the Conseil
General had been accorded a more serious and central role in the governance of the city,
it is possible that the future trouble in Geneva might have taken a less dramatic turn. Both
111	 BPU, Geneve Ms. 1536 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1736-39, 9e. May 1738, 139.
112	 BPU Geneve, Ms. Cramer 77, 118.
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I le	 loc. cit.
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the government and the patriciate group and the Bourgeois had clear, though opposed,
aims, which were succinctly expressed in their respective party documents. Neither were
the Bourgeois in any way inconsistent with their past demands concerning the Conseil
General. The tenacity with which over the centuries they had repeated their desires made
it unlikely that the Mediation would succeed in stopping such entrenched attitudes,
especially once it was understood that the recognition of the Conseil General was, in
reality, meaningless. It had not acquired any return of its old position and power.
The Conseil General would have been the ideal forum in which to settle their political
differences and learn to make the necessary compromises needed for the good of the
state. The refusal of government and ruling elite to consider such a move, combined with
their continuing belief that the majority of the Bourgeois were little more than a contentious
rabble, augured badly for the future. Nonetheless, the acceptance of the Mediation
document by the Bourgeois and the attitude of men such as De LuO, and agreed to by the
majority of the Bourgeois, showed that there was still confidence and trust in the justice
and reasonableness of the government. It was this which provided an interval of peace




One of the main aims of the Bourgeois, the recognition of the sovereignty of the Conseil
General, having been attained by the Mediation of 1738, there was reason to believe that
the coming years in Geneva would be free of the rancour and upsets in political life that
had marred the period 1707-1738. Geneva was to enjoy a period of relative tranquility,
untroubled by political arguments concerning the tortured question of sovereignty. The
actions of De Luc and others in 1743 demonstrated that under the surface, all was not as
calm and stable as it appeared.
This chapter shows that each side had now to adjust to the post-Mediation era. This
required the Bourgeois to form a new organisational base using the cercles rather than the
militia, but which nonetheless still remained as much outside the political process as
before. It was in these meetings that the ideals and claims of the Bourgeois were main-
tained. The outward calm and prosperity, together with a deceptive docility on the part of
the Bourgeois, masked a move by the government to extend its powers in defiance of the
Mediation. The government could claim some success in the two treaties it was able to
negotiate; the first with France settling minor territorial matters, the second with Savoy/Sar-
dinia which finally recognised Geneva as an independent state. The lifting, finally, of the
Sardinian menace and the settling of secure, internationally recognised frontiers to
Geneva's territory may well have contributed to the apparent tractability of the Bourgeois.
Moreover, Geneva, unlike the states of Holland or Genoa, Venice or Lucca, all of which
had according to Venturi: 'entered a phase of irreversible decline', 1 was in the happy posi-
tion of seeing its economy expanding and flourishing with increasing demand for watches
placing the city in an advantageous position regardless of the wars of the time.
Geneva in a war-torn, unstable Europe
The Prussian invasion of Silesia on the death of Charles VI led to the War of Austrian
Succession and the end of the Franco-Austrian alliance, which had held during the last
years of Fleury's 2 leadership in France. A Spanish army had occupied Savoy in 1742 as
part of the Bourbon attempt to seize Habsburg territory in Italy. As a consequence of the
Spanish occupation of Savoy, the Conseil General voted on 23rd. September to bring back
into being the garde bourgeoise. Later, at a further meeting, a majority of the Conseil
General voted a sixfold increase in the imp6t des gardes.3
The ending of the War of Austrian Succession (1748), together with the diplomatic re-
alignment which took place, had one main benefit for Geneva. The agreement between
Austria, Sardinia and Spain, signed in 1752, by which all three countries agreed to guaran-
tee each other's possessions, removed Italy and the duchies in it from the role of play-
things of all three countries. As a result, Sardinia was willing to settle the outstanding
territorial difficulties with Geneva, effectively accepting the existence of the city as an
independent state. This was to relieve Geneva of one of her great fears and the consider-
Venturi, op. cit., p. 70.
a	 Andra-Hercule, Cardinal de Fleury (1654-1743), First Minister of Louis XV from 1726.
3	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3ame. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 443.
115
able financial burden that had been caused by her need to be vigilant with regard to
Sardinia.
The success of the government in finally settling the territorial disputes with both France
and Savoy-Sardinia seems to have done little to improve its overall image. The treaty with
France was signed in August 1749 and that with Sardinia in June 1754.4 The final
settlement of the territorial problems with Sardinia led to minor exchanges of land and was
approvedby the Conseil Gèneral on 30th. May 1754 by 1280 in favour to 26 against.5
One of the difficulties for Geneva arising out of the mediation of 1737-38 was the
involvement of France in her internal affairs, e.g. pressure was applied to ensure that
Geneva no longer sent any religious books into France to those Protestants still managing
to survive in the Cevennes around le Desert, and was prohibited from any future corre-
spondence between the pastors of Geneva and their persecuted brethren in France!' It
was a small matter, but it signified that in future Geneva was no longer entirely free in her
choices; Champeaux, the French Resident in Geneva, was quite clear that:
'la garantie que le roi a donnee a la mediation ne donne déjà que trop d'atteignte a
leur souverainete.17
The aim of Britain in Switzerland and Geneva for much of the eighteenth century was to
attempt, somewhat feebly, to limit the extensive influence of France. Britain had become a
distant player. The British were doubtless concerned at the influence of France in such a
Protestant state as Geneva. The British Resident, Marsey, was not permitted the same
status in Geneva as his French counterpart. This was due to French pressure on the
Genevan government. It is also possible that Britain's friendship with Savoy may have
inclined some in Geneva to prefer France to Britain. Savoy was the country most deeply
engrained in Genevan memory as the enemy. The threat from the Spanish occupation of
Savoy led the Protestant cantons to declare their neutrality, but at the same time to
appeal to the United Provinces, Britain and Prussia for help. Geneva, isolated from the
Swiss, was in an even more precarious position. The treaty which was finally signed with
Turin in 1754 was in part the result of Sir Luke Schaub and British influence 8 (a fact
which never appears to be noted by the Swiss) 9, and was the most that Britain could do.
The French and the patriciate had to be careful. The French were not popular in
Geneva, as Tronchin laments:
faudroit faire le proces aux trois quarts et demy de toute la ville Si c'etait un
crime de montrer de la hayne contre le Roy."
It was this unpopularity that the British failed to use in their diplomatic efforts. Indeed, the
British Resident Marsey had meddled in Genevan affairs on behalf of disgraced members
4	 With.France - Treaty of Paris, 1749; with Sarcinia -Treaty of Turin, 1754.
3	 Amifidifie Roget, 'Le Conseil Gifirkiraf, op. cit., p. 137.
• Barbey, op. cit., p. 133.
7	 Sautier, op. cit., p. 958. Contained in a letter to Amelot in Pads 21.7.1739.
• Horn, op. cit., p. 322.
• Ferrier in P.E. Marlin notes that Geneva had sought the help of various countries inducing England and above all
Bern and ZOrich, then talks of the negotiations of one sort or another lasting over a period of 30 years. P.E. Martin,
op. cit., 341me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, pp. 444-445. Guichonnet mentions long and difficult negotiations.
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of the government in the spiking-of-the-guns affair.''
The situation was aggravated by the large number of Genevans who had become
bankers and large-scale merchants in France, whether in Paris, Lyon or Marseille. Forced
to move from Geneva in order to make their money or to make it work for them, many
Genevans had sought openings in France, Holland and England, some going as far afield
as Constantinople.12 This vast network was essential to the well-being of Geneva. Much
of its trade passed across French territory (although not forced to do so), in part because
of favourable tariff arrangements between the French and Geneva. There were routes
down the Rhine and also across Sardinia, but most of the latter were less favourable tariff-
wise to the Genevans. There was a constant fear amongst the Genevan commercial
community that a blockade of Geneva or some other serious interference with trade would
be the result of displeasing their neighbour to the west.
In 1736, the French had blockaded Basle and arrested Baslers living in Alsace over an
argument concerning salmon-fishing rights in the river Rhine. Basle's appealled to the
Confederation led Zurich, as the Vorort," to summon a Diet. None of the catholic rural
cantons attended 14 ; Solothum advised Basle to bow to France's demands. Basle re-
ceived no help from the atrophied Confederation and asked for English mediation to solve
the difficulty." The lack of assistance that Basle suffered came in addition to the failure of
Bern and Zurich to help either Strasburg or the Franche-Comte at the end of the seven-
teenth century, both occasions of French aggression. All three events were noted by the
Genevans and strengthened their fear of French reactions and 'punishments'.
Trade was the lifeline of Geneva and because of her geographical position all goods had
to cross foreign territory. The emergence of the cotton trade at the end of the seventeenth
century saw Genevan merchants as the main importers of the cotton, either via Marseille
and the RhOne, where they had negotiated reduced fees to encourage the growth of
Marseilles, or through Genoa and Leghorn. Much of this cotton went to Zurich or the
market at Zurzach. Geneva itself specialised in the printing of calico, even in the face of
French attempts to protect the French East Indies Company and their monopoly of printed
calico. Geneva's printing of calico used cloth not only from Holland, but also nearly all the
cloth produced in Switzerland, whether in Zurich, Glaris, St. Gallen or Langenthal. Such
trade tied Geneva very closely economically to the Swiss, though it was Geneva that
profitted most. The printing was a skilled task and was carried on in what amounted to
factories, that of Fazy had 600 workers in 172816, by 1785, there were 11 factories
employing 1,200 workers." Many of these were Naffs stme 'V tirwitienrmie yes% ...itsthu-
ment libre de toute reglementation corporative,'" doing fairly skilled jobs, thus adding to
11
	
See Chapter V, p. 103ff.
12	 Oechsli, op. cit., 'In 1725 there were 88 Genevese commercial houses in Constantinople, engaged in the East with
the commerce of Genevese watches and jewellery.' p. 240.
13
	
Zurich as the Vorort was the canton which had the authority to call a meeting of the Swiss Diet
14 The TrOckliband, which had been signed in 1715 between the catholic cantons and Louis XIV by which the catholic
cantons put themselves under the protection of France. In effect, apart from giving France a further hold in Switzer-
land, it made it impossible for the confederation to act at all.
15	 Oechsli, op. cit., pp. 251-252.
16	 Bergier, 'Histoire economique', op. cit., pp. 156-160.
17	 Babel, 'Histoire corporative', op. cit., p. 150.
16	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 5eme. parte, Mottu-Weber, Ch. XVI, p. 458.
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the relatively skilled in the city who had no political rights and suffered distinct tax disad-
vantages.
The Bourgeois and their cercles
The ending of the use of the Militia for political purposes in the Mediation of 1737-8 in no
way prevented the Bourgeois from continuing their meetings and political discussions.
These were transferred to cercles. The patriciate had created for themselves, around 1712,
a number of small societies which met in the afternoons, usually to enjoy music together,
play cards or engage in any other social diversion." There were also some cercles which
were for the men only. In these, there was smoking and discussion. All the cercles were
held in specially-hired rooms, regularly every week. The abolition of the Militia led the
Bourgeois to expand their own social meetings which had begun post 1712 as well as'to
form new cercles. Madame d'Epinay has left a description of what went on in the patriciate
cercles:
'on y bolt, on y mange, on y trouve les papiers publics; et la on y politique a perte
de vue.... Cependant, ils sont en general plus °coupes ici de leurs affaires que de
celles des autres.'"
It was clearly not only the Bourgeois watchmakers and their apprentices who spent a great
deal of time discussing political matters! These cercles and societies were an important
part of life in a city. But they were equally the ideal vehicle for discussion and organisation.
In many ways for the Bourgeois, and especially for their leaders, the creation of their own
cercles was a better vehicle of organisation than the Militia had been. It was not difficult for
the Bourgeois quickly to adapt this type of system to their own needs. The main difference
between the cercles and the militia was that, in the latter, the Bourgeois met together with
the members of the patriciat, except 1734-8 when the latter were excluded. In the cercles,
there was no mixing, the patriciate had their cercles and the Bourgeois had their separate
and different ones. This separation between the patriciate and the Bourgeois led to the
following comment in a document written in 1781:
'tous les Citoyens et Bourgeois...ayant droit d'assister a ces assemblees [Compa-
gnies Bourgeoises]...s'y trouvent avec leurs Officiers, presque tous alors Membres
du Gouvernement, et avec les Pasteurs, on pouvoit y discuter les matieres, avec
quelque apparance d'impartialite; chaqu'un etoit maitre de soutenir son opinion, et
de prendre fa defense du gouvemement, elf êtoit attaquê.11
It was easier to control some elements of the Bourgeois when there were members of the
patriciate present. Unfortunately, Tronchin conveniently forgets that, in the militia meetings
in 1734-38, the officers and those considered attached to the patriciate had been excluded
from the meetings and the votes.
The prohibition of the continuation of militia delegations had led to the strengthening of
the 'party' organisation which the Bourgeois had already established before 1738. This was
not what the Mediators and the government had intended. Far more serious was the fact
that the cercles intensified the party identity of the Bourgeois as they were regular and
closed only the members of the cercle were admitted to them. In the period covered by
this chapter, the Bourgeois were able to practise and perfect their political discussion so
I.	 Sautier, op. cit, Vol. II, p. 911.
20	 Candaux (Ed.), op. cit, p. 67 Louise-Florence- Petronille Tardieu d'Esclavelles d'Epinay 1726-1783. She spent 2
years in Geneva as a patient of Dr. Theodore Tronchin, (1787-1758).
21	 BPU Gonave, Archives Tronchin 343, Mtimoire sur les Cerc.les et sur les Commissaires-Politiques, 1781, 93. (My
emphasis)
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that, by the 1760s, they would be able to function as an able and successful opposition to
the government. What existed in the Geneva of this period was a parallel political system
that had no official or constructive outlet. Each group, the patriciate and members of the
government on the one hand, the Bourgeois on the other, were all discussing politics
within their separate cercles. Yet there existed within the state a forum - the Conseil
GOnOral - through which, in coming together, these two groups would have been able to
develop (in favourable circumstances) a form of limited democratic process similar in some
ways to that in England. Political life in the city was flourishing, but there was, in reality,
nowhere to express it, except in the two smaller councils, which were closed to the vast
majority of the Bourgeois.
There are few details about these early Bourgeois cercles. There were many, they were
small and sometimes several might meet together. Whether they were entirely political is
uncertain, but that they were certainly places where the Bourgeois could meet and talk
freely cannot be doubted. The lack of any written records may have been an additional
protection for those in the cercles. Rousseau gave a detailed description of the cercles he
saw in Geneva in his Lettre A d'Alembert
'Les cercles sont des societes de douze ou quinze personnes, qui louent un
appartement commode, qu'on pourvoit a frais communs de meubles et de provi-
sions negessaires. C'est dans cet appartement que se rendent tous les apres-midi
ceux des associes que leurs affaires ou leurs plaisirs ne retiennent ailleurs.
chacun se livrant sans gene aux amusements de son go0t, on joue, on cause, on
lit, on boit, on fume.'22
The importance of the cercles for the Bourgeois and their political organisation is evi-
denced by a comment in 1766:
'En s'occupant des affaires d'Etat les Horlogers ant deserte leurs cabinets de
travail pour courir aux cercles.'23
It was in the cercles that the Bourgeois received the latest information on the political
situation and where matters could be discussed. The numbers of these cercles meant that
in a crisis they were brought together in twelve large groups where they were able to elect
their representatives. The cercles also made it possible for considerable numbers of
people to read the Gazettes and other newspapers from Leyden or Paris, there being no
Genevan newspapers until the late 1780s. It was via the cercles that pamphlets were read
aloud and then discussed continuing the strong oral tradition. New cercles were formed as
conditions demanded throughout the period until July 1782, when they were banned, but it
was rare for there to be any mixing across the political barriers in the cercles.24
The relative peace within which the Bourgeois were able to continue their political
organisation contrasts favourably with the difficulty any critics of the government encoun-
tered in Bern. The dissaffection of the city's Bourgeois, theoretically part of the governing
class, but, in fact, excluded by the oligarchy, was expressed, in 1744, by a petition which
demanded a change in the way officials were elected. Treated as traitors, a number of the
petitioners were expelled from the city for between five and ten years, including Samuel
Henzi, who, when pardonned, later returned to Bern to find all avenues of advancement
blocked. He joined a conspiracy to overthrow the government by a coup d'Otat, replacing it
with a guild government as found in Basle and Zurich. The government with the aid of
22	 Babel, 'Histoire corporative', op. cit., p. 486.
23	 AEG, Girod 7, 4 Apologia de la Rejection du Plan de Conciliation du 14.12.66 Deuxieme partie, p. 6.
24 In 1770 -13.4.1770 a new Society was formed La Societe Litteraire which had as its stated aim (p.3): 'D'aquedr
tous les meilleurs Joumaux et feuilles periodque'; it had as members several Representants Le Sage, Floumois
and Joly, which was unusual. AEG, Girod 5, 3 Reglements de la Societe Litteraire.
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troops from outside the city ended the whole and executed Henzi and two others, while
many fled. The position of the Bourgeois in Bern was unfortunate, since unlike their
Genevan counterparts, they were not expected to take any part in trade, it being consid-
ered incompatible with their status, so office was the sole avenue to enrichment. Zurich
and Basle, ensured that the guild members who were the Bourgeois had all the privileges,
especially over those living in the countryside outside the towns. In Zurich especially, there
were problems of censorship during the eighteenth century. Lucerne had a very restricted
oligarchy, there being in 1773 only twenty-nine families entitled to any share in the govern-
ment, and where family feuding, intertwined with disagreements over church matters such
as the Jesuits and state versus church rights, led to power moving from one side to the
other, each group taking its revenge, ending in exile of Valetin Meyer. Fribourg's ruling
oligarchy was small and:
'might be termed a mercenary oligarchy in Bourbon pay, ... even -Lim Bishop was
appointed by France and received a pension from France.'25
Soleure was the residence of the French Ambassador to the Confederation. In both
Fribourg and Soleure, there was little chance for opposition to express itself.
Nowhere else in the Confederation had there been the discussions concerning sover-
eignty and the implications of the ideas propogated by the Bourgeois as in Geneva.
Nowhere else were the Bourgeois as organised and as overtly interested in politics. In
Bern and ZUrich especially, acquaintance with such attitudes was not unknown, since both
had been involved in the Mediation of 1738. The severity of the treatment of Henzi
manifested the determination of Bern to ensure that its discontented Bourgeois understood
that attempts to follow the lead of the Genevans were far too dangerous.
Although without political force, the Bourgeois showed no signs of succumbing to the
siren voice of natural law and the delights of oligarchical absolutism. In Geneva, for the
Bourgeois, it was more than a moral matter,26 it was the survival of the true Republic, it
required constant action and vigilance, hence both the importance of and loyalty to the
cercles. The persistence and seriousness with which they pursued their rights appears akin
to the Protestant work ethic, of which they were equally an example.
The clergy had viewed the emergence of the cercles with considerable misgivings.
Certainly what went on within the meetings of the cercles was outside the control of both
the state and the church. In 1745, the Venerable Company of Pastors made a formal
complaint to the Petit Conseil about the cercles. They claimed that there were at least 50
and that:
'wine, gambling, the table and loose conversation are the principal, if not the only
attractions. Cards are played, even at the hour of the evening sermon.'27
Bearing in mind the comments of Madame d'Epinay, was the concern of the pastors over
'loose conversation' not in fact concern over the near incessant political discussions which
seemed to dominate at least some of the cercles? The Petit Conseil was unlikely to take
much notice of such complaints, since the members of the council were themselves
members of the various patriciate cercles. They may have been unhappy at the way that
the Bourgeois had copied them in forming their own cercles, but it would have been
difficult to move against the Bourgeois without also ending their own associations. Thus
the complaints of the clergy fell on deaf ears and the many cercles continued unabated.
27	 Oechsli, op. cit., p. 275.
21	 See Venturi, op. cit., pp.70-71.
D.W. Freshfield The Life of Horace-Benedict de Saussure, London: Edward Arnold, 1920, P. 40.
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Early difficulties
In Geneva, at the end of 1738 (November), a leaflet appeared urging the Bourgeois to
be vigilant, warning that there were those who were only waiting to overthrow all the
concessions to the Bourgeois that had been obtained and were contained within the
Mediation. It concluded that there was much to fear, especially:
'Si la bourgeoisie n'etait pas attentive a cimenter son union actuelle et ne veillait
pas avec soin a ce qu'il ne Mt fait aucune bréche au reglement.'28
The disagreement which had developed between De Luc senior and Micheli over accep-
tance of the Mediation was clearly causing some concern amongst the Bourgeois?9
Some Bourgeois were aware of the difficulties which might arise if the government were
constantly to refuse to allow matters submitted in a Representation to be discussed by the
Conseil General. The French Resident, Champeaux, was visited by two Bourgeois in July
1739. Neither of the men are named, but one was 'attaché avec le plus d'emportement'3°
to the Bourgeois. They posed the question of what would happen if the Petit Conseil
repeatedly rejected the representations using its right to the droit negatif. Champeaux was
annoyed to learn that the Bourgeois, or some of them, were already focusing on what
some of the Genevan government regarded as one of the important gains of the Media-
tion. Champeaux was convinced that it was the aim of the patriciate to use this droit
negatif to establish itself firmly in power:
'que le magistrat êtait effectivement bien dOcidO a se servir de cet article 6 et a le
faire observer exactement pour reussir dans "son dessein d'atablir son aristocratie
autant qu'il pourra".'31
The comment by Champeaux is important, it shows clearly the attitude of those in the Petit
Conseil and the government. Most of these senior members of the Petit Conseil were
friends of the French Resident, who would have been well aware of their attitude and plans
to ensure that the Bourgeois and the Conseil General remained powerless.
Assuring the visitors that they were worrying about a purely hypothetical situation,
Champeaux promised that in a 'genuine' case he would be prepared to speak to the
Magistrates off-the-record on their behalf. The events of the coming twenty-five years were
to prove that the anxiety expressed to the Resident concerning repeated refusals of Repre-
sentations was not misplaced. Indeed, the comment relayed by the diplomat to his
government concerning how the members of the Petit Conseil intended to use the droit
negatif makes it clear that there was bound to be further trouble in the city.
It would not take long for the Bourgeois to realise that once again they had been misled
in 1738. The frequent use of representations during the forties and fifties should have
made it clear to the government that the Bourgeois were not prepared to give in and allow
the Conseil General to sink into the state it had been in during the seventeenth century.
In the Register of the Councils there appears the following:
'Les representations toujours mai fondóes dont le Conseil a êtê harcele en 1742, 	 .
43, 47, 49, 50, 52, 56 et 57 prouvent déjà que depuis 1738 nous n'avions jamais
as	 BPU Geneve, Ms. Cramer 78, XIX 59-60.
29	 See Chapter V, pp. 10-111.
90	 Sautier, op. cit., p. 945. In effect, this is taken from the correspondence of the French Resident in Geneva to
Amelot in Pads (21. 7. 1739) C.P.G. 54, 184 & 182.
31	 Sautier op. cit, pp. 944-46. The correspondence of the French Resident to Geneva to Amelot in Pads (21-7-1739)
C.P.G. 54, 184 & 182.
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6t6 dans un calme parfait:32
The number of representations was high. At the same time, the attitude of the members of
the government and the two small councils is clearly betrayed by the use of the words 'mal
fondees', together with the word 'harcele. Was it really harassing the government when
the Bourgeois had a matter that they wanted to see discussed by the Conseil General?
Doubtless the government was aware of what had happened in Genoa in 1746, where
because of war and poor leadership:
'An autonomous power ... formed outside the governmental palace. ... it became a
general assembly, ... [which] undertook to report frequently to the people ... in the
piazza:33
Unlike Genoa, in Geneva there was a clear referent and programme for the Bourgeois in
the city and this was more than defending the independence of the state. The nightmare
for the government was that the Bourgeois in the Conseil General might drag Geneva into •
the maelstrom of anarchy like Genoa. While on the other hand, the patience of the
Bourgeois and their determination to do nothing outside the law of the land was clearly
manifested during this period of regularly rejected Representations, as well as their
continued trust in their Magistrates.
There remained one loop-hole in the 'constitution' which the Mediation had not blocked.
The Bourgeois had the right to refuse to elect the 4 Syndics at the annual meeting of the
Conseil General, as well as the Procureur-General and other officials at the tri-annual
elections. This refusal to elect from the given list was used for the first time in January
1741, within nineteen months of the acceptance of the Mediation. The Conseil General
was able to elect only one of the necessary four new Syndics. Du Pan wrote:
'la ligne de nouvelle election eut plus de suffrages que tous les autres. ... Nous
sommes destines a voir des evenemens que nos Peres n'ont jamais vu. Le motif
qui a determin6 le Bourgeois a êtè la vengeance et le dessein d'intimider le CC
[Deux Cents].34
Du Pan was a member of the patriciate, and thus his letter gives a fair idea of the general
attitude of the ruling oligarchy in the city. If nothing else, Du Pan's letter is indicative of the
continuing difficulties which still separated the patriciate from the rest of the Bourgeois.
In January 1743, De Luc,35 the father, led a Representation to the Syndics, to demand
a stay of proceedings on demanding aid from Bern and Zurich and that the question of the
Treaty of Soleure should be discussed first and that:
's'il etoit necessaire d'avoir un secours des Cantons, on en fit la requisition A la
France en mArne temps qu'aux Cantons en conformite du traitte de Soleure;' 36
The Petit Conseil, sitting all day, finally decided that they could not accept the demand
of De Luc and his followers. The reasons given were several, one being that the number of
citizens who had presented the petition was relatively small (around 200), another was that
the petitioners:
'n'avai[en]t pas d'autre but que de gagner du temps pour entrainer dans leur
sentiment une certain quantitá d'esprits indOcis qu'ils ne manqueraient pas de
32	 AEG R.C. 266 31 mai-31 decernbre 1766
aa	 Venturi, op. cit., p. 38.
34	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 1537 Lathes de Du Pan A Freudenreich 1740-1748, 1, 4 janvier [17401
36	 see Appencix IV.
34	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 1537 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1740-1748, 33, janvier 1743.
122
solliciter.'37
The government was clearly unhappy at the attempts being made by those of the Bour-
geois who were opposed to its position to organise their own supporters.
The Bourgeois were clearly divided over the issue of whether troops should be demand-
ed by the government. Both those in favour of calling in Swiss troops and those against
spent most of the days before the meeting of the Conseil General trying to find additional
support for their respective viewpoints. This involved both sides, De Luc's and the
government's, trying to speak to as many of the Bourgeois as possible, rushing from
'des boutiques des rues basses aux cabinets de St.-Gervais, et ... dans tous les
petits cercles de la basse ville.'38
All this fevered activity to drum up as many Bourgeois as possible to vote for 'their' side
took place against the background of a possible attack from Spanish troops. 39 Unfortu-
nately, there are no details as to the names of those involved. De Luc would not have
been the only one on his side of the political divide, and the supporters of the government
position amongst the Bourgeois remain anonymous.
The meeting of the Conseil General (21st. January 1743) was held almost immediately
after the Representation made by De Luc. At the Conseil General, as the two smaller
councils processed through the gathered Bourgeois to their places in the cathedral, the
following was clearly heard:
'point de Suissesi nous nous defendrons bien nous-mernes. ... souvenez-vous de
l'ere Fatio, et de ce qu'on salt faire chez-nous quand on a l'appuis des baionnettes
de Leurs Excellences [i.e. Bern et ZOrich].'40
The Bourgeois had not forgotten what had happened the last time Bern and Zurich had
furnished troops to the city in 1707. As a result of the feelings in the city, the meeting of
the Conseil General was noisy and unpleasant. Just as in the days of Fatio, so in 1743,
those most opposed to the acceptance of foreign troops had congregated in a body at the
back of the cathedral, arguing and nearly coming to blows with those who disagreed with
them. Others made a point of voting in a loud voice, while those opposed to the govern-
ment attempted to crowd around the secretaries taking the votes. The closeness of the
vote reduced the cathedral to silence, followed by a demand for a recount. The Syndics
were prepared to recount when common sense made it clear that there was a government
victory of 59 votes; 658 accepted the government's recommendation, against 599 who
rejected it.'"
Although very surprised by the vote, those who were against the motion accepted it: 'ii
fallait tenir la main sur la bouche'. 42 Once again the Bourgeois in the city, or that part of
them which disapproved of the government and its behaviour, had shown that they were
37
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not revolutionaries, determined to overthrow the government or the state. Once the vote
was taken in the Conseil General, they were willing to accept that decision, however
unhappy they were with it For them the Conseil General was the sovereign body and its
decisions to be respected. The evidence from this episode shows clearly that the Bour-
geois were working as a political, but loyal, opposition.
What is unclear from De Luc's actions is whether he still believed, as he had in his
correspondence with Micheli over the Mediation, that France was a protector for the rights
of the Conseil General and the Bourgeois against the power of the oligarchy; or whether
he was using a crisis and its consequences, with the parallels with what had happened at
the time of Fatio, for his own party ends. Du Pan claims that De Luc was acting in what
would be for the modem observer a perfectly normal political manner:
'le dessein de De Luc etoit de renvoyer l'Assemblee general par les entraves qu'il
vouloit mettre dans cette affaire afin de mieux lier sa partie.'43 .
The divisions which had emerged between those who supported Micheli's view of Article VI
of the Mediation and De Luc's view that France could be relied upon to protect the
interests of the Bourgeois are almost certainly what Du Pan is referring to. It is tempting to
believe De Luc was one of those who went to see the Resident in 1739 over this matter,
and that he came away perhaps confirmed in his original belief. If so, his continued belief
in the efficacy of the French guarantee, together with those who disagreed, would have
continued divisions within the Bourgeois. There was inevitably a questioning of the inten-
tions of the government because of the Fatio affair, as is shown by the shouted comments
before the beginning of the meeting of the Conseil General.
Bern, particularly, was a canton with a powerful oligarchy, so it would be natural for it to
support the aims of a similar group in Geneva. The French might possibly be seen as not
necessarily favouring the patriciate over the Bourgeois quite as much as Bern. In fact, the
anger of the Resident in 1739 indicates that the French were to be as little trusted as the
Swiss. It was the French who had been the driving force behind the Mediation, which had
granted the government the power of Article VI. It was also in France's interest, in support
of the Geneva government and the ruling elite, to weaken and if possible divide the
opposition to that government. In doing this, the French were also strengthening the bonds
between a grateful government in Geneva and the government in Paris.
The arrival of French troops to garrison Geneva would be bound to cause deep anger
and a possible serious reaction from many of the Bourgeois. De Luc cannot have been
unaware of this aspect of the situation. If nothing else, by attempting to have the matter of
allies and treaties openly discussed in the Conseil General, he was highlighting the corner
into which the government had backed itself. If it called upon the Swiss, a logical thing to
do as it wished to be associated with the Swiss declaration of neutrality in the War of
Austrian Succession, it risked being accused of nefarious intentions because of 1707. If it
turned to the French, it risked being attacked by those who considered that the French
already had too much influence in the city. There was also the embarassment of asking
France, Geneva's ally, to garrison the city to protect it from France's other ally Spain. In
such circumstances, any politician or party leader would attempt to take advantage. The
fact that the vote in the Conseil General was so close demonstrates that the answer to the
problem was far from clear-cut. What De Luc really thought is unclear, though the fact that
he was unable to prevent the call for Swiss troops might suggest that his arguments were
unconvincing to some. The Bourgeois in Geneva always buried their disagreements in the
face of foreign threats, and the Spanish army was occupying the immediate vicinity.
There was another side to the question of invoking treaties for the defence of Geneva.
As well as having difficulties with the Bourgeois, the government and the members of the
•	 BPU, Genave Ms. 1537 Lames de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1740-1748 33, janvier 1743.
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two smaller councils were in dispute with the French Resident and in danger of upsetting
the king in Paris. The difficulty related to the claim by the Resident that upon the appoint-
ment of a new Syndic, the latter had to make a courtesy call upon the Resident. In
addition, the French Resident claimed that he should also be visited, as a matter of
course, by:
'un magistrat genevois revenant de negociation ou de deputation aupres d'une
puissance etrangere.'44
This 'rule' was also to be applied, according to the Resident, to all those in Geneva who
moved from the Deux Cents to the Petit ConseiL
To mollify him, the government agreed to notify the Resident upon the election each
year of the four Syndics. It was a blatant attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of a
sovereign country. Clearly, France wished to ensure control of Geneva as the key to both
Switzerland and Italy. At the same time, given all the circumstances in 1743, it would have
been unwise in the extreme to invite French troops to garrison Geneva. This storm in a
teacup between the government and Geneva may also have played a part in the govern-
ment's decision to seek Swiss help.
It was at this same meeting of the Conseil General in January 1743, that it was noted
that some of the younger members of the Conseil General between the ages of 25 and 30:
's'etaient mantes les plus emportes et les plus imperieux ... [us etaient] sans
position acquise, sans merite connu, simples artisans.'45
The existence of such a group within the Bourgeois should have warned the government
that all was not well and that they might be well advised to be careful in their treatment of
the Bourgeois. These were the new generation of voters.
Bread, defences and the cautious Bourgeois
The difficulties of the government were not only political. The attempt to keep the price
of bread too high in 1749 in order to allow the Chambre des Bles to recoup its losses due
to the famine of the previous year, when there had been a bad harvest and they had
ordered considerable amounts of grain from abroad, was unsuccessful. There was rioting,
and bread had to be reduced to its original pre-1748 price. There were constant problems
with the provision of flour for the making of bread in Geneva throughout the century. There
was the problem of storage, especially in the years when the harvest was good and the
price of wheat was low. Bakers in Geneva were compelled to buy their supplies from the
town stores, but, in many years, the cost of the flour was higher than in Savoy or France.
The high price of bread in Geneva was a consequence of this policy, although it also
meant that in years of shortage, the city was able to provide sufficient bread for the people
in the city. The poor were those who suffered most from this system. In normal years (the
greater part of the eighteenth century), they were forced to pay a high price for one of the
staples of their diet, while the better-off would buy their bread or flour in Carouge, outside.
Genevan territory, and pay less. A French visitor commented upon this system in 1780:
'la vente du pain est pour la Republique un objet de speculation, dont le pauvre
soul est la victime, &ant oblige de l'acheter en detail chez les boulangers, qui le
vendent en raison du profit qu'y fait la Chambre des bleds, tandis que les citoyens
44	 Du Bois Melly, La seigneurie de Geneve, op. cit., p. 146. Pierre Mussard (Syndic four times 1750-62) was the
man concerned; he was a diplomat involved in the long negotiations with Twin, a matter of interest to France.
46	 Ibid., p. 164.
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aises en font separêment leur provision.'"
In addition to the high cost to the state of ensuring that there was an adequate supply of
flour and bread, there was also the old question of the defences of the city.
Although future new taxation had to be approved by the Conseil General, the continua-
tion until 1750 of the taxes for the fortifications, first introduced in 1715, rankled. These
taxes and their continuation until 1750 had been included in the Mediation. At the first
opportunity, in 1750, when the smaller councils asked the Conseil General to continue the
taxes for a further five years to complete the fortifications, in order to ensure the safety of
the city, its liberty and religion, the Bourgeois rejected the demand:
'lls avaient cause nos troubles et les approuver, c'etait donner une sone d'ass-
entiment a la conduite des Conseils des trente-six ans.'47
The six suggested taxes were rejected by a majority of three-quarters of those present in
the Conseil General. The outstanding wcrk which the government wished to finance was
on the fortifications of St. Gervais. D'Ivernois claims that, in rejecting the suggested five
year extension of the tax, the people:
'Ills] cherchaient sourdement a s'affranchir de l'Edit de 1738.'48
As a result of the the troubles of 1734-38, the taxes had been imposed in the Mediation for
a further twelve years. This rankled with the Bourgeois, who, not unnaturally, took the first
legal opportunity to end the taxes. With the change in Geneva's circumstances and the
recognition the state was about to receive from Savoy, there would be little need for further
extensive defence works, apart from the fact that such defences were increasingly
obsolete. What the rejection also showed was that the Conseil General would not always
follow the advice of the government and smaller councils. The only time when the
Bourgeois were willing to accept government recommendations concerning higher taxation
was when the city was clearly under military threat, as had been the case in 1742.
Much as the continuation of the taxes for the new defences had been resented by the
Bourgeois, they had waited patiently until they were legally entitled to end them. Although
in the matter of these taxes there was little doubt that any move to have them abrogated
would have had considerable support, the Bourgeois, having accepted the Mediation,
waited until the term set before stopping the taxes and the work. Once again, they had
shown that they did not desire to overthrow the system or to radically change it.
The need for the government to secure the authority of the Conseil General for any
change in the taxes levied was a considerable advantage to the Bourgeois if annual supply
had to be voted as in England. However, apart from the emergency in 1742 and the
attempted renewal of the tax for defence work in 1750, the government had no need to
change the existing taxes. This rendered the government independent of the Conseil
General. For d'Ivemois, it was the Conseil General:
'qui aurait pu la [l'Administration] contenir sans peine si, comme en Angleterre elle
at ate forcee de redemander a certaines époques une nouvelle continuation de
subsides.' 49
If this had been the case then there would have been a state of interdependence between •
these two parts of the system of government which might have avoided future problems.
As it was, in Geneva, the government was fortunate that there was no necessity to have
an annual vote to receive funds.
•	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit, 4eme. partie: A-M Piuz, Ch. 9, pp. 271-272.
47	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3eme. parte, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 446.
D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. I, seconde partie, p. 168.
4° 	 Ibid., p. 135.
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The next twelve years, 1750-62, saw the government moving to circumvent the need to
call the Conseil General. In part this was to avoid any refusal that it might encounter for its
suggestions, but more from its desire to see the Conseil General fade into total insignifi-
cance and thus cease to be a threat to it. The government and the two small councils
began a policy which was in 1763 to lead to serious trouble in the city, using decrees
issued by the Petit Conseil to change existing laws.
The removal of the right of an accused person to be represented at trial by a lawyer in
minor crimes was the first change decreed by the Petit Conseil. At the same time, the right
to a lawyer in matters of serious crime was also curtailed when the government let it be
known that it would deal more leniently with those who did not insist on having a defence
counsel. Lawyers for the defence of those accused of crime had been one of the gains of
the unrest in the 1730s and had been enshrined in Article XXX of the document of Media-
tion. There appeared to be little in the way of reaction from the Bourgeois to what were
arbitrary acts on the part of the government, despite the fact that the alteration of existing
laws and the introduction of new laws had to be approved by the Conseil General.
If the Bourgeois did not react, it was because they regarded the changes as mere
technicalities. Yet this action is important when it is borne in mind that the first Represen-
tations made in Geneva concerning Rousseau and Pictet were, in effect, over technical
legal matters concerning the manner of the trials and the appointment of judges.
A second way the government found to avoid consulting the Conseil General was for the
Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents to jointly publish new sumptuary laws, issued simply as
Ordonnances. Again there was no reaction from the Bourgeois. The government, together
with the two smaller councils, was breaking the law as laid down in the Mediation. The
contrast with the insistence of the Bourgeois on not breaking any of the laws of the state is
interesting.
The complacency of the Bourgeois and their leaders and lack of action was noted by
Du Pan in another context, when he wrote concerning the January 1747 election of the
Syndics:
'Autrefois on voyoit une grande affluence de Bourgeois au Conseil Genêral quand il
y avoit un nouveau Sindic a faire, et cette armee il y en a 300 de moms qu'a
l'ordinaire.'50
There is a clue in Du Pan's letter that some at least of the Bourgeois were unhappy. Was
there a connection, with those objecting to the actions of the government so far that they
realised they had no power to force the issue, but were determined enough to make a
point by not attending the Conseil General for the election? There appears to be no
evidence except the coincidence, but, given the situation in Geneva, one is tempted to
believe that it was, in fact, no coincidence, but rather the action of a small, organised
group. Throughout the history of the city, certainly as of 1562, the Bourgeois, when they
felt that they had no other means of protest, had often refused to attend the annual meet-
ings of the Conseil General.
The same calmness is found in the following year, when Du Pan writes:
'Toutes nos elections se font aujourdhui avec beaucoup de tranquilite et d'indiffe-
rence.'51
More surprising still was the report received by the government in London in May 1748:
'Comme il ne c'est rien passé depuis longtemps & qu'il ne se passe encore rien
dans ce Pals ecy qui meritat l'attention de Votre Excellence, je ne me suis pas
50	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 1537 Leltres de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1740-1748, 1, janvier 1740.
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donne l'honneur de lui ecrire plutet.52
It was no wonder that the British government was reluctant to put much effort into
diplomatic representation in Geneva or Switzerland.
D'Ivernois finds it difficult to explain the passivity of the Bourgeois at this point. He
states:
'Le plus grand nombre des Citoyens, fatigues des troubles precedens, & determi-
nes a ne sentirent point d'abord le danger extreme de cette usurpation, ... n'en
porterent aucune plainte.'53
The neccesity to work, the absence of a man like De Luc on business abroad and the lack
of any important issue around which the Bourgeois could unite must all play a role in this
calm. Yet two years later, they were willing to make the effort to ensure that the govern-
ment was unable to continue with the fortifications and the taxes for them.
Equally paradoxical, in educational matters, the government was forced to cede to the
objections of the Bourgeois. This was to be one of the few occasions in this period when
the Bourgeois were able to 'persuade' the government to change its mind. And even then,
the change was instituted without recourse to the Conseil General. In 1752, the Deux
Cents, having decided to establish a School of Drawing, determined that in consequence it
would suppress what was called 'la grande classe'. 54 Ten days later, the Procureur-
General received a Representation, brought to him by a considerable number of citizens,
demanding the return of 'la grande classe'. It needed to be discussed in ten different
sittings of the Deux Cents before this demand was accepted. 55 The whole procedure after
the presentation of the Representation had been illegal. The matter should have been
decided by the Conseil General rather than the Deux Cents, yet it was allowed to pass
unchecked by the Bourgeois. This was the only Representation which was successful
throughout this period. The success was limited however, in that the decision had been
made without consulting the Conseil General, the Deux Cents believing it had the right to
act.
The technicality of the legal changes achieved by the government certainly played a retie
in the quiessence of the Bourgeois, as did the economic situation of the city. Leaders of
the Bourgeois such as De Luc had to earn a living. As a result, there were occasions when
he was away from the city for certain periods acting as the agent for J.J. Pallard, the larg-
est watch and jewellery merchant of the city. In 1750, he travelled to Spain on Pallard's
instructions, carrying jewellery and watches valued at 2,450,000 florins.
The years 1747 and 1748 were situated well into the period when the economy of
Geneva was expanding rapidly. Between 1745 and 1780, there was an overall gain in
population of 4,000. During the same period, the watch industry was extremely successful
and prosperous. At the same time, it was the most important industry in the state,
producing by 1785 100,000 watches per year, quite apart from movements and various
watch-parts. 57 The master craftsmen in the watch industry were all Bourgeois. Many of
them were simply too busy with business and production to worry over much about politics.
52	 PRO London, SP 96/30 January - December 1748, 20 Mai.
55	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. I, seconds partie, p. 171.
64	 BPU Geneve, Ms. Rocca 12, p. 115, 'se crut en droit de supprimer'.
si	 /oc. cit
M	 O'Mara, Geneva in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit, p. 42.
37	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit, 6eme. parte, L Mottu-Weber• Ch. )0C, p. 633.
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The need to work hard was strengthened by the fact that salaries were static after 1730
for much of the remaining century:
'les salaires ne varient pratiquement pas, restant bloques a l'indice 100 depuis
1720-1730, alors que les prix alimentaires atteignent l'indice 170 en 1780-1790.'58
For the younger Bourgeois, who were still at the apprentice stage, as well as those of the
Bourgeois who were employed by others rather than having their own business, there was
a clear necessity to concentrate more on work than on politics. For them, unlike the
patriciate, political activity could not be a full-time occupation, especially if they had a
family.
By the mid-1750s also, it became clear that there was little likelihood of the government
calling any meetings of the Conseil General except those necessary for the formal election
of the Syndics and government officials. There was a growing realisation that Represent-
ations were becoming an exercise in futility. The government, although it had been acting
illegally, had wisely limited itself to minor matters which did not greatly impinge upon the
life of the ordinary Bourgeois. There were full order books and plentiful work to distract
from politics, coupled with the absence from Geneva of one of the driving forces of the
Bourgeois. All these, plus their desire, as P.E. Martin states to 'rest[er] dans la legalite',58
contributed to the apparent passivity of the Bourgeois. But there clearly was still an active
group who, aware that in many matters, they could not persuade the majority of the
Bourgeois to follow them, made their existence known, if only negatively, by refusing to
vote in the Conseil General. And equally, if the government attempted to act high-handedly
in a matter which the Bourgeois felt touched them closely, as in 1750 or 1752, then they
would react.
Natifs and Habitants
The economic success being enjoyed in Geneva was not confined to the Bourgeois
alone, a fact which began to cause some concern. The government was to become
increasingly anxious about the growing prosperity of the Nat/Is. This was particularly the
case as:
'la prosperite des Natifs, [les] rendait peu a peu independans des riches.'8°
The emergence of the Natifs since the 1680s as an independent economic group within
the state had been accelerated by the rights they had been given in the Mediation. The
introduction of restrictions concerning both Natifs and Habitants in the trades of watchmak-
ing from 1690, had done little to prevent the Natifs from entering and qualifying, as
diagram 8 shows. The Nat/Is were certain to take the maximum advantage of the opening
given them in the Mediation, especially in watchmaking and its associated trades as these
were successful and clearly expanding. This was due to the increasing demand for
watches and the need for more hands to produce them, even the watchmakers guild
admitting to the government in 1735:
'que leur profession allant fort bien A present et n'aiant pas tous les aprentifs et
compagnons qui seroient necessaires, us croioient que l'on devoit etre faciles sur
ces sortes de dispenses.'81
50	 Ibid., p. 636.
5.	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., p. 442.
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It was the same demand for watches that had seen the industry gradually develop with
artisans working in small work shops producing finished watches for the 'metres-mar-
chands' who provided them with the raw materials, watch pieces and tools and bought the
watches from him. By the 1750s, the raw movements were often made outside Geneva,
either in Neuchatel or in Savoy. 62 From 100 maitres in 1685, there were 550 in the
1750s. This was a much larger number than found in a guild city like Augsbourg. 63 In
1745, the Natifs were granted the right to retail the watches and watch parts they made
but they could not own shops; this was a right that was reserved for the Bourgeois alone,
and the Nat/Is, as the Habitants, also continued to suffer from the fiscal disadvantages of
their status."
The patriciate, as a result the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven
Years War (1756-63), found they were able to invest heavily in the countries involved in
the wars. During the War of Austrian Succession and the Sevcri Years War, Geneva was
both competent and wealthy enough to act as 'une reserve passive de capitaux'.65 At the
same time the elite saw their economic position strengthen, they were gradually becoming
culturally less distinct from a proportion of the urban population.
A visitor to Geneva in 1688 states:
'Le !engage vulgaire de cette ville est le Savoyard, mais tout ce qu'il y a de gens
qui sont un peu distingues du bas peuple parlent frangais.'"
The influx of French-speakers, many of whom would have begun life in Geneva living in
the less prosperous areas of the city, may well have given an impetus to the elimination of
the Savoyard patois. Only the exceptionally wealthy or skilled of the immigrants were
admitted into the Bourgeois class in the first twelve years after their arrival. Most would be
classified as Habitants, thus inserting into this group a large element of French speak-
ers!' The gradual elimination of Savoyard meant that, apart from those coming into the
city in recent years, by the 1730's, the vast majority of the people were French-speakers.
Although, Comuaud in 1780 speaks of a' [une] brochure ... en patois savoyard'."
In its turn, this meant that it was an easy matter for them to understand the political
discussions which were, as mentioned previously, the mainstay of conversation in the work
a	 Piuz. Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 5em. pantie Mottu-Weber Ch. KW, pA94 ., Pha., Ch. Xkllk, p., bs) VISC), 'Alias no
longer necessary for the merchant to be a member of the watchmakers' guild.
a	 Landes, op. cit., p. 355.
64	 O'Mara, Geneva in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit., p. 131. They paid double tax at the Hellas, and one third
more tax on estate transfers.
N	 Piuz, Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 5ilim. paste, Piuz, Ch.XVIII, p. 589.
« J.D. Candaux, op dt, p. 17. The visitor was France-Maximilien Misson 1650-1722, Huguenot, later a tutor in
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place and around the fountains.69 Both the Natifs and the Habitants had been involved
with Montreal's attempt to create an armed force which could be used for the defence of
the government in 1736." With the minor concession won by the Natifs in the Mediation,
together with their increasing political education, and their inherent, built-in inferiority within
the state, it was merely a matter of time before they felt angry enough and confident
enough to emulate the Bourgeois, who were busily - if unintentionally - educating them.
Culture and further divisions
Voltaire, already famous, especially as a playwright and philosopher, came to Geneva
from Prussia already an old man ready, he said, to die. Instead he lived at Les Delices, a
house bought for him by a member of the Tronchin family, where he began to entertain
and provide theatrical entertainment, including comedies. Reminded that the theatre was
illegal in the state of Geneva, even though his entertainments were much patronised by its
leaders, he moved to Femey, where he could build his own theatre if he wished, but which
was still within easy carriage and horse reach of Geneva, though in France. He had
already had an altercation with Rousseau concerning the latter's ideas expressed in his
'Discourse on Inequality'.
Those who had been invited to share Voltaire's theatrical evenings were all members of
the patriciate of Geneva. Although in the 1760s Voltaire did invite some Bourgeois to
Ferney, these invitations were concerned with either scientific or political matters. Amongst
the patriciate, there were a considerable number of scientists and mathematicians?' who
because of family wealth were able to devote their attention to such matters as well as
politics, unlike the Bourgeois, for whom both scientific enquiry and politics had to take a
secondary place to earning a living.
In 1756, d'Alembert 72 visited Geneva, staying with Necker" and frequently visiting
Voltaire, where he met a number of Geneva's patriciate and scientists. It was this visit that
led to the article in the Encyclopedie called simply Geneve. In his article, d'Alembert
makes comments about Geneva needing a theatre:
'ce n'est pas qu'on y desapprouve les spectacles en eux-memes; mais on craint,
dit-on, le goat de parure, de dissipation et de libertinage que les troupes de
comediens repandent parmi la jeunesse. Cependant ne serait-il pas possible de
remedier a cet inconvenient, par des lois severes et bien executees sur la conduite
des comediens?' 74
He continues provocatively to suggest that, were Geneva to carry out such a plan, she
would be able to benefit from the theatre as well as setting Europe an excellent example.
In response to d'Alembert's comments on the theatre in Geneva, Rousseau entered,
indirectly, into the political fray in Geneva. In his Lettre a M. d'Alembert sur les spectacles
of October 1758, he attempted to defend Geneva against the introduction of theatre and
N	 See Chapter IV, p. 66, 'Les horlogers de Geneve discutent a perdre haleine sur les affaires de l'Etat..'
"	 See Chapter V, pp. 107ff.
r	 See Appendix IV B VI/1.
n	 See Appendix IV B VI/2.
73	 Jacques Trembley Les Savants genevois dans l'Europe intellectuelle du XVIle. au  milieu du XIXe. sickle, Geneve:
Journal de Geneve, 1987, p. 98.
74
	
D'Alembert Geneve, Encyclopódie ou dictionnaire raisonni3 des sciences, des arts at des mOtiers, Paris: G.F.
Flammarion, 1986, Vol. II (articles choisis), p. 138. Chronologie, introduction at bibliographie par Alain Pons.
131
especially comedy. In part, Rousseau's reaction was because he believed that d'Alem-
bert's article had, in fact, been written by his arch-enemy, Voltaire.
For Rousseau, Horace had been right in principle. Art should inculcate virtue and
discourage vice. Unfortunately, in modern civilisation, which was corrupt, art could no
longer teach virtue. It was better for Geneva to be without a theatre because modem
theatre was mainly French, which meant Parisian. This would be like introducing poison
into the 'simple' society of Geneva," especially with comedy. It was the belief of many,
particularly in the Protestant churches, that theatre (and especially comedy) was a
dangerous and pernicious influence on the morals of ordinary citizens, that wit could in a
few short minutes throw truth out of the window and encourage disbelief in God's universe.
What gave some originality to his article was his contention that the introduction of comedy
in Geneva would act not as a means of teaching manners but as an instrument of factions,
parties and even private vengeance and would cause the most terrible disorders. Proof of
the idealised version of Geneva held by Rouseau.
It was the Bourgeois who were against the re-introduction of the theatre into the town."
In part, this was due to their religious inheritance, perhaps too because their cercles had
filled a void in social life which was both serious and worthwhile. And also to the fact that
the theatre in the city always occurred in the context of the French being present as in
1737-8, when the presence of the French negotiator, the Comte de Lautrec, led to the
introduction of the theatre into the city of Calvin even though against the law. Lautrec had
insisted on the building of a wooden theatre to while away the hours when he was not
negotiating. Many of the members of the two small councils found that they too quite
enjoyed the theatre, just as they enjoyed the other aspects of French culture. Such
enjoyments, apparently unimportant in themselves, added to a further alienation between
the patriciate on the one hand and the Bourgeois on the other.
In attending Voltaire's dinners and amateur dramatics at 'Les De!ices', the patriciate
were breaking one of the laws which forbade theatre in the city as well as breaking one of
the religious tenets of Calvinism. If members of the government were happy to enjoy
Voltaire's plays in defiance of what was legal in Geneva, what else were they ignoring,
disregarding or defying within the state?
Less inclined to follow the French fashions and ideas of the day, many in the Bourgeois
watched with dismay as, during this period, some of the patriciate began increasingly to
ape French manners and attitudes. The basic beliefs of the Calvinist state of Geneva were
theoretically embedded in simplicity, hard work, limited inequality and fear of God.
Increasingly, the government and its supporters appeared to be breaking all of those
ideals. This ideal Geneva had never existed, but was a concept in which many Bourgeois
also believed, none more so than Rousseau, who had not lived in the Republic for many
years. The dedicatory text in his 'Discourse on Equality' (which he dedicated to the citizens
of Geneva) makes clear his own idealised version of Geneva.
The disagreement between Voltaire and Rousseau had grown out of this article and Vol-
taire's negative response to itn. Rousseau's reaction to Voltaire's Poem stir le Desastre
de Lisbonne added fuel to their disagreements. Although refusing to answer Rousseau's
n	 Rousseau uses the example of Molière% Misanthrope, where the audience is encouraged to despise Alceste and
his upright behaviour. Peter Gay, The Science of Freedom, pp. 258-9.
The Church had insisted on the ban on the theatre in 1620. By the eighteenth century, the Bourgeois were against
its reintroduction.
'No one has employed so much intelligence to turn men into beasts. One starts wanting to walk on all fours after
reading your book' Voltaire to Rousseau 30 August, 1755, quoted by Maurice Cranston, Philosophers and
Pamphleteers Political Theorists of the Enlighenment, Oxford: Oxford University Press (OPUS), 1986, p. 80.
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letter about the poem, Voltaire provided his response in Candide (1759), which Rousseau
took to be deliberately aimed at him. The question of a theatre in Geneva was part of this
'battle' between the two men. Rousseau, in denouncing the delights of theatre and
comedy, became the man who was opposed to Voltaire and the patriciate.
In this way, both Voltaire and Rousseau were gradually enmeshed in the politics of
Geneva. For Voltaire, this was due to his moving to Geneva, being friendly with the
patriciate and inviting them to his entertainments. Rousseau, at this time, was beginning to
break away from the philosophes grouped around Voltaire, d'Alembert and Diderot," and
by his riposte to d'Alembert, showing the Bourgeois that he had some ideals which were
similar to their own.
In the same article, D'Alembert also commented on the religion of the state:
'le respect pour Jesus-Christ et pour les Ecritures [est] peut-être la seule chose qui
distingue d'un pur deisme le christianisme de Geneve.'"
This was mild compared with what had been written, but not made public, by Francois
Bruys in 1727 concerning his fellow theological students:
'Je n'en connus que cinq ou six qui fussent de veritables calvinistes. Les autres
etaient, ou sociniens, ou arminiens, ou pelagiens, ••.'80
What upset the city, its fathers and the clergy was the claim that basically the faith as
taught in Geneva at the very heart of Calvinism was a form of pure deism. Certainly the
severities of the Synod of Dordrecht had long been put on one side. Under the influence
and leadership of J.-A. Turrettini at the beginning of the century, the oath sworn by new
ministers had become very liberal, allowing considerable room for individual conscience
with regard to belief. Such lightening of the severity of Calvin's teaching had been
especially welcomed by many of the patriciate, but less so by the Bourgeois. To them,
these comments were further evidence of the dangers that emanated from the irreligious
and corrupt Catholic state of France, the enemy of all that Calvin's Geneva represented. It
was evidence of the already pernicious influence that France had obtained in Geneva.
In this respect, Geneva was not in fact so different from many other countries. The first
half of the eighteenth century saw Europe emerging from the certainties of previous
centuries into a new, questioning era. From being God-centred, philosophy was moving to
being man- and reason-centred. Such a change posed great problems. This was particu-
larly the case in a state such as Geneva, where the Church and Calvinism were an
integral part of the state. To question the truth of the Bible, as Voltaire had done, 81 was to
question the very basis on which the state had been in part constructed. To replace a
world governed in the finest detail by God with a world in which man, with the use of his
'reason', was the important factor inevitably called into question the teachings of the
churches, both Catholic and Protestant. The ability of the patriciate to adapt to the changes
had already been demonstrated by the careful substitution of law and the theory of natural
law as the basis of the government's position in 1736-7. Man-made law replacing God-
made law had led in practice, from the Bourgeois point of view, to the strengthening of the
oligarchy in government at the expense of themselves. The political differences between •
the rulers in Geneva and the Bourgeois were reinforced by their diverging attitudes to
n	 See Appendix IV B VI/3.
n	 D'Alembert, op. cit., p. 142.
so	 J.D. Candaux, op. cit., Francois Bruys, Memoirs historiques, critiques et litterataires, p. 38
si	 In his Sermon des Cinquante, he drew attention to the fact that, although the church claimed that the Pentateuch
had been written by Moses, it actually reports the death of Moses. Peter Gay Voltaire's Politics. The Poet as
Realist Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 245.
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religion and also the theatre. This difference was rarely openly manifested, coming to the
surface primarily in the theatre question.
It was during this period of Geneva's history that the patriciate began to complain about
the lack of respect of the people in the city:
'le relachement dans les moeurs: cet esprit de libertinage qui s'est introduit parmi
nous, qui fait mepriser la Religion et qui porte principalement les jeunes gens a en
secouer le joug et a regimber centre toute autorite legitime, soit civile, soit ecclesia-
stique, ce qui affoiblit et relache insensiblement tous les liens de la soumission aux
loix et de l'obeizance qui est due a tous ses Superieurs.'82
For Cramer, the insistence of the Bourgeois in pursuing their belief in the rights of the
Conseil GánOral had both social and political consequences. In Geneva, because of its
strict Calvinism, questionning of the government was as much a social as political offence.
It was perhaps difficult to feel much - confidence in a government which had deliberately
misled the Conseil Gôneral in 1712 and had then proceeded to treat the promise to consult
that body on any important matter to arise as only there to be ignored. In 1738, it had
granted the long-demanded right of sovereignty for the Conseil Gënëral with one hand,
while rendering that sovereignty nothing but empty words with the other, by in effect
making the lesser councils de facto sovereign. Neither could the actions of the government
be sufficiently off-set by the undoubted honesty in the day-to-day administration of the
state by the Syndics and the elected officers. The patriciate faced tremendous difficulties,
brought up to believe that they were the rulers, the 'fathers' of their people, with the
education, the knowledge and the wealth that made them uncorruptible, they were faced
by a considerable proportion of the Bourgeois who rejected this estimation. The same men
claimed a share of the knowledge and right to govern. It was impossible for the patriciate
to see anything but an esprit de libertinage in such ideas, combined with an inability on the
part of the Bourgeois to appreciate the profound reality of the dangers of 'democracy'. As
Cramer lamented:
'La Magistrature n'a plus etc§ vue comme une Science, tout le monde s'y est cru
propre.'83
What they saw and heard was new, the voice of an alien world, they could not like or
accept what they saw. To avoid the danger of anarchy therefore the Conseil GenOral was
avoided on all possible occasions, except those where clearly there would be little or no
opposition to the government's recommendation, such as the ratification of the treaties with
France and Sardinia. Escher had written clearly in 1736 to Turrettini:
'Monsieur, les affaires ne peuvent jamais eller bien dans une Republique tandis
que ceux qui gouvernent tachent a se soutenir ou a s'introduire centre le gre de la
bourgeoisie, et tandis que ceux de la ville haute et ceux des Rues basses se
regardent comme deux peuples divers. Seroit-il impossible de regagner la confi-
ance d'une belle bourgeoisie comme la vOtre?'"
It was very difficult if not impossible for the patriciate to adjust.
The use of government decrees to change existing laws and to introduce new laws
made it abundantly clear that the government and the patriciate had no intention, in reality,
of allowing the Conseil General any place in the state unless absolutely necessary. The
unfortunate quiescence of the Bourgeois in allowing the government to act in this way
gave it a false impression of its position and an erroneous feeling of the success of its
12	 BPU, Geneve Ms. Cramer 87, 126.
BPU, Geneve, Ms. Cramer 87, Vol. II, juin 1766, 160.
84	 Buda, op. cit, Vol. II, p. 32.
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policy. The sovereignty of the Conseil Genêral, which had for so long been demanded by
the Bourgeois, having been formally enshrined in law in 1738, had proved to be an illusion.
Unbeknown to the patriciate, the period of calm was about to end with the re-emergence of
questions they believed settled by the Mediation of 1738, but which stretched back to the
beginning of the century and earlier and which still remained to be settled.
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Chapter VII
The 'Revolution of 1768'
Geneva iri 1760 still appeared calm with little warning of the storm clouds just over the
horizon. The inability of the Representants to persuade their fellow Bourgeois to insist
upon the sovereignty of the Conseil General appeared set to continue. However, the illegal
and unfair way in which Rousseau was treated in 1762, together with the blatant illegality
of the Pictet case 1763, proved to be the catalyst missing since 1738. The repeated
rejection of Representations concerning these legal matters led to the refusal by the
Bourgeois, in four meetings of the Conseil General, to elect the Syndics for the year 1766,
thus bringing the government to a halt.
As this chapter will show, the subsequent mediation by France, Bern and Zurich,
dominated by the French, failed but led to an internal Genevan agreement - the Edicts of
1768. The concessions gained which allowed an element of oversight by the Conseil
General over the Petit Conseil in exchange for the ending of the right to refuse to elect
Syndics was totally unacceptable to a part of the oligarchy. As a result of the stresses of
these two years, and disagreements concerning the Edict of 1768, divisions began to open
up in the oligarchy with two wings within the overall group of Negatifs1 which were to have
profound consequences later in the century.
Equally important was the emergence of the Natifs during the difficulties of 1766-68.
Organising themselves into cercles copying the patriciate and the Bourgeois, they hoped
by supporting the Representants in 1766-68 to improve their status in Geneva. The
minuscule concessions made to the Natifs, which in no meaningful manner eased the
economic disadvantages under which they lived, caused anger and resentment among
some Natifs, as well as a sense of betrayal. This was to prove fertile ground in the future
for those in the smaller councils who were unhappy at the settlement of 1768.
Legal problems and deadlock
The first copies of both Emile and Le contrat social arrived in Geneva in June 1762. The
government moved quickly and, on 12th. June, the Petit Conseil ordered the seizure of all
copies in the bookshops, and asked the Procureur-General, Jean-Robert Tronchin, to pre-
pare a report. In assessing Le contrat social, Tronchin drew attention to the fact that it con-
tained what he termed 'pernicious principles'. The Lettres of Antoine Leger had been
condemned in 1718, the Social Contract contained the same dangerous ideas concerning
sovereignty2 as well as calling for periodic meetings of assemblies of the people. This was
precisely what Pierre Fatio had argued for in 1707. Having previously considered such
ideas seditious, especially Leger's Lettres in 1718, whicli had been declared seditious and
banned, there was no way that the government could allow the repetition and elaboration
of such ideas once more in the city. Though Geneva's condemnation might have pleased
The Negatifs were those in the government and the two smaller councils who supported the right that the Petit
Conseil had obtained in the Mediation of 1738 to refuse to accept any Representation submitted by the Bourgeois
to the Syndics and the Petit Conseil.
2 Compare p. 178 qu'il ny a pas deux Souverains dans cat Etat,... la Souverainete reside °Mere dans le Conseil
GOntiral with Bk. II, Chs. 2&3; in Lettres: avoit le Droit Legislatif' and in Bk. Ill, Ch. 1,: 'We have seen that the
Legislative power belongs, and can only belong, to the people.' GOr, 'Les lettres "sedtieuses* anonyme', op. cit.,
pp. 178 & 181, Rousseau, 'The Social Contract', op. cit., pp. 70-72 & 101.
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the French, as Palmer suggests, 3 in reality there was no other action open to the govern-
ment which might have hoped, from the relatively compliant behaviour of the Bourgeois
over the last fifteen years, that such ideas were fading.
The Consistoire had been unhappy about La Nouvelle Helase by Rousseau and was on
the point of asking the Petit Conseil to move against the work, when the council acted
precipitately against Emile and Le contrat socia1.4 The law in this respect was clear: in
religious questions, it was necessary for the Consistoire to consider the matter and then to
ask the Petit Conseil to act. In the case of Rousseau, the situation was complicated by the
attempts made by Genevan pastors, Jacob Vemet s and Moultous, friends of Rousseau to
persuade him to provide a written retraction of his attacks on religion.
Emile was condemned because of its attack on religion, denying as it did one of the
basic principles of Christianity, that of original sin. Tronchin therefore recommended that
both books should be condemned to be lacerated and burnt by the public executioner. The
Petit Conseil went further and also issued a decree:
'Au cas qu'il [Rousseau] vienne dans la Ville ou dans les Terres de la Seigneurie, il
devra etre saisi et apprehende pour etre ensuite prononce sur sa personne ce qu'il
appartiendra:7
There was no justification for this type of decree under the laws of the state. That Rous-
seau might be arrested if he came to Genevan territory would not of itself have been
illegal. It was normal in such a case for a person to be held in prison while the matter was
investigated. What was against the laws of Geneva was that Rousseau had been con-
demned by the Petit Conseil without being able to defend himself.
Rousseau was disappointed at the lack of support from the Bourgeois, and hoped that
some form of reconciliation with the government might be possible through the actions of
some of his Genevan correspondents. In fact, the Representants cercles had tried to
prevent the re-election of Tronchin for a further 3 years in November 1762:
'vendredi et samedi on disputa vivement dans les cercles de la Bourgeoisie...18
When this proved impossible, Rousseau decided on the dramatic gesture of formally giving
up his Bourgeois status and his Genevan citizenship. He justified his action in a letter
(26th. May 1763) to Marc Chappuis 9:
'Fletri publiquement dans ma patrie sans que personne ait reclarne contre cette
fletrissure, apres dix mois d'attente, j'ai di, prendre le seul parti propre A conserver
mon honneur si cruellement offense:10
It was difficult for the Bourgeois. They were aware that the Petit Conseil saw The Social
Contract, not as an attempt at a Utopia, but a veiled attempt to reopen a debate it believed
3	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 118.
4	 E. de Bude We de Jacob Vernet, theologien genevois, Lausanne: Georges Bridal & Co., 1893, pp. 281-282.
See Appendix IV B VII/1.
See Appendix IV B VII/2.
7	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3eme. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 447.
BPU Geneve, Ms. suppl. 1540 Lettres de Du Pan A Freudenreich, 1759-64, 70 23 novembre 1762.
See Appendix IV B VII/3.
10
	
Jean-Jacques Rousseau Lettres ecrites de la montaigne, Oeuvres Completes III Du contrat social, kilts
politiques, Geneve: Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1964, Texte etabli et annote Jean-Daniel Candaux, Introduction, p.
cuw.
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settled by the Edict of 1738. It was out of the question that the ban on the book would be
lifted. The shock for the government was all the greater since Rousseau in 1754 stated
concerning Geneva:
'que requite, la moderation , la plus respectueuse fermete continuent de regler
toutes vos dernarches et de montrer l'exemple d'un peuple fier et modeste, aussi
jaloux de sa gloire que sa liberte.'11
A letter written by Jacques Pictet, 12 to Emmanuel Duvillard, the son, claimed that there
were three reasons for the action of the council in condemning Rousseau: their infatuation
('engouemenr) with Voltaire, the council's desire to please the court at Versailles and the
desire to prove that Geneva was still a religious town, thus repairing the damage that had
been done to its reputation by d'Alembert's article in the Encyclopedia" The contents of
the letter became public, leading to both Pictet and Duvillard appearing in their turn before
the Tribunal.	 - -
The court could not be presided over by a Syndic because all four Syndics were close
relatives of either the defendant Pictet, or the Procureur-Genaral Tronchin. In conse-
quence, a former Syndic sitting in the Deux Cents was given the task of temporarily
chairing the tribunal. To complicate the framing of a defence, the details of the accusation
were not made public. The sentences handed down were mild, both men having to beg
pardon of the government; Duvillard was deprived of his Bourgeois status for six months,
Pictet of his for a year, and also losing his seat on the Deux Cents. These actions of the
court were a continuation of what had happened in the 1740s, with the Petit Conseil and
the government adapting the laws of the state to fit their needs. They should have
consulted the Conseil General on the serious constitutional point raised by the inability of
any Syndic being able to preside the court trying the Pictet case.
It was Rousseau's action, however, in returning his citizenship which began a chain of
events which the patriciate were to find, to their horror, they were unable to control. A
Representation was made on 18th. June 1763, led by Jacques-Francois De Luc concern-
ing both Rousseau's case, that of Pictet and Duvillard and a third Bourgeois pair, the
Bardin brothers." The Representation was on entirely formal, legal grounds, concerning
the condemnation of Rousseau without hearing his defence and treating him as a criminal
rather than allowing the Consistoire to deal with him first, as should have been the case
under Article 88 of the Ordonnances Ecclesiastiques. While the Consistoire had ceased to
be the force it had once been in the state, it was still responsible for religious matters, and
the law was quite clear. In the Pictet case, there had been the illegality of a tribunal sitting
without a Syndic.15 Even Du Pan, a supporter of the patriciate, was moved to comment,
concerning the Pictet case, that it was:
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The lack of judicial independence in Geneva was clearly shown to be dangerous. The
difficulty the government found itself in over the trial of Pictet and way it had dealt with the
problem clearly caused unease even amongst those in the patriciate who supported it. It
was further evidence that the government was prepared to write new laws when it deemed
this necessary for its own benefit.
The action of the Representants was not in defence of the contents of Rousseau's
books; it was to draw to the attention of the Syndics that, in their action over Rousseau's
works, they had acted illegally, and was the spur that had been missing during the late 40s
and 50s, when the government had managed to skirt around the law without provoking a
strong and united reaction from the Bourgeois." If the government arrogated to itself the
right to decide what had previously been the domain of the Consistoire, it would be a clear
breach of the existing Edicts, while increasing the power of the government to interfere
further in the lives of the citizens. This riding rough-shod over the legal rights of the
Consistoire added to the anger and determination of the Representants.
It was the beginning of a period punctuated by a series of Representations and refusals
that mirrored what had happened in the period before 1760. The Petit Conseil maintained
its right to reject Representations. Each rejection, however, led to a widening of the
demands made by the Representants. The attempt by the Petit Conseil to limit the right of
Representation in the case of a citizen condemned by the courts to that individual and his
family alone was seen as an infringement of the rights of Representation, as well as an
interpretation of the law which necessitated the agreement of the Conseil General. By
20th. August 1763, a letter supported by 450 Bourgeois demanded that the whole matter
should be put before a Conseil General, as the only place where it could be judged and
settled." As far as the government and its supporters in the town were concerned, this
Representation called into question the prerogatives of the Petit Conseil, and, in the final
analysis, re-opened the whole question of sovereignty. Looking back in 1782, J-A. De Luc
wrote:
'La Revolution de 1763 a 68 pris son origine dans l'obscurite des Loix sur les
Emprisonnemens, sur l'effet des Recusations des Juges quant a la Precedence des
tribunaux & sur quelques Loix consistoriales, tout cela est eclairee au gre des
Citoyens. Mais au sujet de ces contestations particulieres des grands Questions
politiques s'eleveront.'19
The problem remained, as had been the case since 1738, that the government's creation
of new law, such as the use of decrees and Ordonnances, was illegal without reference to
the Conseil General. The government had spent over twenty years avoiding calling the
Conseil General whenever possible. If they were allowed to continue the process of
making new law as required without recourse, as specified in the Edict of 1738, to the
Conseil General, then that body had, except for the election of the Syndics, become
obsolete and the Bourgeois were without any opportunity to influence the government.
From such a position, it was but a short step to the question of the repeated rejections of
Representations, because most of them, in drawing the government's attention to a legal -
or constitutional issue, required a meeting of the Conseil General to discuss and resolve
the problems raised. These were matters of profound constitutional importance which this
time it would be impossible for the government to ignore or sweep under the carpet.
The Petit Conseil asked Jean-Robert Tronchin, the Procureur-General, to prepare a de-
17	 See Chapter VI.
II	 Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes, Ill, op. at, p. CLXVI.
ID	 BPU Genave, Ms. 2466 Papiers adressas a J-A. De Luc, Lettre a M. Roustan le 24.4. 1789, 58.
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tailed reply defending its right to refuse Representations. It was a forthright defence of the
position of the Petit Conseil and above all of its right to decide whether a Representation
was well-founded or not:
'Si le Conseil, les [les Representations] ayant examinees, ne les approuve pas, que
dolt-il arriver? C'est qu'elles tombent.'2°
The rejection of this position by the Bourgeois was inevitable. 21 If they accepted the
definition as given by Tronchin to the Petit Conseil, it meant that they had lost what they
still considered one of their rights. The almost continual rejection of Representations by the
Petit Conseil since the 40s, however, must have made it clear to the leaders of the
Representants, such as De Luc and Chappuis, that they had to make a stand over this
matter. If the definition given by Tronchin stood, then people would cease to support any
attempt to bring their problems to the attention of the government. 22 If nothing else, the
right to make a Representation was a right to openly object, and it was not certain that the
Petit Conseil would always be under the sway of those in the patriciate who were deter-
mined to reduce the Bourgeois and their remaining rights to nothing.
The current troubles demonstrated that the Mediation of 1737-8 had not been, as some
of the Bourgeois had believed, a balanced solution to the political difficulties in Geneva.
Increasingly, events since 1738 had proved that Micheli had been right in his objections to
the use of the word 'approuve in Article 6 of the Mediation and the question of the actual
sovereignty of the Conseil General. The knowledge that they had been misled in 1738, as
they had been in 1712, may well have made the leaders of the Representants more deter-
mined to see that in this case compromise must involve both parties to the disagreements.
A new Representation which responded to the rejection of the Bourgeois' previous
Representation by the Petit Conseil, the formally repeated all their previous demands and
rejected the interpretation of the droit negatif claimed by the Petit Conseil. Simultaneously,
an anonymous brochure appeared in the city. Entitled Lettres de la campagne, it was a
series of letters which purporting to be from a citizen living in the country. The writer
claimed to be giving his impartial reflections on the arguments current in Geneva. In fact,
the eight cogently-argued letters were written by Jean-Robert Tronchin, had considerable
influence in Geneva, especially amongst those Bourgeois who were not, as yet, involved in
the deadlock between the Representants and the government. According to Du Pan the
Bourgeois in Geneva were divided into three equal groups:
'cello des Conseils et leurs environs qui souhaitent la maintien du gouvemement,
400; celle des mecontents ... sous pretexte de garantir leur liberte voudroient
n'avoir point de gouvemement, 400 et autant de ceux qui restent tranquiles
spectateurs n'osant se joindre aux Conseil pour ne pas augmenter la faveur des
autres et ne le voulant pas de peur de donner trop d'autorite au Conseil.'23
It was this latter group which both sides needed to win over to their side.
The 'Lettres' of Tronchin followed exactly the same line as he had already followed in
the earlier reply to the Representations. In the last two of the eight letters, he examines
whether it is the Conseil General or the Petit Conseil which has the right to interpret the
laws of the state. Using the argument of the necessity of the balance of powers within the
state, he 'proves' that the droit negatif is essential to the Petit Conseil. In refusing a
Representation as either mal fondee or peu convenable, the council was using a right
20	 Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes, III, op. cit., p. CLXVI.
21	 See Chapter V. pp. 110-112, Chapter VI, pp. 121-122.
See Chapter V, pp. 112-113.
BPU Geneve, Ms. suppl. 1540 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich, 149 2 ;envier 1764.
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given to it by the Edicts. He also states that the Bourgeois had the right to censure those
Magistrates they believed guilty of acting wrongly, a right exercised by the Bourgeois in the
annual election of the Syndics, as only those approved by the votes of the Bourgeois in
the Conseil Genèral could assume the title and office. 24 There is some irony in the fact
that, when the Bourgeois applied this right of refusal to elect any of the possible candi-
dates for the positions of Syndic in 1766, the Negatifs became extremely angry and sought
to have the right removed.
The success of Tronchin's book was measured by the increase in support for the
positibn of the 1n16gatifs that was soon apparent in the town. Among the Nagatifs them-
selves, the Lettres ecrites de la campagne became:
'Si on peut parler ainsi, l'Evangile de son corps [i.e. le Petit Conseil et Deux
Cents]'.25
The Tronchin work was to some extent to become what the Lettres anonymes had already
been for the Bourgeois since 1718.
Amongst the ReprOsentants, there was not a single man with the skill of Tronchin to
produce a reply or a well-written exposé of their position. Although they were in the pro-
cess of attempting an answer to Tronchin, they felt the need of a writer who would be able
to produce a work as lucid and clear as Tronchin's. Their task of writing a detailed reply
was made deliberately difficult by the government, which had refused:
'de deposer en chancellerie les originaux des edits qui, sur plus d'un point, diffe-
raient des edits imprimes.'26
Already in contact with Rousseau, 27 the Reprósentants tried to persuade him to take up
the pen sending him relevant background documents. Rousseau was well-known to De
Luc and F-H. d'Ivemois and would also be writing both in his own defence and that of the
Bourgeois. Also, of course, Rousseau was a Genevan, even though he had nominally
given up his Genevan citizenship.
The first copies of his work, Lettres Ocrites de la montaigne, 28 appeared in Geneva on
18th. December 1764.29, some time after the Tronchin letters. They caused great interest
and forced the Negatifs onto the defensive once again. Rousseau's letters are a detailed
exposition of the Representants case as well as a refuration of Tronchin's letters. Like the
Social Contract, they owe their roots to Leger's two letters of 1718. The position of the
Conseil General-.
En Conseil general vous ètes Legislateurs, Souverains, independants de toute
puissance humaine. ... [mais] En Conseil general votre Souveraine puissance est
24
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Bodmer et Montgenet, 1920, p. 15.
27	 Jean-Francois De Luc and his two sons, Jean-Andri3 and Guillaume-Antoine, were long-standing friends of
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enchainee: vous ne pouvez agir que quand il plait a vos Magistrats...13°
The Edict of 1738 had made the Conseil General:
'Un corps souverain qui ne peut ni se former ni former aucune operation de lui-
memo, et soumis absolument, quant a son activite et quant aux matieres qu'il traite,
a des tribunaux subaltemes. ... et y a-t-il un seul Genevois qui puisse douter que si
l'existence du Conseil general dependoit tout-a-fait du petit Conseil, le Conseil
general ne fut pour jamais supprime?'31
In 1718, Leger had made a similar point;
'D'ailleurs, oil en seroit-on, si admettoit le principe dont les Conseils se font un
bouclier? Car Si les Conseils avoient le droit de ne porter au peuple que ce quills
croient important, les Conseils seroient absolument les mattes de toutes choses:
Des la, plus de liberte, il faudroit necessairement que le peuple suivit en tout la
volonte des Conseils, juste ou injuste.'32
In the 47 years that had elapsed since 1718, the Bourgeois had not achieved any concrete
progress in their desire to see the Conseil General have a genuine share in the power of
the state. The Edict of 1738 had basically confirmed the loss of power from the Conseil
General to the smaller councils. For Rousseau, the matter was worse, since the choice of
officers of state and the Syndics also manifested the weakness of the Sovereign, there
being no real alternatives.
In comparison with America, the arguments in Geneva were, in one sense, more devel-
oped. By 1765, the colonists were talking of a division of sovereignty but in the terms of
the difference between internal and external taxation:
'In every instance, therefore, of our EXTERNAL government we are and must be
subject to the authority of the British Parliament, but in no others; for if the Parlia-
ment should impose laws upon us merely relative to our INTERNAL government, it
deprives us, as far as those laws extend, of the most valuable part of our birthright
as Englishmen.'
It was not to be until 1773, in the prolonged exchanges between Governor Hutchinson and
two Houses of Assembly in Massachusetts that the supreme authority or sovereignty of
Parliament was finally confronted, the Houses claiming:
'a subordinate power in government, whilst it keeps within its limits, is not subject to
the control of the supreme power.'
Rejecting this argument, Hutchinson said that if the two Houses believed:
'that two jurisdictions, each of them having a share in the supreme power in the
same state, it can be to no purpose to reason or argue ... It's enough to observe
that this disagreement in our principles will have its influence upon all deductions
which are made from them.'34
As Blackstone wrote:
'there is and must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled
authority, in which the jura summi imperil, or the rights of sovereignty reside ... By
30	 Jean-Jacques Rousseau 'Lettres ecrits de la montagne', Oeuvres completes, Du Contrat Social, &rift politiques,
lettres do la montagne, Vol. III, Geneve: Bibliotheque de la PleTade, 1964, Septiime letlre, pp. 813-14.
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the sovereign power ... is meant the making of laws _135
This statement could have been used by the Bourgeois in Geneva for the greater part of
the eighteenth century.
Typical of the anxiety felt by the patriciate was that of Lullin, Secretary of State, writing
to Crommelin,36 the Genevan Representative in Paris:
'Le livre de Rousseau est fort approuve par ceux de nos citoyens qui ont fait les
representations de l'annee derniere; ii m'est revenu qu'il ebranlait merne ceux qui
n'en êtaient pas et qui etaient dans le doute.'37
There was little that the government could do about Rousseau's Lettres, since, if they
moved to ban or condemn them, they would have also to move against Tronchin's Lettres.
Unlike Bern, Geneva, though censuring some books was far less repressive, certainly not
going as far as to insist upon a periodic oath from all those involved in the booktrade from
sellers to printers and all their workmen.38 The situation was similar in many respects to
that which had provoked the Lettres seditieuses of 1718. In 1764, the difference was that
the government and patriciate did not deny the sovereignty of the Conseil General, but had
managed by the Edict of 1738 to wrest real sovereignty from it to the smaller councils by
negating Bourgeois pretensions to power from a different perspective, the introduction of
the word 'approuva in Article VI. The refusal of the Petit Conseil to approve Represen-
tations deprived the Bourgeois of any say in the governance of the state. The Petit Conseil
had become the legislative as well as the executive and judicial authority within the state.
There was only a short period between the appearance of Rousseau's Lettres in Geneva
and the elections of the new Syndics in January 1765. As they had in January 1764 when
the Representants had attempted to exclude Saladin from becoming a Syndic39, so an
attempt was made by the Representants to prevent the Syndics election failed: 'la pluralite
des suffrages ne fut pas pour eux 1 .4° The mildness of the government's initial reaction to
Rousseau's work may have helped. There was also the old tradition that the Bourgeois
wanted to find a solution which was legal, while some felt that there was still time to come
to some kind of arrangement, without recourse to the final weapon of refusing to elect the
Syndics.
The two councils felt so distanced from the people in January 1765 that there was talk
amongst them of resigning en masse. The alienation felt by the patriciate is illustrated by
extracts from one of the pamphlets published in 1765:
'mais les livres de Rousseau et de nos Messieurs [Representants] nous ont appris
quo nous devons defier continuellement des Magistrats quo nous Olisons nous
même. Que nos Messieurs sont les seuls qui entendent bien nos loix et notre
constitution et qu'ils ne peuvent jamais se tromper, en sorte que quand ils sont en
35	 J.C.D. Clark The Language of Liberty 1660-1832. Political discourse and social dynamics in the Anglo-American
world, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, P. 85.
34	 See Appendix IV B VII/6.
37	 P.E. Martin op. cit., 36me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 449.
In Bern, all those in the book trade had sworn that they would never infringe the censorship law, trade in forbidden
matter, especially that which 'criticise[d] the privileges of our official authorities or otherwise affected] the
government. Oechsli, op. ciL, p. 269.
'ils travailleront Vendred et Sarnedi, et méme pendant la nuit du Same& au Dimanche... BPU Genrlove, Ms. suppl.
1540 op. ciL, 149 2. janvier 1764.
40	 Shelbume Papers, Volume 18, 140, microfilm, University of Michigan, William L Clements Library. The letter
quoted is one of a number which were sent to Shelburne either by Norton from Bern or from Hutton. This one is
unsigned as are many of the others.
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quelque differend avec le Magistrat, c'est toujours le Magistrat qui a tort?"
Ironically, it was at this juncture that De Luc arrived with several others to inform the first
Syndic of a new Representation about to be made, but which would also contain within it
an expression of their regard for the councillors and the Syndics. How far this 'threat' by
the councils affected the vote for the Syndics is uncertain, but the knowledge of such
actions by the government and councils may have played a role in the election of the
Syndics for the year.
The promised Representation was made on 7th. February, under the leadership of Marc
Chappuis, accompanied by a thousand of those with the right to vote. The petition did
indeed contain sentences in which the members of the Petit Conseil were described as:
'...digne de toute leur estime, de tout leur respect et de toute leur confiance.'42
It also contained all the previous representations already rejected by the Petit Conseil. As
was traditional, after handing in the Representation, the committee departed saying they
had faith in the Syndics, that they were the fathers of the country, and finally begging them
to bring peace. Such expressions certainly heartened the members of the councils and all
thought of resigning faded rapidly. But they misunderstood what the people were actually
saying. The Bourgeois were not prepared to back down or be in any way deflected from
what they considered important and grave constitutional matter, even though the Bourgeois
would continue to respect the government and Syndics.
Some concessions were needed from the government.The concessions that were
actually offered were the bare minimum. A proclamation was made calling Rousseau's
Lettres '[un] affreux tissu de calomnies' but adding that no action would be taken against
them. The other concession was to take to the Conseil Genera/ the question of a tax which
had been imposed on foreign wines, the legality of which was contested. All the other mat-
ters mentioned in the representation were dismissed. Yet the arguments remained the
same as they had in 1738:
'mais il n'est pas moms absurde de prêtendre, qu'on peut former dans nOtre
Republique, un Conseil legal purement Aristocratique. c'est en vain, qu'on peut
justifier un abus, en tirant des consequences forcees du langage, et du silence de
la loi. ... [le Petit Conseil] traite ces [des Representants] jaloux de leurs preroga-
tives de Turbulens, inquiets et mal intentionnes.43
Throughout 1765, there were a number of Representations, all going over the same
ground. All were carried out in silence and total calm in stark contrast to the rioting which
was seen in Boston with the destruction of Andrew Oliver's house (August 14th. 1765) and
the Boston home of Thomas Hutchinson (August 25th. 1765)." It was clear that the
Negatifs had no wish to concede any part of what they claimed to be their legal powers
and there was little room for compromise. The government and the patriciate had managed
in 1738 to achieve a system which appeared to ensure their continuing oligarchical position
within the state, buttresed by the droft negatif, while the Bourgeois had at last realised the
mistake they made in 1738. The Petit Conseil and its members would always refuse the
Representants demands to refer matters considered 'constitutional' by the government to
41	 AEG, MS. hist 268 Dialogues entre un citoyen de Geneve at un esanger; Geneve en Mars 1765, Premiere
dialogue, p. 6.
a	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3lome. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch.IX, p. 450.
G	 AEG, Ms. hist 268 7 Latta d'un solitaire, p. 14. It appeared Monday 8.4.65, by Wednesday most copies were
seized and burnt.
Bailyn. Pamphlets' op. cit., p. 582, and Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 35. [Hereafter 'Hutchinson']
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the Conseil General. There was an inherent contradiction in the Mediation of 1738, it
allowed Representations to be made, but also permitted the Petit Conseil to block them a
right which, according to the Bourgeois, 'aneantit tous les droits et toutes les prerogatives
du peuple Genevois'46. The Representants turned to this, as they saw it, legal contradic-
tion, suggesting that the contradiction should be clarified in the Conseil General:
'de donner lumiere a une Loix, pour qu'elle ne soit plus en opposition avec elle-
même; de developer et fixer les terms d'une autre qui contredit et choque la liberte
des Citoyens; et enfin de faire rentrer le pouvoir dans les justes boumes oil cette
merne Constitution la place:46
The argument over the droit negatif was not secure ground for the patriciate, since it
could be argued that the constant refusal since 1738 to accept Repesentations led to the
domination of the Conseil General by the smaller councils. The situation in Geneva was
unlike that in England in that there was no independent judiciary; and unlike that in
America, since, in Geneva, the judges were the executive members of the government, the
Syndics. The Syndics acted as judges, as did the Lieutenant in minor matters, and the
Procureur-General, supposedly concerned to guard the interests of the 'people' sat in the
Deux Cents and was a member of the patriciate. In the case of the Syndics, in the Petit
Conseil they created new laws as they had through declarations in the 1740s and 50s and
also sat as judges upon any transgressions of the laws, quite apart from acting as judges
in the interpretation of existing laws and constitution. This deprived Geneva of anyone 'to
settle the contests between prerogative and liberty', the Petit Conseil was not 'perfectly
free of the influence of either'. 47
The frustration of the Bourgeois was such that, in November 1765, they resorted to their
one remaining legal and non-violent way to bring the government to see the error of its
ways. At the autumn session of the Conseil General called for the triennial election of
various officers of state, including the Auditeurs and the Procureur-General, the Bourgeois
repeatedly voted for 'la ligne de nouvelle election'.46 The refusal to elect was repeated
five times in subsequent meetings, with the citizens voting against all the candidates
proposed by the two smaller councils. No officers were elected and the government was
left facing a serious crisis. In desperation, the government decided that the outgoing offi-
cers would remain in their posts. An illegal decision since such a situation was not covered
by the laws or Edicts and had never before arisen. Given that it was a serious constitu-
tional matter, the question should have been taken to the Conseil General. What the Bour-
geois were trying to do was to persuade the government to enter into some form of
negotiation in order to settle outstanding problems. The refusal of the government to
respond in any way led to the whole process being repeated in January 1766, when the
Conseil General refused to elect any Syndics.
The Conseil General met on 5th., 12th., 19th. and 26th. January, when large majorities
on each occasion refused to name the four Syndics necessary. Geneva was exceedingly
tense before the meeting of the Conseil General of 26th. January, according to Cramer:
'Ce merne nuit il y eut de tres grands mouvement dans [les] rues de la Ville. Un
4	 AEG, Girod 5, 17 Le Droit Negatif, p. 8.
441	 AEG, Girod 5, 5 Sentiment des Citoyens, Genclive le 10 clácembre 1765, p. 15.
Bailyn, 'Pamphlets', op. cit., A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 1760, probably by Joseph
Galloway, pp. 257-258.
4 The right of the Conseil Gdneral to refuse to elect from the list given to them. Instead they voted for a new list to be
submitted with other names. Eventually, this meant that all the names of those eligible for the post were exhausted
and nobody elected.
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part de jeunes gens avoit (dit-on) forma le projet de s'emparer des portes de St.
Pierre [the cathedral where the Conseil General took place] pour empacher leur
venue au C.G. Les Chefs des Representants raussirent a les en detourner:49
The fourth session exhausted the sixteen members of the Petit Conseil who were constitu-
tionally permitted to stand for election. As can be seen in diagram 6, the number of those
voting for nouvefie election was relatively static. The support accorded to both Pierre
Mussard and Jean-Louis Grenus in both lists was because, in the normal turn of events, it
was their turn to be Syndics. The two 'new' appointments also managed to maintain a
voting lead over the others on the list, although, candidates such as Mussard, Grenus,
Francois Tronchin and Jean-Jacques Mallet, dropped votes between the two rounds in
which their names appeared. The gradual decline in the number voting for new elections
can be accounted for by the necessity of having to attend the Conseil General for four
Sundays in d low. The faint hearts may also have become reluctant to attend, together
with the fact that the party of the Negatifs had some effect in winning people to their side.
Geneva had reached a state of ungovernability. From the government viewpoint, the
Bourgeois had used la ligne de nouvelle election and in doing so had destroyed the
balance within the Constitution. The right of the Conseil General to vote in this manner
came into conflict with a second fundamental law of the state, that of having to choose
Syndics from the Petit Conseil and with the right of the Petit Conseil to block Representa-
tions. The consequence of this conflict had been to:
'arrater le mouvement de la machine politique, au lieu de l'entretenir.'5°
In December 1765, the Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents discussed the crisis and what
action should be taken if the Conseil General refused to elect the Syndics for 1766. They
decided on an appeal to the Mediators, France, Bern and Zurich. The decision was made
on 31st. December 1765, before the attempt to elect the Syndics for the year 1766. It is
the duty of governments to be prepared for most contingencies, but the decision to turn to
the Mediators rather than to attempt to have any serious discussions with the Bourgeois
can only be confirmation of the determination of the government to continue on its path of
treating the Conseil General as a mere symbol and the right to Representation as a dead
letter. The appeal to be made to the Mediators was made in the knowledge that none of
them, certainly not France, were likely to support the claims made by the Bourgeois. It was
an admission on the part of the Genevan government of its need for foreign assistance to
govern its own people. This was the third call to Bern and Zurich after 1707 and 1734-8)
and the second to France after 1737-8.5'
Legal protest or revolution
The situation in Geneva in 1766 has been misunderstood by the common wisdom
concerning Geneva and the Atlantic Revoultion. Palmer claims that, in their refusal to elect
the Syndics, the Representants had changed their demands from having 'representations
referred to the General Council'. The demand now, according to Palmer, was 'to elect only
officials acceptable to the Burghers.' 52 This is to miss the point entirely. The constitution
of the state declared quite clearly:
•	 BPU Geneve, Cramer 87, Vol. 11 1766 28 Wrier-31 decembre 105.
50	 Ibid., 174.
51	 Palmer does not count 1707 in his calculations, but Bern and ZOrich were 'unofficial' guarantors of Geneva before
the Mediation of 1738. Palmer, op. cit., p. 367.
s2	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 133.
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Diagram 6
Results of the Elections for Syndics - January 1766
Du 5 janvier 1766 Du 19 janvier 1766
Pierre Mussard 442 Pierre Mussard 334
Jean-Louis Grenus 420 Jean-Louis Grenus 370
Jean-Jacques Mallet 253/6[?] H-B. de la Rive 45
Isaac Pictet 68 Jean-Jacques Mallet 169
Pierre Jacquet 98 Pierre Jacquet 89
Francois Tronchin 289 J-J. de Chapeaurouge 80
Pierre Lullin 38 Francois Tronchin 208
Jacob Buffe 93 Jacob Buffe 50
Nouvelles elections 930 Nouvelles elections 824
[Bourgeois present?] 1327 [Bourgeois present?] 1193
Du 12 janvier 1766 Du 26 janvier 1766
Horace-Benedict de
la Rive 50 Isaac Pictet 32
Jean-Jacques de
Chapeaurouge 116 Pierre Lullin 65
Bartolerni Rilliet 134 Bartolemi Rilliet 124
Andre Pasteur 69 Andre Pasteur 68
Jean-Antoine Guainier 76 Jean-Antoine Guainier 82
Jacob Tronchin 52 Jacob Tronchin 53
J-J. Bonnet 21 J-J. Bonnet 19
Gedeon Turrettin[i] 74 Gedeon Turrettin[i] 70
Nouvelles elections 1008 Nouvelles elections 809
[There is no explanation for the additional figures for the meetings of 5th. and 1
January - possibly the number of Bourgeois who attended.] Turrettini was often
referred to as Turrettin during the eighteenth century in Geneva.
From BPU Genêve, Ms. Cramer 91 De la Suspension des Elections en 1766
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'que nul ne soit regeu qu'il n'ait estO approuvó du peuple.'53
This provision of Geneva's constitution went back beyond the creation of the city as an
independent state at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and it was the first time that it
had been broken. The right of the people to approve the Syndics had been carefully
incorporated into the Edicts of 1543 by Calvin and had always been adhered to. It was one
of the most important foundations of the constitution. As a result of events over the last 25
years, the Representants desired some negotiation with the government over the fact that
it had violated the law, and the Petit Conseil had steadfastly refused either to recognise
the fact or to submit the matter to the Conseil General, as laid down by law. The refusal to
elect any officers of state was the only method left to the Representants in attempting to
persuade the government to enter into some kind of dialogue. Palmer's argument fails to
understand the situation in the city. The Representants were not demanding the right to
elect whomever they wished to be Syndics. As they were to show in 1768, they returned
quite happily to the old system of choosing from a list of eight submitted to them by the
Petit Conseil.
By deciding to renew the existing Syndics for a further years tenure, the government had
been wrong-footed and forced to act illegally in clear contravention of the law. For the
Representants, their policy was clear: to protect the sovereign rights of the Conseil
General, which the government had worked consistently to reduce since 1738. The
Bourgeois themselves did not wish to take over all the powers of the state, far less did
they wish to take over the government and all governmental positions. From 1763, the
Representants had attempted to argue and persuade, all to no avail. Short of resorting to
arms, which was totally against their constant desire for legality in all their actions, they
could only force the government to concessions through their refusal to elect the officers of
that government.
The idea that the election of the Syndics, as Palmer claims was 'a mere executive
function which the constitution assigned to the General Council' is merely to repeat the
government's arguments,54 but, if that were true, then so were all the other functions
allowed to the Conseil General. It was the government which negotiated treaties, would
revise laws and so on. In all these cases, it was a mere executive function to have them
passed by the Conseil General before they came into force. The argument of 'mere
executive function' was yet another way of stating the belief of the patriciate that, ultimate-
ly, the Conseil General and its members had no sovereign rights, and that these had been
delegated to the two smaller councils, a position that the Bourgeois had never accepted.
As a result of constant conflict, they also desired some access, however Jimiled, lo pJaying
a part in the government. This was indeed to become the crux of the matter by 1768. In
the privacy of his papers, Cramer himself, in a Memoire inedit, is clear in his own mind
when he states:
'On souffre avec impatience une autorite qu'on ne partage pas.'55
There needed to be a solution to the clear conflict between the necessity to elect
Syndics and the right of the Bourgeois in the Conseil General to elect those they desired. -
Both these points were enshrined in the Edicts. For the Bourgeois the solution to this
contradiction was to allow the sovereign body - the Conseil General - to find a solution. If
the government and smaller councils agreed to the Conseil General being allowed to settle
this dilema, they would be accepting the Bourgeois' arguments concerning the seat of
55	 Arneidée Roget, Les Syndics', op.cit, p. 10.
54	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 135.
56	 BPU, Gengwe, Ms. Cramer 87, Vol. II 28 Wrier-31 dkembre 1766, Mêmoire inadit de 1766, 160.
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sovereignty, since as Palmer says 'to define or change the law [is] the very essence of
sovereign power'.56 Neither did the Representants claim 'that representations could not
be vetoed." They desired that those concerned with matters pertaining to new law or the
alteration of existing law had, by the terms of the Mediation of 1738, to be submitted to the
Conseil General.
For Godechot:
'The Revolutionary movement began in the republic of Geneva in 1768.'58
Yet as already seen, the demands of the Bourgeois concerning the rights of the Conseil
General went back to before 1707. The near agreement of 1737 conceeded more to the
Bourgeois than they had agreed to in 1768. And if it were 'revolutionary', it was a strange
revolution which left the government and the basic laws of the state intact, with one
exception. Moreover, it was not to come into force for a further five years. Unfortunately,
Godechot appears to think that the troubles in 1768- were because:
'Agitation arose among the poor "natives" (Natifs), persons born in Geneva of
immigrant parents of foreign nationality. Following the advice of their celebrated
compatriot Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Social Contract, published six years
before, they demanded equality of rights with the citizens.'59
Leaving aside the confusion between what happened in Geneva between 1765-1768 and
what was to happen in the city in 1770, what happened in 1770 was certainly Natif-led, but
erupted from anger and was not a calculated attempt to overthrow the state. 66 It was not
for the Natifs that Rousseau had written; as an ex-Bourgeois of the city, he was writing
about matters which concerned and had been of constant interest to them since the
beginning of the century. This applied to both the Social Contract and the Lettres de la
montaigne. By 1768, many of the Natifs were second or third generation Genevans, not in
fact born of 'immigrant' parents. They felt themselves to be as 'Genevan' as the Bourgeois.
Their close association with the latter produced the inevitable 'domino' effect: they began
to organise themselves, copying the Bourgeois. But in the period 1762-8, their main
demands were economic, not political, and they were still unsure of themselves. The
confusion of Godechot has done little to clarify the real position of Geneva and her so-
called revolution.
The cercles and the Representants
The Representants had not been idle in attempting to protect their interests. Once it was
clear that the Mediators would be called upon to settle the constitutional impasse that had
occurred, they wished to ensure that their position would be heard. Since the 1720s, the
Bourgeois had organised themselves in cercles, which, as a tool of organisation, had
played an effective role in the 1740s and 1750s. In 1766-8 they tightened their organi-
sation, the numerous circles were brought into twelve main clubs:
'ii s'en forma douze principaux, sous le nom de Cercles Politiques, qui rdunissant
se	 Palmer. op. cit., p. 134.
Fr	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 133.
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tous les autres, etoient uniquement destines a traiter les Affaires Publiques.'61
This was to mirror exactly what the Bourgeois had done in 1734-8, using the cercles rather
than the Militia. The twelve cercles were: cercles Trois mores, Maison Chavanes, de l'Isle,
a l'Imprevu M, Corps de garde, en l'Isle Maison Richard, du Dauphin, a la Colombe, au
bon ragout, eau de F[rance ?], Madelaine, Eau de Geneve. 62 Most of them, as their
names imply, were held in rooms hired at taverns. All of the taverns used were in the
lower part of the old town or in St. Gervais. A tavern like the Trois Mores seemed to do
well out of the cercles. The Natifs also met there at this time, although at a different time
from the Bourgeois.
It was these Bourgeois circles who elected representatives to form their commission in
1765. They had chosen a group of 24 men to represent their views to the Mediators, two
from each cercle. Amongst those elected as commissioners were J-F. and J-A. De Luc, M.
Chappuis, Joseph Des Arts, F.H. d'Ivemois, J. Vieusseux, E. Claviere, J. Barde. 63 Each
cercle gave clear instructions to their elected commissioners, and it was to their respective
cercles that the representatives reported back. The representatives had to obtain the
agreement of their respective cercles members for any matter negotiated. The representa-
tives also refused to discuss any matter without direct instructions from their members.
Thus, any documents and all positions to be taken in the course of negotiations with the
Mediators were ones that had been agreed and accepted by all the Bourgeois who were
members of the Representants party. But the Mediators, unlike 1737-8, had little intention
of seriously consulting with them.
What the Representants had created was a system of election and representation which
while it was nominally within the state actually ran parallel to it, a form of dual authority. It
was to all intents and purposes a functioning opposition in the odd position of being
outside everyday political life and unrecognised by the government in power. This was not
what the Bourgeois had intended or desired. Unable to exercise their political skills in the
Conseil General and the government generally, the Bourgeois created their own system,
and, when it was used in full, the organisation was effective. Moreover it was not used as
a dual system whose intention was to take over the running of the state after the destruc-
tion of the state's political system; the Representants had organised themselves to survive
and attempt to persuade the government to come to some compromise that would allow
the Bourgeois to take a greater part in normal political activity. It was unlike what was
happening in America because it was not 'an organised conspiracy against the govern-
ment' TM , it was an open political movement desiring to settle with the government the
contradictions and difficulties which had emerged as a result of 1738. The system that had
been established was to enable the Bourgeois to act together to bring pressure on the
government, especially with regard to the question of Representations. The difficult
negotiations which finally ended the crisis in 1768 proved the maturity and success of this
organisation which the party of the Representants evolved.
Many in the government saw the cercles as places where the majority of the Bourgeois
were being led astray by their leaders:
'nous avons 25 despotes qui sans autre regle que leur volontê et pourtant 	
[illegible word] force coactive tiennent sous l'oppression douze ou quatorze cent
61	 BPU, Genêve, Archives Tronchin 343, MOmoire sur les Gerdes et sur les Commissaires Politiques remis aux
Seigneurs Planipotentiares, 1981, 94.
62	
SPU, Genêve, Ms. Cramer 97, 26 octobre, 142.
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[de] leur concitoyens et leur mares et violent toutes les lois que nous leur avons
donne:65
The use of language by Du Pan is interesting: illustrating again the difficulty faced by the
ruling class in understanding they faced a new form of political representation and an
alternative source of authority to their own. The Bourgeois though still respecting their
elected leaders were determined nonetheless that they too should obey the constitution,
therein lay the difficulty. For the patriciate, there was also a belief that the Bourgeois'
attachment to the Magistrates was weakening. Cramer wished the cercles did not exist. He
believed that:
'la plupart ne sont composes quo de Demagogues ou de faux Docteurs qui croient
que parce qu'ils on beaucoup de hardiesse et de babel, sont pour cela capables de
faire les Jures consultes et les legislateurs en expliquant les Loix a leur maniere et
leur donnant souvent un sens tout different de celui qu'elles presentent naturelle-
ment... us s'echauffent insensiblement la cervelle et ils infatuent de leur mauvaise
et pemicieuse doctrine des Citoyens foibles et credules...'"
Cramer was not one of the most extreme of the Negatifs, yet here he reveals the difficulty
of an oligarchy facing a challenge to its authority which it did not understand.
The ultra-NOgatifs such as Francois Tronchin were quite scandalised by the behaviour of
the Bourgeois in their cercles:
'ils devienent donc, pour ainsi dire de veritables Conseils, 00 l'on tratoit a loisir,
sans obstacles, et sans apparement-merne de fermentation, toutes les affaires de
la Republique:67
These were thus not the wild babblings of the ignorant, but the calm, well-organised
discussions which could be found in the political cercles of the patriciate. The compliment
contained was perhaps unintentional but clear: the Bourgeois in their cercles were as
capable as the patriciate of discussing political matters in a rational and calm way.
The government attempted to prevent access to the Mediators by the 'committee' of the
Representants. Even so, there were a certain number of 'unofficial' meetings between the
French Resident, Hennin," and some of the leaders, while the Bemese cannot have
been unaware of the demands of the party, as several of the leaders had had considerable
contact with friends in Bern. J-A. De Luc states however:
'II en resulte quo les Commissaires des Representants, regardes par ses Seigneurs
comme des instigateurs d'une Democratie outree, ne furent jamais consultes un
instant sur le projet de conciliation.'
De Luc's comment is a clear indication that the Mediators, or at least France, as the most
powerful of the three, were not in Geneva to 'mediate', but to impose a settlement on the
city. Such an imposition would inevitably be in favour of the government and the patriciate.
The Mediation, the Pronona and the new Edict of 1768
The task facing the Mediators was a difficult one. The views of most of the government
▪ BPU, Geneve Ms. 1541 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1765, janvier, 5.
▪ BPU, Geneve Ms. Cramer 87, Vol. II 28 fevrier-31 decembre 1766, 128.
67	 BPU, Geneve, Archives Tronchin 343, Memoire sur los Cordes, op. cit, 1781, 93.
• See Appencix IV B VII/8.
66	 BPU Geneve, Ms. Tronchin 343, Pieces et Lenses politiques 1780-1783 Lettre a Marc Pictet Turrettini en sa
quake de Secretaire du Comite au Pardo Neutre, le 13 avril, 1789, 30.
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and the patriciate were straightforward. They believed that the Bourgeois had marched into
territory which belonged by rights only to those 'capable' of governing the country by virtue
of their birth, wealth and 'enlightenment'. By procrastinating, at the least, in the task of
publishing the fundamental laws of the state, together with the important Edicts, as had
been promised and incorporated in the Mediation of 1738, the government and two smaller
councils had done their best to make it difficult for the Bourgeois to inform themselves
easily concerning the laws of the state.
The Mediators, before starting work issued a declaration (27th. July 1766) that the
administration of the Petit Conseil had always been: legale, integre et patemelle' and that
the accusations levelled against it and its members concerning the illegality of their
continuation in office:
'Otaient injurieuses, dictees par la prevention & la passion, & que c'etait a tort &
sans raison, que les Citoyens avaient refuse de choisir dans le Corps du Conseil,
les Chefs de la Republique.' 70
Though the declaration gave comfort to members of the Petit Conseil, it made it obvious
that the Mediation was not to be an attempt by neutral mediators to solve Geneva's
problems.
The Representants were equally aware of the implications in the declaration. To state,
as the Mediators had done, that the Petit Conseil had acted perfectly legally in announcing
the continuation in office of the Syndics of 1765 was to attack the very foundations of the
state. The cercles met all day, for three consecutive days, in order to discuss the situation.
After much anguish and hours of discussion, it was finally agreed to be both 'ferme &
sage', to await the unfolding of events and to examine the pacification document when it
emerged from the Mediators:
'de n'apporter a l'examen du projet de pacification, que le patriotisme le plus pur,
depouillee de tout esprit de parti, mais &gage de tout sentiment de crainte.'
The Mediators finally emerged with a Reglement de Mediation in November 1766. The
right repeatedly to reject the lists of candidates for official positions, including the Syndics,
was to be forbidden. The right of the Bourgeois to make representations was to be
maintained, but in a much restricted form: each representation could only contain one point
and could not be repeated until a decision had been given. Representations would in
future be allowed only when they were concerned with:
'le bien de l'Etat et la conservation des droits et des attributions des divers ordres
qui le composent.'72
In addition to which, only twelve citizens would have the right to go together to make the
presentation. There were to be no more processions of a thousand citizens marching
through the streets of Geneva to present their petitions. The Bourgeois had been prevent-
ed from signing petitions in 1738, now they were to be forbidden to accompany their
leaders to show the strength of support there might be.
The droit negatif was to be modified, it was to be handed over to a new creation, a
council of 79, the majority (two-thirds) of whose members were to be taken from the two •
smaller councils and the LX, but which would also contain twenty citizens, i.e. Bourgeois.
The Deux Cents was similarly to be enlarged in the sense that, at each election for new
members, seven would have to be chosen from each of the four quarters of the town. The
LX would no longer be elected by the Petit Conseil, but by the Deux Cents, and finally, the
D'Ivervnois, op. cit., Vol. I , seconde parte, p. 254.
71	 Ibid., p. 256.
72	 Barbey, op. cit., p. 153.
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elected members of the Representants were to go, and it was to become illegal to have
assemblies and cercles, except for ordinary social purposes.
However the new council is considered, it would have been so heavily weighted in the
government's favour as to be of no use in solving the problem of whether a Representation
was to be permitted or not. It would, in reality, ensure the continuation of the government's
untrammelled right to refuse to accept any Representation. For these reasons, there was
no way that the Bourgeois would accept the solutions put forward by the Mediators.
The abolition of the one power that the Bourgeois possessed, that of refusing to elect
the Syndics, together with the decision to ban the cercles from all political activity, was the
height of folly. To most of the Bourgeois, the Mediation looked like nothing less than an
attempt to impose upon the people of Geneva exactly what the most reactionary of the
Negatifs desired, while attempting to suppress all political activity by the Bourgeois.
The Mediation must mark a low in French diplofnatic ability. Both Bern 'and Zurich had
been browbeaten into accepting the terms as dictated by France, even though Zurich, in
particular, had taken a long time to accept the terms of the Mediation. Even if, as Giir
claims, the calling on the Mediators was a ploy of the Petit Conseil to:
'se mettre definitivement a l'abri des enterprises des citoyens,'73
in what way did the resulting document advance their position? Unwilling to come to any
agreement with the Bourgeois at the end of 1765, unwilling even to contemplate any
negotiation with them, how did the Negatifs imagine that there would be acceptance for a
document which did nothing but reinforce their position vis-à-vis the Bourgeois?
So unrealistic were the terms of the Mediation that it was clear that the chances of
having it accepted by the Conseil General, by which it had to be approved were negligible.
Indeed, the question was whether it would ever be accepted. The attitude of the Bourgeois
can be best seen in the following:
'L'article II de 1738 n'a-t-il pas suppose, par la memo quo je ne prendrois des
Syndics dans le Conseil des 25, qu'autant qu'ils s'en trouveroit quatre qui me
seroient agreables? "Ref user, est-ce etre oblige de prendre? Pourquoi la
Garantie auroit-elle maintenu le Droit d'un Conseil inferieur, aux depens de celui
d'un Conseil superieur? Quoi! Ce n'est pas au Legislateur a decider sur le sens
des Loix? Qui mieux que lui pout savoir ce qu'il avoulu dire.'74
Equally, the long document read in all the cercles before the meeting of the Conseil
General made it clear that there was no hope of the Mediation being accepted
'tous les pouvoirs sont augmentes, pousses et accumilês vers les Conseils, ils
ont deja la puissance militaire, cello de juger sans appel ...la regie des finances, le
req?ement vierrt encore tears dormer Pouvoir Legis(atif, (e Omit illimite de s'elire
eux memes et de se perpetuer, que reste-t-il donc aux Citoyens? Rien, je le dis a
haute voix. Rien de tout
A lighter approach with the same message also circulated, as diagram 7 shows. The
meeting of the Conseil General was delayed until after the celebrations of the esca-
lade 78, when the people could benefit from sermons urging them to obediennA and
73	 GOr, 'La negociation de l'edit du 11 mars 1768', op. cit., p. 176.
74	 AEG, Girod 7, 11 Questions d'un Citoyen Representant adressties a M. Payocat, Geneve le 18 novembre 1767
written by Delorme or Comparet.
Bp U Geneve, Ms. fr. 892 9 Reflection sur le projet de conciliation du 15 Xbre. 1766, Qui fut lut dans toutles
cerdes quelque jours avant l'assemblee du Conseil General.






Qui vaut bien un gros livre
Propose a tous les Logiciens, Jurisconsultes & Publicistes de
1' Europe
On se demande si c'est bien raisonner que de dire
Les Genevois pourront refuser
de boire tout le vin qui leur
sera off ert
Le Conseil General de
Geneve pourra rejetter
la totalite des Sujets
qui lui sont proposes
pour le Sindicat
Mais ii ne pourra prendre
les Sindics que dans le
Conseil des Vingt-Cinq
Mais us ne pourront boire
que du vin du Pais
Par consequent le Conseil
General ne pourra, sous
quelque pretext que ce
soit, se dispenser d'elire
annuellement les Sindics
dans le nombre des
Membres du Conseil des
Vingt-Cinq
Par consequent les Genevois
ne pourront, sous quelque
pretexte que ce soit, se
dispenser de boire journelle-
ment du vin du Pals qu'ils
ayent soif ou non
(BPU Geneve, Ms 892, p.221)
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acceptance of the Mediation because it was recommended by the government, and
obedience to the government was, as James Boucher was to preach seven years later in
Maryland,
'particularly incumbent on Christians, because ... it is enjoined by the positive
commands of God.'n
There were various threats and pressures brought to bear upon the Representants' leaders
to weaken their determination. 78 It also gave time for Genevans living at some distance
from the town to return and attend the Conseil General. All the Negatifs living in Paris were
brought together by the Genevan Ambassador and told to go to Geneva for the vote. Many
Bourgeois from more than 200 different places abroad also made the journey home to
vote.78 All was in vain, since, at the meeting on 15th. December 1766, the project was
rejected by 1095 to 515 votes. This was a very high turnout by those entitled to vote in the
Conseil General 'the greatest number of voters known'.8°
The government was appalled, and a certain number of the patrician party now left
Geneva while the Petit conseil wrote to the Duc de Choiseul 81:
'Nous avons vu avec la plus profonde douleur que !l yres a de funestes preventions,
ils [les citoyens] se sont refuses au bonheur qui leur etait offert en merne temps
qu'ils ont eloigne d'eux nos mains paternelles que nous leurs avons tendues avec
effusion de coeur.'82
According to Ferrier in P.E. Martin, the rejection of the Mediation in the Conseil General
led to the emigration from Geneva of a considerable number of the patriciate, 'pris de
panique'. 83 Some doubtless were disturbed by both the rejection and the possible
implication of a French blockade. Men such as Jean-Robert Tronchin and Cramer also left
the city at this time, but they continued to be involved in discussions with the Re-
presentants and among themselves. It may be that they were wearied of the attitude of
many of the ultra-Negatifs in the Deux Cents. They were in a minority in that council and
were extremely unpopular with their fellow council members, who suspected them of
negotiating with the 'enemy'. The later insistence of Cramer that he receive an invitation
from the government to return before he would agree to do so, together with his despair:
'Les esprits moderes ne peuvent faire aucun fruit, ni sur les uns, ni sur les autres
... il en faudra venir a un arrangement dans lequel les gens moderes pourront etre
ecoutes,'"
tends to support the idea of a tactical withdrawal, at least in his case. It was also easier to
have contact with the Representants outside the very public confines of the city.
The Mediators now sought to caw up a Prononce which they intended shtdd be
77	 Bailyn, 'Ideological Origins', op. ciL, p. 315, citing Jonathan Boucher's sermon On Civil Liberty, Passive
Obedience, and Nonresistance, delivered in Queen Anne's Parish Maryland, 1774.
71	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. I, seconde partie, pp.278-282. The use of the pastors to try to browbeat the Commission-
ers into accepting the document indicates how far most of that body had lost its independence of the state. The
effort by the Swiss mediators to see all the Bourgeois, 'dizaine par dizaine' indicates the level of effort expended.
7.	 Ibid., p. 283.
ao	 Shelbume Papers, Volume 18, 150, microfilm University of Michigan William L. Clements Library.
SI	 Duc de Choiseul (1719-1785) Louis XV's Minister of Foreign Affairs 1758-1770.
12	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3ame. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p.453.
a	 loc. ciL
14	 BPU Gen give, Ms. Cramer 97, avril 24 117671, 118-119.
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imposed upon the sovereign state of Geneva. The implications of such a conclusion to
their invitation to the Mediators was not lost upon the patriciate. It would be a French
solution imposed upon the city. It was during the period after the rejection of the Mediation
in December 1766 and the attempt at the imposition of the Prononce that the differences
within the Alegatifs became clearer.
Publicly, the Representants maintained their pressure on the government. On 16th.
October 1767, around 1020 Bourgeois presented a Representation in the form of a
Remonstrance, in which they pressed strongly for compromise between the government
and the Bourgeois." According to Cramer, those taking part were checked off against the
cercle lists. The existence of what must have been membership lists and the fact that they
were used to check those taking part in the Representation illustrates how well organised
and efficient the Representants were. It also showed how little they were worried about the
lists falling into the wrong hands, although none of these lists seem to have survived. The
checking of individuals against lists ensured that only those with the political right to take
part were permitted to do so. For him it was: 'une folie de compter qu'ils se diviser-
ont.'" The knowledge that the long-delayed Prononce would soon be available ensured
that the Petit Conseil rejected the plea.
The Prononce arrived in Geneva in November 1767, and to a great extent it fulfilled the
worst fears of the people. The anger of the Bourgeois is exemplified by the man seen by
pastor Alexandre Sarasin, who shouted in the street that:
'II iroit en Chancelerie crier qu'on lui voloit son bien et sa liberte.'87
Amongst the many provisions contained within the Prononce was the declaration that
the Conseil General had to elect annually the four Syndics, and that there were no
circumstances under which this could not be done, hence the right to reject the names
submitted time after time was abolished. At the same time, the droit negatif of the Petit
Conseil was confirmed. It also suppressed the twenty-four representatives of the cercles
and ordered the immediate publication of all the Edicts, from 1568 onward, upon which the
government of the state was based. It further contained one glaring omission: having
forbidden the use of the ligne de nouvelle election with regard to the four Syndics, it
omitted to forbid the same thing for the election of all the other officers of state, such as
the Procureur-General, the Tresorier and all the positions necessary for the running of the
state.
The Prononce accentuated the divisions within the patriciate. At the meeting of the Deux
Cents to discuss the Prononce, there were some who argued against any attempt to
impose a settlement on the state. Amongst these were men such as Capitaine Jaquet,
who stated that:
'le Prononce seroit le tombeau de la Republique.'"
Dr. Joly 89 went further in attacking not only the Prononce but also the government which
had put Geneva in its present position, by stating that everyone had been: livre au
Despotisme par le Droit Negatif." Equally severe was Mercier, 91 who stated:
63	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., Unto. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 455.
"	 BPU, Geneve, Ms. Cramer 97, 17 octobre 1767, 141.
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'Vouloir conserver la Constitution, c'etoit perdre la Republique.'92
Cramer had to rely on memory for his diary, as no records were allowed to be kept
during speeches in the Deux Cents. He states that, at this meeting of the Deux Cents,
there were '18 or 20' members who had made it clear that they wanted conciliation
between the two parties rather than the imposition of the Prononce. Included in the 12
names actually mentioned by Cramer are those of Jean-Pierre Trembley 93 and Jacob
Vernet.
The contacts that had existed (in secret for the greater part) during the wait for the
arrival of the Prononce continued with greater seriousness after November 1767. No state,
whatever the internal situation, could allow itself to have a constitution and the interpreta-
tion of it imposed by outsiders, who would then act, if necessary, as the enforcers of the
law. The incentive to ensure the greatest possible freedom for the state prevented the
breakdown in the talks that many feared. Eventually, a compromise was hammered out
with great difficulty and submitted to the Conseil General on 11th. March." It was accept-
ed by 1,204 to 23, with the ultra-Negatifs abstaining from the vote.95 For them this was to
be known as the 'Edict of the Pistols'. 96 A claim based on the belief that many of the
Bourgeois went to the meeting armed and ready to rise if they lost the vote.
Nonetheless, there had been no violence in the city, unlike Boston, where the anger of
some was vented in the deliberate destruction of the homes and contents of those they
considered to be opposed to them and their rejection of the Stamp Act. For the governor,
Hutchinson, and others the people were 'the mercurial playthings of leaders who could
profit by exciting their fears'. 97 There was a conviction that:
'powerful pamphleteers had habituated the people, ... to question the grounds of
authority and to encourage acts of violence and the nullification of the law.'99
Geneva was very different from Boston. The Bourgeois had been seeking recognition of
the Conseil General as the sovereign body of the state since 1707, and had been aware of
its weakness since Boutilier and Combe. The cercles together with the oral culture they
engendered had been a successful, long-term basis for both the political education and
development of the Bourgeois. The considerable increase in pamphlets in Geneva in the
mid-1760s often meant that these were read aloud in the cercles and then discussed in a
calm and structured atmosphere. The Bourgeois had always believed that they could only
obtain their ends through peaceful and legal means. Equally, the Bourgeois were a small
proportion of the total population in the city (20%), while none of the remainder had any
political rights and were, on the whole, not concerned in such matters at all.
The parallel trouble in Neuchatel and Bern's reaction to it must have heightened
91	 See Appendix IV B V11/10.
92	 BPU, Geneve, Ms. Cramer 97, 2 novembre 1767, 144145.
se	 See Appendix IV B VII/11,
..	 The contacts in January had been between De Luc (pere), Vieusseux, Flournois and Claviers on the part of the
Representsnts and Jean Robert-Tronchin, Procureur-Gánerat These negotiations faltered due to the obstinacy of
the patriciate. They finally re-opened in March, when Tronchin and Geckion Turrettini, a member of the Petit
Conseil, met with De Luc and Floumois. See Appendix IV B VII112.
NI	 For details, see p. 160.
91	 P.E. Martin, op.cit, 3eme. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch.IX, P . 455.
97	 Bailyn, 'Hutchinson', op. cit., p. 72.
es	 Ibid., p. 73.
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tensions in Geneva. Disagreements over the right of Prussia to farm taxes, the rejection of
the Remonstrance drawn up by the Union of the Corporations and the Communes 99, the
dismissal of three members of the aristocratic council which governed the state and
general resistance led Prussia to invoke the arbitration of Bern under the Burgrecht of
1406. Bern's decision in Prussia's favour, in December 1767, led to Neuchatel's refusal to
accept, so Bern began to raise an army to enforce execution of the arbitration, forcing
Neuchatel to comply. It was not a happy precedent for Geneva: would Bern wish to
'enforce' the Prononce on Geneva by the use of its army?
Parallel, secret negotiations
Some members of the Deux Cents even before the terms of the Mediation were known,
had been seeking ways of coming to some arrangement with the Representants. Jean-
Robert Tronchin, the Procureur-General, was one of those who were, from the outset,
certain that the only way forward was by a settlement with the leaders of the Repre-
sentants:
'M. le Procureur General croit fermement qu'ensuite il faut s'arranger 	  parce
qu'un Magistrat sans force ne peut gouvemer un peuple mecontent et irrite
There were other members of the patriciate, such as Turrettini, who unable to go as far as
J-A. De Luc when the latter stated:
'Je me joignis aux Representations de 1763 parce que je les trouve fondees; j'y
persistai avec les autres Representations parce que le [Petit] Conseil pretendait au
droit de faire tomber les Representations par ses refus; je quittai tout pour me
vouer a la defendre du droit du Conseil General, lorsque le Conseil [le Petit conseil]
entreprit de bomer la liberte d'elire,"
nonetheless felt strongly that the solution to the problems of Geneva must be dealt with by
Genevans and not put in the hands of the Mediators and the possible use of force. Yet
others felt strongly that Geneva's sole salvation, as well as their own positions within the
state, lay in France and French intervention:
'...les principaux Negatifs membres des Conseils sont d'une vivacite et d'une
raideur excessive refusant tout projet d'arrangement, ayant la plus entiére confian-
ce dans la persistance de la France:1°2
The French had carefully built up a pro-French grouping in Geneva, who were to be
found amongst the patriciate and the government of the country. This pro-French group in
the patriciate had no inhibitions about inviting France to intervene in the political affairs of
Geneva, but failed to understand that their own position in the state was hardly likely to be
secure if it were shown to be based on the support of France, rather than upon the
support, however grudging, of the Bourgeois.
Meanwhile, negotiations were begun by some of the patriciate directly with the some of
the Representants in an attempt, somewhat belatedly, to come to some kind of compro-
mise which would gain the acceptance of the majority at a Conseil General and be ac-
This was a union of the Bourgeois of Neuchatel, Valangin, Boudry and Landeron, with the right to their own
executive and juciciary, their own military force and the right to make 'Remonstrances' to the Prince against
government measures and eticts. Oechsli, op. cit., p. 283.
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ceptable to the Nègatifs:
'Des le mois de juillet 1766, M. Cramer et M. Turrettin[i] furent en concert avec M.
Tronchin pour tenter aux moyen d'accomodement. Ceux le ne vouloient pas deviser
a toujours le Conseil d'avec les Citoyens [Bourgeois] ni perdre la Republique, us ne
voulaient pas de victimes."3
A great deal of the putative compromises were discussed and not written down. There is
reference on 22nd. January in a letter sent by Jean-Robert Tronchin to Cramer concerning
what Turrettini and De Luc had agreed to. 104 This attempt came to nothing, as Turrettini
confirmed in a letter to Cramer, who wrote in his diary:
'ii dit que ne voyant aucune possibilite de succes, chacun se retirant, il se retire
aussi.'"6
But there is no indication as to what had been discussed, nor the reason for the break-
down in the talks.
Yet another player entered the complex field of negotiation over the Genevan impasse.
An Englishman, Philip, 2nd. Earl Stanhope 106 was also involved in the attempts to
secure an agreement between the two sides."' Because of the close ties between his
family and the Tronchins, Jean-Robert Tronchin tried to involve Philip in the process of
reconciliation, as well as seeking the views of his cousin, Lord Chatham, 106 but his
efforts bore no real fruit except as a 'safe' conduit between the Bourgeois and the
patriciate."9
Throughout the papers of the year 1766 and 1767, there are a considerable number of
references to the creation of some kind of additional council. It was looked upon by some
of the patriciate and government as a means to bring into the ambit of the government a
group of the Bourgeois at present outside all political positions. It was also a recognition by
some that the existing constitution was not working and that Geneva faced a choice:
'Car comment vouloir donner des remedes a un Cadavre? Des deux chases l'une;
ou il faut reformer l'esprit general, ou il taut donner au gouvemement une force qui
puisse resister A l'esprit general:11°
The Bourgeois were unlikely to give up their demand for the Conseil General to be
sovereign and have some element of control over the government, thus short of some
military force the only option seemed to attempt to change the entrenched attitude of the
majority of Bourgeois seeking what they called their rights.
"3	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 2461 Lettres et Memoires concemant J-A. De Luc, 21.
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In his papers, Cramer has a Memoire inedit of June 1766, which suggests splitting the
Bourgeois into two groups: those considered to be little more than simple artisans, the
poorest of the Bourgeois who in his text are called the 600 'Proletaires', who were to be in
some way segregated from the Bourgeois, leaving 800, who all, or nearly all: 'croyent avoir
des droits au Gouvemement'. 111 To accomodate these 800, it suggests the creation of
an intermediate council of around 400, to which a great part of the rights of the Conseil
General should then be transferred. Half the new council was to be elected by the Petit
Conseil and half by the Conseil General. In this manner, the report believes that 100 of the
Bourgeois, unable in 1766 to take part in the process of government, will in future be able
to do so. The text then continues:
'Les deux tiers et plus de ce Grand Conseil [seraient] composes alors de citoyens
parfaitement êtrangers aux families qui ont occupe jusqu'ici le Gouverne-
ment....'112
This plan for a new council was clever. In the text, however, the writer gives himself away
in a paragraph just before the introduction of his main idea for the new council:
'Le choix des remédes devant deriver de la nature des maux, je cherche quel est le
vice fondamental de la Constitution, et ce vice me parait consister principalement
en ce que les deux Conseils n'ont aucune influence dans le C.G. [Conseil General],
et qu'il y a trop peu de membres du C.G. qui entrent en partage de Gouvemement.
...la Souverainete y est trop repandue, et le Gouvemement y est trop resserre. 11
faudroit donc resserrer l'Aristocratie et etendre le Gouvernement, c a d c'est a
dire] en ouvrir la porte a un plus grand nombre de Citoyens.'13
This is an interesting admission that there was a serious imbalance in the constitutional
arrangements. It is proof that the moderate Negatifs were still attempting to both limit the
sovereignty of the Bourgeois and divide them. At the same time, the LX was to be given
the role of being the 'master' of the new system and maintaining a balance between the
new 'Grand Conseil and the Petit Conseil. The members of the small council were to be
chosen by the new council, as were all the officers of state and the four Syndics.
There were clearly attractions for the Bourgeois in this type of plan, as well as consider-
able dangers. Such a plan would greatly reduce the power of the Bourgeois and divert
their energies into the election of their share of the new council. However, it would also
come up against the stumbling block of the Bourgeois' concept of their sovereignty.
It was this difficulty that men such as De Luc had to face. Although they were able
throughout to hold their party together, the negotiations of 1767 and early 1768 showed
the emerging differences within the Bourgeois. There was a division between those who
were willing to accept some compromise over the composition and election of the Deux
Cents and those who believed that the Conseil General should have the right to elect the
Deux Cents in its entirety. There were others such as De Luc who were willing to move
from the simple control function of the Conseil General into a more sophisticated partici-
pation in government. The difficulty lay in the ideal, strong in the Bourgeois, that there
should be little change in the existing system. Having a number of the Representants
elected and sitting in the Deux Cents would be a step towards the concept of delegation:
they would promote the interests of their party in the organs of government. To give the
Conseil General the right to elect all the members of the Deux Cents would be a move to
what was called popular democracy, which was anathema to the patriciate.
1 "	 Ibid., 162.
' 1 '	 Ibid., 164.
Ibid., 164.
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The difficulty of any negotiated settlement between the patriciate and the Representants
is clearly illustrated by those few documents from the latter's side that have survived. The
disagreement is reduced by De Luc to stark simplicity:
'II ne peut etre fait, non seulement aucune loi, mais aucun changement aux lois
sans l'approbation du Conseil General; c'est I,J la base de notre Constitution.' (my
emphasis) 114
In addition to the above, De Luc reinforced his message in a letter sent to the Duc de
Choiseul:
'n'otre Constitution [...] a place le lien de la confiance et la conservation des droits
du souverain, dans ce que: nul ne soit recu qu'il n'ait ete approuve du Peuple."15
The danger was all too clear to the Reprèsentants: if the Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents
were allowed the right to interpret the laws without reference to the sovereign body, the
latter would be subordinated to the two smaller councils. In this way:
'le pouvoir legislatif attribue au Conseil General ne sera plus qu'une chimere: car
dans la realite le juge des contestations sur les lois sera legislateur dans le
moment ob il prononcera des qu'il pourra prononcer contre la Loi, sans que le vrai
Legislateur puisse mettre aucun obstacle a ses decisions.'116
Closely tied to the sovereignty of the Conseil GOneral was the right of that council to
reject the names submitted to it for the election of the Syndics. If used systematically it
virtually made the state ungovernable, as events in 1766 had shown. The patriciate wanted
desperately to abolish or restrict this right, and it seemed that the two Swiss mediators
agreed. In a document left by mistake upon their withdrawal to Solothum, there are a
series of references to the question. The tone of this 'document' is clearly pro-patriciate:
'...la ligne de nouvelle election est une porte toujours ouverte aux factieux et a la
cabale. Les seigneurs mediateurs auront egalement senti par leurs reflexions
l'impossibilitO absolue de remedier A ces inconveniens en laissant subsister la ligne
de nouvelle Election."17
The fact that such a scrap could come apparently into the hands of the Representants is
intriguing. It was not such a small piece (since the copy of it in De Luc's papers occupies
several pages). It was found, at the back of a drawer, forgotten in the lodgings of the
departed Bernese mediators and found its way into the hands of J-A. De Luc, the question
arises as to whether someone wished it to be found. As De Luc himself comments on the
contents:
'On demande si apres un tel fragment les adversaires de la bourgeoisie peuvent
dire qu'ils n'ont jamais entendue la ligne de nouvelle Election comme les Represe-
ntants l'entendent.... 1118
After the Prononca the Reprèsentants made it quite clear in a number of private
meetings with Tronchin and others that negotiations had to be on an official footing. They
wished to see the government appoint their own commissioners, who would be able to
meet with the commissioners of the ReprOsentants." 9 It was not until 4th. January
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1768 120 that the Deux Cents appointed a commission to attempt to find some compro-
mise with the Representants, when it was clear that the Conseil Genera/ would again
refuse to elect the Syndics,' 21 as they had already, in November 1767, refused to elect
the Procureur-General and other officers of the state.
There was to be a very tense period during these negotiations. De Luc, Vieusseux,
Flournois and Clavibre represented the Bourgeois although, in conformity with the terms of
the Prononce, the Bourgeois had officially dissolved the Commission. There was much
obstinacy in the Deux Cents, many of whom wanted to see the Prononce imposed on the
city. Eventually, after several delays and amid the increasing anger of elements of the
Bourgeois, a compromise was reached. The final details, appropriately, were settled by
Tronchin and Turrettini, with De Luc and Floumey. The compromise finally arrived at was
accepted by the Conseil General on 11th. March 1768.
It was agreed that when there were 50 empty seats on the Deux Cents, the Conseil
General would have the right to elect half of the new members. The greatest concession
made by the Bourgeois was the abandonment of the ligne de nouvelle election. Having
used it once, they had to elect from the second list submitted to them. The Bourgeois, in
return, obtained an element of control over the Petit Conseit. the Conseil General acquired
the right to elect four new members of the Petit Conseil chosen from the Deux Cents, and
named the four members they would replace in the Petit Conseil. In effect, replacing four
sitting members was a more sophisticated tool than the ligne of nouvelle election. It gave
the Bourgeois the possibility of expressing their disapproval of individual members of the
Petit ConseiL Over a number of years, should the Conseil General so decide, the entire
Petit Conseil could be replaced by new members more congenial to the Bourgeois. It was
the latter point which so angered the ultra-Negatifs. They were also very uneasy about the
possibility of the Conseil General having the right to elect 25 members of the Deux Cents
when the time came. It was, on the other hand, a very important first step, for at least a
small proportion of the Bourgeois previously excluded from any governmental position, to
be able to move into the Deux Cents and thus into the orbit of government.
The considerable concessions which both sides made were in order to protect the state
from further massive interference from France. The moderate Negatifs had no stomach for
the kind of imposed regime that France desired and found it better to work on that
common ground with the Representants. The latter had as strong a desire to keep Geneva
as independent of France as possible. The Negatifs were also very uneasy at the emer-
gence of Natifs' cercles and the support that the latter seemed to have given to the
Representants since 1766. In reaching an agreement which gave little to the Natifs and
much to the Representants, as Giir correctly says, the government might hope to use the
disappointment felt by the Natifs to separate them from their erstwhile allies.12-2
The Natifs were to be permitted to take their place as fully active members of their trade
bodies, being able to sit on the juries which controlled and, when necessary, disciplined
them. They were also, for the first time, to be allowed to become doctors, chemists and
apothecaries. As a further concession, it was proposed to allow twenty of the Natifs to
become Bourgeois, with the promise of an additional five annual 'promotions' thereafter, at
1"	 Ibid., 162.
' 	 The Commission consisted of Jallabert, Syndic,. Cramer, Jean-Pierre Sartoris, Ami Rilliet, J-R. Tronchin, Jean-Louis
Michell and Drs. Job and Butini. It was finely balanced, the first four members of the Commission came from the
Petit Conseil, the Last four from the Deux Cents. Joly and Butini had shown themselves to be moderate Represent-
ants, while Tronchin had spent the last three years in a series of behind the scene negotiations and would have
been aware of what was the minimum that the Representatives would accept
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a fee of 4,000 florins, but this was not particularly generous. The attempt that had been
made by the Natifs to obtain greater concessions from the process of the Mediation had
come to very little. There was considerable disappointment and some anger in the Natifs'
cercles which boded ill for the future.
None of the changes concerning elections was to come into effect for a period of five
years. It was hoped that by then the tempers and bitterness that had been so marked in
the city during the previous five years would have had sufficient time to fade. The political
astuteness of the Representants can be seen in the fact that it was they who suggested
this five year cooling-off period:
'c'est que ce fut dans la Commission des Reprèsentants que prit naissance la
clause qui recula [les elections] de cinq ans."
It also shows how moderate they were: they had no desire to storm the government nor to
replace the majority of either the Petit Conseil or the Deux Cents.
The stranglehold of the patriciate on the machine of government in Geneva was
loosened. It was a small relaxation, but it did have long-term implications, in that it was
possible now for a small number of the Bourgeois to join the Deux Cents and in time to
become Syndics. The question, as always in the political life of Geneva, was whether the
settlement of the immediate crisis, with the concessions that had been granted, would
bring peace to the city. Would the usual feasts of peace and kindly words live up to
expectation? Some of the Negatifs made it clear that they:
'ne vouloient plus avoir part au Gouvernement sous cet loi de force. Plusieurs en
effet se retirent et ceux qui se rOsolvent enfin a rester ne le firent que pour eviter a
la Patrie de plus grands malheurs."24
According to the same author, some of the Representants were equally unhappy:
'Du ceitë de[s] Representants les mernes dispositions avoient occasionnO l'Edit,
c'est-a-dire le resentiment du passé et la persuasion que la liberte avoit tout a
craindre de la part du Gouvernement.'125
Yet compared with Bern, where the 1744 petition had led to banishment and the
subsequent attempt to overthrow the state in 1749 had led to executions, 126 the Genevan
Bourgeois had been outstandingly successful. Neither had there been any rioting or unrest
in the city, as there had in Neuchatel in 1768.
All was not gloom and despondency, however, as is clear from the letters of Turrettini:
'II est vrai que nous cedons au Conseil Ganeral une espece de grabeau sur la
puissance executive; mais par la maniare dontil est adoucl je ne le crols inYinlment
dangereux ...1"
The danger for the city lay in the anger of the ultra-NOgatifs and their refusal to accept the
Edict of March 1768. There was, according to Turrettini, a sizeable number of them:
'[le Deux Cents de mercredi] ... ratifia unanimement le projet en l'absence a la
varite de 61 personnes..."28
These were the men who would never accept what had happened as final. They still
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looked to France as their guardian and the source of their salvation and felt sure that
eventually help would come from that quarter to return Geneva to the position it had been
in after the Mediation of 1738. It was in their interests to ensure that the new system in
Geneva worked with as little success as possible.
The changes introduced went to the heart of the Bourgeois argument:
'It held government officials to be only removable delegates, and countered the
theory of the constituted bodies with * the theory of the Sovereignty of the peo-
ple."
This was precisely what the Bourgeois had been positing and arguing for since 1718, the
core of their party, the rallying point of all that had gone before, that the Conseil General
was the Sovereign body of the state, not the two smaller councils, since its sovereignty
was indivisible.
This compromise was sufficient to hold the Representants together in spite of their
differences. As Gar states:
'I'union des Reprêsentants êtait plus forte que leurs divergences, qu'ils parvinrent a
surmonter grace au fonctionnement vêtablement dómocratique de leurs cer-
cles..."3
The Conseil General had acquired some right to oversee the government and have some
influence on the Petit Conseil, so that the government and the two smaller councils could
no longer ignore the demands and comments of the Bourgeois, but both adversaries, the
Negatifs and the Bourgeois had to face the future with fissures within their ranks. For the
Negatifs, this was to pose greater problems, since a considerable part of that group were
unhappy with the settlement reached and came to regard its removal from the constitution
as essential. The more extreme members came to see the only salvation in further French
intervention, and some set out to provoke that hoped-for event. There was also the distrust
which had been fostered between, on the one hand, those in the Negatifs who had worked
for a compromise throughout the crisis and those who had supported them and, on the
other, those who considered them as little short of traitors and had no desire to work with
them in the government of the country.
The democratic organisation and nature of the Representants had borne fruit with
difficulty through negotiation, but the future was nonetheless full of uncertainty. Permitted
to continue their cercles and democracy, how long would it be before they clashed with the
far-from-democratic Negatifs, who still, in reality, controlled the majority of levers of power
and who could rely on elements of a constitution that was increasingly out of touch with
contemporary reality? A constitution, moreover, where the basic division concerning where
the sovereignty of the state lay was still unresolved. Moreover, there could be no certainty
that France would refrain from further interference in Geneva's affairs
French influence
The position of France was crucial in the second Mediation. French foreign policy in
Europe for the greater part of the eighteenth century had remained unwavering:
'The object of the politics of this crown has been and always will be to play in
Europe the superior role which suits its seniority, its dignity and its grandeur; to
reduce every power which attempts to force itself above her, whether by trying to
take away her possessions, or by arrogating to itself an unjust preeminence, or,
finally by seeking to take away from her influence and credit in the general affairs
12°	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 139.
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[of Europe]."31
This summary of France's foreign policy was given by Bemis to Choiseul on his taking up
the appointment as France's Ambassador to Vienna in 1759. For France, there had been
nearly sixty years of indirect involvement in Geneva, followed by twenty-eight years of
direct involvement as a Mediator of 1738. The governments since that date had done little
to show much independence from France and its influence, and the French had no
intention of allowing those within the city who were outside government and who were,
furthermore, pro-English, to change the cosy diplomatic arrangement it had created in
Geneva.
For France, the trouble in Geneva came at an awkward moment. The French Resident
of forty years, La Closure, died in 1765 and had to be speedily replaced. The new envoy,
Hennin, arrived at the very end of the year and took up his work immediately. His first
action was to persuade the Genevan government that, if the Conseil General were to fail
to elect the Syndics, it should be suspended, with the government and its ministers
continuing in status quo. He continued to press for this without success until the govern-
ment, having exhausted all possible lists of names was forced to, in effect, do as France
suggested, but from a much weaker position.
Hennin's parallel task had been to persuade the leaders of the Representants to elect
the Syndics:
'M. Hennin avoit fait tous ses efforts aupres des chefs des mecontents pour les
engager A elire des Syndics mais il les trouve aussi affermis dans leurs sentimens
que De Luc le Pere avec le quel il fut enferme pendant trois heures vendredi. II
dine encore samedi a Fernex avec Vieusseux et De Luc fils.'132
Voltaire had been arranging meetings between various Genevans, believing that, if they
sat around a table as reasonable men, they would surely find a compromise and an
additional task for Hennin was to persuade Voltaire to desist from his efforts, since France
had already taken the position that any settlement had to be one which satisfied the
demands of the government and ended the pretensions of the Bourgeois. Hennin had no
desire to see Voltaire encouraging the Bourgeois and creating further difficulties.
There were three French interventions in Genevan affairs at the request of the govern-
ment of Geneva. Two were, from the French and the patriciate point of view, successful:
the Mediation of 1738 and the military intervention jointly with Sardinia and Bern in
1782.133 The other attempt in 1766, was not, France unable to obtain acceptance of the
initial compromise nor to force the reluctant Bourgeois to accept PrononcO.
In 1765-66, France was recovering from the humiliation that she had suffered as a result
of a series of defeats in the Seven Years War. It would have been difficult for her to use
force to ensure the acceptance of the Prononce and maintain the Negatifs in power,
especially as the attitude of Britain was made clear to both Paris and the Swiss Confed-
eration, two of whose members were associated with France as Mediators.
In Paris, Lord Lennox 134 was requested to sound out French intentions with regard to
131 Orville T. Murphy, 'The View From Versailles - Charles Gravier Comte de Vergennes's Perception of the American
Revolution' in Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert (Eds.) Diplomacy and Revolution - The Franco-Amencan Alliance
0( 1778, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for The United States Historical Society, 1981, p. 110.
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Geneva, especially the sending of troops to the city, 135 while in Bern William Norton 136
was given clear instructions that he was to concern himself only with the question of
precedent in the introduction of any French troops into Geneva and any attempt by France
to ignore the provisions of the Act of Mediation of 1738. The letter from King George III
also contains a strict:
'You are in no case to interfere but where the Guarantees [i.e France, Bern, Zurich]
deviate from the Act they derive their authority from."37
The French were aware that they would have to act with caution and within the terms of
the Mediation of 1738 if they wished to avoid difficulties with Britain. Neither were the
Representants unaware of the advantages they would gain if they could persuade the
British government to become involved in the troubles in Geneva on their behalf. Their
natural admiration for the British system of government was strengthened by the knowl-
edge that Britain was Franca's enemy and it was the French who clearly supported the
Negatifs.
It was a forlorn hope, for there was no way that Britain would directly intervene in
Geneva. Parliament was not prepared to countenance any military involvement on the
Continent and the new King George III was as keen to maintain the status quo in Geneva
as were the Negatifs."8 Neither were many in Britain likely to forget that Wilkes had
been in Geneva in 1765, where he had dined at Picters together with the two De Luc
brothers, an event which caused Du Pan to comment:
semble qu'un esprit de trouble et de tracasserie soit repandu sur la terre, et que
les hommes ne veuillent plus etre gouvemer."39
Pictet and particularly the De Luc family were amongst the leaders of the Representants in
Geneva. Nonetheless, it is interesting that French plans for Geneva were not successful in
1766-67, the one occasion of the three when France was at her weakest and when the
British were still very wary of any extension of French interest in Europe.
The punishment France inflicted on Geneva, and especially those in the Bourgeois who
had been the elected Commissioners after the Conseil General refused to accept the
Mediation 1766, showed how little it understood the situation in the city. The anger of
France was expressed immediately to the leaders of the Representants. Called to see
Beautville 14° the same evening, they were informed that the King had forbidden the entry
of all Representants into France and had suspended all their trade and commercial
activities in France. Any attempt to ignore the ban would lead to their arrest and the
seizure of their goods. A further act of disapproval was the withdrawal of the Mediators
from Geneva to Soleure, where the French ambassador to the Swiss cantons was usually
based. The financial hardship that some of the Bourgeois suffered as a result of the
French blockade was unlikely to make them amenable to further inroads into what they
considered to be their rights inherited from their forefathers. The additional threat by the
French to build a road from Pontarlier to a new port they planned to construct on the lake
ts	 P.R.O. SP 96 4117. 6. 1766 Letter from Conway to Norton in Bern.
13.	 William Norton d. 1822. Son of 1st Baron Grantley.
In	 P.R.O. SP 41 1. 7. 1766.
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continued them [the Genevans] the Free People they now are: and in this political context that Party is certainly to
blame which aims at any Innovation.' P.R.O. SP 96 41, July 22 1766 King's Instructions to Norton.
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at Versoix was an additional problem, not only for Geneva, but also for Bern. The road and
the port would by-pass both Genevan and Vaud (i.e. Bern) customs duties:
'la marchandise venant de Sion a Versoy coutant de voiture et droits cinq ou dix
sols de moms par quintal que si elle avoient passe a Geneve. De sorte que nos
HaIles et notre commerce souffriront une fres grande diminution.' 141
Both the road and the port of Versoix had, however, still to be built.
The disagreement amongst the patriciate was problem enough without the further
difficulty which had arisen on the insistence of France that the 24 leaders of the Represen-
tants must be punished for their role in the whole affair. The absolute minimum that the
French required was that they should be exiled for life from Geneva. The lack of realism in
French diplomacy was stunning; not only did they imagine that they would be able to
impose a government on the people of Geneva, but they also thought that government
would then set about severely punishing the leaders of the Bourgeois. It was a task that
made certain that some of the patriciate would seek to find another, less disastrous
solution. Even Cramer, in his diary, was forced to concede the dangers of such a policy
'Mais il me semble que si on persiste a vouloir absolument la punition des Chefs, le
peuple leur est tellement attache que cette punition, pluteit de ramener la paix,
jettera la plus funeste aigreur dans les coeurs et nous conduira a de nouveaux
troubles:142
What were they to be punished for? They had not broken any law, they had not over-
thrown the government, but had merely insisted that the government itself should obey the
laws as it exhorted its fellow citizens to do. But Cramer adds that the leaders of the
Representants must fear that they are to be punished until peace is established and then
the whole matter can be allowed to drift or the punishment not be put into effect!
The Natifs
A new problem that emerged in 1766 was the behaviour of some of the Natifs. In the
60s, the Nat/Is began to copy the Bourgeois and patriciate by founding their own cercles
and discussing politics. On 3rd. April 1766, the Syndics reported to the Petit Conseil that:
'ils avoient ete informe qu'il se fait avant hier au Petit More assemblees nom-
breuses des Natifs, qui avoient confere ensemble sur quelques demandes qu'ils se
proposoient de faire au Sgr. Plen. [Seigneurs Plenipotentiers] tout relativement a la
finance qu'ils sont oblige de payer en entrant en apprentissage; qu'a quelques au-
tres objets.'
Further investigation showed that there were a number of meetings in various places,
particularly at inns such as the Coq d'Inde, 'Logis du Singe' and the 'Petit More'. The
meeting at the 'Petit More' was the largest, with more than 60 present. More worrying was
the claim that it was not just Natifs who had met together, but there had been some
Habitants there as well. The government had to face the fact that the Natifs were in the
process of organising themselves in what were essentially primitive cercles. The possible
future dangers of such associations for the state cannot have escaped the city fathers.
The Natifs desired to present a petition to the Mediators concerning their grievances.
These were concerned with the difficulties they were encountering in obtaining what they
had been promised in the Mediation of 1738. They particularly complained about the fact
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that they had to pay:
'les droits de Maitrise avant d'être admis aux Apprentisages ...qu'on leur confirmat
le droit de ... [mot Illisible] pour leur compte des Montres et d'en faire la revente qui
leur fut dispute en 1756 par les Citoyens et Bourgeois .. de demander etre admis a
toutes sortes de maitrise conformement a radicle 26 de la Mediation...""
That the Natifs with no political rights in the city should wish to petition the Mediators
shocked the government. The first Syndic warned the Nat/Is of the irregularity of their
behaviour, pointing out to them that, if they had any complaints, they should go to the
Syndics. To the surprise of the government, within four days, Auziere and two companions
returned to the Town Hall, where they presented a request for their complaints to be dealt
with.'" As always, In such circumstances, the Petit Conseil promised that it leur rend-
roit toujours bonne justice'.148
The leaders of the Natifs, Mottu, a casemaker, Pouzait, a rug-weaver, Auziere, a case-
maker and Sylvestre, a boolckeeper, 147 would have to rely on the government to protect
their interests. Neither, in the conditions within the city, were they likely to take much
notice of the warnings they had received from Syndic Jalabert.'" The government lacked
authority if only because it had revealed its weakness by asking for the assistance of the
Mediators in its conflict with the Bourgeois. That the Natifs ignored their warnings is shown
by the fact that they had to be told that:
'les assemblees qu'ils tenoient hors de Territoire n'etaient pas moms irregulieres
que celles qui s'etaient faites dans la ville et [les autorites] leur deffendroient
absolument de les continuer...'149
The Nat/Is had assembled at Carouge (in Savoy, on the frontier) in order to hear and
accept a Memorandum which their leaders had drawn up with the help of Voltaire. The turn
of events showed the determination of the Natifs and a level of organisation which boded
ill for the future. Auziere and others, aware of what they considered to be their ignorance
and inexperience in such matters, had decided to approach Voltaire to see if he would give
them any assistance. This he consented to do, on condition that his name was never men-
tioned by the Natifs. Naturally, in his encounters with the Natifs, Voltaire did little to calm
the latter's ardour:
Ivous faites la partie la plus nombreuse d'un peuple libre, industrieux et vous étes
dans l'esclavage. Vous ne demandez que de pouvoir jouir de vos avantages
naturels; il est juste que l'on vous accorde une demande si moderee.' 15°
Voltaire's attempts to 'mediate' between the government and the Reprèsentants had not
met with the approval of the French government, as has been seen. However, the appeal
for help from the 'oppressed' of Geneva soothed his amour-propre and enabled him to
retaliate. The quality of the document which the Natifs presented to the Mediators was
such that it was clear they were unlikely to have written it.
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Even the Petit Conseil in closed session 151 accepted that the insistence on the pay-
ment of full fees before a Natif began his apprenticeship was against the law. After an
investigation by Grenus and Gainier, 152 it was clear that:
'les droits du fisc se payeroient qu'en parvenant A la Maitrise."53
The Bourgeois only paid the fees when they had completed their apprenticeship and
become master craftsmen. The attempt to force the payment of that sum of money at the
outset of an apprenticeship was clearly an attempt to reduce the number of Natifs applying
for one. The Petit Conseil had only to consult its own registers, it had agreed to a request
of the watchmakers in 1742 that Natif apprentices should pay 200 florins on their entry and
not at the end of the five year period in order 'qu'il ne se jette un trop grand nombre de
personnes dans la profession'. 154 This breached Article XXXVI of the Edict of Mediation.
Neither did the fee prevent the number of Natifs in the watchmaking trades from increasing
- see diagram 8. The watchmaking, silvermakers and jewellery trades had because of their
expansion in the eighteenth century helped the Natifs to begin to bridge the gap between
themselves and the Bourgeois. Those who had served their apprenticeships during the
previous forty years had worked alongside their 'masters' in small workshops, exposed to
all the political discussions and disagreements which had dominated the life of the
Bourgeois during this period. With their increasing wealth, their expanded knowledge and
increased confidence, plus the fact that many Natifs were as 'Genevan' as the Bourgeois,
it was only a matter of time before they began to copy their rOle models and push for
greater rights, both economic and political. The expansion of the 'luxury' trades and the
need for ever more hands made it unlikely that the Nat/Is would have to wait as long as
the Bourgeois for some rectification of their position in the state. The tremendous expan-
sion of la Fabrique in Geneva, and the subsequent need for ever increasing hands in what
was very labour-intensive work was in marked contrast to what was happening in the
United Provinces where, according to Schama, there was '[a] collapse ... of labour
intensive enterprises' with the consequence that
'fewer citizens were able to share in that good fortune [prosperity] than in any
other time in its history.'
Unlike the United Provinces, it was not lack of work or economic decline that troubled
Geneva.
The Natifs certainly had grounds for complaint, especially on the taxation and qualifica-
tions fronts. By the 1760s, the Bourgeois were only 20% of the population, 156 yet they
monopolised commerce and the professions, as can be seen in diagram 8. The Nat/Is had
become a considerable proportion of the population of the city, with 190 Natifs to 100
Bourgeois in the marriage statistics 1770-74.' 57 The level of literacy and education of the
151 All meetings of the two smaller councils were held in private. It was notorious in Geneva that many of the matters
discussed were very soon public knowledge, or at least some garbled form of what had been discussed. Over the
matter of the Natifs' apprenticeships and payment, it was made clear that the discussion was taking place under
absolute secrecy - for obvious reasons.
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Diagram 8
Re-partition de la popsdation dans les przncipaux groupes d'acrivire se/on l'apparrenance polinque (en %i
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Fabrique = orf6vrerie, horlogerie, bijouterie et métiers
annexes.
As can be seen from the above, it was in the watch-making
trade that there was a considerable overlap between the Bour-
geois (i.e. Citoyens and Bourgeois), although the Natifs as a
whole would do the less skilled work, supplying parts to the
more skilled Bourgeois to complete the work. With the increase
in the number of Natifs becoming master craftsmen, this break-
down of work practices was becoming more blurred.
The greatest difference between the Bourgeois and the Natifs 
and Habitants was in the liberal professions and the large
merchants and bankers. Here the status of the Natifs clearly
held them back in comparison with the Habitants. A wealthy
immigrant to the city, or a highly-educated immigrant was able -
to move into areas closed to the Natifs.
Taken from Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 2e. partie, Ch. 3,
p. 73.
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Natifs, together with the fact that they lived in a city where there was close and daily
contact between them and many of the Bourgeois, was bound to have an influence. By the
1740s, 92% of the Natifs were able to read.18
There were also a number of Bourgeois who were at the same artisanal level as the
Natifs. They however had the right to become master craftsmen and head of their trade,
and It was they who, fearful of the competition from some of the Natifs, had made it
difficult for the latter to enjoy the rights that they had obtained in the Mediation of 1738.
But there was also the possibility that, if the Bourgeois were to look favourably upon the
Natifs, this would strengthen their hand against the government. For the government, there
was the possible temptation that they could use the Natifs as a political force against the
Bourgeois as had been the case in the troubles of the 1730s.159
The situation was complicated by the somewhat incestuous relationship between
many of the Bourgeois and the Natifs at the commercial level. In a memorandum Cramer
starkly outlines this relationship with regard to the Bourgeois and the richer and poorer
within that group opposed to the government:
'I'Ouvrier Citoyen dependant pour ces subsistence du Marchand qui le fait travailler,
est oblige de le suivre dans le parti politique qu'il a embrasse. lnteret proprement
dit interet d'amour propre, interets des relations et de Societe, tout lie les Citoyens
[i.e. Bourgeois] entr'eux, et rien ne les attache au Gouvemement.163
The qualified Natifs were in the same position as the small artisan Bourgeois,161
supplying the merchants to order for a salary. The demand for watches and watch-parts
was great and so it was unlikely that any merchant would force those who finished
watches for him to agree to his political ideas. As Cramer laments:
'Nous n'avons proprement que deux ou trois grandes Manufactures, l'Horlogerie,
l'Orfevrerie et la Bijouterie, dans les quelles la consommation interieure est
comptee pour rien."62
Within the Genevan political structure, there was no way that the Natifs could acquire
equal status with the Bourgeois. The lighter taxation on the Bourgeois was a reflection of
their political status within the state and society. Consequently, to lift the extra taxation
from the shoulders of the Natifs would be to tacitly recognise a change in their status.
From such economic recognition, it was but a short step to demanding the political rights
which went hand-in-hand with economic rights. The patriciate were unwilling to share
power with the existing Bourgeois, who were excluded from the government by both the
oligarchical structure of the state and the natural limits that such a small state placed upon
possible government positions. They were therefore less likely to allow the Natifs any
position where they might demand a share of power. By August 1767, the Natifs were
being carefully cultivated by the Bourgeois. Cramer notes in his diary that:
'Les Representans se donnent des mouvemens pour gagner les Natifs et Habitans,
et il viendront a bout."
The difficulty in the 1760s was that there was a certain merging between the less
15.	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit, 2éme partie, Alfred Perrenoud, Ch. Ill, p. 80.
I"	 See Chapter V, pp. 107-108.
BPU Geneve, Ms. Cramer 87, Vol. II, juin 20., 143.
I"	 See diagram 8, p. 167a.
lea	 Ms. Cramer 87, Vol. II, loc. cit
BPU Geneve, Ms. Cramer 97, aout 28. 1768, 136.
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wealthy members of the Bourgeois and the successful Natifs and even some Habitants. As
is clear from diagram 9, there were some members of these two groups who were wealthy
indeed. The ability of one family, the Chavallers, to pay 12,400 florins for four sons to
acquire Bourgeois status indicates considerable wealth. The merging of the economic
differences between some sections of the Bourgeois and the Natifs that had already
commenced, together with the increasingly strong interest in politics and rights that the
Natifs were manifesting, augured stormy times ahead. Yet la Fabrique had continued to
expand and export. By 1766, there were 800 watchmakers relying upon 4,000 workers in
the town alone, apart from out-workers in Neuchatel and Savoy.'"
Geneva had managed to survive four years of political unrest and danger and had
emerged with a hard-won compromise between the two main parties in the state. The
party of the greater part of the Bourgeois, the Representants, had, due to the success of
its organisation and the skill and determination of its leaders, begun a process of moving
into the sphere of government, being able to ensure that in the future some of its members
would be elected to sit in the Deux Cents. It was the organisation of the party of the
Representants that was important. In particular, it was in this system of cercles that the .
Bourgeois were learning the ideas of a form of representation, where they delegated their
power to a small group, who were to act in their name, and, while this group had to report
back for final agreement, they did not do so for every matter in negotiation.
The main structure of government remained unchanged as a result of the compromise of
1768. There was some modification of the system, whereby a limited number of the
executive (Petit Conseil) could be chosen by the Consefl General and a small number of
the Deux Cent (when renewal due to death arose) would also be chosen by the Conseil
General. Such concessions did not wrest control of the government from the hands of the
patriciate, nor in reality establish the theory of 'Sovereignty of the People' over 'the theory
of constituted bodies'.' 66 Neither did the Edict of 1768 remove 'self-perpetuation in
govemment' 166 since replacement of members of the Petit Conseil could only be sought
in the Deux Cents, a self-perpetuating patriciate body. There were to be no further
elections to that body until there were 50 vacant seats (not until 1781). Thus initially, there
was no way that it could 'subvert the society based upon Orders'. 167 It gave the Conseil
General a slightly greater power concerning the members of the Petit Conseil, but the
concession was discretionary, not mandatory. In the first instance, it would ensure that the
Petit Conseil was more responsive to Representations, for, if they were to continue to
refuse them all, then they might face removal and replacement over a period of years, four
by four. It was hardly a dramatic change, the Conseil General had moved nearer to
establishing in practice what it had claimed for a long time that it was the sovereign body
of the state which must be consulted not ignored. Those that consistently ignored it in
future ran the risk of being replaced in extremis by other members of the patriciate. De Luc
together with the other Representants leaders did not consider government officials to be
principally 'only removable delegates', 168 as future events in 1773 were to show. They
desired to be able to remove in extremis anyone completely at variance with the wishes of •
Landes. op. cit., p. 355. Landes gives the date as 1760, but in Babel as 1766. Babel, 'Histoire corporative', op.
cit., citing [AEG] Rapports et requOtes aux Conseils Industrie III, 1769, Dossier Miroglio, 3; p. 397.
/oc. cit.
I"	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 139.
" 	 /oc. cit.
'"	 loc. cit.
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the Bourgeois. It was a power to be used sparingly. Finally, all the changes .hãcf been
brought about by negotiation, not by violence or at the point of a gun, nor even as the
result of riot. Neither the Representants nor the NOgatifs perceived the settlement of
difficulties by the Edict of 1768 as the beginning of a process of future change. The desire
of the Representants to negotiate a settlement with the government demonstrated that
though shaken they had not yet lost confidence in the justice or reasonableness of the
government.'" What remained to be seen, however, was whether the moderates would
be able to make the changes work and whether those unhappy with the compromise of
1768 could be kept in check. Moreover, there was the problem of French unhappiness at
the agreement reached and its continuing support for those within the city who were
opposed to the Edict of 1768. Furthermore there was the problem of the emergence of the
Natifs onto the Genevan stage. The Natifs were a much greater threat to the 'society of
Orders' in so far as it existed Geneva.'" In order to sit in any of the Genevan councils, a
Genevan had to be a Bourgeois; the majority of this group had never accepted that those
who sat on the smaller councils formed a separate and distinct order. Any attempt by the
Natifs to force changes in the existing social structure should unite the Bourgeois to protect
their status.
Geneva had managed her affairs better than either the Corsicans or the Poles. In the
former, the inability of Genoa to deal with the attempts the Corsicans for independence,
led to the sale of the island to France in 1768 and the subsequent crushing of Paoli's
revolt."' Civil war in Poland in 1768 over the ability of Russia to impose their candidate,
Poniatowski, as King, illustrated clearly the dangers of what could occur in weak states
with powerful neighbours. The Russo-Polish Treaty of 1768, which placed the Polish
constitution under Russian protection was to be the prelude to the first Partition of Poland
in 1771172 In this context, the Genevans had been fortunate and astute in reaching a
compromise, in part because of the perception by a proportion of the patriciate of the
dangers of receiving a settlement imposed by France. The question nonetheless remained
as to whether this last-minute agreement amongst the differing parties within the Bourgeois
could be made to work and thus persuade those implacably opposed to the Edict of 1768
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Difficulties, Dangers and Divisions 1 770-1 782
A new, precarious political peace had been established by the Edict of 1768 in Geneva,
but it had also created some implacable enemies, the ultra-Negatifs, who were determined
to see it erased from the constitution at the earliest possible moment. An attempt by the
Natifs to force concessions from the government in 1770, led to an alliance between the
Representants and the Negatifs to maintain the new status quo in the city. From 1770 till
1778, it was clear that a consensus between the moderate Negatifs and the majority of
Bourgeois could be made to work, even though the ultra-Nlegatifs who took the name
Constitutionnaires1 in 1777, were a determined opposition to such a consensus.
By 1779, there was a multi-party struggle involving the Constitutionnaires, the Negatifs,
the Representants, and the two groups into which the Nat/Is had divided - those supporting
the Representants and those supporting the Constitutionnaires, a situation in which each
group sought allies to the detriment of the others. Thus, the divisions within Geneva that
emerged post-1779 were considerable and opened a new act in the drama of the city's
history. The offer made by the Representants of full economic rights together with limited
political rights to a proportion of the Nat/Is led to the Edit Bienfaisant in 1781.
The refusal by the Petit Conseil to accept and to apply this Edict, already accepted and
voted for in the Conseil General led to rioting in the city in April 1782. The deliberate
inaction of the government led the Bourgeois to end the rioting and take control of the
state. The brief Bourgeois regime was ended by the joint armies of France, Sardinia and
Bern in July 1782, and enabled the return to power of those who had been most opposed
to the concessions made in 1768.
Natif Unrest
After 1768, the first sign of the dissatisfaction of some in Geneva came from a Natif,
Jean Bade, who insisted on signing his name followed simply by 'de Geneve' on a legal
document. Only a Bourgeois had the right to the appellation 'de Geneve'. For this simple
crime, he was sentenced to ten years' banishment. Another Nat/f, Ressegueirre, was
arrested and tried for singing satiric verses in one of the cabarets. A large and boisterous
crowd of Natifs waited outside the Town Hall while his case was being heard. Sentenced
in his turn to six months' house arrest, he was greeted on his exit from the Town Hall by a
crowd who carried him home in triumph wearing a sword.2 The crowd insisted that he
accompany them that evening on a round of cafés in clear breach of his sentence. His
subsequent arrest and imprisonment led to an armed confrontation between some of the
Natifs and the government which resulted in three Natifs being killed. Mass arrests
followed, although many of those arrested were later released, only the leaders being held.
According to Turrettini, they took the name Constitutionnaires in 1777:'ce fut la qualification qua prirent alors ceux
qui avoient refuse la prolongation du terme [the extension of the Commission attempting to prepare the laws for
publication]: BPU Gem:we, Ms. Tronchin 343 Copie de M. De Luc de Londres a remettre Jacob Tronchin a la




The wearing of a sword was restricted to the citizens, i.e. all those who had the right to vote in the Conseil
Gendral. The custom survives today in the men who must wear or carry their swords to meetings of the Landsge-
meinde in certain German-speaking cantons.
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Six days after these events, a meeting of the Conseil Genëral voted an Edict which
declared that anyone who claimed rights for the Natifs other than those already laid down
in law was to be treated as a 'disturber of the public peace'. At the same time, the cercles
which the Natifs had created in imitation of the Bourgeois were dissolved. The Bourgeois,
having used their own circles as the basis of their organisation since 1738, were not
unaware of how dangerous it would be to allow the Natifs to continue to organise in this
way. Resseguirre in his trial had stated that there were 12 Nat/Is cercles, formed because
since the Bourgeois had obtained the right of rejecting members of the Petit Conseil:
'on ne peut pas vivre avec eux, us sont trop beaux pour nous - pour eviter des
discussions nous aimons mieux nous separe, et vivre avec nos Egaux.13
The known leaders of the Natifs were exiled without a normal tria1, 4 the punishments de-
vised by the Petit Conseil, accepted by the Deux Cents, then taken to the Conseil GenOral.
Normally justice was administered by the two smaller councils without reference to the
Conseil Gèneral. It was the illegality of the procedure that required the consent of that
body. The punishments handed down were the arbitrary decisions of the government,
which is why they were included in the Edict passed by the Conseil GOnOral, and was the
kind of illegality to which the Bourgeois had objected seven years earlier. The justification
given to those in the meeting who were unhappy at the proceedings was to quote
Montesquieu:
'...qu'il y a des cas ot) il taut mettre pour un moment un voile sur la liberte, comme
on cache les statues des Dieux.16
One of the few who objected openly and defended the condemned was Jean-Robert
Tronchin. His attempts at insisting on the proper legal process being followed led Jean
Cramer,6 First Syndic, to reply:
'ii y aurait de quoi faire saigner la Republique pendant cinquante ans.'7
This was a surprising attitude for a man who had once been a professor of law at the
Academy. The idea that the ends justified the means and that the law was infinitely flexible
in the government's hands showed how deeply ingrained these ideas were in the patri-
ciate, even after the traumas of 1768.
Lady Stanhope, a witness to these events, put it more bluntly; talking of the Egalite
preachers (Representants) she says:
'now they have got the upperhand these same people have acted contrary to their
pretended principles in every thing broke through the usual forms of law, to
introduce an Inquisition.., unknown for what, or by whom accused, & Unheard, [the
leaders of the Naffs] are ordered to Retire out of the Country for Ufe, on pain of
death if they return.
The remainder of the letter suggests that the Natifs were so severely punished because,
although no evidence was presented, they were possibly guilty of more serious crimes
$	 KCA Maidstone, U1590 C37/7 1764-1774, 'Utak des Procedures de Mon. Guillaume Risgaire [sic] Samedi 6
Janv. 1770, p.3.
4	 Auzirlre, Brirenger, Mottu dit la Jonquille, Luya, Pouzet, Rival et Valentin. Martin, op.cit, 3eme. parte, Jean-Pierre
Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 458.
5	 D'Ivemois, Vol. II, (Tome I), op. cit., pp.44-45, f. 15.
4	 See Appendx IV B V11V1.
7	 Desnoiresterres, op. cit, p. 359.
KCA Maidstone, U1590 S5/C11 1 1764-1774, Letters of Grisel, Countess of Stanhope to Countess Chatham, 26
Feb 1770 [sic].
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than singing seditious songs and publicly gathering, armed, in the streets.
The speed with which the whole matter was dealt with showed that, in this instance, the
Negatifs and the Representants had closed ranks and were working together. The
grouping armed of some of the Natifs on the streets of Geneva doubtless caused the
politically privileged to fear a potential revolution from those who were:
'trop confiant en leur nombre, us [les Natifs] avaient pense qu'on n'oserait point
entrer en lutte avec eux.19
Lady Stanhope claimed the government's action was due to the fear among the members
of the Petit Conseil that they might be removed from the council in 1773:
'& this is the real truth, so whatever that part of the Bourgeois, called representant
[sic], are for they [the government] will do:'
There may have been some truth in this, but men such as Jean Cramer were more likely
to have wanted to prevent in Geneva the riotous behaviour that had disfigured Boston or
London when mobs destroyed property, the Wilkes riots in particular. The aim was to
punish the Natifs as severely as possible in the hope of ending their pretensions. They
also had far less rights than the Bourgeois in the state, which made it easier to treat them
thus. And clearly, at this moment in time, there was more common interest between the
government and the Bourgeois, since it was the latter's position in the state which could be
threatened by the Natifs. The government and patriciate, after all, were all Bourgeois, all
part of the same order in the state. Of the 1359 electors in 1770, 600 belonged to the
various arms of la Fabrique," thus forming nearly half the electorate, and some of whom
especially the watchmakers, had been unhappy with the continued admittance to their
trades of the Natifs. The most telling reason for the severity was doubtless the claim by the
Natifs that they had in the fifteenth century had the right to take part in the Conseil General
and had subsequently been deprived of their rights.
Nonetheless, the Edict of 1770 was a miscalculation. It was repressive and cruel and did
little but increase the hostility felt by considerable numbers of Natifs. Fazy makes the point
that:
'aigris, mdcontents, les Natifs deviendront chaque jour plus redoutables; au nombre
de deux ou trois mille, ils figureront au premier rang dans tous les troubles ultó-
rieurs.'12
A little exaggerated, but, if nothing else, one of the consequences of 1770 was to bring the
Natifs fully on stage as important players in Geneva. The discontent was clear: 'nous
vimes combien il nous restoit d'espace a franchir pour 'thre libre'.13 In future, when it was
clear that the differences between the Negatifs and the Representants were still too great
to be bridged, both were to try to find ways to attract the Natifs to their side.
After 1770, civil peace was achieved in Geneva, although as Lady Stanhope states:
'there is a calm animosity which, tho' not so bad for individuals so I believe the
most dangerous for the whole, its [sic.] that I fear will break out at last in something
very bad for this place.'"
9	 Desnoiresterres, op. cit., p. 357.
10	 Ibid.
11	 Babel, 'Histoire corporative', op.cit., p. 400.
12	 Fazy, Les constitutions, op. cit., p. 145.
13	 AEG, Girod 12, 21 Lettre circulaire des Natives de Genéve, MDCC LXX, P. 6.
14	 KCA Maidstone, U1590 S5/C11 1 1764-1774, 2nd. April 1770.
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Such an atmosphere must have been unpleasant in what was still a confined and crabbed
town and where many people lived and worked closely together, thus being forced to
intermingle. Tn the legacy of the bitterness of 1768 was added the frustration and anger of
1770.
Those Natifs who had remained loyal to the state and had not been involved in any of
the unrest and agitation were rewarded for their loyalty. In future, they would no longer
have to pay extra taxes when they married, they were to be allowed to have the prizes
awarded in the archery competitions if they were the winners and they would no longer
have to pay the higher taxes in the market, as well as being able to head the juries dealing
with trade regulation when such juries contained more than one head.
Several hundred Nat/Is, unhappy with their lot in Geneva, decided to leave the city and
attempted to establish themselves at Versoix," a new port on the lake just outside Gene-
va, which Choiseul had been eager to create as a competitor to Geneva. Unfortunately,
there was insufficient accommodation for those who arrived and the dream of establishing
a rival watch-making centre at Versoix quickly died. Voltaire had more success at Femey,
where he established model workshops and accommodation for those he could persuade
to settle there. Most of those who went to Versoix transferred to Femey. None of these
attempts to weaken the strength of the Genevan watch industry were successful, and they
posed no threat to Geneva, although that was not appreciated at the time. It was between
1770 and 1786 that la fabrique was at its height and the period during which the workers
were best paid." In 1788, there were 'pres de quatre [hommes] sur dix' employed in it,"
giving 3,000 working in watchmaking and 5,000 overall in la Fabrique. 18 Sismondi gives a
total of 85,000 watches produced per year by the 1780s.19
Moderation and its consequences
In 1773, the new arrangements concerning the right of the Conseil General to replace
four of the members of the Petit Conseil if it desired, agreed in 1768, came into effect.
There were some members of the Representants who wanted to exercise this right. Others
wanted merely to elect the necessary Syndics and not to go on to any decision about
whether to continue the existing Petit Conseil or whether to replace some of them. Bearing
in mind the previous history of Geneva, it was eventually decided that the new right would
not be used on this occasion. The leaders of the Representants were clear in their belief
that, in the interests of the state and its harmony, it would be best to leave the Petit
Conseil unchanged. In the many discussions in the cercles, in which he was deeply
involved, Charles Stanhope, Lord Mahon, is reported as having said that they (i.e. the
Bourgeois):
'had shown the rod, that was enough & reelecting them [the existing members of
the Petit Conseil] must please all, & show their [the Representatives] moderation
13	 The creation of Versoix had been part of a plan by Choiseul to take some of the trade away from Geneva. It was
connected with the creation of a new road via Pontarlier, which would, it was hoped, enable merchants to
completely by-pass Geneva.
Babel, 'Histoire corporative', op. cit., p. 398.
Piuz at Mottu-Weber, op. cit. 5ame. penis, Mottu-Weber, Ch. XVI, p. 487.
/bid., p. 488, citing Babel.
Landes, op. cit., p. 356.
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and desire of peace.'26
The time and effort that were needed to obtain the agreement of the various Represen-
tants in their cercles can be judged by Lady Stanhope's comment concerning Charles:
'two days ago he went out by 8 in the morning, & did not get home till 6 at night,
eat his dinner in a hurry, out again, & at night he had people with him.'21
That De Luc and Vieusseux and their supporters had to work so hard to keep their party
together and persuade them to behave reasonably is further evidence of the unpleasant
atmosphere in Geneva mentioned by Lady Stanhope. There were those who still wanted to
see the leaders of the oligarchy in the government 'punished'. Yet it was important for the
chances of the long-term acceptance of the rights accorded in the Edict of 1768 that the
Representants could act in a disinterested manner and for the good of the state, not from
motives of personal pique and hatred for old, unsettled scores. The reasonableness of the
action of the Representants was due in part to the realisation of their leaders such as J-A.
De Luc that:
'Toute loi de constrainte ... dans une Republique comme la n6tre, est la victoire
d'un parti ... les vainqueurs, et irrite les vaincus; les uns abusent biented la victoire,
les autres cherchent par tous les moyens possibles A reparer leurs pertes.'22
The question was whether the moderation of the Representants would have any influence
on those members of the two smaller councils who were firmly opposed to the Edict of
1768. The moderation of the Bourgeois in Geneva contrasted with the reaction to the
Repeal of the Stamp Act in America (1766). In Boston, within a fortnight, the House had
purged all the members of the colonies ruling council, including the Governor himself.
Neither, in Geneva, were there the 'economic stringencies [which] pressed harder' to
cause the artisan Bourgeois to become 'more ambivalent' toward the government as was
the case in the United Provinces 24 There was the clear necessity to work with the
government if the city were to continue to expand and prosper.
The tactics of the Representants seemed to bear fruit. The Petit Conseil was encour-
aged by this apparent moderation to undertake, in 1773, what had been ordered by the
Mediation of 1738, and repeated in the Edict of 1768, namely the printing of a general
code of the laws of the state. It began an examination of the task under the title Projet de
revision de l'Edit politique. The problems that this project encountered were indicative of
the divisions which remained in the city after 1768. Or perhaps it was merely the maifesta-
tion of a general discontent with governments which Hutchinson had stated in 1775:
'was not confined to America nor the English dominions, but [was] rather the
general temper of the age ...in Europe as well as in America.'25
If true, Geneva had been in the forefront of such a temper as well as being its longest
serving member and with little hope of escaping. Some in Geneva had been seeking
change within the state since 1707, well before the 'forty-year movement post 1760'
claimed by Palmer.26
20	 KCA Maidstone, U1590 S5/C11 1 1764-1774, Janry 25 1773 (sic.).
21	 Ibid.
22	 BPU Geneve, Ms. Tronchin 343 Copie de M De Luc de Londres A Jacob Tronchin a la MOdiation, 30.
n	 Bailyn, 'Hutchinson', op. cit., p. 112.
24 Schema, op. cit., p. 47.
23	 Ibid., p.378 citing Hutchinson's Diaries and Letters, I, 447.
2.	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 4.
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In attempting to make the printed laws logical and understandable where they were
contradictory, the Petit Conseil found itself having, in effect, to write new laws. This was
particularly the case where practice was in conflict with written law. The old Edicts were
often vague, so that, over time, practice had come, in some cases, to contradict the early
Edicts. As in England, in some cases usage went back a long way, but Geneva, as previ-
ously mentioned in Chapter 111 27 had not entirely escaped the influence of the Roman law
countries which surrounded her. To attempt to codify this mixture was to enter an unchart-
ed minefield.
It was the customs and usage in law in Geneva that were the cause of so much diffi-
culty:
'vu que nos loix ecrites sont peu de choses en comparaison de tous nos usages, et
qu'il regne d'ailleurs le plus grand dasordre.'28
In attempting to make sense of this confusion of laws, which P. E. Martin correctly calls
'contradictoires, caduques, discordantes'" by creating new law, it was argued by some
that the Petit Conseil was not obeying the Edicts which had ordered only the bringing-
together of the laws and their publication. A Representation was made in May 1776 in
which it was stated:
'On demande une Collection d'Edits, comme lui êtant imposae seule, & on vient
requerier Messieurs les Syndics de pourvoir a ce que cette Loi soft executee sans
aucun nouveau alai.' 3°
This demand raised the question of whether the old edicts which had been in effect before
the creation of the city state of Geneva by the constitution of 1543 should be included in a
publication of a collection of the Edicts. As pointed out by Comuaud 31 , the inclusion of
some of the old Edicts had some dangers for the Bourgeois. Such Edicts from the time of
the Bishop in Geneva tended:
'enfin, contre le gn§ mème des Representants, a favoriser les reclamations des
Natifs et des Habitants sur les droits politiques.'32
If such old Edicts were to be included, then it raised the question why the Natifs and
Habitants had lost the right to take part in the Conseil General since, if they had been
heads of households in the period before Calvin, they had usually been entitled to take
part and vote.
The refusal to accept the May Representation led to a second in September, which in its
turn was rejected by the Petit Conseil in November. It was this refusal which contained the
phrase:
'S'il y a dans l'Etat, des Corps ou des lndividus, qui paroissent interesses a un
changement dans la Constitution; il semble que ce devroit dtre le Conseil...'
The Petit Conseil was showing signs of slipping into its old habits, rejecting Representa-
v	 See Chapter I, p. 4, Chapter III, p. 57, ft. 83.
a	 BPU Gonave, Ms. fr. Reybaz 923, Lettre a M. Landolt a ZOrich, 19 octobre 1779, 8.
a	 P.E. Martin, op. cit, 3itme. parte, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 460.
30	 BPU Gonave, Ms. Tronchin 343, Lettre a M. Marc Pictet Turrettini de Gonave en sa qualitoi de secrataire du
comitio au Partie Neutre, Londres le 13 avril 1781, 41.
3 1	 See Appendx IV B V111/2.
32	 Cherbuliez, op. cit, p. 139.
a	 BPU Gonave Tronchin 343, Lettre a M. Marc Pictet Turrettini de Genave en sa quail de secnStaire du comit au
Partie Neutre, Londres le 13 avril 1781, 41.
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Hans, and claiming that, if anyone had an interest or right to write new law, it was they.
There was also the fact that regardless of whether what they were attempting to do was
legal or otherwise, they had certainly fallen back on another of their old ploys, like that
used in 1734:
proceda avec une si sage lenteur qu'on calcula qu'il faudrait quarante ans pour
mener a bien l'oeuvre entiere.'34
Having appeared to agree that the Edicts needed printing, they had moved on to the not
unreasonable step that these needed a complete revision. This provided the perfect
excuse to keep the Representants away from such dangerous work, which was to be
carried out by the Petit Conseil in its own time, thoroughly and slowly in the hope that
eventually the whole matter would fade into insignificance and be forgotten. Perhaps the
reasonableness of the Representants had been misplaced after all.
Throughout the period 1774-77, a number of people were working on their own versions
of a code for Geneva. In October 1774, Du Roveray 35 in a letter to Charles, Lord Mahon,
wrote:
'J'ai commence de concert avec un homme que vous connoissez bien un projet de
revision de nos Edits, dans le quel nous faissons a peu pres la merne marche que
dans celui du Conseil, ... et a y faire entrer un nombre infiniment plus considerable
d'objets afin de fermer, autant qu'il sera en nous instances [la porte ? - illegible] a
l'arbitraire sur cette partie essentielle de notre legislation.' 36
The Representants were continuing their old policy of doing things in parallel with the
government, as they had done before 1768. In the same letter, he also talks of forming a
cercle to include Floumois, Vieusseux, Claviere, Denton [Dentand?], Vemes, Moultou,
Chauvet, Gourgas, Reybaz and De Luc the younger.37
What the Representants wanted was a revision of the laws which would be made by a
mixed group, not a committee which consisted of members of the Petit Conseil alone. If
done by the latter it could well have damaged the position of the Conseil General and the
Bourgeois. The Representants realised that bringing the Edicts together could only be the
beginning of a thorough revision. Vieusseux wrote:
'Je sentois qu'une Revision etoit indispensable.'38
The same letter contains a series of comments on the two Representations made in 1776.
The most interesting is perhaps where he claims that he, himself, did not consider:
'la question de la collection assez importante pour en faire l'objet d'une.controverse
serieuse.'"
He adds for good measure that:
'Je comparois l'etat de la Republique a celui d'un malade a peine convalescent, et
a qui toute espece de secours est dangereuse.'4°
Given that the letter was written in 1785 and could be taken as a justification of, or an
attempt to change the reality of, his position in 1776, it nonetheless raises certain ques-
Fazy, Les constitutions, op. cit., p. 146.
35	 See Appendix IV B VI11/3.
35	 KCA Maidstone, Stanhope Archives, U1590 C65 1-11, Letters to Charles, 1, Du Roveray 15 8bre 1774.
37	 See Appendix IV B VI11/4.




tions, inter alia the extent to which the two Representations of 1776 were the result of the
leaders of the party persuading their members to act and how far the leaders were
responding to the demands of others within their party. The Representations were
complaints that the Petit Conseil was 'revising' the laws, whereas the Edict of 1738
ordered their bringing-together and printing. Yet clearly, men such as Du Roveray and
Vieusseux, wanted a thorough revision, so long as they or some Representants were
actively involved. The speed with which a solution to the difficulties encountered in 1776
was found in 1777 is perhaps evidence that Vieusseux was not being disingenuous in
1785. The leaders of the Representants had shown themselves to be responsive to the
views of their members as expressed in the cercles. The idea behind the Representations
of May and November was a demand that the government would:
'consulter le Lêgislateur [Conseil General] sur les convenances d'une revision, & ...
lui proposer des arrangements pour y travailler de concert.' 41
Du Roveray and his associates had a very clear idea of what suggestions they would
make to any such commission. And a revised legal and political code would have to
ensure the supremacy, or sovereignty, of the Conseil General. A revised code would have
firmly entrenched the power of this council and attempt to end the pretensions of those in
the Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents that what was not allocated to the Conseil General in
the Edict of 1738 belonged to them. Thus it became inevitable that the ultra-Negatifs would
do all in their power to prevent a revision from ever succeeding.
The Reprósentants and the 1n16gatifs show their hands
In 1777, given the rejection of their two Representations, it was clear that the Conseil
General would, for the first time, use its power to eject the most intransigent members of
the Petit Conseil. This was the group of men led by Cramer which, according to d'Ivemois
in an ironical, rhetorical question:
'pendant treize seances,... avait persist& a une pluralite de deux ou trois suffrag-
es, dans l'opinion de faire aux reclamans une reponse conciliatoire.'"
Cramer, Sarasin, Buffe and Rilliet (Robert-Guillaume)" were voted off the Petit Conseil.
They were replaced by four from the Deux Cents who were considered to be moderates,
Mallet, De Candolle, Jolivet and Des Arts." All four rejectees were Constitutionnaires
who had made clear their rejection of both the Representations. They had also publicly
objected to a suggested project to overcome the difficulty:
'Le Conseil [Deux Cents] n'en a pas voulu entendre parler et en particulier nous
sommes quelques-uns qui avons declare tant en Conseil qu'en public que nous n'y
donnerions jamais la main."5
It was hardly surprising that they were removed from the Petit Conseil, the vote for their
removal being 950 for, with 550 against." In the same letter to his son, Rilliet makes
clear he sees nothing good in the Representant party, when he writes:
41	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. ll (Tome I), p. 80.
42	
Ibid., p.. 83.
4	 See Appendix IV B VIII/5.
44	 See Appendix IV B VIII/6.
4	 Jean Rilliet, Six siecies d'existence genevoise - Les Rilliet 1377-1977, Gonave: Editions de la Thabarde, 1977, p.77
.i.	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. II (Tome l), p. 82.
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'M. le Pasteur Vernes sous pretextes de conciliation et de concert avec les autres
Demagogues a presente a M. le syndic Guainier un projet d'accommodement
destructif de la Constitution et qui pouvait avoir les suites les plus fecheuses pour
la Republique.'47
Whatever the views of Rilliet, the attitude of the Representants was clear:
'Je croyois absolument qu'il nous falloit un arrangement legal.'"
The removal of the four members of the Petit Conser led to a swift compromise
between it and the Deux Cents. It was agreed that, rather than a collection of Edicts, as
laid down by the Edict of 1738, there was to be a revision of the laws. The revision was to
be carried out by a specially-appointed Commission consisting of members from both the
Deux Cents and the Petit conseil to be:
trni-partie, c'est-à-dire, composee en egal nombre, de personnes attachees aux
princips des Negatifs & des Representants, & ... serait specialement chargee de
rendre la Legislation "claire, precise, & plus complette",'53
and to thoroughly revise and, where necessary, to rewrite the constitution, though, whether
the Commission could work together would remain to be seen. The Commission was
created by an Edict and approved by the Conseil General on 22nd. May 1777, by 847
votes to 267. There were many who had high hopes of this Commission:
'qu'on pouvoit attendre d'elle par consequent une legislation sage et bien balan-
cee.'51
On completing its task, the commission was to submit its revision to the two smaller
councils and then to the Conseil General. Copies of the newly-revised codes were to be
printed and distributed to every Bourgeois before the meeting of the Conseil General in
order for there to be informed discussion.
The commission contained Gedeon Turrettini, leader of the Alegatifs, and the lawyer Du
Roveray, one of the leaders of the Representants. There were a number of serious
clashes during the meetings, which provoked the resignation of de Chapeaurouge52, Jala-
bert, Boissier and the Procureur-General Dunant,53 all of whom were ultra-Negatif. The
difficulty lay in the completely different approach which each group had to dealing with the
myriad of problems. The Representants wanted the sovereignty of the Conseil General to
be inscribed clearly and unambiguously in the new code. This was anathema to the ultra-
Negatifs and was difficult for the Negatifs. The arguments led to the exchange of clearly
undiplomatic language, with Vieusseux claiming at one meeting:
'qu'il etait loisible aux citoyens de "casser le tete a Messieurs les Syndics" en cas
de la violation de la constitution.'54
47
	
Rilliet, op. cit., p. 77.
• BPU Genêve, Ms. 2461 Lettres at Mêmoire concemant J-A. De Luc, J-A. De Luc a Vieusseux, 4. 3. 1777, 33.
as The four continued to sit in the Deux Cents, where they continued their fight against any revision of the laws. The
removal of their influence in the Petit Conseil made it much easier for those interested in seeking a solution to the
problem of the revision of the Edicts. The four expelled members were to cause more trouble in the Deux Cents in
the future.
30	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. II (Tome I), p. 84.
51	 BPU Genêve, Ms. fr. Reybaz 923 Lettre a M Landolt a Zurich, 19 octobre 1779, 8.
32	 See Appendix IV B VI11/7.
53	 See Appendix IV B VI11/8.
54	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 34me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 460.
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The arguments raged over the question of sovereignty and where it lay. This article was
almost certainly very similar to that which Du Roveray incorporated in his constitution of
1791:
'la souverainete de la Republique appartient au Conseil General, compose des
citoyens et bourgeois qui ont rage et les qualites requises—'55
Unable to influence the work in the manner which they desired and subjected to language
that shocked them, as previously mentioned, four resigned (de Chapeaurouge, Jalabert,
Boissier and Dunant, the Procureur-General) and were replaced by more moderate
Negatifs, so that the committee could continue its work.
After considerable work and more than six hundred sittings, the Commission had com-
pleted the first part of its project and sent its work to be printed. This was distributed to all
Bourgeois via the dizeniers. This chance for all those with the right to vote in the state to
examine and comment upon the proposed project was admirable.
The new code had to overcome the hurdle of the two smaller councils before reaching
the Conseil General. That there would be strong resistance in the Deux Cents was
inevitable. In the first article of the new political code, there was bound to be a severe
hurdle, as Comuaud warned Du Roveray:
'le premier article du code, c'est-à-dire votre nouvelle definition du Souverain de la
Republique enfantera
The code, or that part of it which had been completed, was never to be put to the test in
the Deux Cents. The initial two-year period of appointment of the Commission was at an
end, so the Petit Conseil recommended to the Deux Cents that it should be renewed and
continue its work, since only a third of the task had been completed. The Constitutionnair-
es in the Deux Cents:
'contre toute bienseance et contre la foi publique aneantit ce premier projet du
Code qui n'etait pas encore soumis a son jugement, elle [la cabale de Constitution-
flakes] declara dissoute la Commission qui y travailloit et l'ouvrage fut
arrète.'57
De Chapeaurouge in the Deux Cents was the proposer of the motion which was accepted
on 3rd. September by 105 to 45 votes." The action on the part of the Deux Cents was
against the constitution and:
'par consequent a change totalement la marche et subvert] l'ordre que nos loix
fondamentales ont pose pour eviter la confusion et l'anarchie, savoir que le conseil
des 200 ne peut faire aucun amble sur les matieres qui ne les [sic] auroient
portees par le P[etit] C[onseil].'"
The Petit Conseil had merely wanted to renew the mandate of the commission, the Deux
Cents had gone beyond that and discussed and voted to halt all work on the revision as
well as refusing to allow the work already completed to be put before the Conseil General.
The Deux Cents was not permitted to discuss matters which had not previously been
discussed in the Petit Conseil. The level of anger and bitterness between the two sides
Lucien Fulpius L'organisation dos pouvoirs politiques dons lee Constitutions genevoisos du =a. siècle, Geneve:
Journal de Geneve, 1942, These pnisentee a la Faculte de Droit de l'Universite de Geneve pour obtenir le grade
de Docteur en droit, p. 32.
Cherbuliez op. cit., p. 166.
"	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 896 Journal de Jean Janot, 9.
P.E. Martin, op. cit., 34me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, P. 462.
BPU Geneve, Ms. fr. Reybaz 923, Lettre a M. Landolt, 19 octobre 1779, 8.
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was similar to that which had existed at the time of Fatio.° The Constitutionnaires hoped
that a new Commission would be appointed which would contain only their own supporters
and some AlOgatifs as members. Well aware of the danger of such a revising committee,
which would seek to establish a new legal code on the basis of the Edict of 1738 and the
Prononce of 1767 and thus circumscribe the Edict of 1768, if not have it declared null and
void, the Petit Conseil refused to begin the process of appointing a new one. (The
Constitutionnaires continued to argue that the Edict of 1768 had been extracted by an
element of force, i.e. the refusal of the Representants to accept the Prononce and their
refusal to elect the Syndics.) The refusal of the Syndics and the Petit Conseil to appoint a
purely Negatif and Constitutionnaire Commission was interesting since they were coming
under pressure from the French government unhappy with regard to the proposed code,
copies of which had reached Paris.
Thus the removal of the four Constitutionnaires from the Petit Conseil in 1777 was a
failure. The revision of the Edicts, which had been the aim of the ReprOsentants, was
blocked not, as before 1777, in the Petit Conseil but in the Deux Cents by the ultra-
NOgatifs who agreed with Cramer, Sarasin, Butte and Rilliet. The latter had shown
themselves to be as persuasive and obstructive in the Deux Cents as they had previously
been in the Petit Conseil.
Vergennes wrote the first Syndic a letter which was severely critical of the projected
laws. He did not wish to attack the independence of the state but:
'... Elle [Sa Majeste] a des droits a veiller sur sa tranquillita.'61
The French Ambassador to the Helvetic States began to apply pressure also, criticising the
projected code and asking the two co-Mediator cantons of Bern and Zurich to join France
in deciding what measures should be taken. This letter contained sentences which made it
quite clear what the French had in mind:
'Elle [Sa MajestO1 est resolue d'y mettre fin pour toujours de facon ou d'autre, en
ne laissant plus aucun essor a l'esprit de domination et de chicane dont il semble
que les moindres individus de cet Etat soient possedes pour leur malheur et
l'importunite de leurs voisins.'62
Bern and Zurich were not to be persuaded. They refused to join the French in any
discussions, insisting that the differences in Geneva had not gone beyond a flurry of
written representations which had greeted the action of the Deux Cents, none of which had
seriously threatened the peace of the Republic. In fact, in November 1779, Bern had been
the scene of a meeting between some of the Constitutionnaires from the Deux Cents,
namely Jacob De Chapeaurouge, Jean Cramer, Jean-Louis Micheli° and Etienne Cla y
-iare and T.J. Du Roveray. It was during these meetings that they made it clear that there
could be no agreement while the Conseil GOnOrats right to replace members of the Petit
Conseil continued. They were asked to suggest a constitutional replacement which would
still give some right of sanction to the Representants, and negotiations seemed to be
under way. Janot, in his Journal, claims that these discussions were:
00	 D'Ivemois quotes one of the commissioners - a Negatif - as saying: 'Quand nous nous trouvons en opposition avec
nos co-opêrateurs Reprèsentans, je crois toujours voir les peuples du Nord combattre les peuples du Midi.'
D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol.11 (Tome I), p. 98.
• P.E. Martin, op.cit, 36me. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p.462-3.
02	 Ibid.
• See Appendix IV B VI11/9.
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'bientOt rendues inutiles par la venue inopinee de M. Ami Lullins4
According to Janot and d'Ivemois," Lullin was sent deliberately in order to prevent any
compromise being reached. Lullin and most of the Constftutionnaires did not want a
negotiated settlement that left any kind of control in the hands of the Bourgeois and their
party the Representants. They desired to return the situation in Geneva to that which had
pertained after 1738, with the addition of the Prononce 67 and its restrictions on the use of
Representations as the only safe way to control the Bourgeois and ensure the proper
governance of the state. To obtain their ends, they were moving to a position where they
would refuse any compromise whatsoever, in the hope of provoking a reaction from the
Bourgeois and thus create the need for further French interference on the ultra-Negatifs'
behalf in Geneva. Since Lullin sat in the Deux Cents, a body which had had a large group
of Constitutionnaires, often on constitutional issues able to persuade enough Negatifs to
vote with them to create a majority, it was clear that any negotiated solution which might
have been arrived at in Bern would never have been passed.
In Geneva, the Petit Conseil attempted to solve the difficulty by suggesting a compro-
mise Commission, whose task it would be to explore the points of difference between the
two parties and settle them. The way would then be clear for a further attempt at the Code
of Laws. This was rejected in the Deux Cents by 112 votes." Some members of that
body even accused the Petit Conseil of having 'disobeyed' the resolutions of the Deux
Cents and of being in open rebellion against that council. The Petit Conseil, together with
the Syndics, had the unenviable task of trying to run the country, in doing which they knew
that they could not afford to upset too deeply either of the two powerful groups in the
political state, the Representants and the Negatifs. They tended therefore to be more
moderate than the Negatifs and the Constitutionnaires who sat in the Deux Cents.
As a result of its actions, in 1779 for the first time since the Sarasin affair, the Deux
Cents found itself at odds with the Petit Conseil. The Constitutionnaires were the men who
wished to go back but to 1738, with the additional guarantee of the Prononce of 1767, and
France as the overall guardian angel - a political programme that was anathema to the
majority of the Bourgeois. Many of Constitutionnaires had withdrawn from an active part in
the government after 1768, and some also abstained from voting in the Conseil General,
but they managed to maintain a majority in the Deux Cents. The majority of the Constitu-
tionnaires were from the patriciate, they were simply the most conservative members of
that group and often had brothers or cousins who were Negatifs.
The Constitutionnaires also had their own circle, the Cercle de la rue des Granges or
Cercle Constitutionnaire, and one of their members was the Genevan Minister to Paris,
Ferrinet-Des Franches." Des Franches himself, finding his advice from Paris was
ignored, informed the government that he would report to the Deux Cents directly, an
unconstitutional act. The leader of the group was Des Arts, and other leading members
• See Appencfix IV B
• BPU, Geneve, Ms. fr. 896 Journal de Jean Janot, Vol. I. pp.7-8.
• D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. II (Tome I), p. 171. lorsqu'un des jeunes Chefs Negatifs (Constitutionnaires] arrive a
Bern & fait rompre brusquement les conferences..?
fr	 Chapter V, p. 110,111, Chapter VII, pp. 154-155.
• Ibid., p. 175.
• See Appencix IV B V111/11.
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were A. Lullin and P. Cramer." All the Constitutionnaires believed that France, as a
guarantor of the Edict of 1738 was certain eventually to come to their assistance, and
looked for means to hasten the intervention of the Mediators, especially France, to 'save'
the Republic and hasten their return to power.
The Negatifs were the party of those in the patriciate who believed that accommodation
with the Representants was possible, although they still remained implacably opposed to
what they saw as 'direct democracy'. In effect, they had not changed their position since
1766-68, in that, unlike their former colleagues, they believed that any appeal to the
Mediators should be as a last resort and that it was far better for the Genevans to solve
their own problems. Their main inspiration was Gedêon Turrettini. They controlled the Petit
Conseil and were therefore in charge of the government.
It is important to appreciate that the divisions in the patriciate were based on purely
political grounds. This was so even though certain families tended to support one of the
two parties, since there were divisions within families, such as the Tronchins, where Jean-
Robert remained a Negatif, while his brother, Jacob, was a Constitutionnaire. These
political differences in no way interfered with the normal family intercourse, or with their
contacts with other members of the patriciate and Representants with whom they were
friendly.
By 1780, the fragmentation within the patriciate increased further. A small group of
moderate Negatifs, including Turrettini, formed a group who were referred to as the
Neutres. They had established a cercle called the Societe des Neutres in November 1780,
and summarized their position thus:
'Nos coeurs repousseront toujours Mee de tout arrangement qui devrait son
acceptation a un moyen coactif quelconque...Th
They maintained that it was in Geneva's interest to solve her problems internally, rather
than risk any erosion of what remained of her independence. They also wished to obtain
sufficient influence to prevent either the Representants or the Constitutionnaires from
becoming the triumphant winner of the political battle.
The Representants' position had remained basically unchanged. They upheld the
indivisiblity of the sovereign power of the Conseil General and the necessity for the
government to submit all matters of state importance to that council. They believed in the
rights of the Bourgeois both to appoint the Syndics and government officials and in their
power to approve or reject changes in the laws and practices of the state. As a result of
the Edict of 1768, they were also moving into some minor positions in the state, such as
the Deux Cents. It was clearly understood by all groups within the state that the use of
'democracy' meant the right of the Bourgeois only to political power, as Rousseau had
once written to De Luc concerning the Social Contract:
'Vous avez pu voir dans nos liaisons que je suis pas visionnaire et, dans le Contrat
social, que j'ai jamais approuve le gouvernement dërnocratique.'72
The Natifs re-emerge after 1770
While the patriciate was dividing a new political force made itself felt in Geneva. For the
first time in Geneva's history, the Natifs began to feature in the political plans of some of
"	 See Appendix IV B V111112.
71	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. III (Tome II), pp. 2-4, f. 2.
Karmin, op. cit., p. 22 f.87.
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the parties. As an increasing section of the population, they were looking for some
share in political power. The Representants had not proved very satisfactory allies and,
after 1770, the Nat/Is turned more to the Constitutionnaires as a means of obtaining
benefits and concessions. The Representants represented the complete gamut of the
Bourgeois with the exception of the patriciate. There was for some Bourgeois considerable
social and economic overlap with the Natifs and Habitants. Their one distinguishing mark
was their political status as Bourgeois. Any move to support the Nat/Is' desires to obtain
economic or political advance would inevitably come up against the resistance of the small
Bourgeois because it would threaten their political distinctiveness. In 1774, in correspon-
dence between J-A. De Luc and Turrettini, there was agreement concerning the dangers of
provoking any action amongst the Natifs:
'ce seroit d'exposer a reveiller un feu qui trouveroit bien vite de l'aliment, je
croirois dangereux de les mettre en mouvemens, qui salt si en leur accordant cecy
[on] ne leur feroit pas naitre Mee de demander cela aussi
This showed considerable foresight. Some of the Nat/Is wanted more than equal civil
rights, they desired political rights too, though they were divided on the issue. The worries
expressed by Turrettini prove that the Bourgeois were only too well aware of the potential
dangers of the Natifs.75 The Constitutionnaires, as members of the patriciate, were
wealthy, mostly large merchants, merchant bankers and rentiers, who had little to fear from
giving economic equality to the Nat/Is.
After the loss of their leaders in 1770, the Natifs gradually found new ones. The most
prominent of these was Isaac Comuaud, whose aim was to attach the Nat/Is to the Const-
itutionnaires. Almost certainly in the pay of France, his main aim was to prevent the Natifs
as a group from supporting the Representants. Diagram 10 is one of his earliest works
which was written in 1772, although not made public until later, it is a fair example of his
style. The Natifs, not permitted to have their own cercles, still managed to organise them-
selves discretely, Comuaud talks of 'notre commune societe in Plainpalais in 1774, 76 and
their exiled leaders were not far away. Auziere was with other Nat/Is at Femey, under the
watchful and helpful eye of Voltaire and within easy reach of his friends and followers in
Geneva. Cornuaud journeyed regularly to see Auziere at Femey, and on other occasions
there were meetings in various places just outside Genevan territory.
Comuaud had, during the period 1779-80, written a series of pamphlets exhorting the
Nat/Is to accept civil equality with the Bourgeois, which was promised to them by the
Constitutionnaires. In return, Comuaud was to ensure the loyalty of the Natifs to their
cause and especially that of the need for a French intervention in the city to return it to
stable government, in other words to distract them from thoughts of political rights. The
French government promised the Natifs that, once peace was established, they would not
be forgotten and their reward would be civil equality with the Bourgeois.
The easiest way in which to organise the Nat/Is was via cercles. Though forbidden under
the Edict of 1770, it is clear that, by late 1778, the Natifs had some cercles. By January
1780, Comuaud wrote:
'je visitais leurs cercles, je me fis recevoir membre de celui de I'Ecu de Geneve.
73	 In 1770-1774, marriage statistics give 190 Natifs for 100 citizens. Piuz et Mottu-Weber (Eds.), op. cit., pp. 71-71.
See also Chapter U. p. 17.
74	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 2468 Papiers de Luc, Coffespondance entre Turrettini et J-A. De Luc, 20 juillet 1774, 10.
75	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 137
74	 Cherbuliez, op. cit., p. 135.
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Des lors il devint le point central des assemblees de cet hiver-le.'"
In some cases, they had been established close to the existing cercles of the Constitution-
flakes:
Vetablis des cercles dans le haut de la ville qui les rapprocherent materiellement
de Constitutionnaires qui y avaient les leurs. Nous en ouvrimes un au Bourg-de-
Four et un autre au haut de la Tour de Boel.'78
Just as the Bourgeois in their cercles would often read aloud a text and then discuss it, so
it was in the Natifs' cercles:
Tavais rassemble mes partisans en divers lieux pour leur en lire le manuscrit.. et
mes discours ... encore les tenaient toujours en haleine et ne leur laissaient pas le
temps de la reflexion.'78
The arguments used by Comuaud were to a great extent specious and pro-Constitution-
naire, and he claimed they had to be 'saillants' and 'ne fatiguassent pas l'attention'. His
claim to neutrality began to wear thin:
'L'essence du gouvemement de Geneve est plus aristocratique que dernocratique,
et je ne vois pas pourquoi le premier de ces mots offenserait plus les oreilles d'un
Genevois, que le dernier... II faut chercher le bonheur et ne pas s'arreter A des
mots.'8°
By August 1780, Cornuaud was assuring the Natifs that:
Tinfluence des Natifs sur la chose publique, parfaitement nulle dans le temps de
tranquilite, devient la balance reelle de l'Etat dans les temps orageux.'81
He worked closely with the French Resident in Geneva to keep the Natifs from looking to
the Representants as their natural allies, and was well rewarded financially for his
efforts.82 After the events of 1770, it was natural for the Natifs to turn away from the
Representants, but there was little reality in their belief that they would obtain greater
concessions from the Constitutionnaires. On the other hand, if the Constitutionnaires were
to have any chance of overthrowing the settlement of 1768, they would need the support
of the Natifs. The offer by the Constitutionnaires to the Natifs of full civic rights was not
unattractive so long as they were not offered more by any other group. The desperation of
the Constitutionnaires was shown by this offer since, once the Natifs had secured equal
treatment in matters of tax and trade, it would not be long before they desired to have
political rights as well.
Vergennes and French interference
While the Natifs were finding new leaders, there were also changes in France which
would not leave Geneva untouched. The emergence of Vergennes, in 1776, as leader of a
group of ministers determined upon seizing any opportunity to defeat Britain coincides with
n	 /bid, p. 187. See also pp. 183-4.
m	 Ibid., pp. 246-247.
79	 Ibid., pp. 193-194.
SO	 loc.ciL, extract from the pamphlet Le Natif interroge, 5. avril 1780.
SI	 Ibid., p. 214, taken from the pamphlet Suite du Natif patriote, 4 ao0t 1780.
.2	 'les constitutionnaires lui garantirent ... une rente de quinze cents livres argent de France.' Edouard Chapuisat La
prise dArmes a Genéve, Geneve: A. Julien, editeur, 1932, pp.167-8. He also received the rights and income from
'Les coches et Messageries de France in Geneva. Clearly. Comuaud was an agent in the pay of the French. See
also Karmin, op. cit., pp.53-55 & d'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. ll (Tome l), pp.237-238.
185
increasing French interest and interference in Geneva. Vergennes' success led to the
defeat and resignation of Turgot. By October 1776, Necker had been appointed Director of
the Royal Treasury, which was followed, in June 1777 by his appointment as Director
General of Finance. His passionate belief in loans and the ability of the rentier class to
finance them enabled Vergennes and France to support the Americans in their bid for
independence without having to raise extra taxation. The importance of Geneva in sup-
plying the money for French government stock was such that, by 1782, Necker had been
able to borrow 530 million livres 83, of which the Genevan rentier class had contributed
100 millions." The greater part of the money invested by the Genevans in French loans
came from the wealthy members of the patriciate and the more successful Bourgeois.
Thus, it was imperative that Geneva should remain stable and calm so that they could con-
tinue to provide an important part of French Treasury needs. The simplest way to ensure
this was to form a close relationship with those who tended to look to France and who
wished to see the government of the country escape from the 'dangers' of the Edict of
1768.
Vergennes was doubtless not averse to attempting to end the power of the party which
had been responsible for France's loss of face in 1766-68. It was not in the interests of
France or any country to have on its borders small states which were in turmoil and were
also havens for dangerous ideas. Thus political needs meshed with financial realities.
France had to ensure control either directly herself or through willing agents for what
Necker himself called, when referring to Geneva, 'ce Perou'.85
It was Necker who, in 1780, persuaded Vergennes to hear the views of the two sides in
Paris. Claviêre and Du Roveray for the Representants and Jacob de Chapeaurouge and
Paul-Henri Mallet for the Constitutionnaires therefore went to Paris, and there were several
meetings." Vergennes, according to d'Ivernois, was completely closed to the views of
Claviere and Du Roveray, but found their documents setting out their position useful in his
future interference in Geneva. 87 The only positive result of this 'false negotiation' was the
clear expression of the Constitutionnaires' position:
'la conservation de l'Edit de 1738, textuellement insdrê dans le Code avec le
Prononce [de 1767] qui l'avait eclairci.'
This meant a return to the pre-1768 position, with the additional restrictions on Represen-
tations which had been introduced in the Prononce. This programme was totally unrealistic
in Geneva, given that those who wished to impose it had no serious military force with
which to do so, a situation which provided yet another reason for their reliance on the
French.
At the beginning of 1780, Geneva stood once again on the brink of disaster. The
Bourgeois had managed to ensure that some of their active leaders had been able to enter
the Deux Cents by election into minor positions such as Auditeurs, thus beginning to move
into some of the processes of government. The position of the Conseil General was also
stronger than it had been before 1768, and its main opponents were divided. The lessons
a	 Alfred Cobban A Modem History of France, London: Penguin Books, 1957, Vol. I. p. 121.
.4	 Vincent Cronin Louis and Antoinette, A Biography, London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. for Pumell Book
Services Ltd., 1974, p. 147.
.3	 Piuz at Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 5eme. panic*, Beatrice Veyrassat, Ch. XIX, 611.
N	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3erne. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 463.
17	
D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. II (Tome I), pp.190-200.
a Ibid., p. 195.
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of the first half of the century had been built upon and used effectively by the Bourgeois.
The organisation of the cercles and the acceptance by the members of party discipline and
leadership of their elected representatives had held firm. Some of the leaders of the Bour-
geois, such as the De Luc family, were men who had as many years of service behind
them as the older members of the patriciate sitting in the two smaller councils ," just as
certain families such as the Tronchins were to be found generation after generation in
more elevated positions of power and leadership. 99 The Bourgeois had shown that the
new powers that they had acquired with regard to replacing members of the Petit Conseil
had been used only in extremis, in exactly the same manner as the old ligne de nouvelle
election had been used before 1766.
The trouble over the attempts to codify and then publish the laws of the state of Geneva
and the reaction of the Constitutionnaires had caused a great outpouring of pamphlets in
Geneva, and there was a noticeable increase of tension in the city, with Representation
and counter-Representation being made to the government. Many pamphlets were more
like booklets, although some were relatively short. The majority are serious and sober
reflecting the seriousness of character of those in the city. They also go over the same
ground again and again, though a few are lighter and make the point perhaps better:
'Oh vous vous trompez grandement
Toute la Bourgeois ensemble
Fait du Peuple un quart seulement
Cependant tout le peuple enfin
De cet etat est souverain,
Je l'ai 10 dans un Dictionnaire
On le lit aussi dans nos Loix,
Malgre qu'un usage contraire,
Aux trois quarts en Ote les droits.'91
There is some satire as in the delightful Lettre ecrite de purgatoire par M. Le Go!. J.J.G.
'j'ai encore cent-quatre freres [dans le Deux Cents] qui pense comme moi, ou pour
mieux dire ont pense pour moi...192
It takes all sides to task for their arguments and incorporates many of the catch-phrases,
especially of the Constitutionnaires, such as 'ebranler la Constitution, se laisser conduire
par des Demagogues seditieux, introduire des definitions dangereuses & inconnues
jusqu'a nos jours'.93 It gives a clear idea of what the Constitutionnaires thought of the
Representants and their political ideas.
The Constitutionnaires and their allies in Paris, Hennin, and the Genevan Ambassador,
Des Franches, were determined to take advantage of the unease. The French Ambassa-
dor to the Helvetic Corps suggested again to Bern and Zurich (1780) that they should join
him in examining what measures should be taken to ensure continuing peace in Geneva
N	 See Appendix IV.
' 	 See Appendix IV B VI11/13.
III	 AEG, A67/1 bis, Collection Girod, Vol. 12, 86 Remarques extraites des Registres publics de la Rêpublique de
Genêve, suivis de chansons en forme de dialogue entre un Anglais et un citoyen de Genêve, sur des Airs connus
dèdii•es aux Grimaud. Imprime a Londres aux &Tens de Wilkes', pp.20-21.
92	 Ibid., Vol. 4, 102, p.4.
lq	 Ibid., p.5.
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and to end the incessant quarrels in the city before great trouble broke out:
'Mais je vous previens, Messeigneurs, que si par un &tenement qui ne parait
malheureusement que trop prochain les esprits de cette Republique et par trop
avides changements forgaient Sa Majeste a s'occuper de ses querelles toujours
renaissantes, Elle est resolue d'y mettre fin pour toujours de facon ou d'autre.'"
The Minister, although in the midst of war with Britain over the independence of the
American colonies, put forward a plan for the conciliation of the troubles in Geneva, which
was submitted to Zurich and Bern, but which was not officially communicated to the Petit
Conseil in Geneva. When the council managed to obtain the details of Vergennes' plan, it
was clear why they had been kept in ignorance of it.
The powers of the Petit Conseil were to be weakened. Legal jurisdiction was to be
transferred to the LX. The right to decide whether or not to accept a Representation would
be transferred to a new creation, a council in which half the members would be chosen by
the Deux Cents and half by the Bourgeois. Representations would be strictly limited and
only a small number of Bourgeois could present them. The Conseil General would lose its
right to replace four members of the Petit Conseil and the right to elect half the vacant
seats in the Deux Cents, once these reached 50, as had been agreed in the settlement of
1768.95 The economic rights of the Natifs would be the same as those of the Bourgeois,
they would be permitted to become officers in the militia, and the Natifs exiled in 1770
would be permitted to return. This was an attempt both to increase the power of the
council where the Constitutionnaires were in a majority and to emasculate the effective-
ness of the Bourgeois' Representations.
The weakening of the Petit Conseil in favour of the Deux Cents was a dramatic depar-
ture from all previous accepted practice, while the suggestion of a new council, created to
deal with Representations, was a return to some of the ideas aired between 1766 and
1768. However Vergennes' suggestions are viewed, they would have considerably altered
the provisions of both the original Edict of 1543 and that of 1568.
This 'compromise' was similar to the position of the Constitutionnaires with regard to the
Edict of 1768, but introduced a new element with the weakening of the Petit Conseil. A
situation had been reached where the Constitutionnaires, who had, in the previous decade,
been those who wanted to maintain the constitutional status quo and had objected strongly
to the changes which had occurred as a result of the compromise of 1768, were now pre-
pared to consider introducing changes in order to regain political control. Yet the Constitu-
tionnaires were arch-conservatives, whose whole being was grounded not on constitutional
change but on eliminating the changes introduced in 1768.
These were ideas which emerged from Vergennes, not from the Constitutionnaires per
se, who, when they finally regained political power in the state, did nothing to change the
position of the Petit Conseil. Equally, there was no way short of force that such a scheme
would have passed the Petit Conseil, which it would have had to do before it could go to
the Deux Cents and, certainly, it was never going to pass in the Conseil General. It was
merely yet another tactic of destabilisation in an already tense situation.
The concessions granted to the Natifs were confirmed by the French Resident to
Comuaud and other Natifs (17th. May 1780) when he called them to his residence to read
them a letter from Louis XVI promising them that, unlike previous Mediations, in this one,
the Natifs would not be forgotten. He also promised them that the concessions listed
.4	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3erne. partie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 463.
N	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. II (Tome l), pp. 209-210, It 13. The 50 vacancies had little effect upon the balance within
the Deux Cents, it continued to be dominated by Negatifs and Constitutionnaires.
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above would be included in any solution reached by the Mediators."
Figures bandied around by the Constitutionnaires claimed that:
'pits de 1500, ou 2000, soit Natifs, soit habitans leur etaient davoues;'97
It was clear to the leaders of the Representants that they needed to win the Natifs to their
side in order to remain politically relevant and avoid being crushed by their opponents. It
required considerable effort and took two months:
'ils eurent a combattre chez un grand nombre, l'interet personnel d'un commerce
exclusif auquel il etait coOteux & pónible de renoncer; chez quelques-uns, l'orgueil
des distinctions, & surtout chez la plupart, une vive indisposition qu'excitait contre
les Natifs la conduite de Comuaud.'98
Comuaud was perceived as a French agent and the lackey of the Constitutionnaires, the
Representants resenting the way he was treated as an honoured guest and friend by many
of the patriciate. The Bourgeois were extremely distrustful of France and French influence,
and Cornuaud, in his political and his personal life, was the personification of all their fears.
His affair with a patritiate wife aggravated matters, since many of the Bourgeois followed
Calvin's strict moral code. He was also known to be a frequent guest of the French Resi-
dent, was clearly a good speaker and was popular in the Natif cercles; and, initially, his
arguments were successful.
By October, after considerable argument and discussion in the cercles in which the
Representants met, the logic of the situation was accepted by them, and they prepared a
Representation concerning the rights of the Natifs.
This was presented to the government on 20th. October 1780. Apart from saying that
the Natifs should be granted civic equality, it went on to state that:
'II ne serait ni biensëant, ni utile, que les Natifs restassent aussi &rangers qu'ils le
sont au Corps legislatif, & il conviendrait qu'on fixat pour eux un moyen de parvenir
a la Bourgeoisie...199
The exact manner in which the Natifs were to be granted full rights within the state was left
open for the government to decide, though it was clear that the Representants did not
envisage a sudden change for all the Natifs, but some kind of gradual transformation over
a period of time.
France reacted sharply to the action of the Representants. The Resident invited Corn-
uaud and other Natif leaders to his residence, a second time, where he read them an
extract from a letter from Vergennes in which they were assured that:
'Sa Majestë ne perdra pas de vue leurs intërtts quand Elle sera dans le cas
d'influer sur la pacification de la Republique.'10°
The attempt by de-Vaux 191 to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the state to which
he was accredited aroused the anger of the Representants. It was not normal diplomatic
behaviour to give overt backing to one particular group within the state. It was, of course, a
desperate move by France to help Comuaud maintain his influence over the Nat/Is in the
face of the tempting offer of the Representants. It was also the fulfilment of the claim that
..	 Ibid., p. 238.
97	 Ibid., p. 240.
se	 Ibid., p. 243.
••	 Ibid., pp. 143-4, ft. 2.
No	 Cherbuliez, op. cit., p. 249.
"I	See Appendix IV B VIII/14.
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had often been made by many Bourgeois about the dangers of French interference in the
affairs of Geneva.
The Swiss co-Mediators refused to accept Vergennes' plan for 'pacification'. The Petit
Conseil and government tried to find some grounds for conciliation between the various
parties within the state to make French intervention unnecessary, a similar situation to that
which had occurred in late 1767 and early 1768, and which had led to the Edict of 1768. In
their appeal to the other two parties, they noted that they were:
'persuades que dans les divisions d'une Republique comme la nOtre le triomphe de
l'un des partis ne peut qu'aboutir au malheur public:102
This appeal to the parties by the Petit Conseil to follow the path of compromise failed, in
part because the Constitutionnaires felt little need to be conciliatory, certain that any
attempt to allow the Natifs extensive entry to the Bourgeois would provoke a strong French
reaction. This certainty was in part due to the reports they were receiving directly to their
own cercle the 'Club des Constitutionnaires' from both Des Franches and one of their own
members in Paris, Jacob Tronchin.
The Du Roveray affair and its consequences
The representation that the Representants made concerning de-Vaux's actions was
presented to the Procureur-GenOral on 11th. December. He then, as was usual, prepared
his report for the Petit Conseil. The Procureur-General was Jacques-Antoine Du Roveray,
who had been elected to the post in 1779, and his Remonstrance owed more to his loyalty
to his party, the Representants, than the necessary neutrality expected of his position as
the legal officer of the government:
'Jamais les Magistrats d'un Etat libre ne sont plus dignes de respect de leurs
concitoyens, que quand us plaident pour l'independance & la paix de leur patrie.
II est temps ... de faire cesser ces moyens obscurs par lesquels on surprend la
bonne foi de nos compatriotes... Et faut-il que ce soit par des etrangers que les
enfans de la patrie apprennent A respecter son independance?"3
It was courageous, but unwise, to make an official complaint regarding the connection
between the French Resident and the Natifs. It was equally unwise to denounce the
French Residence as a centre which broadcast its desires as to what should happen in the
city, issued threats and openly favoured a particular party within the state, all without
reference to the government to which the Resident was officially credited. Neither was it
tactful to draw to the government's attention its utter supineness to French interference,
but Du Roveray's speech expressed the very essence of the anger and disgust felt by
many of the Bourgeois at the inability of the government to govern.
The Petit Conseil had changed from being a relatively mild Negatif council into one
which was far more hard-line and pseudo-Constitutionnaire. Many Negatifs were unwilliing
to accept the entry of appreciable numbers of Natifs into the Bourgeois. This negative
attitude also included the members of the Petit Conseil. For stir:El Negatifs, the acceptance
of a proportion of Natifs to the status of Bourgeois was to dramatically alter the constitution
of the state. Realising that they might need the assistance of France to prevent this from
happening, the Petit Conseil, terrified lest the content should come to the ears of the
French, ordered Du Roveray not to let the text of his speech out of his hands and not to
allow its publication.
Unfortunately, Du Roveray's text was both printed and distributed although exactly by
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whom is unclear. The Resident made haste to send it to Paris and, by 3rd. January 1781,
was demanding the immediate punishment of Du Roveray, who was arrested and sus-
pended from his functions. The King subsequently demanded that Du Roveray be expelled
from the Deux Cents and removed from his post, a demand that the Petit Conseil hastily
acceded to. France was attempting to rule Geneva. This led to rioting, with street skirmish-
es between the Representants and the Constitutionnaires, in which a number of Natifs
supported the latter. On 5th. February, in renewed unrest, the Representants rushed to
take control of the city gates and the Town Hall and rapidly became masters of Geneva
withoat firing a shot. 104 The Petit Conseil bowed to the inevitable and officially handed
responsibility for the gates of the city to those who controlled them, the Representants.
The government, as tradition dictated at times of unrest in Geneva, sent for mediation to
both Zurich and Bern. The Resident also made an appearance to inform the council of
instructions from Louis XVI that the Constitutionnaires had been taken under his 'special'
protection.
The council, unable to leave the Town Hall, decided to turn to Vergennes for a mediation
conciliatrice as well as repeating its pleas to Bern and Zurich to send delegations to
Geneva. Meanwhile, the Petit Conseil refused to accept the proposals put to it by the
Representants, arguing that they could not meet and discuss under the threat of force.
They soon accepted that, in fact, the Representants were in control of the state and that
there was little else they could do. The normal military force in the city was the citizen
militia, consisting of both Bourgeois and Natifs, the latter serving in the ranks. The
Representants were in control and were prepared to offer limited political rights to the Nat-
ifs, many of whom had been won over to the Representants by the latter's seizure of the
city gates, which left the government without any military support.
The Petit Conseil therefore voted to accept the Edict proposed by the Representants
and sent it to the Deux Cents, which held two votes. In the first, the Constitutionnaires
rejected the Edict; in the second they abstained, with the result that it was passed by 55
votes to 3• 105 The same day as the Deux Cents accepted the Edict, a meeting of the
Conseil General was called. This meeting voted the new Edict, now named the !'Edit
bienfaisant, by a clear majority ot1,117 to 29.
Under this new Edict, the Natifs were given considerable benefits. The most important
was the right to citizenship for all those of the third generation of Natifs who were in a
'useful profession or trade'. In addition, as a special measure 100 Natifs, 20 Habitants, and
2 sujets would receive Bourgeois status at once without payment of any fees. Thereafter,
the status of Bourgeois was to be allowed to eight Natifs, and one each for Habitants and
sujets per year. The Natifs also received full civil rights. Their previously exiled leaders
were to be allowed to return to Geneva. The Natifs were also to nominate 56 officers in the
militia. Since the concessions offered to the Natifs were greater than those which had been
offered to them by the Constitutionnaires, the former rallied to the support of the Repre-
sentants. There was some questioning of the situation by some Natifs:
'Le Natif dit: L'on parle beaucoup a Geneve de Liberte et des Droits, et il semble ...
enfin que nous y participions; mais le Negatif ne nous offre les Droits utiles, que
parce qu'ils lui sont inutiles n'en usant plus et le Representant ne nous offre les
droits honorifiques que nous l'aidions a les defendre... Au lieu de ces promesses
nous voudrions qu'ils fassent d'accord sur quelque arrangement, par lequel il fOt
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sur quo nos Enfants ou nos petits-Enfants seront Citoyens."8
The Edict was a fascinating Genevan compromise in that it maintained the outline struc-
ture of the state as it had been since 1543, but allowed for the upward movement of the
Nat/Is in a controlled manner after the initial influx from those of the third generation. It
allowed for 'change by agreed upon and legal methods', since the Edict had been
accepted by a large majority of those with political rights by the voting in the Conseil
General. Neither was it likely that the vote would have been different if the Bourgeois had
not been in control of the city gates. The knowledge that the Representants were a
majority of the Bourgeois in the state was the reason why the smaller councils had blocked
the presentation of the Edict to the Conseil GeneraOff Unlike the unrest of 1734-7,
there had been no deaths or serious street fighting, but, unlike 1768, the Representants
had had to take up arms to protect themselves and had then found themselves masters of
the town. Even under these circumstances of men under arms, the Edict was a very impor-
tant step towards progress in the city. It underlined the fact that Geneva was not a true
societe d'ordres since the Edict both maintained the existing structure of the state while
allowing considerable numbers of people to move upward into the Bourgeois. This
movement being on the basis alone of being 'Genevans' of long standing. There was to be
no payment of fees for the 'privilege' as previously.
It was the first time that Bourgeois status had been offered to such a large number of
people, and was thus completely new for Geneva. The structure and the base of the
system of government in the city would remain in all essentials unaltered by allowing the
entry into the Bourgeois of third-generation Naffs. In the early years of the Republic, there
had been considerable numbers annually who had become Bourgeois, especially in years
like 1555, when a substantial number of French Huguenots were admitted to the Bour-
geois. The influx of a possible 460 new members under the Edict increased the numbers
of Bourgeois to a maximum of 1,700. There were always a certain number of those entitled
to sit and vote who were not in Geneva because they were abroad on business or lived in
foreign cities, a situation which led to the scramble by many Bourgeois in 1766 to return to
the city in order to vote on the Mediation.
It was not an over generous offer, since, any Natif seekinn to become a member of the
political class would need to have had a family connection with Geneva for at least eighty
years, first as an Habitant, then three successive generations of Natifs. It certainly did not
introduce 'democracy' into the state, the number of Bourgeois still being under 2,000 in a
population of 24,000. It did not violate the existing Edicts since they had always allowed for
the movement of successful Natifs into the Bourgeois and pro rata large numbers had
been admitted in Calvin's timewe It also meant that the majority held by the Represen-
tants in the Conseil General would be even greater. It enabled many of those who had
come at the time of the religious persecution in France in the second half of the seven-
teenth century were eligible for Bourgeois status. Equally, it meant a further tilting of the
political balance against the patriciate and towards that part of the Bourgeois represented
by the Representants, especially in the Conseil General. The small widening of political
rights in Geneva was in contrast to the continued restrictions found in the Swiss cantons
such as Lucerne, Bern, Zurich and Basle. In comparison with the changes that had
occurred in the state constitutions of Pennsylvania in 1776, with a unicameral system and
1°. AEG, Girod 22 Maniere de servir son park sans nuire A la patrie - Par un Vieux Natif, 8 janvier 1781, p.8.
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a very wide franchise, Geneva was conservative and unchanging.w°
The position of the Syndics and the councils was in no way changed by what had
happened. The government continued to function and there was no attempt at, or even
thought of, effecting any changes. The Conseil General had voted for the Edict, and it was
left to the government to implement what had been voted, while the Representants kept
control of the city gates.
Geneva was offered an avenue of reform, which while altering the balance between the
constituent parts of the people within the state, still retained the basic instruments and
organisation of the state. It was a genuine attempt to reform an ancient republic by the
majority of those with political power, the Bourgeois. The admission of an additional block
of ex-Natifs into the Conseil General, together with the right of replacement obtained by
that council in 1768 could have led to 'a way of formalising ... conflicts in institutions'."°
To be successful the cooperation of the patriciate was required but the Constitutionnaires
led the way in refusing to accept the Edict. They had refused to accept the Edict of 1768,
the Edict of 1781 was even more indigestable. The situation had been reached in Geneva
where the Bourgeois were looking forward, accepting conservative, 'controlled' change,
while the Constitutionnaires became increasingly determined to turn the clock back to 1767
and the Prononce with its strengthening of 1738. Thus, Geneva, together with the other
ancient republics, 'could not be reformed', 1 " because all attempts at peaceful reform
required the working together of the smaller councils and the Conseil General. The refusal
of the Constitutionnaires, together with some of the Negatifs, to countenance any political
reform, joined with their majority in the Deux Cents, blocked all avenues of negotiated,
lawful change.
It also placed Geneva at variance with what was happening in many of the Swiss
cantons.112 In Lucerne the decline in Bourgeois had led to the admittance of a few to that
status on the basis that they replaced their wooden houses with stone and that they had
no right to government positions until the third generation after admission - a very restric-
tive change. In Bern, although by 1787 only 243 families theoretically had the right to
participate, three-quarters of them were excluded from power, leaving 68 families with that
right. For Bern particularly, the increase in those allowed to take part in the Conseil
General posed a threat, even if it only encouraged those theoretically with rights to attempt
to follow the lead of Geneva and demand change.
The advice from France, Bern and Zurich was not to implement the new Edict, while the
Constitutionnaires themselves made a Representation to the government:
'Ce projet de Code par lequel nos Loix les plus sacrees auroient eta alterees,
mutilêes ou dOtruites, n'etoit-il pas l'ouvrage de leurs chefs? [les Represen-
tants].'1'3
They ended their submission by demanding the intervention of the Mediators. The inter-
ference of the French in Geneva thus became enmeshed in the question of rights for the
Natifs, with dangerous consequences for the city. The Constitutionnaires meanwhile
attempted to re-attach the Natifs to their cause, arguing that the Constitutionnaires should: -
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'se familiariser avec eux comme des camarades, les admettre dans leurs cercles,
dans leur sociate, e leurs tables qu'ils tenaient ouvertes, les attirer, les caresser
d'une maniere aussi indecente que publique: tout cela pour les ameuter contre les
Representants.""
With what were the Constitutionnaires supposed to turn the Natifs away from the Repré-
sentants? The only successful strategy would have been to promise all male Natifs
immediate entry into the Bourgeois, an unlikely proposition. That left the negative approach
of attempting to persuade the Natifs that the offer contained in the Edict was nothing but a
ruse to obtain their support. This was the difficulty for the Representants, since the
Constitutionnaires were aware of the fact that the Mediators had ordered the government
not to apply the Edict, apparently giving credence to their claims to the Natifs that the offer
from the Representants was not genuine.
The government found itself in a no-win situation: unwilling to put the Edict into effect,
but unwilling to say so publicly, for fear of a violent reaction from both the Natifs and the
Representants, it reverted to the old Genevan policy of procrastination. The Representants
attempted to pressure the government to apply the Edict, and the government, under
pressure from both sides, had to make a decision as to where it stood. This came on 18th.
May:
'Un pareil edit ne peut subsister plus longtemps que les jours d'anarchie qui lui
donnerent naissance et le Conseil, devenu libre, ne saurait l'executer sans trahir
ses devoirs envers la patrie."15
The Petit Conseil argued that the acceptance of the Edict in both the smaller councils was
obtained under threat and, on those grounds, the Edict could never have the force of law.
The argument put forward by the Petit Conseil skirted around the real difficulty. What it
was denying was the sovereignty of the Conseil General. The Edict had been accepted by
a large majority of the people in a free vote, but the Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents
would certainly never have forwarded any Representations granting Bourgeois status to
the Natifs. The rioting of February 1781, during which the government had remained
passive, had temporarily solved the impasse that had been present in Geneva since the
Edict of 1738. In February 1781, the Petit Conseil was unable to block the Representation,
thus giving the Bourgeois an opportunity to make an important decision. In effect, all the
years of the eighteenth century spent in finding compromises to avoid exactly this difficulty
had ended in nought, and the Genevans were brought to face the question clearly: was the
government willing to accept the clearly-expressed will of the Bourgeois when this was
against its own ideas and beliefs? There had not been a seizure of power, as the Syndics
remained in place, as did all the members of the Petit Conseil and Deux Cents. There was
no interference whatsoever in the daily running of the government, and, when the govern-
ment was seen to be reluctant to enforce the new Edict, the Representants did not march,
armed, to the Town Hall to demand the immediate application of the new law; they
organised, as usual, a Representation. None of this was the action of a group who had
seized power.
It should also be noted that the Representants did not use their dominance to impose
upon the government any settling of scores. After all the trouble over the revision of the
laws, the Representants were content to delay for two years any further work on the
contentious issue of revising the constitution, which had been halted in 1779. This was
included in the Edict. There was to be an amnesty concerning all that had happened
before February 1781. Thus the three matters on which the Representants insisted were
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an amnesty, a delay in the contentious issue of the revision of the laws of the state and
the move to enfranchise a proportion of the Natifs. Such moderation was, as ever, politic
as well as prudent, and they would be:
'trop heureux si cet acte unique de moderation nous redonnait la paix.'118
The division within the patriciate lessened as a result of the position taken by the
government. The majority of the Negatifs joined the Constitutionnaires in believing that the
threat to Geneva from within was greater than that from without. For them the application
of the Edict was to radically alter the constitution as it had existed since 1543. The
admission of third generation Natifs to Bourgeois status was from the patriciate view an
attack on the social order upon which the state rested as Fazy comments, 'le premier coup
de hache dans l'adifice des privileges et des abus', 117 and marked an erosion of the
security of the state, the initial concession inevitably leading to others and the ultimate
destruction of the state. And, as in 1770, a stand had to be taken.
As in 1766, the French wished the negotiations for the conciliation to take place outside
Geneva at Soleure, where, as in 1738, the French wanted to impose a solution which
severely limited the powers of the Conseil General, while the Swiss sought to find a
compromise solution between the parties. The meetings between the three mediators
ended in deadlock due to the French insistence that the Conseil General due to be held in
Geneva to elect 25 members of the Deux Cents should not be held.
The death of a member of the Deux Cents meant that there were now 50 vacancies and
under the terms of the Edict of 1768 50 new members had to be elected.'" This meant
beginning the process of election, whereby 25 seats were to be chosen by the two smaller
councils and 25 by the Bourgeois voting in the Conseil General. The result of these
elections would mean more Representants in the Deux Cents. The Constitutionnaires,
together with some Negatifs, argued that, given the dangerous political state in Geneva, it
would unwise to hold elections. They also found themselves in a rather unfortunate posi-
tion: they rejected the validity of the Edict of 1768 and wished to see it removed from law,
and felt that they should not act under its provisions and become involved in the election
process but they were only too aware of the danger of not ensuring that as many of their
candidates as possible were elected.
Vergennes, to avoid all these difficulties, attempted to persuade Bern and ZOrich to
support a suspension of the application of the Edict of 1768. Geneva should remain as she
was at present, while the conciliation by the Mediators went on, an idea which was to
become the question of the 'in status quo'. Bern and Zurich could not accept this:
'La constitution d'un Etat libre ne saurait etre arretee et rendue inactive par des
Puissances etrangeres sans que sa souverainete soit blessee."19
France, seeing that she would not be able to persuade the Swiss otherwise, then declared
that she would withdraw from this attempt to find a solution to Geneva's problems, leaving
the conciliation to the two Swiss cantons. However, she warned the governments that:
'Si qui que ce soit attentait A la vie ou ã la liberte d'aucun des individus de la
Republique sans que le gouvemement eat et employát la force necessaire pour l'en
punir, Sa Majeste se charge de ce soin ainsi que de retablir sur le champ le bon
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ordre parmi vous par tous les moyens que sa puissance lui met dans la main."2°
The Genevan government, however, knew that to achieve what the French desired,
namely in status quo, the consent of the Conseil General was necessary. There had
already been a Representation concerning in status quo on 2nd. April 1781, and clearly
another was in preparation:
'de nouveaux peletons l'ont ete appuye [sic]... ce matin. C'est le resultat d'une
assemble des Cercles politiques tenue hier a 4hs. par le Comite des Chefs."
For the Representants, the attempt by France to introduce the in status quo was an attack
on the independence of the state. In submitting the 'in status quo' idea to the Conseil
General, the two smaller councils must have known it was likely to be rejected. Having left
the matter until almost the end of the year, the government had to act and attempt to
obtain the consent of the Conseil General to the in status quo. The result was as expect-
ed:
'Le Conseil General a refuse hier a la pluralite de 1194 suffrages contre 393 la
proposition de l'in status quo .. de sone que apres midi le Petit Conseil a fait
passer la Trompette pour achever les Inscriptions qui doivent etre fermees jeudi, et
que les Elections s'ensuivront."22
The speed with which it thus moved to begin the process of the elections is surprising.
Whether the government was intent on demonstrating to the French the intractability of the
Bourgeois and so hastening French intervention or whether it wished to distract the
Representants from the question of the rights of Natifs is unclear. In any case, the
government's defiance of French wishes was surprising. On the other hand, a Deux Cents,
which had more Representant members might make it easier for a revision of the Codes to
go ahead. There might also be grounds for a compromise between the less extreme
members of the Petit Conseil and the Representants, which might bring a measure of
political peace to the state and avoid French intervention.
The continued refusal of the government to put the Edict concerning the Natifs into effect
was a threat to the support that the latter had given to the Representants, seeming to give
substance to the claims of Comuaud that the offer was merely a trick. By March 1782,
nothing had been done and the situation was becoming increasingly difficult, so a further
Representation was made with the support of nine hundred Bourgeois: The text of the
March 1782 Representation was very much to the point:
'Nous sommes deputes aupres de vous de la part des Natifs, Habitants et Sujets,
pour vous soliciter a faire en leur non, une Representation dont la force et l'energie
mette le Petit Conseil dans le cas de repondre trés promptement et tres Categori-
quement sur le sort que nous fixe dans l'Etat l'Edit du fevrier 1781. Afin qu'en cas
de refus nous puissions agir de concert avec les Citoyens et Bourgeois sur les
moyens les plus efficaces et les plus patriotiques pour soutenir la dignite du Sou-
verain."23
Tactfully worded, it was a coded warning that the patience of the Representants was
running out. The matter of giving certain rights to the Natifs had become, because of its
acceptance by the Conseil General, a matter of the sovereign rights of that body within the
state. The Petit Conseil would have done well to reflect on the emotive power of the
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sovereignty of the Conseil General in the previous eighty years of the century.
Meanwhile, Comuaud was busily stirring up distrust and anger amongst the Natifs. In a
series of 9 Adresses aux membres du Comite des representants, he argued that they were
not serious in offering the right to Bourgeois status to the Natifs as promised in the Edict of
1781. In the uncertain situation in which political life found itself, it was essential that the
Edict be put into effect. There was a danger that the Natifs' patience was running out. It
was in response to a plea from the Natifs, as well as to counter the propaganda of
Cornuaud, that the March Representation was made.
The response of the Petit Conseil, after considerable discussion, was a refusal, made
public on Monday 8th. April. The council based its response on the Regulations of the
Mediation of 1738,' 	 had clearly set out the different powers of the various arms
of the government. It went on to declare:
'quo le Conseil Genêral n'êtait point to souverain de la Rópublique 125 et ... "qu'il
[le Petit Conseil] perseverait invariablement dans le ref us d'executer un edit (celui
du 10 Mx/der 1781) qu'il avait constamment envisage comme nul"."28
Once again at a time of crisis, the Petit Conseifs members showed themselves to be
totally unaware of the consequences of their actions and words. It was as if all the
struggles and all the arguments which had taken place in the eighteenth century in the city
had never existed. The statement concerning the sovereignty of the Conseil General could
have been made by Chapeaurouge in 1718 or 1734. This was the final push by the
patriciate to provoke the Representants and the Natifs into actions that would necessitate
the military intervention of France. Angry though the Representants were, their anger was
not as great as that of the Natifs.
Rioting and the application of the new Edict
Initially expressed within the Nat/Is' cercles, the anger and frustration quickly spilled out
onto the streets and squares of the town as night fell. Their leaders lost all control and
rioting followed, while the government, the Negatifs and the Constitutionnaires refused to
do anything to contain the Natifs' rioting, remaining firmly aloof and refusing to react to the
situation. Gradually, the Representants, who had waited for the government to act, took up
their arms and were able to put themselves at the head of groups of armed Nat/Is bringing
them under some control and thus preventing too much bloodshed. Eleven of the most
prominent Constitutionnaires were arrested and taken under guard to be held at the He'WI
des Balances.'27
In 1782, when the intransigence of the Constitutionnaires and the Petit Conseil led to
their refusal to apply the Edict Bienfaisant. It was not as Godechot claims that the:
'Genevan democrats, including du Roveray, Claviere ... and the lawyer Grenus
called the natives to arms"28
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Du Roveray was at the Town Hall 'au desespoir', 129 begging the Syndic de la garde to
calm the rioters. A request which was refused. Du Roveray was joined by several other
Reprasentants, who seeing the refusal of the government to act then armed themselves
and put themselves at the heads of the rioting groups of Natifs. For many of the Reprasen-
tants, It was at this moment, with the government refusing to act against rioting in the
town, together with the refusal of the Petit Conseil to carry out the Edit Bienfaisant that
Palmer's criteria of 'confidence in the justice and reasonableness of existing authority'133
was destroyed. No responsible government sat idle while a considerable proportion of its
people rioted in the city.
It was the angered Natifs who began the rioting. Genevan historians agree that the
action of the Representants prevented much bloodshed, as they also agree on the inaction
of the Syndics and government.' 31 The arrival at the Town Hall of several of the leading
Bourgeois, including Du Roveray, in an attempt to help the Syndics to re-establish order
affirms their century-long desire to do nothing outside the law. Neither would they have
been unaware that the refusal of some of the government to act was deliberate. Rioting
and danger to the patriciate would, some of the Negatifs and all of the Constitutionnaires
hoped, lead France to intervene with troops. The Bourgeois' taking control of the Natifs
and thus bringing the rioting to an end without the cooperation of most of the members of
the government led them to take the reins of the government into their own hands. And
shocked though the French were with the holding of many members of the government in
the Hotel des Balances, no harm came to the latter, a further demonstration of the degree
of control over their followers that the Reprósentants were able to exercise. The events of
April 1782 are interpreted by Godechot as:
'The "natives" unable to gain victory in 1768, seized power with the aid of the
"burghers" (Bourgeois) in April 1782 and attempted to give the old republic a new
and more democratic constitution:132
Unfortunately, no-one had tried to seize power in 1768, certainly not the 'natives'.Some of
the 'natives' had attempted to seriously riot in 1770. The Natifs having been encouraged
by both sides in the political conflict in Geneva to develop and hone their political interests
were angry and frustrated at the refusal of the Petit Conseil to allow the considerable
breach in the barrier between the Bourgeois and themselves which the Edict of 1780
promised. Their acceptance of the leadership of the Representants showed that they, in
fact, had no clear notion of what they would do, except perhaps take their vengeance on
those they considered responsible for the situation, being the typical mob protest of the
eighteenth century world. 133 The Representants desired the government to apply a new
Edict approved by the Conseil GOnóral in 1781. While this Edict would have introduced
some changes, added to the constitution as it existed, it hardly amounted to a 'new'
constitution. It was marginally more 'democratic', because over a period of time the
numbers of Natifs becoming Bourgeois would increase. In preventing the Natifs from
rioting, the Reprasentants found themselves in the position of illegally holding power, the
very position they had ardently striven to avoid.
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There was no attempt to remove the four Syndics; they had been elected by the Conseil
General, and nothing could therefore legally remove them from office during the year of
their election. They worked with the Representants, in part because they would not have
been allowed to resign and leave, but also because they must have felt that the new
regime would probably not be of long duration, since almost certainly the French would
now intervene.
A committee to 'purify and renew' the smaller councils was appointed by the Conseil
General, 134 removing 11 from the Petit Conseil and 32135 from the Deux Cents. The
creation of the new smaller councils by an act submitted to the Conseil General for
approval was an attempt to give a legal gloss to acts which were outside the existing
Edicts and to avoid the charge of acting illegally. An edict of 12th. April created the new
Petit Conseil and Deux Cents. The composition of the two new councils is documented
thus:
'le petit conseil se trouvait compose de onze Negatifs contre treize Representants
et le Deux Cent de 98 Representants contre 152 Constitutionnaires.'136
There were no Constitutionnaires sitting in the Petit Conseil, those who normally sat there
were under armed guard in a Genevan hotel, but the figures for the Deux Cents are
surprising. They almost certainly include those who had previously been either neutral or
Negatif and who may have retained more moderate views. Jean Roget in Lausanne was a
supporter of the Representants and in the rather fevered atmosphere of the moment
doubtless saw little difference between the Constitutionnaires and the Negatifs. The large
number of Constitutionnaires was irrelevant, as they refused to attend. At the first meetings
of the reconstituted smaller councils, the Negatifs who remained on the councils also
refused to take any part in the deliberations. The Neutres, however, such as Jean-Louis de
Bude-de Boissy, Sellon fils 137 and Dr. Butini, did attend and participate.138
The creation of a Commission de la sarete pour le retablissement de la tranquillite et du
bon ordre on 16th. April was one of the first acts of the Conseil Genera1. 139 The creation
of a new council which was to take to itself most of the powers of the two smaller councils
was to step away from the existing constitution. Jean Roget saw this new creation as:
'une espece de dictature... sa charge et son inspection embrassent tout ce qui
conceme le militaire et la police:140
This new body had 11 members and was all powerful during the short period that the
Representants controlled Geneva. This was confirmation that there was dramatic change
in the existing constitution. The refusal of the government to act upon the wishes of the
sovereign by applying the Edict of 1781, made it clear, finally, to the Bourgeois that they
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could have no confidence in it to abide by the terms of the constitution. In Palmer's
terms"' the revolution had arrived in Geneva, not in 1768 but in 1782. Ironically, once in
power, the Representants themselves by-passed the Conseil GOnOral by using the new
Commission and the cercles, in effect confirming the revolutionary nature of what had
happened, and was a move towards the delegation of power from the sovereign body,
which Palmer argues was missing in 1766-68. 142 Until the capitulation of the city, the
Commission acted as the government of Geneva, with power given to it by the sovereign
body, the Conseil General. Furthermore, it did not consult the Conseil General, consulta-
tion being organised through the Commissioners of the cercles. There was no time in the
few months during which this structure functioned to test whether a new system would
emerge in Geneva, which might have developed in conjunction with a thorough revision of
the Codes. What happened in these few months was that the members of the Commission
were in constant contact with the cercles.
The Constitutionnaires and many of the Negatifs were waiting for the French to inter-
vene, as is shown by their appeal to the Plenipotentiary powers:
'Mais la majeure partie des Membres de Deux Cents, et un certain nombre de
Citoyens, qui de concert avoient resolu de tout tenter pour le salu de la Republique,
recoururent a la protection et aux bons offices de ses augustes Allies:143
There was an awareness throughout Geneva that the powers, led by France, were
unwilling to accept what had happened and were preparing for an attack on the city. In a
letter written from Paris to Vemes, this is made very clear. 1 " Being able to argue in
1782 that the government running the state after the riots was illegal and unconstitutional
made it inevitable that the French would intervene on behalf of the Constitutionnaires.
In Geneva, the Edict of 1781 was put into effect. In the Council Register, an entry for
4th. May lists thirty Natifs granted Bourgeois status, the first of a series of names of those
granted this under the Edict of 1781. The interest of the Register for this period is that,
once power was restored to the NOgatifs, in July 1782, the Register was separated from
the others and a Syndic carefully annulled the majority of the grants of Bourgeois status
that had been made under the Edict of 1781. 145 In all, 460 Natifs were granted Bourgeois
status in the brief months that the Edict was in force, only 60 retained their status as
Bourgeois after the return to power of the Negatifs and Constitutionnaires. 16 Palmer's
figure of 150 Natifs retaining their Bourgeois status may well include the 5 or more annual
admissions since the Edict of 1768.147
The French Resident left Geneva, Louis' government refusing to communicate with the
'faction' which had taken control of the state while by May, it was clear that Sardinia as
well as France and Bern were sending troops to Geneva. Neither state could allow France
to have a free hand in Geneva. Sardinia, whose frontier with Geneva touched the edge of
the city, was aware of the economic benefit Geneva bestowed on a vast stretch of Sardin-
ian territory and thus had no desire to see the city swallowed by the French. Bern
"1	Palmer, op. cit.. p. 21.
I'	 Ibid., p. 215.
143	 BPU, Gem:we, Archives Tronchin Ms. 343 94-5.
"4	 See p.201.
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preferred that Geneva, still the key to Switzerland, where Bern was, by territory, the largest
Canton, should remain in non-French hands; neither state had any desire to allow Geneva
to be a beacon and example to those of their own citizens who might be tempted to
emulate the Genevans, Bern with regard to those in the state with theoretical political
rights, but in reality without any political power, and France where the Parlements needed
little encouragement to question the authority of the King's government.
In the city, extensive work was carried out to strengthen the fortifications, and plans
were made for the evacuation of Saint-Gervais, which was the most exposed to the French
artillery, which had dug in on the hill above the town. There was also some attempt to find
a compromise between the parties, as had so often happened before. The Reprèsentants,
in a declaration to the Syndics at the end of May, said they were willing to attempt a
reconciliation with the Constitutionnaires, but, should the latter refuse such attempts:
'ils feront tous leurs efforts pour repousser le sort dont Us sont menaces et que Si la
Providence veut qu'ils perissent, ce sera en hommes libres et en citoyens vertu-
eux. 1148
However, the Constitutionnaires were, according to Pictet, unwilling to negotiate on their
own:
'lls ne veulent plus faire d'arrangement qui ne soit consenti par les Puissances,
c'est le seul moyen d'empecher les Prises d'Armes ..."49
All kinds of preparations went ahead, including the storage of gunpowder in the cathedral,
which in its turn led to a rapid departure of many living in the old town. Work on the
crumbling fortifications of the city went on at a feverish pace, including the cutting down of
the chestnuts which were planted along the top of some of the old fortifications:
'...ces Bastions depouilles de leurs beaux ombrages...' 159
Arms were handed out to defend the town against attack. The involvement of so many in
the city, many of whom volunteered was like a popular mobilisation. It demonstrated
without any doubt that the majority of those who remained in the city clearly supported the
new regime.
However, defence of the town was nearly impossible:
'notre Ville n'a de munitions que ce qui est necessaire pour se defendre d'une
attaque subite, ...elle est merne entierement dópourvue de plusieurs articles
indispensables pour soutenir vigoureusement un siege;... pour defendre le ate de
St. Gervais, il faudroit nécessairement prendre une partie de l'artillerie placee de
l'autre ate de la ville, qui n'en est déjà pas suffisament pourvu."51
This report was by the engineer Charles Chatel and his assistant/advisor the pastor Essie
Gasc.152
Attempts were also made by those outside the city to persuade the defenders of the
hopelessness of their desire to defend the city:
'Et au lieu de preparer des canons, dites leur de laisser tout le monde libre et les
portes ouvertes, ... et je peux vous assurer quo lorsqu'on pane ici des dispositions
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que l'on fait pour se defendre on hausse les epaules.'163
The first ultimatum of the armies surrounding Geneva was delivered to the Syndics on
29th. June. It included the handing over of the town to the troops, together with the expul-
sion of 21 leaders of the Representants. The offer was a shrewd move, as it allowed the
leaders of the Representants to escape with their lives, while saving the city from destruc-
tion. The Allies may have hoped that such an offer would be sufficient to divide the
defenders. It was extended on several occasions as various people in the town tried to
persuade the Genevans of the likely consequences of not surrendering. This was no easy
task, as the people seemed very determined to defend their city and new regime, more
committed than the Americans had been to fight for their independence, since there were
few left in the city who did not support the changes since April. The Genevans, umlike the
Dutch newly raised Militias, had always had an active and trained Militia, including units
concerned with the cities artillery, the Bourgeois and Natifs both serving, while the officers
were always from the Bourgeois. There were also some younger sons who had joined
foreign armies for periods of service. Thus they were not lack[ingl of experience ... in
military service and military command'. 154 What Geneva suffered was an insufficiency of
cannon and the fact that contemporary warfare made it difficult for towns to withstand
seige, and Geneva was certainly 'small and [an] easy object for intervention'.155
The one group that might be successful in persuading the people to surrender was the
Compagnie des Pasteurs. The eighteenth century had seen the decline of this body as a
politically neutral force because they no longer remained a clearly neutral body. The
Compagnie had attempted to act as a mediating body between the factions after the
events of February 1781, but it had been a thankless task, in which they progressed little.
They were themselves divided, with some pastors such as M. Picot, pastor at Satigny,
supporting the Constftutionnaires, while others such as Jacob Vemes and Essee Gasc
supported the Representants. 156 They were able, however, to obtain extensions of the
allies' ultimatum to the city.
The cercles were called to meet on 1st. July to make the final decision. They created a
commission of 120, ten elected members from each of the twelve political cercles of the
ReprOsentants, under the presidency of the Commission of Security. The use of delegates
from the cercles had been extensive throughout the regime's rule. Given the apparent
divisions, the calling of a Conseil General would have solved nothing, and time was of the
essence. There were three main strands of opinion, the first arguing for determined resis-
tance to the death, the second talking of mass emigration and a third, led mainly by the
pastors, calling for capitulation in the belief that, at some point in the future, Geneva would
rise again. While the delegates had instructions from their electors, they also had to have a
certain leeway in order for a final decision to be taken. It was an easier task to persuade a
majority of 120 to accept what was capitulation, than nearly 2,000 who would have sat in
the Conseil GenOral.
The first vote was in favour of resistance, but a second vote, after hearing graphic
details of the consequences of resistance as told by a pastor - Mouchon - who had been in
contact with Marmora, the Sardinian commander, gave a small majority for surrender.
Martin talks of: 'un second tour de scrutin, probablement falsifie,' (my emphasis) but gives
Im	 BPU, Geneve, Ms. fr. 297 Lettres adressries a J. Vemes De Tronchin-Labat A Paris (cousin of Vemes).
I"	 Palmer, op. cit., pp. 368-369.
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no indication as to why he makes this statement or what the source for it is. 167 One of
those present, Prevost-Cabanis, merely states his surprise after the first vote, in which all
but '10 ou 12 membres' had voted for resistance:
'Qui auroit cru qu'on en entreprit un second[?] Je fus confondu, je vous l'avoue de
voir Ms. renvenir a la charge a ce second tour."
The second vote was relatively close, with 57 voting for capitulation and 40 against.166
The Commission of Security dissolved itself, handing its powers to the Syndics, and
issued a Demiere Declaration Des Genevois at 2 a.m. on Tuesday, 2nd. July 1782. It was
an apologia for all that had happened, together with an attempt to rally support:
'ayant fait les plus serieuses reflexions sur l'inutilite de leur resistance ... non a
soumettre, mais a ceder aux conditions qui leur sont imposees par la constrainte,
quelque dures qu'elles soient ...et dont le Gouvemement sera desormais entre les
mains d'hommes pour lesquels ils ne pourront jamais avoir ni estime ni confiance,
us iront chercher sous un autre ciel une terre 00 ils puissent respirer en paix l'air
pur de la liberte:166
This was an admission of defeat. The hope of establishing a new Geneva elsewhere was
to cast a straw of hope in a sea of despair for those who remained in the city. The
Genevan colony at Femey established after 1770 had survived only because of the help of
Voltaire and his continued care for the colony. As d'Ivernois was to find, it was exceedingly
difficult to begin a new city elsewhere.
The capitulation of the regime was due to the fact that the city was militarily weak and
had always been so. It had a citizens' Militia and relied for its defence on the Swiss, as it
always had. This must have been known to the leaders of the regime from the moment
they found themselves in power. The reaction of France cannot have been doubted either.
In such circumstances, they must have put their hope in managing to persuade those held
prisoner to negotiate an internal settlement, as in 1768. When this was refused, it was
clear to Flournois, Vieusseux, Du Roveray and the Commission for Security that there was
only one possible end.
With the departure of the Commission, the Syndics immediately requested that troops
should be sent into the town to help keep the peace in the face of the anger of those who
wished to resist to the bitter end. The leaders of the ReprOsentants left the town,161 and
a proclamation of 4th. July annulled all the decisions that had been taken since 7th. April
and recalled to their positions all those councillors who had been replaced. In other words,
the councils reverted to what they had been before 7th. April, with the exception of those
Rept.&enfants who had left. A commission of eight councillors was appointed to collabo-
rate with the three powers to work out a plan of pacification, which was to be imposed on
the state.
France had achieved the task she had set herself. Whether there would have been a
resort to arms in Geneva without French interference is impossible to say. Left to their own
devices, it was probable that the Constitutionnaires would have ultimately been forced into
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some compromise with the Representants. France's oft-repeated refrain to the Constitu-
tionnaires promising support nurtured their discontent and encouraged their intransigence.
An example of this was seen in a letter of Robert-Guillaume Rilliet to his son in December
1781:
'Quoique l'on suive a l'election du 200 par le Conseil General, il n'en faut pas
conclure que le Roi nous abandonne, nous avons des assurances Tres fortes du
contraire."62
All attempt at compromise foundered on the rock of their obduracy. That neither they, nor
the French sought compromise is shown by their refusal to attempt to split the Represen-
tants or to enter into any negotiations whatsoever. Among the Representants, there were
clearly a number who had not been happy with the offer made to the Nat/Is. It had, after
all, taken two long months for their leaders to persuade them to support the enfranchise-
ment of third-generation Nat/Is.
France came increasingly, in the 1770s, to attempt to extend the scope of 'mediation' to
include interference at the behest of one party within the state. In the final analysis,
Geneva existed for the benefit of France and therefore had to bend to her will. As
Vergennes commented:
'The insurgents whom I am driving from Geneva are agents of England, while the
American insurgents are our friends for years to come. I have dealt with both of
them, not by reason of their political systems, but by reason of their attitudes
towards France. Such are my reasons of State."63
Although for d'Ivemois:
'le Comte de Vergennes avait resolu de faire une revolution a Geneve, bien avant
la destitution qui eut lieu en 1777; & plus de trente mois avant que l'apparition du
projet de Code lui en eut foumi le prêtexte.'164
Vergennes had no more desire than the Representants to make revolutions. The French
desire for a revision of the Treaty of Paris (1763) had been satisfied. At the same time the
French had worked hard in the United Provinces to extend their influence and take
advantage of the republican anti-Orangist feelings of the urban areas. The long minority of
William V and his lack of ability as a ruler, together with his perceived pro-British leanings
proved fertile ground in which France could sow seeds of discontent The Representants,
true to their political creed had sought to maintain the rights of the Conseil General, which,
they perceived, went back to the pre-Calvin days of the state. By 1780 this had come to
include a widening of the rights of Bourgeois status to others within the state.
Geneva was in the unusual position of possessing a constitution which had always
allowed for the small enlargement of the political class, though the numbers were much
reduced in comparison with new Bourgeois admitted in the sixteenth or late seventeenth
centuries. Nevertheless, the creation of new Bourgeois had continued there being entries
every year. Thus in Geneva, it cannot be argued that the constitution and the patriciate
'provided no means of lawful adjustment'.' 65 To allow the Natifs over a period of time to
be absorbed into the Bourgeois class would have created the 'evolutionary change' rather
than the revolution involved in the complete overthrow of the constitution as occured in
Rilliet, op. cit., p. 78 [my emphasis].
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1792. Neither the Representants party in the Bourgeois, nor the Negatifs and Constitution-
naires, both latter groups as well as the Representants being Bourgeois, wanted revolution
in Geneva. It was the refusal to accept the need for any evolution by some of the Negatifs
and all the Constitutionnaires that caused the breakdown. In Geneva, at least, 'inflexible
conservatism' appeared not 'after, and as a reaction to the French Revolution',' nor as
a result of the 'revolution' in the city in April 1782, it had been a dominant factor in the
city's political life throughout the century, as manifested in 1707, 1734-8, 1763-68 and in
the trouble over the Edit Bien faisant.
Nonetheless, in 1782, it was the Representants who introduced changes in way the
state was governed, and this created a precedent soon followed by the Constitutionnaires
in the post-July 1782 period. It was the forced abandonment by the Representants of the
way of legality that, to paraphrase Palmer, was 'to fundamentally alter the old constitution
of Geneva,'167 not the Edict to grant Bourgeois status to the Nat/Is. It remained to be
seen whether the restored Constftutionnaires would, in their turn, honour the old system of
governing Geneva, or whether they would need to introduce changes to remain in power.
loc.cit.
I"	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 359.
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Chapter IX
Final Failure 1 782-1 792
The capitulation of Geneva to the combined armies of France, Sardinia and Bern meant, in
effect, that the Constitutionnaires, and the Negatifs who supported them, could take control
of the state, backed by three armies. The introduction of the Black Code, as the new
Edicts of 1782 came to be known, was an attempt to make it impossible for any party
within the state to threaten the governing elite. The maintenance of a properly-formed
garrison of mercenaries from outside Geneva and officered by foreigners would, it was
hoped, ensure the safety of the government and the obedience of the people. The hurdle
of obtaining the necessary consent for the new code from the Conseil General was
overcome by the temporary suspension of many Bourgeois' right to vote in the Conseil
GOneral.
This chapter shows the increasing political unrest in France, together with the Europe-
wide difficulties caused by the harsh winter of 1788-89 led to a reconciliation in Geneva
between the government and the Bourgeois in February 1789. The adaptations of the
Black Code which resulted, though initially warmly welcomed, soon came under increasing
pressure, in part as a reflection of events in France. A further and more radical change in
1791 proved equally unavailing. The old Calvinist constitution was finally abrogated in early
December 1792, but this proved inadequate and an additional change was forced by the
mob at the very end of the month. Geneva thus had two 'new' constitutions in three weeks.
The abortive purging of the Bourgeois
By 2nd. July 1782, Geneva was taking on the air of an occupied city, with soldiers from
the three armies encamped within and without its walls. A series of proclamations by the
generals annulled all the decisions taken since 7th. April and returned to their positions all
those who had been dismissed from their posts and seats in the councils. The Syndics
established a commission to work with the three Plenipotentiaries on a plan of pacification
for Geneva, which contained eight members, two of whom were Representants, Barthe-
lemy Pierre Noel' and Jean Barde. 2 The anger of the Representants against Barde and
Noel for agreeing to serve on the commission was such that, by 10th. July, they wished to
resign. So important was their token role on the commission for the government, however,
that they were not 'permitted' to do so. It was arranged that they would meet separately
from the other members of the commission and send their report independently to
Vergennes. 3 The difficulty faced by the government over the commission and its composi-
tion was to be only the beginning of their troubles.
It was soon clear to the government and their supporters that there was to be no recon-
ciliation between the different parties in the state even though some Representant
members of the Deux Cents attended the first meeting of that council on 5th. July, such as
Pierre Noel, 1746-1814. Jean Barde, 1732-1819, one of the 24 Commissioners in 1766, a member of the 'illegal'
Petit Conseil April-July 1782. Both were moderate Representants.
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Jacques-Antoine Odier,4 Jacob Meynadier, Jean-Jacques Choisy, Sautter, Jean Johannot,
besides Jean Barde.5 There was a state of cold war within Geneva, and there were no
social contacts between those who were considered to be supporters of the Constitution-
naires and the majority of the Bourgeois, which was to endure for some years, to the
discomfort of the government and the patriciate who supported it and which underlined the
complete breakdown in confidence and trust between the two sides.
The Edict of Pacification was presented to the two smaller councils in November 1782 at
the same time as Un Acte de garantie et Traite de neutralite. The Edict of Pacification
became known as the 'Black Code', because it was imposed upon the city by the Constitu-
tionnaires, backed by the military might of France, Bern and Sardinia. The main changes
that it made were to remove the benefits that the Bourgeois had obtained in the Edict of
1768. There was to be no election by the Conseil General of one half of the replacements
in the Deux Cents. The right of the Conseil General to to replace 4 members of the Petit
Conseil was abolished. The right to make Representations was retained but made so com-
plicated and restricted as to abolish, in effect, that right too. There was to be an 'additional
council' attached to the Deux Cents, through which Representations were to be made, with
a number of Bourgeois elected by the Conseil General to sit on the council but they would
be outnumbered by appointments made from the two smaller councils. The post of Syndic
was to be filled automatically in rotation unless candidates were rejected by three-quarters
of the members of the Conseil General. The Allies and the government had done their
homework well. It was most unlikely that such a majority would ever be achieved, thus
reducing even the ancient right of the people to have only those Syndics for whom they
had voted to a nonsense.
In addition, the cercles were suppressed and were to be replaced by public cafés: 'il n'y
aurait point de chambres', and entry to all cafés was to be open 'a tous les particuliers'.6
Until 1782, the taverns or public houses had hired out rooms which were used as the
meeting places for the cercles, but the hiring of rooms for private meetings was no longer
permitted, and there were to be no political discussions allowed in the cafés. This prohibi-
tion was applied to all cercles and societies, even those which had existed for purely
scientific purposes:
'ou coteries d'hommes qui s'assemblaient chaque jour pèriodiquement dans le
mOrne lieu, soit dans la vile, soit A la campagne.' 7
The prohibition concerning the cercles was to attack the root of the organisation, not only
of the Representants but of all groups which desired to organise themselves within
Geneva, including the Natifs and Habitants, and made opposition very difficult. Strictly
enforced, it applied as much to the Constitutionnaires and the Negatifs as to others, and
also saw the destruction of the many non-political cercles which had existed for many
years within the city.
Taking a leaf out of the Representants' book, there was to be a new council called the
Conseil Militaire, which had the task of overseeing all military matters as well being
responsible for all cases which appeared to be 'Orneutes, attroupemens [de gens],
mouvemens tumultueux, etc.'5 To make any turther upheavals impossible, the possession
4	 See Appendix IV B IX/1.
5	 Chapuisat, op. cit., p. 121.




of guns was forbidden, the militia dissolved and the garrison was to be increased to 1,200
men from the previous 800. The two senior officers in the garrison were to be non-
Genevans. The newly-appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the garrison was in fact a Genevan,
Descombes, appointed because he had spent ten years in the service of the Holy Roman
Empire,9 and had not been involved in any political activity in the city. The necessity to
have an enlarged garrison not commanded by Genevans was a further indication of the
basis of the power of the new government. Imposed by force of arms, it was to survive by
the threat of the garrison against its own people. The visibility of the troops of the garrison
was to be a daily reminder to the Genevans of the reality of their situation and did little to
increase the chances of conciliation within the city.
Included within the Code were new taxes as well as increases in existing taxes. True to
the earlier promises given by the Constitutionnaires and the French government, the Nat/Is
were granted equal civic rights with the Bourgeois. The new Edict Of code was concluded
with a guarantee given jointly by France, Sardinia and Bern that there would be no
modification of the Code without their joint agreement. Finally, all the Bourgeois had to
take an oath to the new Code if they wished to retain their rights as citizens. The difficulty
was to have the code accepted by the Conseil General.
This problem was overcome by depriving a considerable number of the Bourgeois of the
right to vote. All those who had taken up arms earlier in the year were to be 'legally'
deprived of the right to vote, based on a clause in the Edict of 1738, which, according to
Vergennes:
'nous offre un moyen legal et sans replique. Cet edit prononce la peine de mort
contre tous ceux qui crieraient aux armes, ou qui les prendraient sans ordres du
gouvemement. Or, tous les representants, ou peu s'en faut, ont noirement trans-
gresse cette loi le 8 avril demier et depuis, donc tous les representants sont dignes
de mort. Commuer cette peine capitale en celle de les declarer dechus de leur droit
de cite, et leur interdire en consequence d'approcher du Conseil general oU sera
pone le nouvel Edit, ce sera de leur faire grace, et remplir en méme temps le but
propose et necessaire de faire neamoins accepter par le Conseil souverain,
compose des citoyens non coupables, l'edit de pacification."
All those who had voted in April 1782, to dismiss the members of the Petit Conseil and the
Deux Cents, were 'temporarily' refused the right to vote as well, as their act had also been,
according to Vergennes, against the Edicts. Thus, a considerable number of the Bourgeois
were disenfranchised, ensuring that the Black Code was accepted. It was not, as Palmer
claimed that 'only half the authorised voters appeared'", they had deliberately been
disenfranchised to ensure the passage of the Black Code. The anger of the Bourgeois was
great. They had taken up arms in 1782 not to overthrow the government, but to protect the
state from the continued rioting of the Natifs in the face of governmental inaction. Inevita-
bly, given the circumstances, the reduced Conseil General accepted the Edict, on 21st.
November, with 411 votes for to 113 against. The vote on the Edict was also not secret, so
it required some courage to vote against. Amongst those who did so were the majority of
the pastors, members of the Trembley family and an ex-Syndic, Guainier, 12 who was a
Chapuisat, op. tit, p. 159.
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Palmer, op. cit., p. 360.
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relative of Necker."
Geneva was certainly pacified, there was little threat to the government from a disarmed,
leaderless and disheartened population. By making all the cercies illegal, the patriciate had
struck at the roots of the organisation of the Representants. If they had been allowed to
continue after the exiling of their leaders, then certainly there would have been continued
and organised open opposition. Meeting in public places such as cafés made any serious
extensive organisation more difficult, as it was easy for the authorities to be aware of what
was happening.
The actual punishment of the Representants' leaders had still not been carried out by
the end of November, for a variety of reasons, the most potent of which was probably the
government's desire not to make itself more unpopular. In consequence, the Mediators
decided to determine the punishments themselves, and after much searching decided to
charge the leaders of the 'tyranny' with virtual high treason:
'[qulls] voulussent defendre leur tyrannie au peril de l'Etat entier, qu'ils voulussent
envelopper dans leur catastrophe les victimes de cette tyrannie, que dans ce but us
eussent prepare la destruction de la vile entiére, en amoncelant les poudres dans
l'eglise cathedrale et dans les souterrains de quelques maisons... '14
The storing of gunpowder in one of the safest places in the city, namely the cathedral, was
portrayed as a plot to blow up the town in case of attack, and so it was that Dentand,
Vieusseux, Jean Flournay, Etienne Claviere, J-A. Du Roveray, Francois d'Ivernois, and M-
F. Rochette were exiled for life by order of the Allies. The Genevan government had to
undertake never to recall them, just as the Mediators would not allow them to live in their
own territories within forty leagues of the Genevan frontiers. The Allies had no intention of
allowing easy access from Geneva to these dangerous subversives, learning perhaps from
the experience with Auziere and other Natifs who had remained at Femey. Jacques
Grenus, who was to play a disruptive role later, David Chauvet," Jean Janot, Guillaume
Ringler, J-J. Breuse la Motte, all former members of the Deux Cents, together with J-A.
Thuillier and EsaTe Gasc, both Bourgeois, and Jean-Louis Schraidl, a Natif, were all exiled
for ten years. The return of the second group was to be conditional upon a two-thirds
majority of the Deux Cents, but they could never again become members of the councils.
Many of the Bourgeois simply withdrew from 'public' life. The election for the Syndics of
1783 gave ample evidence of this, there being no more than 300 electors in the cathe-
dral." Others left Geneva, together with some Natifs, and went to live elsewhere; indeed,
before Geneva was handed over to the foreign troops in July, there had already been calls
for emigration:
'...[comme] le Gouvernement sera dësormais entre les mains d'hommes
pour lesquels ils ne pourront jamais avoir ni estime ni confiance, ils iront
chercher sous un autre del une terre oi, ils puissent respirer en paix l'air pur
de la liberte.'"
D'Ivernois was busy in Ireland, attempting to create a New Geneva with the backing of
13
	
D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol III (Tome II), pp. 178-180.
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BPU, Geneve, Ms. fr. 896, Lettre de Tres Illustres & Tres Excellens Seigneurs Les Ministres Plenipotentiares de
Leurs Majestes Tres Chretien & Sarde & de la Republique de Berne aux Magnifiques Seigneurs les Syndics &
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13	 See Appendix IV B IX13.
14	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 34me. parlie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 476.
17	 BPU, Geneve, Ms. 896, Demiere Declaration Des Genevois - Remise aux Seigneurs Syndics le mani 2 juillet a
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the Viceroy, Lord Temple. The venture was to fail, but for a while the possibility of Geneva
losing a proportion of its skilled workforce and the creation of a possible commercial rival
to the city caused concern to the government. The Edict of Pacification had, however,
granted all rights to the Natifs save political rights. It had also granted many rights to
Habitants. A good number of these were not so concerned with political rights that they
were prepared to take the obvious risks and financial hazards of emigration. Neither did
they have anyone to organise them from within Geneva, and, as Roget said in one of his
letters:
'II est certain que neuf dixiernes de la ville desirent ardemment en sortir, mais faire
et desirer sont choses Si differentesr8
Of those that did emigrate, many went not to Ireland, but to Brussels and only after they
had:
'prete sermon de fidelite a l'Etat, et non pour se rendre en lrelande mais a Bruxel-
les oil us establissent une Maison des plus considerables puisqu'elle ote sur notre
Place quatre millions en Negociations.'
It was men like this, with capital behind them, that were badly needed in Ireland. The
mixture of principle with financial security, as demonstrated by the example above, was a
typical Genevan 'compromise'. The same letter goes on to report that, of those who had
left for Ireland, 'II y a trois natifs pour un Bourgeois'. They had taken only their tools with
them and little, if any, money.
These were the 'ouvriers horlogers', the men who made the different parts of the
watches, from the mechanisms or parts of the mechanisms, to the hands, and so on, from
which the complete watches would then be assembled. It was the Bourgeois and some of
the artisan Natifs who assembled and sold the watches. The former would be needed in
considerable numbers in order to provide the capital to ensure that the workers had the
necessary materials, food and accommodation until the first sales of completed watches
were made. Hence Pictet's certainty that the settlement in Ireland was doomed to failure.
The arrest and condemnation of Melly, 2° when he returned to Geneva to persuade and
organise more recruits for the enterprise, showed how seriously the government took the
threat. Melly was able to organise his escape from prison in Geneva with the help of
friends and by bribing his gaolers. He was forced to rely on this method of escape due to
the inability of Britain to protect him, even though he had become a British citizen.
Although the government was neither corrupt nor lazy this had no influence on the
people, who continued to harbour resentments concerning past events. The Genevans
found various ways to make their protest at the way the state was being run. One of the
earliest was the brother-in-law of Reybaz21 who, on 15th. July 1782, went to the Syndic
responsible for financial matters offering to return his certificate of Bourgeois status, which
he had received as a result of the terms of the Edict of 1768. He also, however, demand-
ed:
'les cent Ocus ['?] que lui avoit coute sa bourgeoisie. On lui a fait beaucoup de
compliments on seroit bien facile de perdre un tel citoyen, et lui on refuse sa de-
mande.'22
Is	 F.F. Roget, Lettres, op. cit., de Lausanne, 19 octobre 1782, p. 278.
Is	 Ms. 32, op. ca, 21 9bre. 1783, 300.
20	 See Appencix IV B IX/4.
21	 See Appencix IV B IX/5.
n	 BPU Gentive, Ms. Reybaz 926 Lettres diverses tenues pendant sa mission a Paris 1792-3, 15 juillet 1782, 5.
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The writer continues:
'Ce seroit a mon avis un excellent proces a soutenir contre la Seigneurie.'23
Sadly, it does not seem to have been an idea which was followed. It would have caused
the government considerable embarassement, both financial and civil. It also required
some courage to march into the Town Hall, confront one of the Syndics and demand the
return of a fee paid for a 'returned honour' in the atmosphere of the time.
The government, basing the Pacification of November 1782, as it did on the Edict of
1738, decided that they should prepare all the Edicts for publication, which, though
promised in 1738, had still not been done. The Constitutionnaires were therefore at last
able to create the body that they had hoped to have in 1779 after the ending of the bi-
partisan committee by the vote of the Deux Cents. This Code des Edits politiques was
prepared and submitted to the Conseil General for approval or rejection on 20th March.
1783:
'301 personnes l'approuverent, 388 le rejetterent. II avoit 731 citoyens Bourgeois on
donnait son suffrage, selon le nouvel Edict, [la Pacification] non a l'oreille de
secretaires d'artume mais dans les loges. On a conclu de la qu'il y a 388 Repre-
sentants plus animes, et que tous les autres etoient indifferens [a regard de] ce
que le Gouvernement faisoit.'24
D'Ivemois goes further and claims that two-thirds of the Bourgeois had decided not to
attend this Conseil General:
'afin de protester ainsi par leur retraite, contre la spoliation de ses droits.'25
The old Genevan habit was in full play once again, non-attendance being a passive form
of disapproval. Most of the Bourgeois who had remained in the town, that is the vast
majority, had had their right to vote in the Conseil General returned. Yet the numbers
remained low. For important matters throughout the century, the numbers hover around
1,200. Those who felt strongly, nearly 400, attended and voted, but that leaves at least
another 400 unaccounted for. The numbers voting for the government during this period
remain fairly static around the 300 mark. What is impossible to know is whether those who
refused to attend the meetings would have gone if the Representants had been able to
organise their followers, as they had previously been able to because, within a mere nine
months of a government being formed, it was in a minority in the Conseil General. This
highlights how important the three-quarters vote to reject a Syndic was for the continuation
of the government. It was also an indication of the inherent weakness of the government's
position with regard to the part of the population which had political rights, counterbalanced
by the weakness of the Bourgeois with no-one to organise them and their party organisa-
tion destroyed.
The number of Bourgeois who had decided to swear the oath of loyalty to the state after
the Pacification made it inevitable that the government would quickly lose control of the
Conseil General if all the Bourgeois attended. By 13th. December, Pictet 26 in a letter to
Mountstuart 27 stated:
'dans quatre Conseils ... plus de 700 Bourgeois ou Habitants ... se sont acquittes
23
24	 BPU Genêve, Ms. 901 Journal d'Ami Dunant, Vol. I, le 12 mars 1783, 36.
23	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. III (Tome II), p. 253.
26	 See Appendix IV B IX/6.
See Appendix IV B IX17.
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de ce devoir.'28
Even Pictet himself, together with his brother, had decided to take the oath, confiding to
Mountstuart that:
'II n'est pas aise de se refuser a ce qu'on exige ... Au surplus ce sermen n'engage
qu'autant que nous resterons attaches au sol, et quand on ne sera jamais mele du
Gouvemement, II est plus indifferent de suivre telle Joy de preference a d'autres.'29
Doubtless such sentiments were common amongst many in the Bourgeois desiring to
remain in Geneva. At least, in taking the oath, they protected their Bourgeois status and
would, in the future, when there had been another political change, be able to take part in
the Conseil General and to vote. By the end of January 1783, Pictet was able to report.
'ii n'y a pas sept membres du 200 [qui] ne se soit acquite de ce devoir.'39
As March 1783 showed, although shorn of many of its rights, the Conseil General could
still reject new laws recommended by the government. By the end of 1783, the govern-
ment, though, must have been content:
Imalgrel le mecontentement, de 17 a 18 cent bourgeois que nous comptons,
quatorze cent ont préte le serment, et le Reste eat ou absent ou n'ayant pas
l'age.'31
By the end of the period permitted to the Bourgeois to take the oath, only 136 had refused
to do so. 32 Those who remained in the city lost all their rights as Bourgeois and were re-
duced in status to the equivalent of Domicilies. This was a new category of resident
introduced by the Edict of Pacification. It differed from Habitants in that children born in the
city were unable to become Natifs, they remained Domicilies. Reduced to stark simplicity,
there was very little choice for the majority of the Bourgeois but to comply and swear the
oath, they were victims of political and economic blackmail.
The majority of the population was able to work unaffected by the government and
therefore opted to stay. The atmosphere was not pleasant in the city:
'oil l'on n'est plus environne que des mouches, di un seul mot est souvent puni
comme un crime, Cu le jour se passe a emprisonner, a donner la bastonnade, a
infliger des supplices de tout genre.'33
Deprived of their leaders, unable to openly express their views, without their arms, the
people of Geneva in the first few years after the Pacification appeared very subdued and
unlike themselves, with many contining to refuse to attend the meetings of the Conseil
General. At the same time, because of this 'strike' of the Bourgeois voters, the govern-
ment found it impossible to find candidates from the Bourgeois willing to sit on the council
attached to the Deux Cents. The result was the reappointment of the same people. To the
majority of the Bourgeois, the council was considered to be little more than window-
dressing, as is seen by the fact that there were few if any Representations.
a	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 32 Intelligence from Geneva 1779-1783, 286.
a	 loc. cit.
30	 Ibid., Geneve, fe 22 fOvrier 1783, 290-1.
31	 Ibid., 21 9bre. 1763, 300.
32	 Kannin, op. cit., p. 109, f.33.
33	 F.F. Roget, Lettros, op. cit., de Lausanne, 19 octobre 1782, pp. 277-8.
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Punishment, reports and taxation
In Geneva since 1718, the Bourgeois had been an organised political force, albeit
outside the main political bodies. They had become dependent on the cercles as the outlet
for their political energies. The double-headed attack on the cercles, with the exiling of the
leaders and the prohibition of the cercles, together with the severity with which any attempt
to skirt around the new restrictions against any political meetings and discussions was met,
had succeeded in halting united political action by the Bourgeois within the state. Just how
carefully the government watched for any attempt at party organisation was shown when a
lawyer, Bousquet,34 was sent to prison for:
'avoir voulu eluder la loi qui supprimait les Cercles, en invitant plusieurs fois les
mOrnes amis dans sa maison.'35
Knowing the Bourgeois well, the government relied on spies and rumour to attempt to
prevent them from trying to get round the law. The patriciate would remember that it was
various dinner parties and evening meetings of friends in private homes that had sustained
the Bourgeois between 1707 and the 1730s, and they had no intention of permitting similar
actions in 1783. It must have been a busy time, trying to keep a track of who ate where,
with whom and how often. The need to prosecute in such a case was also further proof of
how insecure and weak the government was.
The supervision of the population which the Bousquet case shows makes it seem
unlikely that, as claimed by Godechot:
'In Geneva, the "natives", after their defeat in 1782, reorganised and prepared to
resume the struggle.'36
Perhaps in the alleyways and taverns of St. Gervais it was easier to escape government
spies, but there seems little evidence of such organisation existing underground.
What the government had not been able to do was to divorce the Representants and the
Natifs from their ideas and beliefs. The Representants had played an increasingly impor-
tant role in the state from 1768 to 1782. The withdrawal and the smouldering resentment
of what was the greater part of the 'political' body of the state should have made it clear to
the government that there was a need for some attempt at genuine 'pacification'.
The Natifs were less of an immediate danger. The events of 1780-1782 had seen them
make considerable strides forward to equal civil rights with the Bourgeois. Their admission
in 1782, in limited form, to political rights had been only for a relatively short period. Thus
the Edict of Pacification, though it had deprived some of the Natifs of their newly-acquired
political rights, did not deprive them of their civic equality with the Bourgeois. By this
means, the Natifs retained the financial gains they had obtained before 1782. Any attempt
by the Natifs to cause trouble within the state could well have brought their civic rights into
question. Also they were well aware that the Bourgeois, a more powerful group within
Geneva, had been reduced to a weak position vis-a-vis the government.
Both the Bourgeois and the Natifs were also aware that the current government in the
city was there because of the military backing that it had received from the French,
Sardinians and Bernese. France and the other powers had already demonstrated their
willingness to use considerable military might to impose on Geneva a minority party as the
government of the state. It was the fear of further armed support by the Guarantors that
was the main threat which kept the Natifs and Bourgeois from overt opposition.
34	 See Appendix IV B IX/8.
33	 D'Ivemois, op.cit, Vol. III (Tome II), p. 210.
as	 Godechot, op. cit., p. 130.
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The reality of the situation in Geneva was faced squarely in a report made to the Conseil
militaire in July 1783, concerning the question of the city's fortifications and artillery. It
acknowledged the unpopularity of the government:
'qu'il n'y a que peu ou point de changement dans les dispositions des Represen-
tants.'37
The suppression of the cercles and the establishment of the garrison, 'une force physique',
together with the loss of arms and the military societies, all these had served to increase
the number of those opposed to the government:
faut encore observer que dans la classe des indiffarens, des neutres & des
Constitutionnaires eux-marnes [il y a beaucoup qui] ne s'y sont soumis qu'avec
repugnance.'38
This was the crux of the matter: even for some of their own supporters, the government
had paid far too high a price for power. In the history of the previous eighty years,
compromise and negotiations had played integral parts in settling differences. This had
been abandoned in April and July 1782. The government had introduced a code which put
into practice all it desired, treating the Bourgeois as little better than a conquered people,
rather than fellow citizens with the same political rights. In its actions, the government had
succeeded in alienating considerable numbers of the population, including some in what
should have been their natural constituency.
The supporters of the government who drew up the report did not hesitate to state
clearly to the government that their power and position within the state was based on the
fear within the city of the guarantee given by France, Sardinia and Bern to the Edict of
Pacification, calling it 'la clef de la voOte'. The report wanted to rid Geneva of its existing
defences. The argument was based on various points, one of which was the cost of
uprating these defences. Another was that, in any future trouble in the city, the Mediators
would be more inclined to come to the help of Geneva if they did not have to mount a
siege, but could, because of the city's lack of defences, march straight in.
The government faced other difficulties, apart from unpalatable reports. The decline in its
finances led it to look for new sources of income. The change in the status of the Natits
meant that there were fewer people in the city paying the higher taxes that those without
civic rights had to pay. The government had been forced to raise all kinds of new taxation
when it came to power in July 1782, and, for a party that took its inspiration from France, it
was surprising that, in fact:
'Lord North a (Re le Modèle et on Pa assez
The cost of the American War had forced North's government to raise taxes on houses,
carriages, coaches, servants and a considerable number of luxury goods. Clearly, the
government in Geneva hoped by using such indirect taxes to avoid increasing personal
taxation, which would, of course, fall heavily upon its own followers. Under the circum-
stances, such new taxes were unlikely to add to the government's popularity. There was
an additional problem, namely a slow but clear haemorrhage of the population of the city,
which continued throughout this period. In 1785:
'Le résumé des roles des Dizaines donnat environ 25, 500 habitans dans la ville,
dont 4,600 dans St. Gervais et dans l'Isle... Celui de 1786 donnat 25,297 habitans
dans la
37	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. III (Tome II), p. 229-237, ft. 13.
38	 loc. cit
30	 MS. 32, op. cit, Pregny 20 novembre 1782, 280.
40	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 901, Vol. II, novembre 1785-fin 1789, 48.
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Although this was apparently a small drop, there was constant worry about the city losing
some of its more skilled workers, taking their abilities elsewhere and creating a new centre
to rival Geneva. The atmosphere in the city was a possible contributing factor to the
decline in the population, but fewer people also meant less taxes for the government
Geneva was not alone in facing internal unrest and foreign interference. While the city
was trying to come to terms with the 'Black Code', trouble erupted in the United Provinces.
The Amsterdam Regents, the oligarchy which ruled the city and had extensive influence in
Holland and thus in the Estates-General, were traditionally interested in limiting the power
of the stadtholder. Their encouragement of such sentiments led to the lesser Bourgeois to
form the Patriot Movement and the Bourgeois Free Corps to help in the removal of
Orangist municipal and provincial governments. William V's rights were abolished in many
of the urban areas, although he retained the support of the country and the unskilled
workers. He was even forced to leave his capital in 1786. 41 Unfortunately, the Free
Corps, influenced by the new United States wanted to create a federal republic, not the
unitary state desired by the oligarchy. A meeting of the national federation of the Free
Corps at Utrecht in 1786 even talked about the extension of political rights and a national
representative assembly of the 'Netherlands people'. The success of the Patriots and Free
corps in Utrecht in their goal of an elective government in Utrecht was not dissimilar to the
way that the Bourgeois in Geneva had used the Militia to organise until 1738; the Patriots
ability to bring 2,000-5,000 men together at a time reflected the action of 1734 in Geneva.
As Geyl, cited by Schama contends, such ability implies 'both an ideology and an organ-
isation',42 and as in Geneva in 1782, so in Utrecht there was no bloodshed. But in
Geneva, the struggle was between the oligarchy and the Bourgeois and Nat/Is, while in
Holland, the struggle was complicated by the third fact of the Stadtholder and the Oran-
gists. The attempt to adapt the constitution in Geneva was of long standing, while in
Holland attempts by the burghers was of very recent birth, encouraged by the new
America and the action of John Adams in addressing the various Regents and Pension-
aries around the country on behalf of the American cause and Dutch recognition of himself
as Ambassador. The petitioning campaign with its associated meetings to persuade the
States to accept Adams gave the Dutch impetus:
'America had held up a mirror to their own Republic in which they had glimpsed an
idealised image of heroic patriotism ... [the Dutch] passed to further action more
directly reminiscent of events on the other side of the Atlantic, public meetings,
petition campaigns and agitation for a citizens' militia.'43
Geneva had had a Militia until 1782, its first public meetings were in 1707, petitions (i.e.
Representations) there had been aplenty throughout the century, most to no avail, the
influence of American actions upon Genevan politics was negligable, (it was not to
America to settle that those who left Geneva went post-July 1782 but to Belguim, to
England and Ireland and to France).
The result for the Dutch was the same as that of Geneva. The action of Prussia with
naval support from England in 1787 restored the Stadtholder to power and purged the 	 .
state of all those who had shown any sympathy to the Patriots and the Free Corps, exiling
or silencing all overt opposition, again a situation that was familiar in Geneva.
41
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Hesitant opposition and new perils
The withdrawal of the Bourgeois from active political life in the city, together with the
repressiveness of the government meant that it was not until 1786 that the first overt,
public resistance was shown. A public disagreement and fight between a young Bourgeois
and an officer of the garrison led to the former's imprisonment. He believed himself to be
owed redress, instead of which:
fut condamne a trente jours de chambre close, dont huit au pain & a l'eau.'44
An anonymous pamphlet appeared, despite the strict censorship, which attacked the
sentence and the Petit Conseil. Believing that it had been printed in Neuchatel, the
government in Geneva sought the assistance of that government in an attempt to trace
both the publisher and the author. When this was to no avail, the Genevan government
opened lettcm passing through the post, but the author was never traced. The appearance
of the pamphlet was a straw in the wind, a sign that the Representants and others were
becoming less cowed than they had been in 1783.
So clear was the cleavage between the government and the majority of the body politic
that even Vergennes began to see the dangers of the situation. In a letter to the French
Resident in Geneva, Castelnau, he suggested:
'On ne peut pas forcer les representants a entrer dans le gouvernement; cependant
comme il serait a desirer que leur scission cessat d'être aussi marquee, il con-
viendrait qu'on s'occupat d'avance, sans affectation des moyens, d'en engager un
certain nombre a se presenter pour la premiere election.'45
The desire of Vergennes to create a legal opposition in the city was too late. It also
demonstrated the inability of Vergennes to understand what had happened in Geneva
since 1707. The belief that a few Bourgeois could be bribed to go through the motions of
being elected to a council that none of them accepted and which was the ever-present
proof of the victory of the Constitutionnaires in imposing the Black Code was absurd. For
the Bourgeois in Geneva, it was a matter of principle that no money or bribe could
subjugate. Unfortunately for Vergennes, Geneva was unlike many of the other Swiss
cantons, where French money was used to buy support. The Reprèsentants had, until April
1782, always maintained a legal opposition to the government. The imposition of the Black
Code on Geneva by force made it impossible for them to respond. The desire of the
French to have some candidates for the seats on the committee concerned with ReprO-
sentations showed how much they still failed to understand the situation in the city.
Continuing to consider the leaders of both the ReprOsentants and the Natifs as leaders of
faction, they found it impossible to compTehend that they wale supptrieti by Ma majunty oi
those groups in the city.
Those amongst the Negatifs who had supported the introduction of the Edict of Pacifica-
tion, but who had been alienated from the government by the near police-state which had
resulted, only began to make their unhappiness more publicly known in 1786, but, as
always, the Genevans were falling into their old habits:
'on dit toujours que presque tout le monde est mecontent a ce Geneve, & que les
Negatifs ne s'en cachent plus; ce que sembleroit devoir reunir les deux partis, & ne
le fait pas. us s'amusent seulement reciproquement a se faire des reproches;
chacun veut que ce soit l'autre qui soit cause de tout.'"
4 4	 D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol III (Tome II), p. 212, I. 2.
Karmin, op. cit., p. 169, ft 59, 2 juin 1784.
•	 BPU Geneve, Ms. suppl. 1010 Francois d'Ivemois Correspondence, de Floumay, Neuchfitel 28 9bre. 1786, 81.
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If the Representanfs and the discontented 1n16gatifs could have acted in concert, then they
might well have been able to block the election of the Syndics, but they seemed unable to
unite, even to try to force the government to make some concessions.
Only after the death of Vergennes in 1787, did the government begin to take his advice
to heart. It had been Vergennes who had been the champion of the Consfitufionnaires,
now they could no longer rely on such strong support from that quarter. Moreover, the
French government was also becoming increasingly involved in complex internal matters,
which did little to help the Genevan government.
A visit to Geneva by Dumont 47 in January 1788, when he preached several sermons,
led the Syndics to approach him to take the oath to the state, as he was now of an age to
do so. He refused, leaving to return to his tutorship to Lord Lansdowne's son." Attempts
were also made to discuss politics with d'Ivernois on two occasions when he was on the
frontiers of Geneva. He twice met with the Procureur-General, Prevost-Cabanis," but on
both occasions refused to talk politics. Any opposition would be little more than a cosmetic
measure, to organise any group as an opposition required meetings and discussions of a
political nature, forbidden under the existing law. The only way in which the Genevan
government would be able to escape from the situation in which it had placed itself was by
making concessions to induce some level of response from the Bourgeois and their own
followers. Unfortunately, nothing in the Black Code could be altered without the agreement
of all three Mediators, and, in 1787 and 1788, they were most unlikely to sanction any
changes whatever. Without changes, there was no hope of any compromise with their
political opponents, and changes which would possibly encourage political dialogue and
agreement would never be accepted by the Mediators.
New perils and dangers
The loss of a number of artisans in la fabrique together with some of their workers to
places such as Constance, where they attempted to create a watchmaking industry under
the protection of Joseph II, does not appear to have had a profound effect upon the
industry in Geneva, although the Austrian attempt to protect its products made it difficult to
sell Genevan watches in the Empire. More important was the fact that for a number of
months in 1782, it had been difficult to obtain watches from Geneva and foreign traders
had discovered replacements, especially the growing watch industry of la Chaux-de-Fonds
in Neuchatel, where they found:
'd'ouvrages prets ... qui leur ont paru beaux, bons, Olegants, au pair de ceux de
Geneve, et a meilleur marche; ils les ont achete, ...quelques uns de ces nouveaux
chalants reviendront...'5°
It was this loss of foreign trade which appears to have been the cause of the decline in
Geneva's watch industry. There was the additional problem of the high tariffs of up to one
tenth of value charged by France on Genevan watches and jewellery entering the country.
An attempt in 1787 to persuade the French government of the disadvantages of this tariff
(Geneva was one of the main sources taking up French loans, etc) failed. French need for
a	 See Appendix IV B Ix/9.
46	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 901, Vol. II, le 25 janvier 1788.
4.	 'Carmel, op. cit., p. 169.
50	 Piuz at Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 5eme. parlie, Mottu-Weber, Ch. XVI, p. 497.
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money was too great.51
As it was the French who had been the prime movers in placing the Constitutionnaires in
government in Geneva, it was poetic justice that it should be from France that came the
first signs that their regime was unlikely to survive for long. Vergennes' successors, as the
Constitutionnaires had feared, were far less interested in Geneva than they were in the
political unrest and financial insolvency of France. The decision to call a meeting of the
States Genera152 in France pushed the concerns of the tiny city state of Geneva well into
the background.
However, this meeting was used by a group of the Genevan exiles to attempt to gain
some advantage, especially with regard to what was considered to have been the severity
of France towards the Representants. A meeting in Paris between Claviere, Dumont,
Berenger (who was now a Bourgeois), and d'Ivernois possibly worked on a document to
present to the Estates General when they were all in Paris, though no trace of it has been
found.53 It was Claviere who was to have by far the greatest influence, and he remained
in Paris, closely associated with Mirabeau and Brissot."
One symbol of the close association between Vergennes, France and the Constitution-
naires still remained very active in Geneva after his death. This was the theatre which had
been needed for the entertainment of the officers. In 1782, a theatre was built in stone, a
permanent memorial to French influence and interference in the city. The cost was to be
borne by subscription, but 'le nombre des souscrivans n'êtoit pas si grand' and the
constructors were forced:
'de laisser une partie de la somme qu'on leur devroit hypotheque sur le baliment,
en leur [magons et charpentiers] donnant le cinq per cent.'"
Thus the theatre became a regular part of life for some Genevans, not least because it
was only in the theatre that they were able, legally, to gather in large groups without
causing the authorities to check what they were doing. The theatre brought in its train,
together with the garrison, all manner of problems that the city had escaped until that time.
It was not much patronised by the supporters of the Representants, but was much enjoyed
by the patriciate. It was perhaps fitting that the weakness of the government and its
garrison was first shown because of an order to expel an actress, because she was being
courted by the son of a junior official. He persuaded the government to send her away."
The Authorities' decision that she should leave the city led to a minor riot which was
finally broken up by armed soldiers from the garrison. 57 Many in Geneva might well have
forgotten that the garrison was there, not to protect them from outside forces, but to ensure
51 Babel, 'Histoire corporative', op. cit., pp.280-281. The political differences referred to by Lands must be those of
1780-82, the consequences of which are mentionned above; there were no open or visible conflicts in the city in
the middle 80s. Landes, op. cir., p. 356.
52	 Cobban, op. cit., p. 263. The States-General was convened in August, to meet the following year.
93	 Karmin, op. cit., p. 169.
55	 See Appendix IV B IX/10.
SS	 BPU Gonave, Ms. 901, Vol. I, le 3 mars 1783, 33.
5•	 She was popular and people murmured that Auclif•oud should simply keep his son in during the evenings.
57	 The leaders of this trouble were three young sons of patrician families, Richard Calandrini, his brother Marc and
Jean Sarasin an officer in the Prussian army. The father of Marc and Jean was Francois Sarasin, 1723-1803, was
one of the most senior government ministers. He had been a Syndic three times, 78, 82, 86, and was to be First
Syndic in 1790. The fact that Francois Sarasin had been a Syndic in 1786, but was also chosen in the freer
situation of 1790 indicates that he was a moderate NOgatif.
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the continuation in power of a certain group within the state. December 1788 and the
events at the theatre made that message very clear, and any doubt was dispelled by the
satisfaction of the Deux Cents at the behaviour of the troops. As Fazy points out, the
whole matter had been ill-managed and made it clear that there still was:
'une certaine tension, un certain mecontentement, qui se manifestaient dans la
population...'8
It had also shown a reluctance on the part of the government to fire on the crowd, even
when it was throwing stones and menacing, a fact that was duly noted by some in the
town:
Shortly after this unrest in December 1788, within three weeks, there was a further
manifestation of discontent at the election of the Syndics in January 1789. 879 turned up
for the meeting of the Conseil General for the election of four Syndics. They were all duly
elected but with three fifths of the votes against them. 66 This followed what had happened
in 1788 when there were 909 electors at the meeting for the confirmation of 3 Syndics,
MM. Bonnet, Michell and Ami Rilliet. Bonnet had 470 for with 425 against; Michell was 409
for and 491 against; Rilliet 503 with 396 against. As Ami Dunant says:
'II y eut a peu pres 400 representants contre les 3 ... [qui voulurent] montrer qu'ils
desapprouveroient toujours la loi de 82 n'ayant pas d'autre moyen de faire voir.'66
Just as in 1788, so in 1789 in none of the cases was there a three-quarters majority
against the three, but it was a demonstration, after seven years of the current regime, that
the Representants were unbowed and beginning to organise themselves, regardless of the
difficulties of doing so. The result was exactly the same as that which had occurred in
1786, when an attempt had been made to exclude Claude-Philippe Claparede from his
position as Syndic. That too had failed to achieve the three quarters of votes required to
prevent his taking his place.62 All these attempts demonstrated how difficult it would be to
prevent the automatic rotation of the members of the Petit Conseil as Syndics unless the
Representants could organise their followers and persuade all of them to attend meetings
of the Conseil General. In the case of Micheli in particular, the announcement that he
returned to his post as a Syndic with ?a superiorke des suffrages' was, to an outsider,
beyond comprehension. Where was the authority of a Syndic when he was elected by a
minority?
The rioting at the theatre and the meeting of the Conseil General in January 1789 took
place against a backdrop of a particularly cold and hard winter. The fountains in the city
were unable to function because the RhOne was frozen and the water wheels were unable
to work. There had been a poor harvest in 1788 and in the autumn, due to the unusual
dryness, the mills for the grinding of corn had been unable to work at full capacity, leading
to a shortage of flour. All the normal measures had been introduced: forbidding cakes,
allowing the entry of flour into the town and restricting the departure of bread from the
town as well as the distribution of ration tickets. 63 An initial attempt to raise the price of
bread by the Chambre des Bles was rejected by the Deux Cents, because of the severe
10	 Fary, Genêve de 1788 A 1792, op. cit., p. 7.
a	 Ibid., p. 17. The tour elected were Augustine de Candolle, Jean-Jacques Dunant, J-Baptiste-Frangois Fatio and
Jean-Frangois Thellusson.
.0	 BPU Geneve, Ms 901, Vol. II, janvier 1788, p. 48.
ill	 See Appenclx IV B IX/11.
a	 BPU Geneve, Ms. Reybaz 926, 8 janvier 1786, P. 25.
SO	 Piuz et Mottu-Weber, op. cit., 4eme. partie, Piuz Ch. XIV, p. 383.
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conditions. But eventually, they agreed to raise the price of the 'pain ordinaire' from 41/2
sols to 5, white bread was to be sold at 7 sols, and restrictions on taking bread out of the
city were lifted." The price was raised in an attempt to stop the illegal traffic in bread
from Geneva to the areas outside the city. The price being cheaper in the city than outside
it, there were fears that the amount of bread being bought in the town and taken out would
lead to the complete emptying of stores in the city.
During the next two days, there was rioting by the Natifs and Habitants which the
garrison was unable to end, notably in St. Gervais. There the rioters had organised
themselves sufficiently to use two fire pumps which they primed with boiling water, vinegar
and soap. Their other weapons were stones ripped from the roads and tiles from the roofs.
Even the cannons which were finally bought up were unable to operate because of the
effects of the water spray." The troops were halted in front of the bridges and could
advance no further. The inability of the military to enter St. Gervais and re-establish calm
made retreat by the government inevitable.
It was only when the government reduced the price of bread and released those who
had been arrested that the rioting halted and there was calm throughout the town by
nightfall. Further rioting was occasioned by the stupidity of the Military Council in putting
the garrison under full arms at the time of the funeral of two of those killed in the earlier
riots. This led to a reaction by those attending and the temporary seizure of some of the
city's gates. Reassured by the withdrawal of the troops to barracks, they handed the gates
back and all was calm by five in the afternoon.
The government had to face the fact that the garrison was not able to deal with rioting in
the confines of Geneva. The desertion of part of the garrison with their arms added to their
problems, yet all was not black. The rioting had calmed immediately the price of bread was
dropped, making it clear that there was little, if any, political calculation behind the trouble,
and the return of the city's gates once the cannon and troops had been returned to
barracks proved the point. For the government, however, the lesson was clear: they could
not rely on the garrison.
Throughout the rioting, the Representants, the greater part of the Bourgeois, had
remained neutral. Once it was clear that the Conseil militaire had lost control of the
situation, the government was left with no choice but to turn to the Bourgeois for help. The
Bourgeois had little sympathy for the majority of the rioters, and it was clear that they
would be able to extract some concessions from the government if they agreed to assist it.
There could be no doubt that the concessions would be amendments to the Edict of
Pacification. The few Representants who remained in the Deux Cents asked for a revision
and were supported by the Procureur-General, Prevost." For Tronchin, the situation was
different:
'on saisit ce moment merne oCt tout le monde est dans la consternation et l'effroi
pour produire inopinement [ce changement] qu'on vient de susciter mais qui tendra
alterer en plusieurs points essentiels la constitution de retat.'67
This was clearly the 'official' viewpoint of the Constitutionnaires. If the riots had been to
extract concessions from the government, why had the rioters not followed up their initial
successes and forced concessions for themselves? They had instead gone home, once
the price of bread returned to its previous level, and the second time (when their advan-
"	 loc. cit.
D'Ivemois, op. cit., Vol. III (Tome II), pp. 270-72.
P.E. Martin, op. ciL, Berne. panie, Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Ch. IX, p. 479.
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tage was even greater), when assured that the soldiers and cannon had retired, they had
returned home. As Fazy says:
'ce qui prouvait que le pris de pain avait etO la cause róelle et non le pretexte de la
prise d'armes.'"
Without the garrison, which had proved useless in the urban environment, it was inevitable
that the government would look to the only other source of protection in the state. This was
the state Militia, abolished by the Black Code. The Reprêsentants, delighted though they
may have been at the government's discomforture were not prepared to stand aside while
the Natifs discovered this fact and learned to play on it for their own ends, as they surely
would. It was a return to the norm, since
'... militia armies whose members were the benefitiaries of the constitution [were]
unlikely to wish to destroy it.'69
What the bread riots had done, quite unconsciously, was to re-establish in Geneva a more
normal political situation, with both sides having something to offer the other as the price of
their respective future cooperation.
With calm returned to the city and joint patrols of Bourgeois, Negatifs and Constitution-
naires operating in the streets and holding the gates, the Petit Conseil named a group of
councillors to begin negotiations concerning a reform of the constitution (30th. January
1789). The small commission consisted of Des Arts, Lullin, Dunant and Rigaud 70 , and
the Procureur-General negotiated with them on behalf of the Bourgeois. The revisions
were drawn up quickly and boiled down to revisions of the Edict of Pacification or Black
Code. This was unfortunate, for the Black Code was not removed in its entirety but
remained in force with changes; it was still the law that had been introduced in November
1782 by force of foreign arms. As a result, the compromise reached had the feel of
'Konkordanz politik'. There was an advantage in coming to terms with the majority political
group in the state, who had shown in previous years considerable organisation. A united
Bourgeois in Geneva would be better enabled to withstand the uncertain future. It was not
that the government had converted wholesale to the views of the old ReprOsentants. It was
better to have the Representants on the government's side than against it or even neutral.
The commission suggested the suppression of the Conseil militaire and the replacing of
the garrison by the militia, in which the Bourgeois and the Natifs played a part. The cercles
were to be allowed to re-open, but 'de n'y plus parler politique'. 71 There was, however, no
system that was to ensure that this latter wish would be obeyed. In the Genevan context, if
cercles were permitted, there would be political discussion, but the 'prohibition' was a way
to disguise the enormity of the point conceded. The Natifs of the fourth generation were to
be admitted to the ranks of the Bourgeois. Elections in the Conseil GOneral were to be by
majority vote, including, as before, for the Syndics. The Conseil General was to have the
right to elect all the members of the Petit Conseil, and, for every vacancy that occurred,
the Deux Cents would submit three names from which the choice would be made. The last
right was not, however, to come into effect for ten years. The strict censorship introduced .
in July 1782 was also to continue. The most difficult question was the recall of those exiled
as	 Fazy. Genéve de 1788 a 1792, op. cit., p. 39.
N	 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, op. di, p. 84, citing Trenchard 'An Argument, pp. 21-22 in the The Pamphleteer, X,
132-133).
70 Karmin, op. cit., p. 175. All four were members of the Petit Conseil, and Des Arts and Lullin had been to the fore
of the Constitutionnaires since 1779. Dunant was a Syndic who had done much to calm the rioters of St. Gervais
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in 1782. Normally in Geneva, except for those involved in the spiking of the guns in 1734,
exiles, when recalled, were able to return to their positions in the smaller councils. All that
could be agreed was that the exiles of 1782 would be recalled to the city, though they
would be unable to re-take their seats in the councils. Tronchin made the valid point:
'Comment esperer que ces hommes qui s'etoient edges en Legislateurs ne
reviennent dans leur Patrie que pour s'y perdre dans la foule et se soumettre
paisiblement a un regime dont us ont déjà hautement temoigne une vive indigna-
tion? Cela n'est point dans la nature et moms encore dans leur nature.'"
For him, the best solution would be for France to:
'declarer que [dans] l'interet de notre tranquilite	 l'engagement de ne les [les
exiles] jamais rapeller, ce seroit nous rendre un important service.'"
It was inevitable, if the exiled leaders returned, that they would immediately become the
leaders of their movement. It was unrealistic, however, to believe that France was in any
position seriously to concern herself with such matters. There would be no settlement in
Geneva if France were to interfere in any way whatsoever, regardless of the terms of the
Mediation document of November 1782. Clearly there were still some Constitutionnaires
who believed that France would once again come to their aid, if less dramatically than in
1782. The question of the exiles was settled by the Conseil Ganeral which allowed all the
exiles to return to their places in the councils that they had held before 1st. April 1782 by
984 votes to 123.74
The question of the return of the exiles was closely tied to the tortured question of the
position of the Guarantors of the Edict of Pacification. All changes to that document had to
have the consent of the three Guarantors. There was considerable argument on the part of
the Representants as to the need for the Guarantors, as they saw them as a threat to the
independence of the state. There were still those amongst the Constitutionnaires who
wished to maintain the Guarantors, as an insurance policy. Even Charles Stanhope, now
3rd. Earl, was asked for his opinion on the question of Guarantors. His reply was swift and
clear:
'que dans un Etat libre et independant aucun parti ne devroit rechercher l'appui
d'aucune puissance Etrangere pour faire prevaloir leur parti politique ...les Magist-
rats (quoi qu'ils soyent) devroient rechercher la bonne opinion et la confiance de
leur Concitoyens."
In the last seven years, that is precisely what the government of Geneva had done: relied
on the threat of France, rather than the trust of their own people. In order to obtain a com-
promise solution as quickly as possible, this aspect of the question was left vague and
unsettled, to await the response from the Guarantors to the speed of events in the city.
The Conseil GOnóral accepted the revisions on 10th. February, by 1321 votes to 52,78
the Bourgeois who had steadfastly refused to take any part in the meetings of the Conseil
Genaral clearly turning out to vote, as is shown by the numbers. For the first time since
before the imposition of the Edict of Pacification, the figures for voting are above the thou-
sand mark. Even compared with the election of the Syndics in January, a month earlier,
72	 Ms. Tronchin 216, op. cit., J-R. Tronchin a Necker de Gennagny, 17 avril 1789, 9.
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L'entrde du Petit Conseil en 1789.
This depicts the return of the Petit Conseil to the Town Hall
after the meeting of the Conseil Gdndral and reconciliation of •
February 1789. It was to be the last time that this tradition-
al event took place before the overthrow, on 28th. December
1792, of the government and constitution of Geneva.
Illustration 3
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the figures are up by four hundred. The vote was followed by considerable joy and
conciliation between the majority of the Bourgeois and the Constitutionnaires and Negatifs.
It was the last time that the traditional feted cortege after a happy meeting of the Conseil
General returned to the Town Hall and was recorded (see Illustration 3).
The feelings of euphoria quickly began to evaporate. It became clear to many that the
compromise reached was to place Geneva in a situation where:
'La majeure partie des Citoyens ... a êtabli "une Constitution qui tient a peu-pres le
milieu entre les deux derniers 11738 et 17681"..:77
Some of the ground lost by the Representants in 1782 had not been regained. Tronchin,
on the other hand, complained:
'des commissaires sont nomme sur le champ ... il les [changements a la Constitu-
tion] redigent en 24 articles; on les pone tout de suite A la deliberation de Petit et
Grand [Deux Cents] Conseils mais in globo sans qu'il puissent les discuter en
detail; us y passent et dela ils vont sans intervalle a la sanction du Conseil Gen-
eral.'"
On the side of the Representants however, there was equal unhappiness. A witness
wrote:
'La bourgeoisie est fort eloignee d'être contente; plusieurs murmurent tout bas de
ne pas avoir mieux profite des circonstances, [et] les natifs reclament les droits que
leur donnait leur Edit bienfaisant (du 10 Wrier 1781).'"
This was in great part due to the fact that many of the Representants and the Natifs had
never bothered to read in full the contents of the Edict of Pacification, to the revision of
which the former had so recently given their consent. It had been a hated thing, a weapon
of repression; in 1783, Jean Roget had written to his brother-in-law with reference to the
Edict of Pacification:
'Je n'ai jamais eu le courage de lire en entier le demier edit de Geneve.'8°
Tronchin was certainly right in his complaint about the speed of the revision. If the
Conseil General had taken the revisions article by article, many would then have realised
that what they were getting was a hybrid, not the return of the rights they had lost in 1782.
The whole revision process had been completed in less than a fortnight, under less than
ideal conditions, while all the leaders of the Representants were still exiles. Here, too, the
Representants were unfortunate, and the absence of Du Roveray, much experienced in
Genevan constitutional matters, was possibly fatal. However difficult, he would have insist-
ed on the removal of the Edict of Pacification and its replacement with a new and more
radical document, restoring the rights given to the Bourgeois in the Edict of 1768.
Those Genevan communities which existed abroad were all deeply disturbed by what
had been agreed. The Genevans worshipping in the church where Roustan 81 was pastor
in London tried hard to persuade J-A. De Luc to join them in a letter of protest which they
intended sending to the Syndics. In the long letters which passed between Roustan and
De Luc there is much argument concerning the February 1789 Edict, with De Luc support-
ing the agreements made in Geneva in February. In response, Roustan writes:
'...nos codes, ob l'on defend aux membres d'un peuple Souverain sous la peine les
rt	 BPU Geneve, Ms. 2466 Lettres adressees A J-A. De Luc, De Luc a Roustan le 13 mai 1789, 54.
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plus graves de deliberer dans leurs Cercles les affaires d'Etat; l'Inquisition de Ven-
ise n'auroit pas mieux fait.'82
There is an even more interesting comment, though partly lost due to a damaged sheet:
'II [le peuple] n'a senti que le -- de briser le joug d'une legislation imposee et
s'est dit tout bas quo tant qu'il auroit des pierres, des — et de l'eau chaude,
sauroit corriger les defauts de la nouvelle [legislation]."
Considering what was to happen in the coming three years, Roustan was certainly right
concerning the attitude of those who had been left outside the agreement, the Natifs of
less than the fourth generation, the Habitants and the Domicilies." They had learnt how
to hold soldiers at bay without arms, they already knew how to organise themselves
through cercles, they had been granted more generous terms in the Edict of 1781, and
they were a considerable proportion of the population. With the notions of equality which
were soon to swamp Europe,-to ignore them was to court disaster. On the other hand,
Roustan, knowing his fellow citizens, cannot seriously have believed that they would not
use their cercles to discuss politics.
It was ten months before it was certain that France, Sardinia and Bern would accept the
changes, thus causing some anxiety in Geneva. There were even some in the city who still
hoped that the Mediators would prevent any serious changes to the Black Code, while
some Constitutionnaires claimed that it was only the fear of the Guarantors and their
reaction that:
'puisse contenir l'ambition inquiete de la Demagogie et la seule force de resistance
qui puisse opposer le Gouvemement A de nouvelles attaques.'"
The continued use of terms such as 'Demagogie' to refer to the Representants demon-
strates how little some of the Constitutionnaires had learnt. The gathering storm in France
would seem to have had little influence upon the Constitutionnaires, except to reinforce
their determination to maintain within strict limits the privilege-based constitution of
Geneva. They were still unable to grasp that their fellow Bourgeois were not concerned to
introduce a 'pure democracy' into Geneva. Such a development would be as repugnant to
the majority of the Bourgeois as it was to the Constitutionnaires and the Negatifs. The
compromise which had been reached also demonstrated that there were clearly some in
the Negatif party who were happy to end the cold war between the government and
patriciate on the one hand and the Bourgeois on the other. How far this was a reflection of
the ideas already being discussed in some circles in France is unclear. In February 1789,
the States General still had to meet and the French Revolution was unknown.
Others, especially Claviere, Du Roveray and Etienne Dumont in Paris, wanted the
French to refuse the Guarantee since they judged that the 'new' Genevan constitution was
too reactionary. They questioned whether there was any need for a Guarantee at all:
'les Exiles ont ... fait et presente des mernoires pour demander qu'on effacat
comme inutiles et dangereuses les precedentes Garanties.'"
It was not to be until December 1789 that the three Guarantors finally signed the new Act
of Guarantee, the government of France having at last overcome Louis' dislike of guaran-
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teeing a constitution which he believed had been brought into being as the result of rioting.
With some pressing him not to abandon Geneva, it was likely that, out of concern for
France's long-term interests, Louis would eventually sign. France would not easily abandon
its influence in the city, nor wish to encourage those such as Claviere to obtain freedom to
do what they wished in the city. As Montmorin, 87 the French Foreign Minister, wrote:
'Au pis aller, Si par le malheur de Geneve de nouveaux troubles venaient a y
eclater, nous aurions un titre de plus pour nous occuper de la pacifier.'"
There was the possible advantage that some in Paris, such as Hennin, might see the
return to Geneva of the exiles such as Claviére as a distinct benefit to France:
'on serait charm() que les exiles quittassent la France.'"
The return of the cercles was welcomed by all in Geneva, and it proved impossible to
prevent political discussions within them. New cercles were formed and were to be found
even amongst the Habitants. There was also more mixing within the cercles than there had
previously been, and Natifs and Habitants would sometimes be members of the same
cercles, as they had been before April 1782. A cercle de la Coalition was created, which
brought together moderate Negatifs and Representants, and many of the members of the
government and the Petit Conseil. It believed that the giving of political rights to all in
Geneva was neither possible nor desirable." The events in France and the necessity for
the withdrawal of the Swiss soldiers from Geneva in December 1792, together with the
murmurs of some of the Natifs who had hastened to the defence of Geneva in September
and who now desired some acknowledgement of their loyalty, eventually led to divisions
within the Cercle de la Coalition.
In the final analysis, the Edict of 1789:
'etait une transaction; il etait le fruit de concessions mutuelles... [le gouvemement]
se resignait, comme un homme qui a le pistolet sur son gorge; il accepta, parce
qu'il avait perdu toute autorite morale et qu'il n'avait plus en main la force mated-
elle. 191
It was a reconciliation within that group which held political power, like the ending of a
severe and vicious family quarrel, but it was too late to save the state as they understood
it. Moreover, it contained the fatal error of treating with some contempt the claims of the
Natifs, which had previously been recognised. Deeply flawed, the compromise of 1789 was
to break down almost immediately.
Reform and revolution
The crowding of events in France, with the creation of a National Assembly in June, the
abolition of privileges and the Declaration of the Rights of Man in August 92 and the
general unrest in the countryside, was bound to have an influence on Geneva. The
constitution of the city was based on privilege, where the status of being a Bourgeois gave
political rights. The government in power since July 1782 had ridden rough-shod over a •
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number of rights which the Representants had held dear. There was some danger in 1789
that:
'on pouvoit facilement faire envisager la Bourgeoisie de Geneve comme le Tiers-
Etat opprime.'93
If that were the case, the government would face the anger of at least some of the
Representants as well as those in the city who were without political rights. The govern-
ment would need all the support it could get if it were going to survive and keep the state
of Geneva independent, but by its own behaviour during the previous seven years, it had
alienated a proportion of those who should have been its greatest supporters.
The unhappiness of some of the Bourgeois at the settlement which had been reached,
together with the events in France, led to a proposal in the Deux Cents by Horace-
Benedict de Saussure," previously a staunch supporter of the government, and certainly
a Negatif, for a revision of the compromise Edict of February 1789. The signs of discontent
in the town had shown themselves in the first elections for the Syndics after the new Edict
when 300 had who voted for la ligne de nouvelle election, although the Syndics had been
voted into office without difficulty. His suggestions of a constitution which would be 'plus
agreable a la majorite' seemed dangerous to some of his fellow patricians. Their unhappi-
ness was compounded when another spoke of the need for there to be an 'Assemblee
nationale' to discuss a new constitution.95 The suggestion foundered in the Petit Conseil
and was not acted on until August 1790, when it was decided to create a Commission to
write a new constitution for Geneva. The Commission was created by the Deux Cents in
December 1790. 99 The slowness with which the whole matter progressed (the old Gene-
van habit, seen before in 1734 and 1774) is indicative that there were some who were
unhappy with the idea of a new constitution.
The Commission of 1790, as in 1777, contained men from different parties, Lullin and
Rigaud, both Syndics, the ex-Syndics Dunant and Micheli, Du Roveray, the Procureur-
General Prevost and six members of the Deux Cents: Jean Flourney-Balaxert, Jean-Fran-
cois Butini, Horace-Benedict de Saussure, Jacob Girod, Pierre Boin and Charles Ach-
ard.97 The Commission which showed the increasing strength of the Representants in the
state, reported back in March with a new political Edict accepted in the Conseil General by
1124 to 313. At the same time, the Edict ordered a revision of all the political laws and
their union in a Genevan code which was to be submitted to the Conseil General during
the first half of October 1791. The Commission was reduced to eight members and set
about the task of consulting the Bourgeois dizaine by dizaine. The whole was finished by
November 1791, added to the already-accepted political Edict and submitted to the Conseil
General on 14th. November 1791. The result of the voting showed how rapidly the ground
was shifting under the government. The new Genevan Code was accepted by 960 to 761.
Compared to March, this was a weak majority.
The difficulty was in the relative conservatism of the Code, which to a great extent was
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the work of Du Roveray. It was an advance in that it recognised that sovereignty lay in the
Conseil General. The powers of that body were clearly listed and included the election of
all new members of the Petit Conseil and the Deux Cents, but, once elected, they retained
their seats for life. Representations were to be permitted, including those by the cercles.
Liberty of the press was to be granted. There was to be civil equality between the
Bourgeois, Natifs and sujets, the latter defined as 'anciens Genevois de la campagne'.98
This equality was to extend also to church appointments and positions in the militia. There
was no change in the status of the Domicilies. The Natifs were to be admitted to the ranks
of the Bourgeois if they had no debts, while the country Genevans would be permitted to
become Bourgeois by selection and promotion. There were also extensive changes in the
taxes in the countryside with the removal of the old feudal rights and taxes.
As a compromise, the Genevan Code was too much for the old Constitutionnaires to
accept, just as it was considered to be too restricive by the Natifs. While drawing up the
new Edict, the commission had received two Mernoires, one from the Natifs demanding
political equality, while the second claimed political equality for all the sujets in the
Genevan countryside. The rejection of the demands in these Memoires meant that there
were many Natifs and sujets who were also discontented. What it did was to clarify many
of the contentious points concerning the interpretation of the vague Edicts which had
plagued the body politic throughout the greater part of the century. If it had emerged from
the work of the Commission in 1779, it would have greatly benefited Geneva, but its emer-
gence at the end of 1791 was to ensure that, like its predecessor, it would die a rapid
death. In reality, it was totally inadequate for a city that was about to be surrounded by
French Revolutionary armies, carrying, as they did, the germ of 'equality', since it was, for
all its moderation, still based on inequality within the state.
In Geneva, it was the familiar story of too little too late. The revision had come about
because of the pressures from what was happening in France and the increasing tensions
in Geneva as a result of the new ideas. Jacques Grenus was from a patriciate family and
had been exiled in 1782. Although Grenus had been a Representant in the period 1762-
1782, he had been less than moderate and, after his return to Geneva in 1789, he became
increasingly influenced by the revolutionary ideas coming from Paris. By late 1790, he was
advocating the equal political rights of all the Habitants and Natifs in the city. By 1791, he
advocated the granting of full rights to the sujets in the Genevan countryside, so that his
expulsion from Geneva was inevitable. He led a group of Habitants and Natifs who took
the name egaliseurs, composed of the people in the city who had no political rights. After
being sent into exile, he bombarded the republic with his Appel A la Nation and his
newspaper Les Sifflets de Saint Claude. As Guichonnet wrote
III] va desormais conspirer pour "revolutionner" Geneve en s'inspirant des me-
thodes des Jacobins et des extremistes frangais.'99
By 1792, the members of the group were extremely francophile, even to accepting the
possibility of the annexation of Geneva by France. George Auziere, a Nag who had been
exiled in 1770 and had lived and worked at Ferney, was another egaliseur.
Foreign affairs and war
The French declaration of war against Austria on 20th. April 1792, followed by Prussia's
«	 P.E. Martin, op. cit., 3eme. partie, Edouard Chapuisat, Ch. XI, p. 498.
••	 Guichonnet, op.cit, p. 258.
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declaration of war against France on 13th. June'°°, made it necessary for Geneva to es-
tablish its neutral status, preferably with the Swiss cantons. The Swiss had ordered a
meeting of the Federal Diet to discuss the position the Swiss states were to take with
regard to the warring countries in Europe. Geneva wanted to be included in any decision
by the Swiss to declare their strict neutrality. Once again, Geneva had to overcome the
hostility of the catholic cantons, but with the support of both Bern and Zurich, it was finally
included in Swiss neutrality on 7th. June 1792.101
The massacre of the Swiss Guard in the Tuileries (10th. August) made it difficult to
maintain Swiss neutrality, as some cantons were extremely unhappy with what had
happened. The approach of French Revolutionary armies toward the frontiers of Switzer-
land, together with the increasing pressure that the confederation was coming under from
Austria, added to the difficulties. At a second Diet at Aarau in September, it was decided to
maintain strict neutrality, but to sever diplomatic ties with France. As a resuit, Geneva
dragged her feet over the recognition of a new Resident, Francois de Chateauneuf, leaving
relations between France and Geneva in a state of suspension, at least in Geneva,102
and annoying Paris.
The attack by France on Sardinia, which was allied to Austria, led to Geneva being
surrounded by a French Revolutionary army. The situation was particularly dangerous be-
cause, in Paris, the exiled Genevan Claviere was a member of the government and was
pushing hard for a French occupation of Geneva and her incorporation into France as the
only way that the city would be able to obtain 'democracy'.
In this, Claviere may have been aided by the increasing hostility in France to the
Genevans. The consequences of Necker's loans had led the French by 1790 to see the
Genevans:
'not just as speculators but as conspirators, deliberately undermining France's
government and society for their own profit and for the sinister ends of the foreign
governments who paid them:103
The erroneousness of this attitude was clear, for, by 1792, many Genevan families were
on the edge of bankruptcy as a result of the events in France. However, such attitudes
among the French gave encouragement to, or could be used by, those who desired to take
Geneva under French contol.
The second danger for Geneva was that Grenus, just outside the city, was willing to use
the French armies to help activate a revolution in the city. By 23rd. September, Geneva
was under arms, and on the 24th., the government asked the Conseil General for agree-
ment to bring in troops from both Bern and Zarich. This was agreed by a relatively small
majority, 983 for and 734 against Those against included:
'quelques-uns pour leur gout d'être frangais ou pour leur systeme d'egalite de
municipalite, et d'autres en plus grand nombre, parce qu'ils croyaient par la
provoquer cette partie de la nation frangaise qui domine, lui montrer la defiance,
qu'ils ne croyaient pas a des plans d'attaque."°'
The French immediately treated this demand for troops as a breach of the Treaty of
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Neutrality signed in November 1782. It was an interesting demonstration of the continuing
French capacity to interfere in Genevan affairs, and was also an indication that the change
in the rulers of France had done little to calm the nation's desire to expand. But, by 5th.
October, it was clear to the French that the Swiss were willing to defend both the neutrality
of Geneva and Switzerland.
As always when Geneva's independence was threatened, Genevans of all parties rallied
to the cause of its independence. The withdrawal of the French Resident to Carouge and
his attempts to persuade the people of Geneva that their magistrates were betraying them
only increased the patriotic fervour. A meeting of the militia on 13th. October saw 3,000
men declare their loyalty to the government and submit to it a declaration which included:
'Oui, l'instant est arrive, oil mettant tout inter& sous les pieds, nous no voyons plus
que le danger de la Republique:105
The arrival of troops from Bern and Zurich in November gave Geneva the protection she
needed and sent a clear message to France that the Swiss were willing to defend their
neutrality, beginning with Geneva. The French General, de Montesquiou, had no intention
of attacking Swiss neutrality and therefore refused to move against Geneva. Negotiations
between de Montesquiou and Ami Lullin, Jean-Francois Prevost and Francois d'Ivemois
led to the Treaty of Carouge, accepted by the Conseil General by 1578 to 17,1°5 but
rejected in Paris, partly due to the influence of Claviére, who had wanted the French army
under Montesquiou to attack and take Geneva. In an irony lost on him, Claviere wanted to
do exactly what the Constitutionnaires had done in 1782: he wished to use a French army
to impose his political solution on Geneva, in the name of freedom, of course. It was an
attitude which shocked and appalled his ex-colleagues, who tried hard to turn him from
such action. In a letter, Chauvet claimed that:
'la nouvelle Republique frangaise se prepareroit a nous ecraser, sans motif, sans
interet, sans raison, et seulement pour s'excercer ce Despotisme odieux...Du
Roveray a envoye un memoire signe au Ministre des affaires etrangares ... Reybaz
a ecrit deux puissantes lettres a Claviere dans lesquelles il a resume tous les
efforts pour l'engager a faire son devoir:107
Reybaz was in Paris standing-in for Tronchin, Geneva's Ambassador in Paris, who was in
London. What both Chauvet and Reybaz and other Genevans were trying to do was to
ensure the continued existence of Geneva as an independent state. Claviere seemed to be
willing to sacrifice the city in the interests of ensuring real equality for its citizens. A second
negotiation led to the Treaty of Lancey on 2nd. November. This treaty was alsia (*clad irk
Paris, but eventually the same terms were contained in a Decree issued by the French
government.
The withdrawal of the Swiss troops from Geneva, as required by the agreement with
France, was completed before Christmas, leaving the government with little military support
in the town except the militia and the small, limited garrison, unless it could persuade the
people to accept once again the presence of a full garrison of mercenaries in the town.
This they managed to achieve, when the Conseil General accepted by 950 to 534 a plan
to augment the garrison to 1,180 men from the current 700 (which was considered
insufficient). The loss of the Swiss troops seemed less of a problem if the city could have a
reasonably-sized garrison. What the government did not expect was:
'quelques soins que nous nous soyons donnes pour accelerer le recrutement de
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notre Gamison nous n'avons, jusque ici a cet egard que tres peu de Succes, elle
ne s'eleve pas encore a la moitie du nombre au quel elle devroit etre portee..."8
This left Geneva exposed externally to foreign attack. The Militia could cope with minor
internal problems in the city, but, in the event of trouble from the sujets in the small
Genevan territories, it would have been inadequate.
Although the people had rallied to the government in the moment of crisis, there was still
considerable discontent both within the city and outside it. The idea of equality was strong
and had been further encouraged by the declaration in Paris by the Convention that
France:
'accordera fratemite et secours a tous les peuples qui voudront leur liberte, et le
pouvoir executif donnera aux generaux les ordres necessaires pour porter secours
a ces peuples et defendre les citoyens qui auraient ete vexes ou pourraient l'etre
pour la cause de la libertfs."9
Furthermore, Brisson speech in the Convention, in which he claimed:
'C'est pour enchainer ces egaliseurs natifs, patriotes ou sans-culottes qu'on avait
appelö les Suisses dans Geneve:11°
added fuel to the smouldering resentment of those without political rights in the city. In
1792, Geneva had needed Swiss troops to ensure her declared neutrality. The Swiss had
responded because it was necessary to reinforce their declared neutrality at the first
opportunity. Events proved them correct, as they gained six years of freedom before the
arrival of Napoleon.
Winter was approaching, and the winter months had always been those of civil unrest in
the city, as Comuaud pointed out to anyone who would listen. There were many warnings
of trouble to come and appeals to those in and connected to the government to act. There
was an inherent reluctance by the government and most of the members of the two
smaller councils to make any further changes in the Codes. To some, it must have
seemed that they were on a non-ending roundabout of change and further change followed
by yet more suggested change. Nonetheless, there was an attempt by Lullin to grant con-
cessions, and a project was presented to the Deux Cents at the end of November. How
extensive these reforms were to be is clear:
'un nouvel Edit sur retat des personnes qui fasse a jamais disparaitre les nuances
qui differencient aujourdhui les diverses classes de Genevois.'
It was an attempt, very late in the day, to face reality and try to cut the ground from under
the ëgaliseurs by conceding their demands, but keeping contld in the bands ol Yne
government. The backdrop to these discussions was intermittent rioting in the city. A
meeting of the Conseil Gèneral planned for 4th. December to discuss these reforms was
never held; the cercles of the ëgaliseurs were too impatient and called for violent action.
Serious rioting erupted on the night of 3rd. December, provoked by the agaliseurs, and
there was bloodshed on the 4th., when the city was very close to civil war. Finally, the gov-
ernment withdrew its few soldiers to the garrison and handed over the keys of the city to
the cercles Egaliseurs. Their leaders worked in conjunction with the Syndic de la garde to
return the town to calm:
'Les membres du Cercle de la Grille ont la garde de l'hOtel de Ville, mais ils ont
pour la plupart le bonnet rouge [;] l'on vient de dresser sur la Treille en face des
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fenetres du Conseil l'arbre de la liberte avec le bonnet ce qui n'annonce pas chez
eux l'intention de moderer la douleur profonde dans la quelle sont plonges la
majeure partie de nos concitoyens."12
The members of the two councils had at last been brought face-to-face with reality. It was,
in effect, the end of old Geneva.
On the morning of 5th. December, the Deux Cents voted for the suspension of the
Conseil Góneral. A Commission of Forty elected from the cercles egaliseurs was given
charge of the administration while a new constitution was prepared. This document was to
be a 'radical departure from normal Genevan practice:
'on voudroit abroger les anciennes formes pour leur en substituter d'absolu-
ment nouvelles. Les partisans de ce dernier systerne ne constituent point ni tant
s'en faut, le plus grand nombre mais il est a craindre qu'ils n'agissent par toutes
sortes de moyens pour le faire triompher et que le decret du 18 [sic, it was the
19th.] n'encourage leur audace en leur donnant l'espoir de vaincre par la terreur ou
par la force la resistance qui leur se voit opposee.'113
This time there was no tinkering with the constitution within the old base of 1543. There
was to be a completely new document reflecting the latest ideas and founded on the
equality of citizens of the city. It was to cut the Gordian knot of sovereignty which had
bound Geneva since 1543. This new constitution was ready to be submitted to the Conseil
General on 12th. December. The first part gave Genevan citizenship to all Bourgeois,
Natifs and Habitants. This was accepted by 802 to 161. The second chapter set out the
creation of a Constituent Assembly and was accepted by 590 to 355. The third part re-
voked all political judgements and sentences given during the eighteenth century, pro-
claimed the rehabilitation of those condemned and specifically mentioned as nul the
decrees against Rousseau. This was voted by 777 to 179. Yet even this radical departure
left the Syndics and the government still in place, old habits clearly dying hard.
Not surprisingly therefore, the unrest in the city continued, aimed at certain members of
the government. Even though a new constitution had been accepted, the previous
government continued in existence. There was a project to pass an Edict which would
force some of the members of the councils to retire. On the morning of 28th. December,
the revolutionaries occupied the city, and the cercles decided upon the demise of the
government, replacing it by two committees, the Comitá provisoire de surete and the
Comite pro visoire d'administration, the members of which were elected by the cercles'
delegates. Geneva was clearly set on a new course These two committees both contained
13 members, and their constitutions were accepted by the Conseil GOneral by 1884 to 318
on 30th. December 1792. Thus in Geneva in December 1792 the city received two new
constitutions, that of 12th December which remained in force, the second on 30th.
December 1792 swept away the old government structure and was added to what had
been achieved earlier in the month. The two committees worked in the midst of consider-
able difficulty and unrest in Geneva. As can be seen from a copy of the poster, diagram
11, everything in Geneva had changed overnight: there was no longer any talk of 'la
patrie', it was 'La Nation', and the town crest was accompagnied by the words liberte' and
'Ogalite'.
The committees worked closely with the Constituent Assembly authorised by the Edict of
5th. December and elected in February 1793. There were 3553 electors with the right to
vote in this selection process, since, as a result of the Edict of December 1792, some
1,500 Natifs and 700 Habitants registered for Bourgeois status. There were 373 sittings of
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the Constituent or National Assembly before the presentation of a completely new constitu-
tion to the Conseil General in April 1794, which was accepted by 4,200 votes to 200.
During this period, decisions taken by the Assembly were referred back to the Conseil
General, which, in effect, was reduced to a form of national referendum on the work of the
Assembly. The new constitution confirmed this position of the Conseil General, with the
creation of a Legislative Council of 42. All new law and any projects of the Legislative
Council would be submitted for approval to the Conseil General, a system which came to
be called le referendum obligatoire. This maintained the Conseil General as place of final
resort, with the people given the simple right to accept or reject new laws, although
whether the people would constantly reject suggestions put to them was never put to the
test.
The end of the road
December 1792 marks the end of the system of government under which Geneva had
been ruled certainly since 1543 and, in some respects, earlier. It marked the end of a
century of periodic conflict because of division within the Bourgeois, where 'no way was
found of formalising these conflicts in institutions." The creation of an elected tempo-
rary Assembly to carry out the function of a legislature in preparing a completely new
constitution was to introduce into the system the delegation of sovereign power which had
been missing in Geneva up to that point It became necessary because it was clear that a
body which numbered 5,000 or more voters was no longer in any position to discuss and
take decisions. The ending of the divisions within the state as to political rights was a clear
and dramatic break with all that had gone before making it possible to begin anew. The
desire of the Representants to slowly absorb part of the Natifs into the body politic was of
a completely different order from the across-the-board granting of full rights of citizenship
to all Protestant males born in the city. The attempt by the Bourgeois and their leaders, as
late as 1791, to try to adapt the existing structures of the Edicts of Calvin to the new
demands of equality released by the revolution in France was a final demonstration of the
consistency of the Bourgeois and their belief in the importance of the Conseil General as
the sovereign in the state. It was certain to fail since in the old commune, in the Geneva of
Calvin's Edicts and the various changes wrought in the eighteenth century, equality,
especially political equality and its corollary, political rights, was not possible. It was the
Revolution in France which changed the ground rules.
"4	Venturi, op. cit., p. 84.
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Conclusion
The history of Geneva in the eighteenth century raises serious questions as to whether it
can easily be accommodated in the concept of an Atlantic Revolution. Even the wide
definition given by Palmer, where a revolutionary situation means an undermining or loss
in confidence in an existing authority, is difficult to accomodate with the Genevan situation
until 1781. 1 The belief of the Bourgeois and their leaders that the Magistrates and the
government could be persuaded to compromise, even as late as 1777, demonstrates a
continued, if misplaced, confidence in their rulers. It is only in the last years of the 1770s
that there are clear signs of a decline in respect for and trust in the reasonableness and
justice of their rulers. That trust finally ended, apparently, in the refusal of the government
to apply the Edit Bienfaisant of 1781. Whether the admission of the third generation of
Natifs to political status in Geneva posited by the Edit Bienfaisant was a 'new kind or basis
of community' 2 is debatable. It left a considerable number of Natifs and all the Habitants
still outside the political sunshine. All other aspects of the constitution remained in place,
including the continuation of divisions in Genevan society, where political rights were
based on privilege.
The troubles in Geneva go back to the constitution introduced by Calvin and his
followers. This constitution, by attempting to marry the old commune and its rights as
manifested in the Conseil General with the government-dominated ideas of Calvin, created
from the beginning a dichotomy which by the eighteenth century had become difficult, if not
impossible, to resolve. The inherent contradiction was aggravated by the ease with which
the oligarchy developed in the city and its strenuous efforts to asphyxiate over time the
Conseil General. The Bourgeois in the city wanted the rights of the Conseil General to be
respected, and the government to consult and obtain approval for changes in the constitu-
tion, as laid down in the Edicts. The Bourgeois in the Conseil General did not desire to
'change the basis of authority and representation nor reconstitute the constituted bodies'.3
Neither, until 1781, did they desire to open membership of their body to others.
It could be said of Geneva, as of Poland, that the interference of a powerful neighbour,
in this case France, on behalf of the patriciate and government had made it impossible to
'reform an ancient republic, to find a way out of the constitutional deadlock which
had finally immobilised them al1.14
France had, by insisting on mediating in 1737, prevented a reasonable compromise from
being attempted; compromise was reached in 17, when Frame was westms, t‘st kts
encouragement of some of the oligarchy in the city to believe that it would come to their
rescue in further trouble led at first to their refusal to try to work the compromise and then
to deliberate obstruction, precipitating the crisis of 1782. America, unlike Geneva or
Holland, did not have to contend with interference once she had obtained her indepen-
dence, thus enabling the Constitution to emerge by 1789.
The success of Fatio in forcing concessions from the government in 1707 showed the
authorities that the Bourgeois had some kind of organisation outside the reach of authority .
with clear ideas of the need 'to fight off the apparent growth of prerogative power.3 In
Palmer, op. cit., p. 21.
2	 loc. cit.
3	 Ibid., p. 23.
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233
Geneva, the Petit Conseil had acted as the prerogative power. However, the Conseil
Generals rejection of this position and its own claims to sovereignty went back to Combo
and Boutilier, both aware of the growth of the Petit Conseils power. The severity of the
repression in 1707-8 did not destroy this belief or the organisation of the Bourgeois, neither
did it intimidate the Bourgeois into abandoning their beliefs. Indeed, the loss, in 1712, by a
clever Government manoeuvre, of the concessions gained in 1707 merely led to some
Bourgeois codifying and setting out their ideas. The Lettres of Leger influenced all that was
to happen in the future, including the works of Rousseau, who, growing up during this
period in Geneva, in the midst of those involved with Leger's letters, cannot have been
ignorant of their contents. These letters produced no apparent effect, no marching in the
street, no demands presented to the government, yet their influence was profound and
insidious.
The sovereignty and rights of the Conseil General were discussed and debated at length
until such beliefs became second nature to many of the Bourgeois. Indivisible sovereignty
belonged to the people assembled in the Conseil General:
'sans remetre le Gouvemement a des Chefs ou officiers qui lui sont comptables et
dont II a le droit d'examiner l'administration,'8
the government in the city was not sovereign nor had it ever been. For the political class in
Geneva in the 1720s and 30s this question was of paramount importance, strengthened by
the fact that the Conseil General was their referent and that their loyalties were not
involved in and divided by guilds or corporations, but united in their rights as Bourgeois,
marking them off distinctly from others in the state. The concern over sovereignty and its
implications was discussed in Geneva thirty years before such discussions were to sweep
over Europe and America. The interest in the rights of a sovereign Conseil General was
almost as old as the state. The Bourgeois in Geneva had in fact been asserting 'ideas
much like those of the Social Contract'', before such a work was even a gleam in Rous-
seau's eye.
The agreement negotiated between the Bourgeois and government in 1737, which would
have needed the approval of the Conseil General for the election of members of the Petit
Conseil, was a radical departure from existing practice. The insistence of the French on
becoming involved in the process of pacification ensured that such changes were torpe-
doed. However, the acceptance of the Mediation emphasises the continuing confidence of
the Bourgeois in their government leaders.
The persistence of the Bourgeois in trying to persuade the government of their grievanc-
es until 1766, regardless of the illegality of some government acts, is surprising. In part this
was due to the ingrained habits and training of respect for elders and social superiors,
common at the time, and reinforced by their strict Calvinist upbringing. There was also the
dilemma of what the Bourgeois could legitimately and legally do to make the government
listen and respond. The development and elaboration of the arguments in Leger's letters,
which Rousseau produced in the Social Contract and Lettres de la montaigne, were part of
the continuing debate which in Geneva had been in progress since the beginning of the
century. It was not the arrival of the Social Contract in the city which 'produced its first
explosion'a, but the accumulated anger and frustration at the deafness of the government
and the accumulation of a series of unconstitutional, illegal acts over more than twenty
years, of which Rousseau's condemnation, with regard to the Social Contact, was but one.




Palmer, op. cit., p. 133.
a	 Ibid., p. 112.
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Unfortunately, Delorme was exaggerating when he claimed that the refusal to elect the
Syndics in 1766 was 'by the Will of the Sovereign' and not by the laws of the constitution;
it was the people in the Conseil General exercising their prerogative:
'quo nul ne soit regeu qu'il n'ait este approuve du peuple.'9
The refusal of the Conseil General to elect any Syndics was the sovereign carrying out its
lawful task as laid down in the Edicts, which Tronchin in his Lettres ecrites de la campagne
had accepted, restating the right of the Conseil General to reject the Syndics if they so
desired. The Bourgeois had been restrained in their earlier refusals, usually refusing to
elect from the first list, but electing from the second list submitted to them. 19 It was the
refusal to elect any Syndics that was different, but was perfectly legal. Two laws within the
state came into conflict, that which required an annual election of Syndics and that which
permitted the Bourgeois to elect only those acceptable to them. It was not a case of Law
and Constitution opposed by the sovereignty of the people. After three years of trying to
persuade the government that 'ruin begin[s] when constitutional laws are broken'," the
Representants, the majority of the Bourgeois, were beginning to question their confidence
in members of the government. They sought desperately to reach a compromise with the
government and patriciate, to avoid the chasm they saw opening ahead of them. They
desired the government to continue to govern with the proviso that, in important matters,
they were consulted, and that the government obeyed the law. It was clear that some
revision of the various laws of the state was required to avoid the conflict of law with law in
the future.
The compromise reached between the Genevans in 1768 returned to the ideas ex-
pressed in 1737 and led to the right of the Bourgeois to replace four of the Petit Conseil
from the Deux Cents, rather than the need to approve all the members of the Petit Conseil,
as initially agreed in 1737. The subsequent attempts to revise and codify the constitution
ran into the sand of the patriciate, who were extremely unhappy with the compromise of
1768. The final straw for the Bourgeois was the refusal of the government to effect a new
law discussed and approved by the Conseil General giving political rights to a proportion of
the Natifs. This further denial by the government of the sovereign rights of the sovereign
body was the act which destroyed the trust between the people and the government. It
was a denial of belief and trust shared as strongly by the Natifs as by the Bourgeois and
taught the Natifs whom they could trust in Geneva. The rejection of the Edict was the act
that paradoxically brought together the greater part of the politically privileged people with
a considerable part of the politically non-privileged population. The rioting of the latter,
together with the supineness of the government, forced the Representants to remove the
government and replace it. It could be argued that this was the revolution in act, rather
than thought which had plagued the country since 1707.
The inability of the new regime to defend itself against the combined forces of Bern,
Sardinia and France led to the return of the old system, which reinforced the power of the
government at the expense of the Conseil General. The reliance upon a garrison to
reinforce its position, together with the cold war which became the norm within the state, -
showed the gaping gulf between the rulers and the ruled. Palmer's so-called 'aristocratic
resurgence' 12 in Geneva was a weak plant indeed, as was shown by the inability of the
garrison to prevent rioting over the price of bread in 1789. The attempt to reach a compro-
Amedêe Roget, 'Les Syndics', op. cit., p. 10.
10	 As in 1741, see Chapter VI, p. 115.
Venturi, op. cit, p. 45 quoting from Montesquieu Book VIII, Ch. V.
12	 Palmer, op. cit., p. 366.
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mise with the Bourgeois was too late, and even the new constitution, of which Du Roveray
was the main architect, was outdated before the ink was dry. The emergence of segalite'
was a concept which struck at the roots of Geneva's existence, while France's conquest of
Savoy surrounded the city with an army carrying these ideas.
Can Geneva, confronting the problem connected with sovereignty and its interpretation
at periods much earlier than the last forty years of the eighteenth century, really fit into the
'Atlantic Revolution'? By extending the time span to the entire eighteenth century possibl,
but this would be to ignore the demands made by Boutilier in the sixteenth century and
Combe's demand in the seventeenth century. The Lettres anon ymes of Leger expressed in
written form what had been said amongst the Bourgeois in Geneva for many years, as
witnessed by Gallatin's attempt to provoke unrest in 1698, quite apart from having pre-
dated Rousseau and the Social Contract.
Added to which, the influence of the American War of Independence or the ideas ex-
pressed during this time make no appearance in the pamphlets of the period. With the
Genevans deeply engrossed in their own disagreements, the arguments of the British and
Americans may well have had an air of déjà vu. What little comment there is on America is
not positive, with d'Ivemois pointing out in language not dissimilar to that contained in
Leger's Lettres :
'que le Conseil General de Geneve, qui en formait tout a la fois La Nation et le
Souverain, avait de plus que les Americains, dans les annales de sa propre
Constitution & dans les actes precis & declarations de son droit, non-seulement
inalienable mais inaliene, de retirer a lui les pouvoirs dont ceux-ci auroient ab-
use:13
There is this constant time-shift when trying to place Geneva in the context of Palmer's
generous definition.
The contradictions within Geneva during this time span are profound: on the one hand,
there is the:
'progressive breakdown in the consensus ... necessary if any regime is to maintain
itself,'
yet, on the other hand, there is attempt after attempt to negotiate compromise, to retain the
existing structures of the state, each failure sapping the body politic. Even after the Brack
Code of 1782, the Bourgeois were happy in 1789 to return to the old constitution with all
its inherent contradictions intact, in the belief that a revision could be achieved. Geneva
was never 'democratic' in the eighteenth century. It was a corrupt republic in Montes-
quieu's terms, with a declining political group divided within itself and relatively reluctant to
allow access. But, within that 'elite', the Republican tradition was strong, together with the
old communal ideas of equality and a right to a say in the governance of the state through
the meeting of the commune members. The overlay of Calvinist teaching concerning the
governance of states introduced different ideas and incorporated old and new together in
such a way as to make conflict inevitable, as well as adding the Calvinist teaching that any
change was unnecessary and dangerous. It was only in the eighteenth century, when
education and improved prosperity produced easier living conditions, that these problems
came to be tackled.
How should we categorize a state which had faced the questions that were of impor-
tance post-1760 in the first half of the century and been unable to solve them? How should
we classify a state which, even in 1791, introduced a new constitution allowing for election
for life to the two smaller councils, ignoring the dangers of such a system in the contempo-
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D'Ivemois, Vol III (Tome II), op. cit., pp. 77-78.
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Behrens, op. cit. p. 163.
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rary world of limited elected chambers and governments, at least in France? Ultimately, It
is perhaps more valid to ask why ideas being argued over in Geneva were ignored by
most of the world. France, seeing the danger, tried to suppress both the ideas and the
arguments, to no avail. If Geneva was revolutionary in the Palmer sense, as measured by
the decline in the trust between the Bourgeois and the government, a decline which was to
be seen only during the events of 1781-2, it was so because the usual Genevan habit of
reaching a last munute concensus was blocked by the support given by France to the
party within the state totally opposed to any compromise. Geneva, in part because of its
historical inheritence was probably the only state apart from Britain in a position to evolve
and absorb peaceful, non-revolutionary gradual change. The immediate future of Geneva
after 1792 reflected the unfortunate, further influence of France, when the 'terror' led to the
execution of those considered most reactionary on account of their actions prior to 1794,
even though they were found not guilty by the people. The wheel had rapidly come full
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Turin.
Ms. suppl. 1536	 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1736-1739,
Ms. suppl. 1537	 Lettres de Du Pan a Freudenreich 1740-1748.
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Archives Tronchin Ms. 181
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240
Archives Tronchin Ms. 282
Archives Tronchin Ms. 293
Archives Tronchin Ms. 299
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Geneva.
U1590 Z373 Photocopies of Setters from Gnsel, Countess Stanhope to Jacob and
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C) University of Michigan, William L. Clements Library
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The Edicts of 1543 
Taken from Henri Fazy Les Constitutions de la Rdpub-
lique de Genbve, Genbve et Bale: H. Georg, Librairie-
Editeur, 1890, pp. 289-335.
Edits de 1543.
(D . APRES LE Tian: CONSERVE, A( . % AID:DIVES DI 6ENEVE)
1)1t: L'ELLECTION DES SEYONEURS SIND1CQUES
Quo chasetin an, le mardi &want le dintenche
prochain snyvant la Purification, le Conseyl se
tienne expressement pour les eslire ; (levant quo
-COIDIDelleer, WIC le premier 'Sindicque pour lors
face tine bonne remonstrance et exhortation A
cc qu'on eslise gens de bonne conscience, qui
ayent rlionneur de Dieu en recommandation,
aymans equité et droycture et le profit commun
de la ville, de bonne vie et bonne renommite.
Sur cella, qu'on lace pribre a Dieu ; puys
cliascun conseyller face serment (resin .° cold x
pensera estre les plus propres et sulisans
en la !brine qui s'ensuyt : Notts promotions et
jurons (levant Dieu, entre les mains (le la Seyg-
neurie, ireslire et nommer Co rollice tie Sindic-
qual eeulx quo nous ponsons estre propres
ytloines, tant pour maintenir l'honneur de Dieui
et la religion crestienne en . ceste vile commes-,:
pour conduyre et gouverner le peuple en bonnel
pollice et conserver la liberte de la ville et Vett
eslisant nous aurons esgard an Wen publique et.
non pas A quelque affection particuliere, no de
(mine no de favour; quo Dieu nous soyt tesmoin:
ilo ceste promesse, affin d'en estre juge Si nous
laysons tin contrayre.
Appres cella quo chascun par ordre on 'tomtit&
quatre, Las cytoyens, devant les Sindicques et
que les seeretayres soyent là pour recevoir cetilx
qu'on nommera.
Le vendredi snyvant on tienne le Conseyl des
Deux Cens et appres l'exhoration et la pribre,
que la forme du serment soyt reel& et que tons
la prennent en levant la main. Puys qu'on en pro-
ounce huyt do ceulx qui auront estes nominds.
en l'élection du Petit Conseyl : assavoir pour la
plus grant voyx et stir cella qu'on face aussy
rálection do !twit ou du nombre qui aura este
propose, ou d'aultres s'il semble bon, moyennant
que ce soyent citoyens, tenement quo rdlection
du Petit Conseyl soyt comme un advertissement,
sans prejudicier aux Deux Cons on la libend
(rdlive.
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Le dintenche prochain quo le Conseyl g-6néral
soyt assemblc . et que Pon promince au peliplo
l'election Ibicte par los .betix Cons, alibi title de
huyt qui seront presentês le peuple
quatre, moyennant qu'il les ayt. agreables, mais
a tissy quant bon lily sembleroyt, ayt la
liberte de refuser flint le nombre total qu'une
part ie.
S'il advient que LIU nonlife presente ii no s'en
trouvent quail.° au grd du pettple, c'est a dire de
la plus grant voyx, qu'on procede A nouvelle
election pour le 11011IbrO qui aura este recuse,
prernierement au Conseyl Estroyt, puys des Deux
Cents, tenement quo nul ne soyt mem qu'il n'ayt
este approve du peuple.
Quo cost ordre soyt observe d'en prendre deux
du has de la ville et deux d'en haul.
Quo l'election faicte et conform& par le peuple,
Los quatre eslotis viennent en la mayson de la
ville faire le serment entre les mains des quatre
anciens pour estre mis en possession de Police.
LA FORME DU SERMENT
• Nous proniettons et jurons de nous acquitter
lidellement du debvoir de notre office, premiere-
mont de maintenir et. defendre, en tail qu'en
nous sera, la liberte et les droyts de la vile, de
lion administrer cc que nous aurons entre nos
mains, d'exercer bonne at droicte justice, rendant
un chascun cc quo lily appertient. soustenans
Los bons et punissant les maulvais, sans hayne
no favour.
Item plus nous promettons de tap.° et observer
cc qui est contenu en Pollee des conseyllers of
quo Dieu nous soyt tesmoin do tout cella pour
nous pugnir si nous allons au contrayre.
Touchant du lieu pour savoir loquel sera pre-
mier on second, si ceulx qu'on eslit ont desja
aultrefoys estes en l'office, qu'on regard° lequel
il aura este le premier, et gull precede les aultres
et ainsy un chascun consequemment at sellon
son ordre ; si on en prend que jamais n'y ayent
estés, qu'un regarde lequel aura este du Conseyl
(levant les aultres et quo, sollon ceste anciennote,
to lieu soyt applique. Or estre du Conseyl nous
entendons, taut en l'office do Tressaurier et secre-.
tayre comme du Conseiller, quo celuy qui aura
laidt son an no soyt esleu, sinon gull se soyt
repose troys ans.
S'il advenoyt qu'un Sindicque allast de vie A
trespas pendant qu'il est en office et well y restat
encore quatre moys de son temps, qu'on en es-
lise iuuu aultre le plus test quo possible sera
aultrement, c'est A dire quaml le term sera
plus brief, on layssora passer Nome() sans C11
S0111)S1 i UM' Wald( re.
260
DE 1:ELECTION DU PETIT CONSEYI,
Quo le lungtli prochain les q more Sitillieques
notivellement esleus avec ceulx de l'an passe et *
le thresorier assembleront les Deux Cens et apres
avoi • thiel l'exhortation et lit priere et le sentient,
Ille011 recite le roulle de l'an passe., et appres
(pie chasciin (Ilse cettlx wen vouldra laissor en
race el ceulx vouldra ouster. Toutesfois
qtie les quatre Sindieques anciens detneurent
sans coin revorsie, si ee n'est gulls ayent commis
faulte digne de reprehension, de laquelle on
vetiylle eminent..
S'il s'en trouve qui soyent ostes par In phis
grant voyx, qu'on no mette point d'aultres en
leur lieu stir le champ, rnais quo le lendemain le
Petit Conseil, qui aura este esleu, en 1101111110
en nombre double, c'est A dire deux
11011 • 1111 par (levant les Deux Cons pour prendre
lesquels bon my semblera : on hien pour en
eslire ii lour jugement, amine il a Ote dist des
Sindieques. S'il advient quo quelque conseyller
mourust, qu'on no sustitue point de successeur.
en sa place jusqu'à l'aultre annêe, n'estoyt quo,
pour poste ou aultre inconvenient, le nombre fust
sy fort diminue que le Conseyl demorast despour-'
vett.
Que l'election faite, tons viennent Ihyre le ser-
ment devant quo s'asseoir ou bien le renouveller,
quant tons l'auront faict auparavant.
LA FORME (du serrnent).
Notts promettons et jurons do nous employer
tidellement a fayre ee quo nostre office 'torte:
et premierement de mean) peynne ot dilligence
it conserver et entretenir le bien, honneur et
utillite de la yule et de venir touttes foys et
quantes quo tnestier sera pour dormer bon et
fiddle consul sur ee quo nous seront requis.
Item d'advertir cold' appartiondra do•
tout cc quo nous penserons estre an proffit de la
ville : Item de tenir secret tout ce qui aura este
dist et determine au Conseyl, s'il co n'estoyt
matiere publicquo et laquelle deust estre publiee.
Item, de no prejudicier nullement a l'honneur
ou profflt de la ville pour faveur ou amitie d'aul-
cull ou aultre consideration charnelle quelconque.
Item, de no sollieiter par brigue et aultres pratic-
ques quelconques de la justice pour tityre coil tre
son debvoir, mais all contrItyre de romp .° et cm-
Ocher de nostre ponvoir telles entreprinses. Item,
de ne prendre present ne corruption, point lavo-
riser A auieun en ee	 eoneernera 1105111!
office, ne en general tout cc (neon voudroyt nous
presenter all regard de nostre estat, pour nous
fayre decliner de In lidellite quo nous del,-
VOHS it In ville et (Ell droyt quo 11011S S0111111eS
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causes dont nous scrolls requis, de prontincor en
droyl et equile cc (veil nous seniblora, sans raven'.
ne liayno I les parties, stirtout (le procurer quo
la religion chrestienne soyt ohserveo purement
et (Jue iJicu soyt se •vi et lionore on la ville et au
torritoyro. Que Dieu nous soy) tesinoyng do toules
les promosses pour en cstre juge Si nous contre-
venons.
Toucliant d'assigner le lieu A un chascun ;
les qua) ro Sintlicques anciens soyent los premiers,
puts les ;mitres, sellon le temps qu'ils attront
estes conseyllers ou en (Alice plus haul.
DE L'ELECTION DU TRESAURIER
Quo ito troys ails en troys ails ii soyt osleti
aver los Sindicques en semblable mire el facon;
puys, quant il aura este esleu, qu'il Ince sombla,.
ble serment qu'un dos consoyllers, adjoustant la.
promesse d'administrer fidellement ot an protflt
de la vile rargent commung qu'il lui sera mis
entre mains et en general de procurer le hen
public, comme to sien propre, tant A recouvrer
comme A le garder et dispenser.
DE L'ELECTION DES SECRETAYRES
Qu'il y ayt deux secrêtayres, rung superieur
at raultre moindre, dont roffice ne sera point A
certain terme precisément, mais quail ralection
des Sintlicques se fora, chascun an, le Conseyl
regardera s'il sera lion de continuer ceulx qu'ils
seront en l'office et. sy, pour bonne consideration,
ii sembloit estre utille de les demettre, gull pre-
cede A en substituer d'aultres, portant toutesfoys
son jugement an Conseyl des Deux Cons, lequel
en pourra fayre sellon quo bon luy semblera et
;ti psy ayt revision tous les ans stir cost
office, pour fayre election quant la necessild le
req ne•ra.
Li FORME DE LEURS SERMENTS
Nous promettons de rediger par escrit,
Inca et diligemment, tout cc cc clue 'nestler sera,
cotton° 'lustre office le pork; : et mettre peynne
que, par nostro faulto et negligence, il n'advienne
auk:Ling dommage no A la ville no aux particti-
hers.
Item, dc no lien communique' des secrets du
Conseyl, ne reveller it aulcung, sinon par coin-
niandement et ordounance (indict Conseyl.
Item, d'expether cc qu'il nous sera donne en
charge, tan( pour la ville glue pour les particu-
tiers, et en general d'observer en bonne cons-
cience re Weil CO11031'110 10 (lehvoir de 'lustre
!ace.
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Quo le Conseyl Estroyt ayt plein pouvoir et
anclorité de les eslire et les continuer, taut qu'ils
feront bien bett y debvoir on aultrement les de-
poser.
Tons feront serment entre les mains des Sindic-
ques en telle forme et be renouvelleront en temps
tie necessitd:
Jo promets et jure de m'employer fldellement
in dcifense de la ville et no Pabandonner nulle-
ment en sa necessyte.
Item, d'estre toujours prest A porter armes
contre les ennemis d'icelle, quant il me sera or-
donne par mes superieurs.
Item, d'entretenir bonne paix et union entre ,
bourgeois et les habitans et d'empecher sellon
mon pouvoir toutte sedition, esmeute et baterie.
Item, ne fayre maulvayse conspiration on
entreprise, mais an contra.yre resister a celles
qui se feront et les reveller A, mes superieurs.
Item, d'empecher touttes dissolutions et insol-
lences on en general tout cc qui sera contrayre
l'ordre et pollice de la ville.
REOLIER On sof ILDAN
OtIC (Psi ollice ne soyi A certain temps, toillefbys
y ayl revision de troys en troys ans pour
seavoir sy cellny qui y est raid hien son delovoir.
1.`estection sera an Conseyl, In confirmation aux
Deux (ens. comme il a eski diet des aultres.
1"0RAIE	 SERMENT DONT ON usEnA
SERA TELLF:
.le promels et June de layre fidelle garde de
cenlx qui me sere(' I. eonunis, pour en rendre
bon compte sans traulde; item, (le lenir ehasrun
prisonnier semi on pins an large, sent)» qui
me sera commathle.
Item, all cas j III 11)0 sera dell'endu, 1)0 permettre
(pie a ulcung parle a ungprisonnier, dome 1.1011Der
si songneuse garde qu'il ne se face point.
Item, de no permettre aux prisonniers de layre
auleunes insolIences, jells dissolus, banquets no
a nitre chose.
: Item de n'exiger online cc qui me Sera deu
sellon . la lave.
Du SA ULMER
Quo ce soil office perpetuel, sy wilily qui est
esleti tine la ys s'en acquitte (tenement; toutestiiys.
quo tons les troys ans, ii s'en face revision, aftirr:
quo, s'il n'estoyt convenable, gull fust . desposd;'.
Quo l'eslection soyt raicte du *Petit Conseil, con7-i
fermde par les Deux-Cens.
DES BERAULTS
Qu'il en soyt aultant faict des lidrauts, assa-:
your rung ctiovauclicur et Vaulty° do pied et quo
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Itt; pitocuttEua-iiENiattki..
Quo co soyt office minuet, continua qu'il sera
licite do continuor wilily qui aura servi,
soluble bolt, et mesnie sera le plus expedient sy
c'est ung homme propre at qu'il s'acquite
gemment de son debvoir; au reste, quo la forme
do l'eslire soyt sembla.ble aux precedentes.
Estant esleu, qu'il jure entre les mains de la
Seygnorie comme ii s'ensuyt:
Jo promets et jure de maintenir de mon pou-
voyr rhonneur et le proffit tin commung et veyl-
ler a conserver los drop de la villa, comma sy
c'estoyt le mien propre at poursuyvre ceulx qui
appartiendra pour les recouvrer sans potirce rung
no greyer raultre.
Item, avoir l'oyl quo nul particulier ontrepregne
stn• le commung et s'il aynsy, le revelle on le
poursuyvre, sellon quo mon office le pQrtora.
Item, de ne faire paction on transaction on
cotnpat aulcung pour diminuer le proffit de la
villa at no recepvoir present no corruption pour
dissimuler ou me ta,yre, quand mon dchvoir sera
. do parlor.
DU CAPITAINE-GENERAL.
QUO cc soyt office perpetual, tenement ndantmoins
y nit revision de troys on troys ans, affin
de ponrveoir • la vile d'ung nouveau, sy celluy
qui y sera lois estoyt ou •caducq de vieillesse on
detenu en longue maladie, on tollement empêche
a ylleurs qu'il lIe pew vacquer A son estat at quo
relection se lace pal' Jo Conseyl, soyt approuvee
par les Deux Cents, comme dist a este.
DES l'ARTICULIEU.S.
Quo se sey1 missy hien °nice A vie et quo elms-
cuil gnarlier eslise le sien, prdsanl le capitaine- -
gdndral ol deux dii Conseyl, d(SpIttes a cola. Puys
quo refection soy! mpportee a ii Consey1 qui aura
l'autoril0 de la ratiffler.
I /ES IIANDERETS.
Jo Wink:re( general soyt eslen comma le
eapilainne 01 011 belle sorb. Tonchant des (mitres,
(peon les 051150 001111110 les capitainnes partion-
hers, shun' que au lien ties deux conseyllers
stfflira tole 10 capitainne (In earlier ii soyt aver
Ses dizoniors.
LEURS LIEUTENANTS.
Chasciin putirra eslire son lieutenant, inoyen-
mint quo ct soyt par le consentement do lours
hentles on hien de Ionics les hendes pour le gd-
((Oral, excopte missy quo en temps dangormix
celia ne so him poinI sans le seen at permission
expresse titi Conseyl.
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Qua le etnisey1 estroyt, le lentlentain aura
este esleu, advise stir le relic de l'an passé, aftin
d'eslire le Conseyl des Soyxante at consequent-
ment des Deux Cens, continuant cettlx qu'il pen-
sera estre propres, ostant cettlx verra estre
expedient (roster et en suppleant d'aultres au
lieu pour accomplir le nombre. Pays appres,
qu'on les mande pour les fayre jurer on renou-
"eller le sentient, dont la forme sera commencee
avec cello du Petit Conseyl.
DES AUDITEURS DES COMPTES
Quo tons les aus le Petit Conseyl en eslise
quatre, dont l'ung soyt nag des Sindicques, soyt
pour continuer, si bon lay semble, &mix gull
auront este l'an precédant on on creer d'aultres;
appres, que cella soyt raporté aux Deux Cons,.
lesquels auront toile liberte de la ratitlier ou
casser, comme diet a este.	 •
LA. FORME DU SERMENT
Nous jurons de fayro en' nostre office cc qui .
appartient ti bons et fidelles procuretus du hien,
public et d'en avoir tel soing comme du nostre
mesme et premieroment, on oyant les comptes.
qu'on nous rendra, de ne passer, no Whiner rien
gull no nous semble juste et raysonable.
Item, do conserver touttes lettres, documons,
et droyts de la ville bien et sourement, reduysant
le tout en bon orth•e, ama qu'on plisse s'en
ayder.
Item, s'il y avoyt rien d'esgard, layre bonne et
-dilligente inquisition de le retirer ot recouvrer..
Item, de tout cc quo sera den b. la ville, soyt cons,.
route, prest, amende, confiscation, on anItre.
.chose quelconque, de fayre bonne et diligent
inquisition el poursuyte, sans mils Opargner,
linallement tie niettre pilule quo rien no pelisse
cii 110 s'aliime on quelque sorb; quo CO soyt, par
nostre flu nile. negligence ott dissimulation.
CONTE1:01.1.EIllt, 1)I1 h1.1ISTILE DE L. MONNOYE,
DE LA GARDE, DE CESSAYEIllt Kr on MAYSTRE
DE L'ARTYLLERIE.
Qua de trays en trays ans appres lc Consul
eslett, on les csliso an Petit Consoyl, It toile con-
lition tiduitttioins quo l'illection so rapporte
Deux Cells pour ()stye ratiffitie; quo Si elle n'estoyt
lit approuvde, quo le Petit Consoyl eslise do nou-
veau; toutesroys (peon puisso continuer cculx
gill 801111)h:rota propres.
Totteliant de la forme de lours sermon's, il
• suffira (pectic soyt gendra.le, do procurer le hien
et 'withour de la 'dile sellon lour ponvoyr et
mettre peynno at diligence d'exereer leur office
265	 sans commottre frande aulcune, taut envers lour
public comine envers les partictiliers.
TAINT DU CONSEYL COMME DU LIEUTENANF
Cc sera office it vie, sinon intervint quel-
que faulte; au reste, quo le Conseyl Estroyt ayt
pleinne puissance de les fityre et creel • et despe-
ser, cy mestier estoyt.
Le nombre est de quatorze officiers de vine,
quail.° du Lieutenant.
Touchant du sermeut, ii suffit quo, °nitre la
forme commune des bourgeois ils promettent
(Pesti .° dilligens, d'assister i toutte Ileum deue
a Messieurs les Sindicques et Conscyl, pour wr-
yly en lour office.
Item, de venir incontinent qu'on les mandera
et d'exticuter tout cc qui lour sera donne en
cliarge.
Item, de se trotiver en tout CO que lour (Alice
porte sans layre faulte. Otilire cella, le Souffler
jurera de tonir secret co quo sera faict an Consul
et d'estre dilligent a fayre bonne garde de la
mayson de la ville et ce qui est en icelle.
Item de fayre fiddle rapport de touttes les
visitations oil il sera commis.
DES tiA RDES DES TOURS ET PORTIERS
Quo, l'ollice soyl missy perpetnel pendant quo
ceitix. qu'on il aura mis feront bien leur debvoir;
toutesfoys que In co gnoyssance en soyt au Conseyl,
commc la puissance (le les layre et erect . . Ii nest
'nestle,. de 'Imam forme spiiciale de serment,
pour re (veil n'est question que de lidelliti % et
 ñ garder le lieu oii on les eonstillie,
ce qui se petit brietVement fityre par parolles.
1)i.s NOTAY RES	 •
La puyssance de les fayre et creer sera. aussi
au Conseil Estroyt ; tottlestoys quo nul ne soyl
cre(") sans a voir le raport el tesmoignage des
11011:Lyres de In vi lie touchant sit sifflisatice, tant
tot pretalltoinie comme en l'arl.
LA FORME DE LEUR SERMENT
Jo promets et jure de no recepvoir nul note
ne instrument qui soyt en deshonneur ou . dont-
inage de la ville on contra la. pollice d'ieelle.
Item, de coucher fidellement par eseript les
instruments et actes dont je seray requis, sans
rien adjouster a la pure vérite.
Item, delivrer a ung chascun les droys quo
In appertiendront quo j'auray entre mes mains.
Item, de no supprimer nul instrument an pre-
• udice d'aulcung on favour de l'aultre, no pared-
lement de mettro entre les mains de la pantie ad-
verse les documens pour frontler celluy qui s'en
ileitvroyt ayder, mais de conserver fidellement
266 	 tout actes qui seront commis en ma charge.
4.;*
A
servir sellon dquite et rayson.
DES DIESSEILLERS, DES GARDES STIR IF.S l'OIX ET
liESURES, DES blASSONS ET CIIAPPUIS .MRES,
DE LA GARDE SUR LE$ POYSSONS.
Que. le Conseyl ayt plain pouvoir d'ordonner
de touttes ces offices et d'y mettre at constituer
ceulx qui vouldra. Or il est a notter quo, pour
Itxercer les offices _sitsdicts, quant au Conseyl
Estroyt, dempuis les Sindicques jusqu'au Saul tier,
• I sera requis d'estre citoyen.
Item, pour estre Lieutenant ou ung des EISSOS-
sours.
Item, de lolls les capitaines et banderols gii-
iieral.
Item, conterolleur, auditeur des comptes, garde
de la monnoye, procureur general, maystre d'ar-
teyllerie et goofier, il sera requis d'estre cytoyen ;
aim reste ii stillira trestre bourgoys.
(pant ñ co qui a este dit du tonne et espace
Ile temps, il le faut entendre en tale sorte quo
s'il advenoyt cependatit faulte digne (Pesti .° pu-
gnie par despusition, soyent tousjours belle
de deposer le delinquenr qui l'aura merite.
lratillre part le bourgoys ou cytoyen qui re-
fusera d'aceepter la (lignite, office ou estat au-
quel il aura este ordonne par la Seygnorie et nu
vouldra nullement condescendre a l'accepter on
estant requis et sommii, qu'il soyt chic d'escuts
d'amende pour sa coutinnace et contreinct de
s'absenter de 1;1 vine pour ung au, sinon qu'il
oust excuse higitime, laquelle debvra estre co-
gneue par le ronsoyl._
DE L'OFFICE, CHARGE ET PUISSANCE DES
SEIGNEURS SINDICQUES
Qua tous les quatre soyent tousjours residens -
on la villa durant Paull& de lent' sindicat,
inent quo nul ne sorte pour coucher dehors at ne •
lust quo pour tine nuyt, sans le faire seavoyr aux.
aultres at quo nul n'entreprongne long voyage
pour estre six ou huyt jours absent sans deman-
der conge an Conseyl.
Quo tous los jours us ayent a so trouver en-
semble et appres diner, assavoir une heure pour..
consulter de cc qui sera a fayre et meth .° ordre •
tout at aussy pour adviser de mettre on execu-
tion ce qui aura este arrest6 at conchal par le
Conseyl.
Aux jours ordinayres que le Conseyl se tient,
qu'ils soyent tousjours les premiers en la mayson
de la ville, tant pour monstrer bon exemple aux
aultres que pour ddliberer ensemble de Ce qu'il
fauldra mettre en avant.
S'il suryiont chose qui requiére d'assembler le
Conseyl, qu'ils se treuvent ensemble pour cc faire
267 	 l'heure qui sera mestier.
Quo es-clioses qui requierent lour presence en_
divers lieux, qu'ils se advisent de tellement
parlir entre eulx quo chaciiii soyt li Oil il hiy
sera expedient.
S'il advient tpieltitte esclandre public(1,
feu on tinnulte on aultre cas sernblable, quo le
Premier Syndic(' vicuna incontinent en la mayson
de In ville, et se tionne là poor attendre les no-
voiles citron I ny rapportera, atin d'asseinblor 10
Consey1 d'heure en lieure si mustier est on aul-
I remcni disposer sellon la necessilci. Quo les 11•03'S
:mitres courent visternent an lien on le danger
sera. et puis a.yant yeti quo c'est, que deux se (le-
partissent, l'ung thin couste, et Pant y° (Paulin:,
pour visitor les carfors et les portes, si inestior
est, et le troysiesme clamour° stir le lieu (hi dan-
ger • usqu'it CC qu'il soyt appaysti.
DE 1:010FICE 1111 PRE111E11 EN Eser::cisi..
Quo tons les lours qui n'y aura point de Conseyl,
il se trouve tine hour° du math) en la mayso» de
la villo, assavoir a 'Issue du sermon, pour. voyr
s'il rest° quelque conclusion du Conseyl it exe-
cuter ou pour ouyr ceux qui y vientlront
Qu'il aye a recovoir les lettres atheyssantes
Conseyl, mais qu'il no les ouvre sinon en pre-
sence do Piing des compagnons pour le Twins on
de deux conseylliers. Pais, si Cosi chose bastive,
qu'il appelle ses autres compaiguons 'pour'. 1411
communiquer sur l'heure, on aultromont
attende qu'ils se trouvent ensemble et genera
lement quo en touttes matieres qui mariterontt
d'avoir consultation stir Ileum, gull assombio,
ses compaignons.
Quo les jours du Conseyl, incontinent appres—•
la fin du sermon, il soyt en la mayson de la viii
pour escripre ceux qui demanderont audience.
Que a la sortie il ayt a fayre les responces sur.
les audiences donnees et quo le jour mesme i1..
prouvoye do mettre en execution cc qui aura este •
ordonne, si c'est chose qui se puisse executer
si tost.
Qu'il Lilt it signer les mariages devant qu'on..
les annonce t. Pesglise, s'enquerant dilligemment
silo manage se petit fayre salon les ordonna.nces.
ait le scel entre les mains et qu'il alt
charge de sceller.
Qu'il soyt president des secondes appellations
011 Sllpl'OSMOS.
DE L'OFFICE DES AULTRES TROTS
Quo l'ung preside au Consistoyre, l'aultre en
la Chambre des Comptes at le troysiesme aux
premieres appellations.
I lout, qu'il ail mtg depute It visitor los prisons
tine roys la sepinitinno et 11110 COS charges se
distrilluent an commencement de lour aline° par
268
	 Padvis flu Consnyl.
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Que deux puissant signer les mandemens or-
dinayres pour fayre les payemens des charges
passees par le Conseyl.
Item, ouvrir les lettres addressantes au Con-
seyl, comme (list a este.
CE QU'UN(: SEUL PEUT FAYRE
Quaid (juelque plaincte viendra, quo tin elms-
cun des Sindicques all la puissance tie
ceulx qu'il a.ppertiendra, interroguer et examiner
et fayre emprisonner, si mestier est.
Item, quo pour touttes insollences, dissolu-
tions, yvrogneries et aultres semblables, nag
chascun puisse fayre mettre en prison, puis
porter au Conseyl, mais	 Wait puissance
faire sortir Ic prisonnier devant qu'Intvoir laidt
lc rapport.
DES ILAT1ERES CRUMNELLES
S'ils prennent wig criminel, quo dedans vint
et quail.° homes, us ayent a commander
Lieutenant de le fayre respondre stir les charge's.
desquelles il est accuse.
Appres qu'il lour S0111 l'eMiS tin Lieutenant, Ili':
(fest cas dont le faict se prenve facillement
inesine	 soyt desja prouve et qui n'y ayt point
tie difficulte au droyt, comme do metirtre, de
larresin et semblables, quo incontinent us facent
justice et pour le plus long terme qu'ils ne le
iennent point plus de dix jours.
Sy c'est. matiere .difficille a prouver quant
fait on qui requiére consultation quant A la sen-
tence, quo tonne competant soyt donne an Lieu-
tenant pour ammor et produyre ses tesmoings,
sellon le lieu on us seront. Toutetbys qu'il n'y..
ait plus d'ung moys it cc fayre, tout an plus en-
core qu'il faille evoquer les tesmoings
lours; s'ils sont on la vile ou deux Iteures juts,
qui n'y ayt quo quinze jours.
S'il le criminel domande estre admis It ses .
justifications, quo le Consoyl regard° Wit est de
raison on non; que s'il le Consoyl treuve y
doibve estre admis, qu'on my donne. terme de
trente jours.
Les preuves cogneues et lea deffenses ouyes, au
cas qu'elles soyent admises, quo les Sindicques
1101111(!blI on ire tint! le prisonnier soyt senieutie -
dedans dot= jours tout nu plus turd, encore
quo la mat iiwo requiere consultation ; M1111'0'110111,
qU'llS 10 Dissent an premier jour.
Que les diets Sindicques soyent jug,es de tonnes
CallSOS criminellos, °slant toutesfoys acCompa-
gne's du Consul et chascun des quatre Koniince
les sentences it son ordre, tellentent neantmoins
quo sy plusieurs sentences estoycnt dennees en
tine assise, n'y on mist qu'un soul qui les
proutincea. Quo s'il y en avoit uuuug 011 plusieun
tjtit:	 t	 tjtal	 • ../•-• • •
;11)1WitS eux an Consey1 tyennent leurs lietix aver
les bast ons ; ion ieslys ne in unit
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Que troys jou •s la sepmaine, assavoir le lung-
di, mardi el vendredi, us ayent a se trouver au
son de la cloche sans estre appelles.
Au reste, quant ii surviendra matiere extraor-
(Hilaire, (peas ayent aussy It comparoys1re
l'heure qui leur sera signitiée par le commando-
went des Sindicques taut quo null.
Que es jours ordinayres dempuis Pasques jus-
que it la Saint Michiel apprés huyt ',cures, den,-
puis la Saint Michiel jusque it Pasque it neuf
perde ung gros de son sallayre. .Que en
matiere de grande importance et qui requerra la
presence de tout leConseyl, que lesSindicq ties man-
dent querir les conseyllers par le serment qui oat
la ville, mais quo cella ne se face sinon avec
bonne discretion. Quiconque estant evocque par
son serment ne comparoystra, qu'il soyt en l'es-
mende de cinc florins, sinon qu'il ait excuse
legitime, de laquelle ii jurera si vent qu'elle soyt
recoil° ; an reste ii fauldra quill y ayt este signi-
fla en sa personne on it sa femme ; quo nul no
sorte pour s'en alien du tout, devant que le
Conseyl soyt levê, sans demander conge.
Quiconque sortira contre le voulloir du Consoyl
et mesme °stint rappelle par le Saultier du com-
inandoment du Premier Sindicq, s'il sort centre
la deffence, il sera it cinq if. amende et tiondrat
prison troys jours.
La priere faicte, nul ne pane qu'en son ordre
et si plusieurs parloyent, que le premier Sindicq
impose sillence, le sillence impose, si quelcung
no cesse, portant qu'il soyt cinq s. diamond°.
Quo chescung se tienne on son lieu affln d'evi-
ten confusion.
Que nul no s'ingere de proposer rien de soy
mesine, mais quo cella soyt seullement au Pre-
mier Simile(' et si quelcung avoyt chose it propo-
ser, qu'il en inform° le diet Syndicq, (levant que
le Conseyl soyt assis, lors quo le Syndicq le
propose de Sa bouche; toutesfoys sy I/011 luy sem-
ble, qu'il commando it l'aultre d'en dire plus °ni-
tre pour inieulx informer le Conseyl. S'il adve-
noyst quo queleung oust advertissement dempuys
Jo Conseyl assys, qui appertiont an bi01) public*
tine estant entró, il en advertisse le Premier
Sindicq it part.
Si quelcung avoyt rien it proposer de son eats
',repro, qu'il se lace escripre on a.ultroment, qu'il
attende qu'on aye d6péclid tons ceux qui. seront
escripts; (1110 nul n'ayt it reveller cc qui sera fatiet
et tratict0 en secret an Conseyl, sun peyne d'estre
270  despos6 et repute inhabile ft toujours d'estre en
d'estre pugny par l'advis du Conseyl on (Pitmen&
pecuniaire, on lionnorable, ou pugnytion corpo-
relle; toutesfoys s'il appert quo ii l'aye faict pour
empticher le cours de justice, y ait amen&
lionnorable. Si ce a este pour intdresser le hien
publicq,	 y ait peinne corporelle.
Que mil no jure et tie dyable dedans los Con-
sells, stir peine de chic; gros, et s'il continuoyl
appres on avoir este corrige plusieurs tOys,
tre depose.
Que nul no blaspheme Dieu sur peinne de cl•c':
mercy solennellement et estre mis en prison et.
s'il le faysoit par plusieurs foys, d'estre depose et
pugny de peinne plus rigoureuse.
Que nulles injures ne se disent de rung
Fault.° et qu'on n'entre nullement en contention
on noyse; qu'on no dise parole coutumálieuse ou
doshonneste, mais que chascun, en disant son
oppinion, patio en toutte modestie, sans charger
les aultres on parlor contre lour lionneur, sun
peine de eine sols et s'il estoyt coustumier de ce
fayre, appres certainnes amonitions, s'il no s'en
corrige, qu'il soyt 	 do Conseyl.
Si quelcung impose crime sun l'aultre, qu'il
soyt tenu . de le prover ou autrement de luy crier
mercy et qu'il soyt deppose du Conseyl pour la
reste de l'an et quo celluy qui aura este charge
en alt attestation; que cest ordre se tienne tant
aux Conseil des Soyxante et Deux cens comme an
General et c'est pour dviter confusion, et affin que
le tout soyt mieux observe, qu'on use ce qui en
est dist par chascun an, tant au premier Consoyl
Estroyt qui se tiendra appres l'ellection, comme
(levant les Deux Cells et lorsque tuns jureid. do 10
Quo rien no soyt mis on avant entre les Deux
Cons devaut qu'avoir este traicte an Conseil Es-
troy, ni au Conseyl General (levant qu'avoir este
traictó Ulla an Consey1 Estroyl. comme WAN: les
Deux Cells.
130111; QIJELLES CAUSES SE DEIIVRONT ItETIREIL •
LES CONSEYLLERS.
(With chascun en son propre ca.s ait a se reti-
re!. sans qu'on luy commando, on s'il no le fay-
soyt pas, (peon lily face fayre.
En co qui attochera les siens et non pas sa •
1)01'801111C, quo en causes civilles le pere ne soyl.
present quant la cause du Ills sera démenee, ni
&ere ni oncle, et an contraire si quelqu'un no
so retiroyt de soy mesme, soyt admoneste
par le Conseyl.
En causes criminelles que nul no se tienne
en l'atlayre de son parent ou affin, jusqu'au cou- •
sin issu de germain inclusivement.
Item, On tons cas quo bon semblera an Consul •
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Quo le tresorier ait A. assister toujours en Con-
seyl sur les peinnes dictes et ayt voyx comme
les aultres.
Qu'il tienne secret cc qui se fora au Conseyl
soubs mesme peinne qui a este mise sur les con-
seylliers.
Qu'il recouvre tous les deniers commungs,
taut du revenu ordinayre c,omme des peinnes,
amendes et autres émollumens extraordinayres.
Qu'il ait a. exiger au terme ce qui sera deu par
les fermiers, recepveurs particuliers, tant des
amendes et peinnes que du revenu, et tous aul-
tres, tellement quo la vile nait nulle . faulte par
sa negligence.
S'il ne peust estre paye de bonne volonte,
ayt a. contraindre les debiteurs par prison, 'sans
aulcung delay; qu'il n'ait a. delivrer argent aul-
cung sinon par commandement; quo ayant receu
mandement, ii ne retardo point, tellement qui
en Vienne complainte. 	 •
ayt a rendre comptes do six moys en six.
moys en la chambre des Comptes, tellement quo
ne différe jamais six sepmaines oultre le terme.
En so reddition de comptes qu'il ait A mons-
trer quo sa recepte convient avecq l'amodiation
!aide on ordennance en vertu de laquelle il a.
Qua nt aux mises, qu'il ayt a. produire les man-
demons avec les quittances stir chascun article.
Item, allin quo les comptes soyent plus clans,
ayt a les rd(Ittyre en forme de registre.
(Juant il sera depposd (le	 qu'il alt
rendre be reliqua dedans six sepinainnes on aul-
trement	 tienne prison jusque A lin de
payernent.
L'OFFICE DES SECILETAIRES
Quo totts deux soyent tousjouts au Consoyl,
sinon quit y oust excuse fort ldgitime.
aient a. tonir secret cc qui se fora an
(.7onseyl.
Item, gulls n'aiont A communiquer, ni exiber
on copier aulcung acte qui doibve estre secret,
no rien-rdveller oultre 'Intention des Seygneurs;
qui fora (In contrayre, soyt pugni commune
(list a estd.
Qu'il y ait deux registres, l'ung pour • les
affayres publiques ou qui aulcunement atouche- •
ront le commung ; l'aultre pour les causes pu-
rement particulliêres, lesquelles n'appartiondront
liniment A la vile ni d'une part ni d'aultre. 	 •
Quo le premier secrêtayre tienuo en Cons41
le premier registre pour oscripre et Pimlico ait
celluy des affayres particulieres.
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de lire lettres. ou. instrumens_.ou actes, quo l'aul-
tre le lace, awn qu'il n'y an point tie retartio-
ment.
.Que chascun des deux a son endroyt face les
despeches des matiéres que son registre.portera,
toutesfoys que le premier soul alt la charge de
tout signer, tant les ungs que les aultres, quant
sera present.
D'aultre part, quant il aura matiere publicq
depesches de grant consequence, commo instruc-
tions at semblables, que le premier communique
avec son compaygnon pour user de son consey1;
mais que en l'absence de l'ung, l'aultre ait la
charge totalle et entiere et quo le second face du
tot l'office du premier.
Qu'il y ait ung'registre a part pour les lettres
missives qui demeure en la secrdtayrie,
sera commung aux deux sellon la necessite.
Item, registre a part des causes criminelles ;
Item, ung aultre des causes de manage.
Item, nag maitre oft soyent enrolles les Wit-
ciers dempuis le premier jour qu'on les aura cons-
little jusque ft co gulls seront sortis de Polite°.
Item, ung aultre pour reduyre en ordre les
Edits of crieries qui so throat, sellon in necessi-
te du letups.
Item, registre des mandemens qui smut laidt
pour desbourser argent, allin que la reddition des
comples soyt plus an net Milieu.
Ilem,	 y nit ung aultre registre a.uquel
soyent extrail tons les actes qui emporteront
recouvrer argent pour le commung, commo des
amendes on uultres emoluments.
Hem, quo toutes intermations soyent serrees
on ung armoyre dent le premier secrelayre aura
in clot' on en son absence le second, dont ils au-
rent it rendre compte. Et an) les puisse
trouvor au besoing, qt1t! chasenne alt sa marque
de nonibre of qu'en une itultre armeyre ii y on ait
tin inventayre, inais quo tons les prosses concluds
( . 1 parMiets soyent retire on ;mitre lieu.
ayent it faire dilligemment los depeches,
taut pour lo commung quo pour les partieul-
hers, et BUM que rien ne deineure en artier°, quo
tons deux se I rouvent l'appres-dinee it l'hetire
(pie les Sindicques conviendrent.
11.0111, h. six itouresdo matin qu'ils ayont dis-
tribuer ensemble esgalloment tons les profits.,
DE L'OFFICE DES CAPITAINNES, BANDERETS
ET DIZENIERS
Quo le capitainne-general soyt vigilant et dil-
ligent sur toutte la vile, qu'il ne se face utile
mende, conventicule ou assemblde .suspecte et
touttes aultres choses semblables qui pourront
estre preparatifs de tumulte, sedition ou mutine-
rie, et quo les c,apitaines-particuliers, bande-
nets at dizeniers, facent 'le semblable chascun
273	 son endroyt, et en son quartier.
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Item, cy cella aavenoyt et gull y eusi gum--
clue commencement de trouble, que le capitaine-
general s'en appercevant en ativertisse de bonne
!retire le Consiy1; que les capitaines particuliers.
•s'ils s'en apergoyvent les premiers, fassent le
semblable en informant Messieurs, ou lour ge-
neral, pour en fayre le rapport, sellon qui lour
semblera bon.
Item, gulls veyllent chascun A son endroit
qu'il ne se face nul desordre et nulle insollence
et quo les bourgeoys et habitans se gouvernent
honnestement en leurs menages et sans bruit.
.Si quelcung faysoit autrement, gulls l'en admo-
nestent, et ne profile de lien, gulls en fassent
10 rapport.
S'il y advenoyt quelque danger ou inconve-
nient A la ville, qu'ils soyent toujours prests
pour la deffense, quant leur commandement lour
sera fait.
Toutefoys qu'il ne soyt licito ny a capitaine,
banderets, d'assemble,r gens no fayre port d'ar-
mes sans le commandement expres du Conseyl,
n'estoyt qu'il y advient quelque assaut subit de
auquel cas qui facent tout co qui est de
lour office, attendant quo le Conseyl ii provoye
phis amplornent. Et affin quo la villo tie demeure
an depourveu, que le capitainne-general n'entre-
prenne long voyage, comme pour estre plus de
hilyt jours absent sans avoir conge.
Item plus, quo chascun d'eux et en especial
les ilizeniers ayent esgard quo les crieset ordon-
minces de Messieurs, tant stir la reformation de
l'Eglise quo stir la pollice, soyent hien observees
et. s'il le contrayre se fait, qu'ils en advertissont.
Item, quo chascun dizenier face do six en six
moys ung roll() de tons les bourgoys et habitat's
do sit dizainne, auquel soyt comprins tous me-
nages faysant feu A part et presentent ledict role
tu Conseyl.
Q'tine lays Pan le eapitainne-generel accom-
pagne des capitainnes particulliers et dizoniom,
chascun en son quartier, face visitation de may-
son en mayson, scavoir s'il les bourgeoys et ha-
lams sont gurus d'armes, commo ii apportiont,
pour la deffence do la villo.
DES AUDITEUltS DES COMPTES
QUO troys 'lours la sepmainno, assavoir 10
inardi, jeudi et sambedy, us aient s'assembler
tant le matin que l'appres-diner pour vacquor
A Jour office ; qu'ils ayent a mettre tous les droys,
instrumens et obligations par ordre et les
' rer en inventayre, affin que rien no se porde,
mais se trouve facillement; qu'ils ayent ung
ollicier propre, depute pour envoyo querir les
parties qu'il sera mestier; quo _sans :dpargner
274	 nuls, us mandent bus ceux qui trouvent dobvoir .
A. la vile, pour les fayre payer; quo quant quol- .
t..uti6a 011LISUL tw payer Ull nyera Ut ((Law uu,..-
Idguera quelque excuse qui no leur semblera sur-
lisante, gulls ayent a en faire le rapport an Con-
seyl dedans huyt jours prochains.
S'il no se despechoyt rich pour cc cop, gulls
ayent a le reduyte en mOmoyre, puis appres,
vovre juseue it la troysiesmo et quatriesme foys,
tellement quo rien n'y denieure en arriere jusq(10
ft to soyt vnylle; Si par favour on militia Hs
pardonnent ft quelcung, qu'ils en soyent pugnis
do punition de leurs gages pour le passe et d'estre-
'onus de la debte.
Pour voir s'ils se seront (tenement acquites,
quo de troys en troys moys us ayent a presenter
ling roll° on inventayre des deities et obligations
gulls attront trouv6es, pour thyre aparoystre
de letir dilligence et cc avec(' exibition de lour
registre pour collationner, Si mestier estoyt
toutesfoys que pour fayre le profit de la ville, us
no deffraudent point les particulliers de lours
droys, mais, quant les registres (le la villa les
potirront servir, gulls but communiquent lour
OH faysant copie.
Qu'ils ayent aussy ft 'totter tous droys dos
tons et revenus qui ne se payout point et. appres
les avoyr exiges, en fa.yre le rapport. an Conseyl,
atilt de les recoudre l'inventayre ordinayre
avecq les aultres el c'est stir pollute confine
ilessus.
Qu'ils ayent a revisiter les comples du threso-
tier, incontinent qu'ils leur seront présentes, el
les clorre d'un traict sans delayer; quo s'ils no
les anuortoyt all temps dist, assavoir an bout des
six moys, qu'ils les sollicitent et les exigent et no
permettent point qui passe le terme.
L'OFFICE DU CONTEROLLEUR
Qu'il no passe point ung an sans visiter.tous
edifices apartenant It la yule ; quo, quant if
sera adverty par . les habitans qu'il y alt nO-
cessite de reparation, que sans Mayer long
temps, il vienne sur le lieu pour voyr quo c'est
et y mettre ordre; que s'il advenoyt inconvenient
par sa negligence, 4pres qu'il en aura est6 ad- -
verty, qu'.il en responde.
Que en tous les bastimens oft ii n'y a point
d'habitans, comme aux temples, pons et amble-
Nes, qu'il soyt dilligent d'y adviser, sans qu'on
Pen admoneste ; qu'il pourvoye et motto ordre quo
rien no perisse on se arrompo par faulte do
reparation.
Qu'il ait registre propre potir signer diligem-
ment les journ6es, affin de ne point signer los
acquits du thresorier, sinon qu'il en soyt bion
certain ; pour ce fayre, que partout oii ii mettra
les masons ou chappuis en ouvre, 	 ne
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	 point d'havoir l'oyl pour scavoir s'ils font fidel-
lement la besongne.
Qu'il tionne soigneusement les clots, SitlIN los
livrer en aultre main, ne s'en tier it personno,
sans commandment expres du Conseyl. Qua s'il
en advenoyt faulte, il aura A en respondre;
soyt soignettx (le la tenir 'tette et bien accous-
tree, pour s'en servir tousjours quant mestier
sera ; qu'il se donne garde que en la nettoyant,
elle no soyt remude pour confondre l'ordre at (le
pour (full no s'y face quolque tromperie, y
soyt lors present et appres quo cc sera faict,
regarde voir s'il n'y a rien de mal.
no charge, ne decharge nulle piece, shim'
en necessita et par conunandement do Messei-
gneurs at qti'il observe cella par tons les bon-
levars.
tienne missy la poudre luien serree, tene-
ment quo mil inconvenient n'y advienne stir
pollute de respondre si eestoyt pour sa faulte
quant masher sera (le mettre hors l'artoyllerie,
son office sera de cc fayre par commandment
des Soygneuts at lors qu'il soyt prest.
Du PROCUREUR-GENERAL
Qu'il assiste A la cm . du Lieutenant attx play-
doyers, pour scavoir at entendre eil y aura int&
rest popr la ville en quelque • cause, at lors
eentremettre at former ses conclusions at qua
pour ce fayre non settlement audience' luy soyt.
donnee, mais que Monsieur le Lieutenant. l'inter-
rogue s'il a rien a dire, devant que vityder los
causes qui sembleront estre mesIdes avec Vint&
rest commung; que en touttes causes qui apar-.
tiendront au hien at proffit de la ville at A la
conservation de l'estat publiCq, ii soyt instant
pour suyvre comma procureur (In commung,
mesme aux causes criminelles qui en despoil-
dront, qu'il soyt adjoint an Lieutenant.
Que, an defiant de parens et ainis, ii sollicite
et poursuyve pour fayro creer tuteurs on cura-
teurs aux pupille's on pour fayre desposer coux
qni y seront, si besoing estoyt ; soyt partie
pour exiger les amondes an nom do la villo de
tons ceux qui auront offense. Toutesfoys ne
les recouvre point et ne my soyt lieite d'en pac-
tionner ou transsiger on en appointer et quo de
coux qui auront este condemnes, qu'il les signi-
fie touttes les sepmaines an thresorier, affin (pen
recouvre.
Que en cela ii n'espargne person no sus poyenne
de payer la somme luy-mosme. Toutesfoys qu'il
no molest° mil pour le fayre venir en justii3e-
qu'il no soyt garni de probation. Item, qui mette
peinne et dilligence (le scavoir ceux qui &Hien-
nein den it la ville, comme terres, possessions,
!was, maysons on cons, pour en admiir los au-
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en itt vile, qu'il ait regard n'entrepregne
su • la rue oil sus le commung el qui s'y oppose
pour empecher jusque ñ cc qu'il en soyt den par
justice ; quo si quelqne mayson est ritylitie on
dOmolie, en sorb e que in ville en soyt defformee,
qu'il poursuyve celltly a qui sera in place (fill
rap In rediger on quitter.
Pareillement, s'il y a danger quo quelque may-
son caducq se ruyne avec 'Interest commung,
gull se face partie centre le maystre pour la
tityre appuyer ou reparer.
item, no souffre point quo nulle mayson
soy( apply& 811r la rue pour empêcher le corn-
;Dung, sinon en attendant le temps oppurtun de
la reffayre, quoyqu'il soyt qu'il no passe point
Ituyt moys ; s'il estoyt negligent et qtte princi-
',aliment par favour et support, il dissimuhlt,
qu'il en soyt mis a l'admende.
Qu'il nit la visitation des pains que les houlan-
gers . et autres mettent en vente, voyr s'ils
sont de juste poy ou non et quo buttes los sop-
mainnes ii s'en acquite; là ou II trouvera fault°,
qu'il precede en la forme qu'il s'ensuyt.
Assavoir s'il no treuve pain qu'il no soyt
marque et poysant son poyx jouxte le prix du
bled du sambedi prochain passé, qu'il exige cinc
sols d'amende, dont la moytie soyt applique°
la vile et que le thresorier la recoyve, J'aultre
audict procureur et oultre plus que le pain soyt
confisque an profit de l'hOpital et c'est pour la
premiere . toys; pour la seconde foys, vint sots
-d'amende , confiscation du pain it appliquer
comme dist est ; pour la troysiesme soyxante sols
d'amende et confiscation du pain ; pour la qua-
triesme dix f. a distribuer, confine dist est, avec
cella que le délinquant soyt privd du mestior et
quo son four soyt abbattu.
Qu'il face les inventoyres des meubles de
touttes confiscations et biens oil la justice aura
mis la main, an profit de la vale& pills rapport°
an Conseyl.
Item, qu'il se donne garde des maysons apar-
tenantes it la ville qu'elles no soyent usurpees
par aulcung particulier, mais qu'elles se Iowa
an profit du commung ; toutesfoys, coin no face
pas de lonage, mais par son advertissement le
thresorier le face, voyre si c'est an dessotibs de
dix florins et pour l'espace d'ung an seullement.
Si c'est pour plus long tonne ou plus haul prix,
gull se taco it la chandelle.
DU SAULTIER
Qu'il ail la garde de la mayson de la vine
corm° concierge ; quo les jours de Conseyl
ouvre In grant porte an matin et no hi forme
point jusque le Conseyl soyt party, pareillemont
quant le Conseyl se tiendra extraordinayrement
277	 on quo les Deux Cons seront assembles.
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sera pour ouyr les plainctes et fayre les ildpeclies
oil que tuus les quatre conviendroni ensemble
l'a.ppres-diner.
Item, quant la court du Lieutenant • se tient en
hunt on Los appellations, le reste du temps au
long du jour, qu'il n'y ait que le petit lulls
ouvert.
Au soir fernie de bonne lieure tout et le
tienne forme toutte la nuit, mais (levant qu'il
visite hien qui n'y ait nul dedans ; toutesfoys quo
quo qua.nt l'ung des Seygneurs Sindicques viendra,
qu i ll lily ouvre It quelque lieure quo CO sop.
voyre de nuit. Qu'il tienne toutte la mayson Wet;
Bette et en bon ordre et s'il y. avoyt non a re-
fayre, qu'il en advertisse incontinent le conte-,
rollout. ; qu'il face allumer de bonne heure he
ten pour chaufer la salle en hyver, quelque temps.
(levant que he Premier Sindicq et les secretayres
vionnent.
Qu'il ne faylle point de se trouver, quant le Con-
soyl se tiendra, le premier pour gander la porte.
Qu'il tienne secret tout ce que se dira et Lena
dodans, sus mesme peinne que dist a este des
Conseylliers ; accompagne les Sugneurs
Sindicques en puis alter la justice.
Item, qu'il accompaigne le Lieutenant on rex&
cution dos sentences criminelles.
Item, qui presente le y in que Messieurs on-
voyeront aux ambassadeurs et aultres.
Item, ait a visitor les maysons ruynetises
avecq les jurds, quant il en sera requis, pour on
faire rapport au Conseyl.
Item, de limiter les champs et possessions de-
dans les franchises.
Item, qu'il ait ung cachet publicq pour barren
et scener les biens qui appartiendront a la con-
gnoyssance de la justice, en attendant qu'inven-
tayre s'en face, assavoir quant la ville ii preten-
dra interest ou n'y aura point d'heretiers oil
(pie les beretiers ne s'aceorileront el quo rung
deinandera hi main misc.
Item, les cettres (Los notayres, (plant quelcung
mourra, pour conserver les droits ((Wits auront
passes par lours mains.
Item. (pie (plant lung desquels sera mort ou
despose, ((iii retire la hallebarde, le gouge, he
hornoys et la secrette gull a de la Seygnorie
pour Los delivrer aux sueeessours.
Quant le guet aura prins queleung de nuyt
par les rues, qu'on my anieynne et qu'il he
garde jusque it lendemain.
Item, s'il s'apportoyt quelque chose (pie lily
rust mist: entre Los mains, gull le recoyve pour
en layre bonne et fiddle garde. Toutesfoys qu'il
alt ung registre pour eseripre taut les prisonniers
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	 (peon my amenera quo cc quo my sera appourte
et qu'il escripve stir le champ en presence de
t..witiy (fill HI .) lic1.11110Fit Cl pie IC llI Ltttt It act . ., Os-
gner cela par le secretayre.
DE CoFFICE DES PORTIERS, lantrrs	 poirrE
(iAltDES DES TOURS •
Quo chasciiii ',oilier forme la porte appres
soil de In cloche et ne l'ouvre point. (levant Mien-
re, soyt de matin ou de soir. Si quelcung de-
mandoyt d'entrer hors heure, qu'il ne luy ouvre
point sans conge, sinon par le passage des
postes; mais encore que on ne leur ouvre qUe.•
le guet n'y soyt present de pour du danger.
Item, en necessite speciale, comme en temps de
pest,e, pour mettre les manacles, que le portier
auquel le commandement sera faict ouvre a la
requests de celluy qui sera commis a cella. •
Qua chascun soyt diligent a garder ses clefs,
tellement quo, s'il advenoyt faulte par sa negli-
gence. qu'il en responde.
Item, que nul n'ait a commettre aultre en son
lieu sans demander conge au premier Sindicq ou
on son absence l'un de ass compaygnons.
Que en esmeute, comme de feu ou d'aultre
accident, us se tiennent a lours portes et ne s'en
despartent sans avoir expres commandement ;
quo en temps suspect le portier avec les gardes
Terme incontinent la porte, quant le guet aura
donne signe tel qu'il sera dit.
Que les touriers no faillent de coucher chascun
en sa tour et qu'ils n'y introduysent point multi-
tude de gens sans conge ou commandement ; en
leur absence ou deffaut, qu'ils n'y commettent
nul autre sinon au conge.
Que celluy qui garde le boulevard do Molart
alt la clef de la chainne du lac pour former
touttes les nuyis le passage des basteatix et. on-
vrir le math'.
DES DUETS DES DEUX CLOCHERS
Quo les guets soient unit et jour aux elochers
de Sainct-Pierre et de Sainct-Gervais et soyent
dilligens Il regardor dedans at deliors ; s'il adve-
noit quelque feu A la villa, que celluy des deux
qui en sera le plus prochain Ic crie de voix aux
maysons procliaines sans son de cloche.
En temps suspect, que chascun des deux alt
line cloche at one barmier°, at s'il voyt quelque
gross° troppe, sonne la cloche at matte la
balmier() du consta quo ce sera, affin quo les
pourtiers soyent stir lour garde et s'il mestier
est qu'ils ferment la porte.
Les ordonances ins escriptes hont est& passes
par Petit, Soyxante, Deux Cens et ceste dimenche




The psalm read by Fatio to the Petit Conseil upon his condemnation in 1707 (see p. 27)
Psalm 58
Do you indeed speak righteousness, 0 congregation? do ye judge uprightly, 0 ye sons of
men?
2 Yea, in heart ye work wickedness; ye weigh the violence of your hands in the earth.
3 The wicked are estranged from the womb: they go astray as soon as they be born,
speaking lies.
4 Their poison is like the poison of a serpent: they are like the deaf adder that stoppeth
her ear;
5 Which will not hearken to the voice of charmers, charming never so wisely.
6 Break their teeth 0 God, in their mouth: break out the great teeth of the young lions, 0
Lord.
7 Let them melt away as waters which run continually: when he bendeth his bow to shoot
his arrows, let them be as cut in pieces.
8 As a snail which melteth, let every one of them pass away: like the untimely birth of a
woman, that they may not see the sun.
9 Before your pots can feel the thorns, he shall take them away as with a whirlwind, both
living, and in his wrath.
10 The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance: he shall wash his feet in the
blood of the wicked.
11 So that a man shall say, Verily there is a reward for the righteous: verily he is a God
that judgeth in the earth.
The Holy Bible containing the Old and New Testaments. Translated out of the original
tongues; and with the former translations diligently compared and revised, by His Majesty's
Special Command. London: Eyre and Spotswood Ltd., 1902.
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Appendix III
Taken from JerOme Sautier La Mediation de 1737-38. Contributions a l'histoire des institutions
politiques de Geneve, These pour le doctorat d'Etat, Paris 1979, pp. 982-990.
Reglement de l'Illustre Mediation pour la pacification des troubles de la Republique de Geneve
Au Nom de Dieu,
Amen.
Les troubles et divisions arrives dans la Ville de Geneve des l'annee 1734 ayant eta
portas au point d'y attirer les horreurs d'une guerre civile, dont les suites funestes auraient pu la
plonger dans les plus grands malheurs et entrainer la perte entiere de l'Etat, SA MAJESTE TRES
CHRETIENNE, etant informee de l'extrame danger 00 se trouvait cette Rapublique, qu'Elle a
toujours honore de sa bienveillance, et faisant d'ailleurs attention a l'alliance qu'Elle a avec elle,
a bien voulu lui accorder sa mediation, conjointement avec celle des Louables Cantons de
ZURICH et de BERNE, dont les representants en quanta d'allias, s'etaient déjà rendus a Geneve
pour y rëtablir le bon ordre et la tranquillite, laquelle mediation fut acceptae par tous les differents
ordres de la Republique. A l'effet de quoi sa MAJESTE aurait envoye le tres illustre et tres
excellent seigneur Comte de Lautrec, son lieutenant general en la province de Guyenne,
marechal de ses camps et armaes, inspecteur general de son infanterie, muni de ses pouvoirs
pour confarer avec les illustres et magnifiques seigneurs representants Jean Hoffmeister,
bourgmestre, Jean Gaspard Escher, stathalter, charges aux mames fins des pouvoirs du Louable
Canton de ZURICH, et les illustres et magnifiques seigneurs representants Isaac Steiger, ancien
avoyer, et Louis de Watteville, haut commandant du Pays de Vaud et ancien banderet, aussi
charges des pouvoirs du Louable Canton de Berne, lesquels, apres avoir pris une parfaite
connaissance des matieres relatives a l'objet de leur commission et regu d'un chacun toutes les
informations, instructions et mar-noires necessaires a ce sujet, se seraient employes avec zele
et impartialita a procurer une entiere pacification dans la Republique et y assurer une forme de
gouvernement qui fit respecter les lois et l'autorita du magistrat, en conservant les droits et
privileges du peuple, ainsi que l'independance de l'Etat. En consequence de quoi les susdits
seigneurs madiateurs ont *la et arrate les articles suivants.
REGLEMENT convenu et arrate entre les seigneurs madiateurs
ARTICLE I : Tous les diffarents ordres qui composent le gouvernement de Geneve, savoir, les
quatre Syndics, le Conseil des Vingt-cinq, le Conseil des Soixante, le Conseil des Deux Cents
et le Conseil Ganaral, conserveront chacun leurs droits et attributions particulieres provenant de
la loi fondamentale de l'Etat, et il ne sera fait a l'avenir aucun changement au present Reglement,
en sorte que l'un des susdits ordres ne pourra donner atteinte ni rien enfreindre au prejudice des
droits et attributs de l'autre.
ARTICLE II: Les Syndics ne pourront 'etre pris que dans le Conseil des Vingt-cinq; les membres
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du Conseil des Vingt-cinq ne pourront etre choisis qu'entre les Citoyens du Conseil des Deux
Cents; ceux du Conseil des Soixante ne pourront etre pris que dans le Conseil des Deux Cents;
et les membres du Conseil des Deux Cents ne pourront etre pris que parmi les Citoyens et
bourgeois.
ARTICLE III : Les droits et attributions du Conseil General legitimement assemble demeureront
invariablement fixes et limites aux articles suivants
1. au pouvoir legislatif, c'est-à-dire d'agreer ou rejeter les lois proposóes, ou les changements a
celles qui sont etablies, lesquelles lois ne pourront avoir d'effet qu'auparavant elles n'aient ete
approuvees par le Conseil General;
2. au pouvoir d'ëlire ses principaux magistrats, savoir, les quatre Syndics, le Lieutenant, les
Auditeurs, le Tresorier et le Procureur General, pour choisir dans le nombre des sujets qui lui
seront presentes ceux que bon lui semblera, ou les rejeter en tout ou en partie, de meme que
la fixation du taux du vin, en agreant ou rejetant, en tout ou en pate, les prix qui lui seront
proposes;
3. au pouvoir confederatif d'approuver ou rejeter les traites et alliances qui lui seront proposes
avec les puissances etrangeres, comme aussi les echanges, acquisitions ou alienations des
domaines de la Republique, ainsi que les emprunts hypothecaires qui pourraient se faire á
l'avenir;
4. au pouvoir d'agreer ou rejeter la declaration de la guerre ou la conclusion de la paix qui lui
seront proposees;
5. au pouvoir d'agreer ou rejeter les impOts et subsides qui lui seront proposes pour subvenir aux
necessites de l'Etat, a l'exception de ceux qui etaient etablis avant l'annee 1714 qui continueront
d'avoir lieu comme par le passé, lesquels ne pourront etre augmentes sans le consentement du
Conseil General;
6. au pouvoir d'accepter ou rejeter les augmentations de fortifications qui lui seront proposees.
Toutes lesquelles attributions ci-dessus enoncees, y compris le contenu aux Articles XV
et XVI mentionnes ci-apres au present Reglement, appartiendront incontestablement au Conseil
General, et les Conseils ne pourront par aucun reglement et innovation de leur part deroger aux
Edits, ni faire de changement aux lois fondamentales de l'Etat, non plus qu'a la forme du
gouvemement tel qu'il est a present, sans le consentement du Conseil General.
ARTICLE IV: Le Conseil General en consideration de la depense des fortifications ayant accorde
par l'Edit du 8 juillet 1734 pour dix ans les impOts y mentionnes et ce terme devant expirer au 8
juillet 1744, les seigneurs mediateurs ont estime convenable de prolonger lesdits impOts de six
autres annees, qui expireront au 8 juillet 1750, passé lequel temps ils ne pourront etre continues,
ni des a present aucun autre nouveau etabli, sans le consentement du Conseil General, ainsi qu'il
est portO par ledit Edit.
ARTICLE V : Toutes les matieres qui seront portees au Conseil General ne pourront y etre
proposees que par les Syndics, Petit et Grand Conseils.
ARTICLE VI: II ne pourra rien etre porte au Conseil des Deux Cents qu'auparavant il n'ait ete
traite et approuve dans le Conseil des Vingt-cinq, et il ne sera rien porte au Conseil General qui
n'ait Me auparavant traite et approuve dans le Conseil des Deux Cents.
ARTICLE VII : Les Citoyens et Bourgeois, conformement a l'Edit du 26 mai 1707, auront droit de
faire telles representations qu'ils jugeront convenables au bien de l'Etat a Messieurs les Syndics
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ou Procureur General, sous l'expresse defense de commettre aucune sorte de violence, a peine
de chatiment suivant l'exigence du cas.
ARTICLE VIII: L'election des membres du Conseil des Vingt-cinq continuera de se faire comme
par le passé et suivant les Edits.
ARTICLE IX : Dans les elections des Auditeurs qui se feront a l'avenir, le sort sera et demeurera
supprime et aboli, et au lieu de six sujets qu'il etait d'usage de proposer prftedemment, H n'en
sera plus presente que quatre au Conseil General, pour en choisir deux a la maniere prescrite
par les anciens Edits, sans que cette clause puisse rien changer a ce qui s'est toujours pratique
jusques a present dans ces elections.
ARTICLE X : Outre les limitations des degres de parente ëtablis par les precedents Edits, les
freres de mame sang, ainsi que les uterins, oncles et neveux dune méme famille, comme aussi
les neveux d'alliance de marne nom, seront exclus a l'avenir du Petit Conseil.
ARTICLE XI : Aucun candidat ou prëtendant au Conseil des Deux Cents ne pourra y etre admis
qua rage de trente ans accomplis, sans que les Conseils puissent donner atteinte a ce reglement
par des dispenses d'age, ni autrement, sous quelque prêtexte que ce soit.
ARTICLE XII : Pour faire participer plus de personnes de l'Etat au gouvernement, le nombre des
membres du Conseil des Deux Cents sera des a present augmente de vingt-cinq, qui avec les
deux cent vingt cinq dont il etait prkkiemment compose, feront ensemble deux cent cinquante
membres, et il ne sera procedó a l'avenir a aucune promotion dudit Conseil qu'il n'y ait cinquante
places vacantes, lesquelles seront remplies a la fois, lorsque ledit Conseil se trouvera rOduit au
nombre de deux cents; et toutes les fois que les promotions se feront, ledit Conseil sera rendu
complet sans qu'il puisse y avoir de changement fait a ce reglement que du consentement du
Conseil G6nOral.
ARTICLE XIII : Immècliatement apres que l'Edit du Reglement des seigneurs mediateurs aura
passe au Conseil General pour y recevoir la sanction, il sera procede sans aucun retardement
a Pelection des membres du Deux Cents pour remplir le nombre des deux cent cinquante et le
rendre complet, conformement a Particle XII.
ARTICLE XIV : II ne sera fait aucun changement A l'usage qui s'est pratiquë jusques A present
dans l'election du Syndic de la garde et de ses offices et fonctions.
ARTICLE XV : La garnison de la Ville de Geneve continuera d'être entretenue sur le pied de
douze compagnies de soixante hommes chacune telle qu'elle est a present, sans qu'elle soft
augmentee, ni qu'aucunes troupes 6trangeres ou auxiliaires puissent y etre introduites et admises
que du consentement du Conseil Ganeral, a l'exception toutefois des cas relatifs a la garantie,
oil l'introduction des troupes des Louables Cantons de Zurich et de Berne pourra avoir lieu du
consentement des mediateurs.
ARTICLE XVI : La garde de la Maison de Ville subsistera telle qu'elle est 6tablie presentement
et ne pourra 'etre augment6e, ainsi que celle des autres postes de la Ville, que du consentement
du Conseil General, a l'exception des temps de vacances, de moissons et jours de foire, oa Ion
suivra l'usage qui s'est pratique jusqu'a present.
283
ARTICLE XVII : Les majors, capitaines, aide-majors, sergents, caporaux, appointes et soldats
preteront serment a la forme ordinaire et conformement A l'usage qui s'est pratique jusqu'a
present.
ARTICLE XVIII : Lorsque le Conseil General sera assemble, aucune garde bourgeoise ne pourra
etre employee aux portes du Temple ni a la place de la Maison de Ville, et il ne sera mis aux
susdites portes que des dizeniers pour empecher d'entrer ceux qui n'ont pas le droit d'assister
au Conseil General. ll n'y aura ces jours-la aucune garde extraordinaire de la garnison.
ARTICLE XIX : En cas d'alarme causee par le feu ou autrement, le Syndic de la garde disposera
de la garnison pour la sUrete de la Ville, comme il s'est pratique jusqu'a present et conformement
a ('article VI de ('Edit du 28 juin 1735.
ARTICLE XX : Au meme cas d'alarme provenant de l'ennemi du dehors, ou de feu, chaque
Citoyen et Bourgeois, Natif et Habitant, de quelque qualite et condition qu'il soit, etant oblige de
prendre les armes, se rendra, sans mettre la baIonnette au bout du fusil, a la place d'armes de
sa compagnie, et non ailleurs, dont il ne pourra s'ecarter sans ordre expres du capitaine, a peine
de chatiment, a ['exception de ceux qui seront preposes pour servir a eteindre le feu ou qui auront
des excuses legitimes connues de leurs officiers.
ARTICLE XXI : ll est expressement defendu a toutes personnes dans les cas d'alarmes, cu de
feu, d'arreter et empacher les Citoyens, Bourgeois, Natifs et Habitants, ainsi que les soldats de
la garnison, de se rendre aux endroits 00 its ont ordre de se trouver, a peine de chatiment contre
les contrevenants.
ARTICLE XXII : Les compagnies bourgeoises, en pareil cas de feu et d'alarme, qui seront
destinees A eller occuper les portes de la Ville, s'assembleront dans leurs places d'armes, d'o0
elles se rendront sur les ordres de leurs capitaines et officiers aux susdites portes par le
commandement du Syndic de la garde, qui de sa part aura attention de faire a l'avance tous les
arrangements convenables a ce sujet.
Lorsque lesdites compagnies arriveront aux portes, pour prevenir toutes les difficultes qui
pourraient survenir entre les officiers sur le fait du commandement, il sera A l'avenir observe que
les capitaines et capitaines lieutenants des compagnies bourgeoises commanderont les
capitaines de la garnison, et que les capitaines de la garnison, en l'absence des capitaines et
capitaines lieutenants des compagnies bourgeoises, commanderont tous les autres officiers
bourgeois.
Dans les postes oi2J il ne se trouvera que des sergents et bas officiers de la gamison, les
sergents, bas officiers ou caporaux de la bourgeoisie auront le commandement sur tous les
serge nts de la garnison.
Le merne reglement aura lieu dans toutes les occasions oil les compagnies bourgeoises
et celles de la garnison se trouveront ensemble.
Immediatement apres que le feu sera eteint et qu'il n'y aura plus de danger, lesdites
compagnies bourgeoises se retireront sur l'ordre du Syndic de la garde.
ARTICLE XXIII : II est expressement defendu, sous les peines les plus rigoureuses, a toutes
personnes de quelque qualite, condition et sexe qu'elles puissent etre, de crier aux armes sans
le commandement exprés des Syndics.
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ARTICLE XXIV : II est pareillement defendu A tous capitaines, lieutenants, sergents, caporaux
et a. toutes autres personnes, de quelque qualite et condition qu'elles soient, d'assembler les
compagnies bourgeoises, ou de leur faire prendre les armes, sous quelque pretexte que ce soit,
sans le commandement expres des Syndics, ou Petit Conseil, sous peine de mort.
ARTICLE XXV : Tous mouvements, attroupements par compagnie, ou autrement, ainsi que toutes
entreprises, pratiques et machinations tendant a troubler la tranquillite publique et l'ordre du
gouvernement, sont expressement defendus, a peine contre les contrevenants d'être punis
suivant l'exigence du cas, a l'exception toutefois des assemblees de societe que l'usage de la vie
civile autorise, Cu on observera de ne rien traiter contre l'Etat.
ARTICLE XXV : AussitOt apres que l'Edit du Reglement de la mediation aura passe au Conseil
General pour y recevoir la sanction, les 34 deputes des compagnies bourgeoises, dont le Conseil
a permis l'election, a la requisition de l'illustre mediation, par arret du 19 octobre 1737, seront et
demeureront supprimes, sans qu'il puisse e l'avenir y en avoir d'autres etablis, sous quelque
pretexte que ce soit, A peine de chátiment.
ARTICLE XXVII : Reglement de l'artillerie relatif a l'Edit du 28 juin 1735
La charge de maitre d'artillerie ne pourra etre reunie avec celle de syndic de la garde, et
ces deux emplois ne pourront etre exerces en meme temps par la merne personne.
Le maitre d'artillerie presidera a la Chambre d'artillerie, assiste de ses lieutenants, tires
du Conseil des Deux Cents.
II aura soin de faire faire un inventaire de toute l'artillerie et de tout ce qui en depend,
duquel il sera fait deux doubles dont l'un sera remis a la Chambre des comptes, et l'autre a la
Chambre d'artillerie.
Les arsenaux, armes, munitions de guerre, et artillerie, ainsi que les lieux ob elles pourront
etre placees et conservees, seront a la disposition des Conseils, qui auront attention d'y pourvoir
comme ils le jugeront a. propos, sans que les reglements faits precedemment puissent rien
changer a cet egard.
Les dix chefs de batterie seront conserves tels qu'ils Otaient avant le 21 aoat 1737 et
choisis comme precedemment d'entre les Citoyens. Les bas officiers seront aussi remis ainsi
qu'ils Otaient avant ledit jour 21 anat et pris indifferemment parmi les Citoyens et Bourgeois, a la
discretion du Conseil, conformement a l'Edit du 28 juin 1735.
ARTICLE XXVIII : Matieres criminelles
Les juges connaitront de toutes les causes ou genre d'injures sans exception, soit qu'elles soient
poursuivies d'office, ou a l'instance de la partie civile, et ils puniront les coupables, ainsi qu'il a
ete statue et observe ci-devant.
ARTICLE XXIX : Le Procureur General sera et demeurera parte publique dans tous les proces
criminels jusqu'a sentence definitive, et les conclusions qu'il donnera ne seront point
communiquees a l'accuse, non plus qu'a son avocat et procureur; les Syndics et Conseil en
seront juges comme d'anciennete, et procederont de jour en jour a leur instruction.
ARTICLE XXX : Afin neanmoins que l'accuse puisse mieux se defendre, il sera en droit de
prendre, si lui Cu quelqu'un en son nom le requiert, un avocat et un procureur de la Ville, a son
choix, lesquels a peine d'interdiction seront obliges de le servir.
Ledit accuse pourra en outre, au lieu de douze parents et amis qui lui avaient ete
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accordes ci-devant par l'article XIV de l'Edit au titre XII des matieres criminelles, en choisir
seulement deux, tels qu'il voudra, pour l'assister aux prisons dans les instructions qu'il lui
conviendra de donner a son avocat et procureur.
Lorsque ledit accuse aura subi son interrogatoire et fait ses reponses, il lui sera permis
d'en faire, si bon lui semble, la lecture avant de les signer, et la procedure finie sera
communiquèe a l'avocat et procureur de l'accuse, ainsi qua ses deux assistants, huit jours avant
le jugement, s'ils la demandent, lesquels en la recevant seront mis sous le serment de n'en
donner ni prendre aucune copie et de la rapporter a un des Secretaires d'Etat aussitOt apres la
sentence definitive.
ll aura de plus la liberte de prendre deux autres parents ou amis, faisant ensemble quatre,
pour l'accompagner a l'audience et 'etre presents au plaidoyer de ses defenses, sans que les
quatre, une fois choisis, puissent ate changes, ni le nombre augmente; l'avocat et le procureur
dudit accuse pourront aussi assister a l'audience.
ARTICLE XXXI : Si quelque Citoyen, Bourgeois, Natif ou Habitant, Menu dans les prisons pour
cause criminelle mëritant punition corporelle, apres avoir ete jug6 et condamne dëfinitivement,
requerait d'être entendu au Conseil des Deux Cents pour en obtenir grace, ledit Conseil sera
convoque a cet effet et recevra la requête de l'accus6, signee de lui ou de son procureur, dans
laquelle il exposera les raisons qu'il aura a representer pour demander grace, et alors ledit
Conseil des Deux Cents, apres avoir pris sommairement connaissance du proces et du jugement
rendu par le Petit Conseil, decidera s'il y a lieu d'accorder grace, ou de moderer la sentence,
laquelle ne pourra etre aggravee, d6rogeant a toutes clauses contraires au present Reglement,
et nommêment a l'article XXI de l'Edit au Titre des matiêres criminelles.
ARTICLE XXXII : Les accuses et criminels ne pourront atre appliqués A la question ou torture que
prealablement ils n'aient ete par jugement definitif condamnes a mort.
ARTICLE XXX III : Tous ceux qui s'opposeront a l'execution des jugements prononc6s et rendus
en dernier ressort par les differents Conseils seront punis capitalement.
ARTICLE XXXIV : Les Citoyens, Bourgeois, Natifs et ceux qui auront êt6 regus Habitants, comme
de toute anciennete ne pourront atre obliges de prendre du ble au magasin de la R6publique pour
leur subsistance ordinaire, a l'exception des boulangers, les rêglements de police concemant
cette matiere devant au surplus subsister comme precedemment, suivant l'usage.
Us conserveront de mérne le droit qu'ils ont eu de tout temps d'acheter seulement pour
leur usage particulier des vins Otrangers, dont l'entrte est permise en cette Ville, n'entendant
comprendre dans le present Reglement les Wes, cabaretiers, traiteurs et ceux qui tiennent des
pensionnaires, lesquels se conformeront en cela aux réglements qui les concernent.
Les Citoyens et Bourgeois auront aussi la libertè de faire vendre le vin de leur cru comme
precedemment, suivant les us et coutumes.
Lequel susdit article a ete ainsi reg16 cons6quemment a la declaration du magnifique
Conseil portant que son intention n'a jamais Ot6 de former aucune opposition a l'usage de ces
immunites.
ARTICLE XXXV : ll ne sera faire aucun changement a la formule ancienne les lettres d'Habitation
qui continuera d'avoir lieu comme par le passé.
ARTICLE XXXXVI : Les Natifs de la Ville seront a l'avenir admis a toutes sortes de métiers et
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pourront parvenir aux maitrises en payant au fisc les droits etablis par les reglements et
ordonnances.
ARTICLE XXXVII : Les Citoyens et Bourgeois conserveront les privileges de leurs professions
et maitrises suivant les reglements etablis par le Conseil qui y fera les changements qu'il estimera
convenables.
ARTICLE XXXVIII : Pour entretenir desormais l'esprit d'union dans tous les ordres de la
Republique, il est expressement defendu de rappeler par des invectives et reprocher les troubles
passes, ni de se donner reciproquement certains noms de parti, que l'animosite et la discorde
avaient ci-devant en usage et qui seront á l'avenir entierement supprimes et abolis, de merne que
les fetes qui pourraient etre relatives ä cet objet. ll est pareillement defendu d'imprimer, ou de
faire imprimer, des libelles injurieux, tant dans cette Ville qu'ailleurs, de merne que tous les acrits,
memoires et brochures, de quelque nature qu'ils puissent etre, tendant a renouveler les vieilles
dissensions, a peine contre les contrevenants d'être punis suivant l'exigence du cas.
ARTICLE XXXIX : Afin que la reunion entre tous les individus de cet Etat s'affermisse de plus en
plus, les seigneurs mediateurs ont estime convenable pour un bien de paix que les six membres
des Conseils qui furent demis de leurs emplois dans le temps des troubles le 6 decembre 1734,
savoir les Sieurs Marc Conrad Trembley, Jacob de Chapeaurouge, Jean Trembley, qui en
particulier demeurera releve de son bannissement, Charles Lullin, anciens Syndics, et Jean
Tronchin, conseiller du Petit Conseil, ainsi que Philippe Decarro, de celui des Deux Cents et ci-
devant Auditeur, obtiennent des Conseils leurs decharges pour toujours, conformement a la
demande qu'ils en firent eux-mémes ledit jour 6 decembre 1734 et qu'ils viennent de nouveau
de confirmer, laquelle leur sera accordee comme ayant servi avec honneur, et qu'en consequence
leurs noms soient mis sur le tableau comme conseillers decharges, conservant aux cinq premiers,
sans rentrer dans le Petit et Grand Conseil, les honneurs accouturnes des conseillers decharges,
et en outre les gages de conseillers pendant leur vie, dont ils commenceront 6. jouir des ã
present.
ARTICLE XL : Tous les Edits, ainsi que les us et coutumes approuves par les lois dont l'usage
aura Me constamment suivi, et auxquels le present Reglement ne deroge point, continueront
d'être observes et executes contormement ä ce qui s'est pratiquê jusqu'a present.
ARTICLE XLI : Et pour qu'un chacun puisse jouir dune entiere sOrete par rapport aux troubles
passes et profiter de l'acte d'oubli general publie par le Petit et Grand Conseil le 1er novembre
1737, les seigneurs mediateurs, desirant procurer l'affermissement de la paix et de la tranquillite
dans tous les ordres de la Republique, ont de nouveau confirme ledit acte d'oubli par la presente
mediation, afin que personne ne soit a l'avenir susceptible d'aucune recherche sur les faits
passes pour quelque cause que se puisse etre, conformement au dit acte d'oubli.
ARTICLE XLII : Pour qu'un chacun connaisse les lois de l'Etat et s'y soumette avec plus de
docilite, il en sera fait, le plus tot que faire se pourra, un code general imprime qui renfermera
tous les Edits et reglements.
ARTICLE XLIII : En cas qu'il arrive apres tous les reglements ci-dessus expliques des desordres,
prises d'armes, attroupements, etc. tendant a renverser l'ordre de la Republique, en faisant
violence au magistrat, comme aussi de desarmer les soldats de la garnison, Citoyens, Bourgeois,
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Natifs et Habitants, ceux qui seront atteints et convaincus des cas ci-dessus enonces seront
punis comme perturbateurs du repos public, sans pouvoir esperer d'être compris dans aucune
amnistie.
ARTICLE XLIV : Tous les articles compris au present Reglement auront a l'avenir force de lois
et ne pourront 'etre susceptibles d'aucun changement, quel qu'il puisse etre, que du consentement
du Conseil General legitimement assemble par le Petit et Grand Conseil.
Et d'autant que SA MAJESTE TRES CHRETIENNE, et les Louables Cantons de ZURICH
et de BERNE n'ont eu pour but en accordant leur commune mediation a la Ville de Geneve que
d'y procurer parmi tous les ordres de cette Republique une paix stable et durable, ils ont estimá
convenable pour prevenir le retour des troubles passes et y assurer une tranquillitá parfaite,
d'accorder (sans toucher ni prejudicier ã l'independance et souverainete de ladite Republique de
Geneve) la garantie des articles ci-dessus enonces, qui ont ete regles et arretes, savoir, de la
part de SA MAJESTE TRES CHRETIENNE, par le tres illustre et três excellent seigneur Comte
de Lautrec, son lieutenant general en la province de Guyenne, marechal de ses camps et
armees, inspecteur general d'infanterie et son ministre plenipotentiaire, et de celle du Louable
Canton de ZURICH, par les illustres et magnifiques seigneurs reprësentants Jean Hoffmeister,
bourgmestre, Jean Gaspard Escher, stathalter, et de la part du Louable Canton de BERNE, par
les illustres et magnifiques seigneurs representants Isaac Steiger, ancien avoyer, et Louis de
Watteville, haut commandant du Pays de Vaud et ancien banderet, plenipotentiaires a l'effet de
ladite mediation, lesquels promettent au nom de leurs maitres d'en garantir l'execution, qui ne
pourra se faire que de concert et relativement a l'article XV mentionne au present Reglement ou
au traitë de Soleure de 1579 apres avoir employó leurs bons et communs offices; lequel susdit
Traite continuera d'avoir force et valeur dans toute sa teneur comme par le passé, sans que le
contenu au dit article XV puisse y prójudicier en rien ni en empOcher l'effet.
Finalement les deux Louables Cantons de ZURICH et de BERNE se reservent les Traites
d'alliance et de combourgeoisie de 1558 et 1584 qu'ils ont avec la Republique de Geneve.
[...]
Fait a Geneve ce 76me avril 1738.
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Appendix IV
A. An Introduction to Genevan Families.
1. Families sitting in the Petit Conseil.
With regard to the patriciate, the work based on the Petit Conseil carried out by Arnedee
Roget gives an important insight into who they were: between 1600-1775 there were 232
members of the Petit Conseil, but these 232 came from only 90 families:
Family Names	 Number of Members of the Petit Conseil
Pictet	 12
Gallatin, Lullin	 10
De la Rive, Du Pan, Trembley, Rilliet 	 8
De la Maisonneuve, Le Fort, 	 7
Sarasin, de Chapeaurouge	 6
de Normandie, Mestrezat, Favre, Buisson, Rigot 	 5
Fabri, Tronchin, Grenus, Lect 	 4
Chabrey, Roset, Galiffe, Gautier, Turrettini, Bonnet,
Leclerc, Chouet, Voisine, Humbert	 3
14 families provided 2 and 40 families 1 member of their families during that
period.
In reality, therefore, 29 families supplied the overwhelming majority of councillors in the
Petit ConseiL By the eighteenth century, this was even lower, as families such as the
Chabreys and Rosets drop from view.
Information taken from Arnedee Roget 'Le Petit Conseil', Etrennes Genevoises, Geneve: J.
Carey, lmprimeur-Editeur, 187, 1, p. 53.
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2. The closeness of family connections amongst the patriciate.
This is the information that Thellusson, Genevan Ambassador to
Paris, relayed to a relative in Geneva concerning his family's
connections with certain important families in Geneva.
1. Pour Men comprendre la situation en 1733, du fait surtout du petit nombre des families
puissantes et de Petroitesse de leurs liens par des mariages entre leurs membres, U est fort
utile de connaltre lee eclaircissements 2 qu'Isaac Thellusson. le grand banquier genevois
etabli Paris, donnait a son beau-frere J.-J. des Gontcas, quand celui-ci eherchait a entrer
dans le Conseil des Deux-Cents, sur ses rent-nuns ne famlne avec les personnes dont son diee-
„Lion dependait (lee membres du Conseil des Deux-Cents etaient nommes pPr le g merrihnie dii
Petit Censeil)
• Mons' Francois Pictet est Ills d'une Rocca, niece de ma bisayeule 'rronchin, nee Rocca.
• Mons' le sindic Buisson est arriere-petit-neveu de ma bisayeule Tudert, nee Buisson.
Monsieur le Conseiller des Arts est petit-ills de M. lc professeur Mestrezal, dont la femme
Otait petite-fille de M. Tudert de Mazieres, mon Trisayeul, & celui de Mr. des Arts, qui d'ail-
!curs a epouse la file de M. Gabriel Rilliet, dont ma femme est la tante a la mode de Bretagne,
car elle eat Mallet & file d'une Tronchin.
• Monsieur le Conseiller Favre est petit-ills d'une La Croix qui etoit flue de Mons. Tudert
et petite-1111e de mon Trisayeul Tudert qui, par consequent, oat aussi cclui de M. Favrc.
▪Monsieur le Conseiller De La Rive a epouse une Franconis qui est fille d'une Pictet, scour
de Mons' le Sindic Pieta, ainsi memo parent& 11 y a aussi parenté par la mere de Mons , de
La five.
' A I'dgard de Monsieur le premier de Pannée prochaine, nous luy appartenons en ce que
son Ore avoit epouse une Mestrezat, Rile de Monsieur le professeur Mestrezat, petit-fits de
Monsieur Tudert, mon Trisayeul, dont une des lilies epousa Mr. Domaine Mestrezat, Sgr.
Sindic, Ore du professeur ; d'ailleurs Monsieur le premier a Opousi: une Pereal, fille d'uno
Colladon, qui Pótoit de notre Grande Tante Tronchin : ainsi, d'un cbt6, ii est issu de ger-
main, de l'autre, il est d'un degre plus Coigne, mais je compte bien plus sur son amitid quo
sur la parent&
. M. Turretin a Opouse la file de Mr. Gedeon Mallet, mon issu de germain, sa grand mere
et la mienne Otant sceurs & lilies du professeur Theodore Tronchin (Archives de l'Etat de
Geneve, fonds Galiffe, Archives des families, liasse IV, lettre d'Isaac Thellusson a J.-J. des
Gouttes).
An extract from Andre Sayous 'La haute bourgeoisie de Genbve
entre le debut du XVIIe et le milieu du XIXe. siècle', Revue
Historique, T. CLXXX, juillet-ddcembre 1937.
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3. The Lullin and Tronchin Families
Included in this appendix are the family trees and details of two Genevan patriciate
families. Both had members who were important in the state over two hundred years, and
both illustrate that the patriciate were not content with political power, but also occupied
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4. The De Luc Family
Although they claimed to have come originally from Lucca in the sixteenth century, this
was unlikely. During the eighteenth century, the family was to play an important role, in the
Bourgeois group, in the politics of the city. It is interesting to see how they began to estab-
lish the same family interest in politics that had marked many of the oligarchy in Geneva.
Jacques-Frangois De Luc 1698-1782
Jean-Andra 1717-1817	 Guillaume-Antoine 1729-1812
Jacques-Frangois was described by one historian as 'the very model of a Genevan
bourgeois. He was very pious, very honest, very patriotic and "republican", very stiff and
very tedious.'(James Miller, Rousseau Dreamer of Democracy, New Haven: Yale Universi-
ty Press, 1984, p. 51.) Jacques-Frangois was friendly with Rousseau and in 1754 accom-
panied him on a tour of lake Geneva. He was rather a serious man, totally lacking in any
sense of humour. Both he and his two sons were deeply religious and all of them, being
interested in science, spent a considerable time trying to accommodate contemporary
scientific discoveries with the Book of Genesis. They were also mostly self-taught, although
Jean-Andre had studied under both Prof. Cramer and Jalabert.
Both sons began their careers in their father's company, Garriques, Francois De Luc et
Cie. Jean-Andre however, soon left to devote himself io science, and invented the
hygrometer. He was, together with his brother and many young men in Geneva, fascinated
by the mountains, collecting rock and mineral samples from them, as well as trying to find
ways to climb to their peaks.
They were also passionately involved in politics. Jean-Andre was one of the 24 Commis-
sioners in 1766 and became a member of the Deux Cents in 1770, his brother joining this
council in 1775. In the 1760s especially, they both had a reputation for being restless and
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troublemakers, but, in 1774, Jean-Andre was already in London and about to become
Reader to Queen Charlotte. The reason for his departure from Geneva was possibly some
financial failure, although there is no evidence for this, and, theoretically at least, he had
left the family business some time earlier. Normally, a bankrupt was not allowed to sit in
the Deux Cents, but his brother was allowed to become a member of that council.
Guillaume-Antoine remained in Geneva, where he became a moderate Negatif, judging
from the contents of the letters he wrote to his brother in London. This disagreement over
politics might have been one of the reasons for the departure of Jean-Andra. Although
settled in London, Jean-Andra still found himself involved in politics, going to Paris to see
Vergennes over the crisis in Geneva in 1782 and writing a lengthy report on the political
situation in Geneva as he had known it. He also became embroiled with Roustan, pastor of
one of the Genvan churches in London, over the changes in the Genevan constitution
introduced in 1789. Jean-Andra never commented on English politics, nor did he become
in any way involved in them.
His correspondence, especially on scientific matters, was profuse. He invented the 'Dry
Pile' or 'Electric Column', but his attempts to fit all new scientific discoveries into the
Creation as told in the Old Testament made him increasingly isolated.
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B. Biographical References
This section is to give the personal details and where relevant political details of individuals
named in the text. Each name occurring in the text is found consecutively under the
heading of the chapter in which he/she is mentionned.
Chapter I
1.	 De la Baume was 'Intelligent et intrigant, il recut, en 1539 le chapeau de cardinal
puis, en 1544, devint archeveque de Besancon.'
2 Besancon Hugues (ca.1480-1532) a rich merchant credited with a following
amongst the Genevans, especially the less wealthy. Responsible for winning
support of both Fribourg and Bern 1525-6.
3.	 Ami Perrin, originally an ally of Calvin but became estranged, in part because he
enjoyed dancing and bright clothes and was opposed to giving immigrants the right
to become Bourgeois. The Sept, Fauvre and Vandel families were of the same
opinions as Perrin. They also objected to being subjected to the same treatment as
all the other citizens of Geneva when they danced, etc.
Chapter II
1. Jacques Necker had entered Isaac Vernet's bank as a clerk in Geneva. He had
been sent to work in the Paris branch. In 1765, having become a millionaire by the
careful buying and selling of British and French treasury bonds, he became sole
director of the bank.
2. Theodore Tronchin (1582-1657), Benedict Turrettini (1588-1631), Jean Diodati
(1576-1649), all theologians, Francois Turrettini (1623-1687) an important and
strict theologian, to name but a few.
Chapter III
1. Colladon and Legagneux castigated moneylenders from the pulpit. Told to discuss
such matters in the Compagnie before making them public, they refused and were
dismissed. Germain Coliadon, 1509-1594, Doctor of Law, lawyer, became a
Bourgeois in 1550 and often consulted by Calvin's government. In the XL from
1559, he was a rigid Calvinist.
2. Ami Varro, 1526-1593. His father had become a Bourgeois in 1521, Ami was a
member of the Petit Conseil from 1569 and Syndic 6 times from 1573. He was one
of those in favour of declaring war on Savoy in 1589. He also carried out several
diplomatic missions to the Swiss Confederation; a man of prime importance in the
state.
3. Jean Diodati, 1576-1657, pastor and theologian and Theodore Tronchin, 1582-
1657, pastor and theologian, Professor of Hebrew and strict Calvinist.
4. Bishop Burnet, 1643-1715, went into exile during the reign of James II, when he
travelled extensively on the Continent. He became Bishop of Salisbury and was
one of the moderate men appointed to replace the non-jurors when William III and
Mary II ascended the throne.
5. Jean-Robert Chouet, 1642-1731. This was the same man who, as Syndic, was to
be involved in the Fatio affair in 1707. When a young man, he had spent five years
at Saumur 1664-1669. He joined the Petit Conseil in 1686 and later became a
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Syndic. He was considered to be nearer to the Bourgeois than many of his col-
leagues on the Petit Conseil which was to cause considerable difficulties in 1707,
as a result of his interpretations of the sovereignty of the Conseil Gentkal.
6. Jean-Alphonse Turrettini (1671-1737). He was initially Professor of Ecclesiastical
History, a new Chair at the University in 1697, later, in 1705, he became Professor
of Theology and was Rector 1701-11. He was opposed to the narrow orthodoxy of
the church.
7. Jacques Lect, Professor of Law at the Academy.
8. Michel Roset, 1534-1613. He was first a Syndic in 1560, then in 1564, thereafter
he was 1st. Syndic every fourth year from 1568-1612. He was also a skilled
diplomat. On his death he was awarded by a grateful government the title of 'Pere
de la Patrie'.
9. Jacques Boutiller was the son of Syndic Jean-Ami Curtet dit BoutIller, who had
died in 1567. Jacques had been a member of the Deux Cents for several years.
10. Charles Perrot 1541[1 -1608, he had become Bourgeois in 1567 and replaced
Beze as Professor of Theology; he was twice Rector of the Academy.
11. Jean-Antoine 1645-1719, Ezechiel Gallatin 1630-1709 was a Syndic 11 times and
1st. Syndic a number of times 1693- 1709; Barthelemy 1662-1748, was a Syndic
6 times 1723-35, 1st. Syndic in 1737. Ezechiel made no move to help Jean-
Antoine.
12. Sebastien Arlaud, Chevaux, the patissier and Jacob Bartholont, the lame.
Chapter IV
1. Jacob de Normandie 1649417 1n ,Deux Cents 1675, Auditeur 1680, Chatelain de
Peney, 1688, Petit Conseil 1703. His acceptance of a post with the King of Prussia
led to his resignation from the Petit Conseil and his return to the Deux Cents. His
cousin, Jean de Normandie, was elected Syndic in 1707. Pierre Gallatin's father,
Ezekiel, served several times as a Syndic, and was in the Deux Cents as of 1693.
In 1707, Pierre was an Auditeur.
2. Francois Delachenaz/De la Chenaz/De la Chana, 1645-1720, a 'marchand-
tailleur, the French Resident, De la Closure, called him 'un petit marchand qui est
une espece de fanatique' and he was described by Corvette: 'II eta habille de la
merne maniere que sont les Trembleurs d'Angleterre.' Fatio, op. cit., p. 105. Some
considered him insane, he was clearly honest, pious and determined.
3. Jean Du Pan (1655-1721):'homme de lettres, avocat... indifferent, indispose contre
le peuple, membre des grandes families. En plaidant leur cause, il plaidait la sienne
propre.' Corbaz, op. cit., p. 100.
4. Fatio, Gallatin, Marc Revillard, son of Leonard, once Chatelain de Saint-Victor,
J.A Piaget (1659-1707) maitre-horloger de St. Gervais, R. Dentrand (1672-vers
1717) maftre-chirurgien, N. Lemaitre (?-1707) maltre-horloger, F. Delachanaz,
Thomas Delorme (1661-1708) magasin de joaillerie, Galleine, joaillier, Favon,
l'horloger, Durand, le graveur, Mars& le tanneur, John Fevre, le fustier. The oth-
ers seem to be unknown. All were hard working artisans. Corbaz, op. cit., p. 123.
5. Jean-Antoine Piaget, 1659-1707, maitre-horloger, 'ii etait le plus violent, le plus
hardi, le plus fougueux et le plus intriguant des chefs.' Cortaz, op. cit., p. 112.
6. Jacques Chenaud, 1654-1741, a doctor of medicine, known as a moderate, and
who led the moderate Bourgeois to the government side.
7. Jean Trembley, 1674-1745, later he was a Syndic in 1726 and 1730 and in 1734.
His attitude towards Fatio was to be remebered and helped in his condemnation
and banishment in 1734.
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8. Francois RIIllet was a member of the RHliet family which was to be consistently
anti-change throughout the eighteenth century in Geneva.
9. Robert Millet, 1644-1728, member of the Petit Conseil, 2 times Syndic, 1720 and
1724. David Sartorls, 1659-1735, 6 times Syndic between 1713-1733. All were
clearly determined to ensure the punishment of what they perceived as rebels.
10. Nicolas Lemattre, 1684-1707, 'maitre-horloger - pauvre, timide et reserve mais un
enthousiaste, un convaincu et un tenace.' Corbaz, op. cit., p. 112. He was one of
the commission that went with Fatio to negotiate.
11. Pierre Perdlau, son of a Syndic of the same name, a member of the Deux Cents
as of 1704; his brother Daniel was in the Petit Conseil from 1702. Fatio and three
of his supporters were reported to have spent the night at his country house at
Landecy 1.6.1707. Arnedee Roget, Fatio, op. cit., p. 177.
12. Jean Tronchln, 1672-1761, Procureur-Gáneral 1718-23. He later became a
member of the Petit Conseil.
13. Marc-Comrad Trembley, 1669-1748, had become a member of the Petit Conseil in
1707 and was to be a Syndic four times. His actions at this time were to be held
against him and explain the harshness with which he was to be treated by the
Bourgeois in 1734. Jacob de Chapeaurouge 1669-1744, a member of the Petit
Conseil and a clear supporter of the rights of that council and the oligarchy, as he
was to show in attempting to argue in 1715 that the Procureur-General was merely
a servant of the Syndics, under whose orders he would watch over the public's
interests. The Procureur-General, Le Fort, was able to maintain the independence
of the office, from the desire of Chapeaurouge to make it the mere mouthpiece of
the Petit ConseiL This was to have important consequences later.
14. No. 20 Abraham Cassln, leader of a delegation on 8th. December, No. 2 Isaac
Soret, member of a delegation on 9th. December, etc. O'Mara, l'affaire des lettres
anonymes', op. cit., pp. 265-268.
15. Francois Terroux, a master watchmaker, who had a watch business, was co-
owner of a building rented out to others and owned land at Jussy, a small piece of
land at Plainpalais and several cattle.One of the leaders of the Bourgeois in 1718.
16. Jean Francois Chevrler was the father of Jacob, who was one of the Com-
missioners in 1766, entered the Deux Cents in 1770 and was on the Comite de
SOretO in 1793. Louis Duval was chosen as a representative by one of the Erkilitias
in 1737. He was elected to the Deux Cents in 1738 and was a moderate.
17. Pierre Mestrezat, a Bourgeois who was a friend of Michel Leger. The Mestrezats
were one of the important political families in the seventeenth century.
18. Jacob de Chapeaurouge (1669-1744). He became a member of the Deux Cents
in 1698, eventually became Syndic in 1724, 1728 and 1732. He had also written a
text at the time of Fatio in 1707, arguing the case for the government: Lettre d'un
citoyen de Geneve a un autre cito yen de ses amis sur les mouvements presents.
Chapter V
1. Jacques-Barthelemy Michell du Crest (1690-1766), a member of the patriciate,
serving in the King of France's armies. He was known as a specialist on fortifi-
cations. He was also an engineer and cartographer. Elected to the Deux Cents
even though in foreign service in 1721, he was given the fief of Crest for services
rendered to Geneva. According to Sayous: 'ses theories politiques [d'être] inspirees
un peu trop par son interet personnel.' Sayous, op. cit., p. 45.
2. Men such as: Balexert 1698- [?], became a member of the Deux Cents in 1752.,
Chevrler, his son Jacob was to become an important leader of the Bourgeois in
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1766. Jean-Louts Delorme, 1707-1784, he was later to become a member of the
Deux Cents in 1746 and the Petit Conseil in 1764. De Luc, Michel Leger,the
pastor, Isaac Marcet 1669-1734, a 'monteur de bones de montres', Jacques
Masse, 1697-1762, a supporter of Michell, he was later to change sides and be
chased by the Bourgeois from the city and go to Constantinople. Aml and EssaTe
Mussard, Soret, Sartorls, Robert Vaudenet, 1693-1743, nephew of the Vaudenet
defended by Fatio in 1706.
3. Louis Le Fort, 1668-1743, Procureur-GenOral 1711-17, Syndic 1722 and 26, 1st.
Syndic 1730 and 1734. He had already shown himself to be independent of the
government in insisting on the independence of the post of Procureur-Ganáral in
1715. The rancour had clearly remained.
4. Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748), lawyer in 1716, became a teacher of law,
1723 Professor of Natural and Civil Law at the Academy in Geneva. 1721 in the
Deux Cents, 1730 in LX, 1738 in the Petit Conseil. He was in no way Inclined to
accept any of the arguments put forward by the Bourgeois. The association
between Chapeaurouge and Burlamaqui was considerable, as he had married his
daughter to Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui.
5. Charles Lullin, 1669-1761, Artillery General 1725-34, Syndic, 1725, 29, 33; Jean-
Louis Du Pan, 1698-1775, David Sartorls 1659-1735, Syndic six times 1713-1733;
Francols-Jean Turrettlnl, 1690-1765, Syndic seven times 1741-65; Pierre Muss-
ard, 1690-1767, 'Dr. en Droit', Professor, diplomat, Syndic four times 1750-62.
Marc-Conrad Trembley, 1669-1748, a Syndc 1721, 23, 25, 33. tie was, llke all the
members of this committee, a convinced supporter of the oligarchy. Jean-Louis
Chouet, 1678-1756, was the great nephew of Jean-Robert Chouet and was the
only member who might have had any leaning towards the Bourgeois. Certainly, he
was often associated with Le Fort.
6. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). Unlike Hobbes, Pufendorf considered that the
state of nature of man as relatively peaceful. (De Jure Naturae, II, VII, cited by
Barbey, op. cit., pp. 182-184; N.B. all further references are to Barbey's translation
from the Latin). But the fear of punishment from Heaven, together with the opera-
tion of conscience did not stop man's baser instincts and passions from breaking
'natural laws'. In order to overcome the misery of such a life civil society was
organised. On entering into such a society, the individual gave up his natural liberty
and submitted himself to a government or a sovereign authority. (Pufendorf De
Officio II, V, 4.) The sovereign was 'regulator' of all in the interest of all. In this civil
society everyone had surrendered their will to that of the sovereign, obeying the
latter's demands in all matters concerning the public good.(lbid, VII, 2) Civil liberty
corresponded to natural liberty minus the restrictions imposed upon society by the
sovereign. (Ibid., II, XII, 7.) It was essential to completely obey those to whom
sovereign power had been given.(Mid., VII, VIII.) This civil state was for Pufendorf
the surest guarantee of the liberty of the individual.
7. Philippe de Carro, 1693-1750, Auditeur and artillery lieutenant; after his banish-
ment he went to Russia, where he became a general. Jean Trembley, 1674-1754,
Syndic de la garde, responsible for the safety of the government and the state.
8. Jean-Pierre Oltramare, 1672- [ 1  or Jerome, 1705-1746, both were supporters of
Micheli and both had been in prison for their support of him. Vaudenet the Elder,
was probably Andre-Robert, 1693-1743, who had been defended by Fatlo in 1706.
Identification here is tenuous.
9. Jean-Gaspard Escher, 1678-1762; in 1740 he was Burgermaster of Zürich. In
1734 he was one of Zurich's deputies sent to Geneva.
10. Bernard de Bude, 1676-1755, he had been an officer in the Swiss Guard in
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France. After his departure from Geneva, he lived at Ferney and died without
successors.
11.	 Ami (Arnedee) Lull In, 1695-1756, Professor of Ecclesiastical History 1737-1756,
Rector 1753-1756, but even Lullin believed that the Bourgeois had been misled.
Chapter VI
1. Men such as Charles Bonnet, FRS, 1720-1793. III-health made it difficult for him to
take part in the politics of the city, but he supported the Negatifs in the coming
conflicts. Abraham Trembley, 1710-1784. A zoologist, he was also a member of
the Deux Cents 1746-1770, a cousin of Bonnet. Jean Jalabert, 1712-1768. A
mathematician, astrologist and interested in electricity, he was also a member of
the Petit Conseil from 1757, Syndic in 1765 and 68, not the most hard-line oppo-
nent of the Bourgeois but killed in a riding accident in 1768. Theodore Tronchin,
1709-1781, was a doctor, Professor of Medicine in 1755, a lay member of the
Compagnie des Pasteurs. Doctor to the Duke of Orleans, he moved permanently to
Paris in 1766. He was against the theatre and was not a supporter of the Bour-
geois.
2. Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717-1782) Writer, philosopher and mathematician. He
was one of the founders of the Encyclopedie; secretary of the Academie Frangaise.
3. Denis Diderot (1713-1784), given the task of bringing the Encyclopedie to fruition
in 1745. It took him 27 years. He was also a writer, philosopher and art critic.
Chapter VII
1. Jacob Vernet, 1698-1789, theologian and holder of the Chair of Theology at the
Academy from 1756; a Representant.
2. Paul Mouitou, 1725-1787, a pastor, he had become a Bourgeois in 1755. A friend
of Rousseau, he published his complete works with Girardin and Dupeyrou in 1782;
a moderate Representant.
3. Marc Chapouts, 1733-1779, known as la ptume. One ot the teaders ot the ReprE-
sentants. More extreme than moderates like Moultou, he later became one of the
leaders of the Natifs. His defection from the Representants was behind the hostile
comment made on his death by G-A. De Luc to his brother in London: 'Je ne le
regrette point et il n'est pas a regretter.' BPU Geneve, Ms. 2469 Lettres de G-A De
Luc a J-A. De Luc 1756-1782, novembre 1779, 71.
4. Jacques Pictet, 1705-1786, Member of the Deux Cents, Col. in the Sardinian Army
(Retrd.), Reporter to the Sardinian Court, English Charge d'Affaires to Geneva,
1763-67. The Pictets were one of the important patrician families. Jacques was a
strong supporter of the Bourgeois cause and as a result had his appointment
withdrawn by George III. Emmanuel DuvIllard, 1693-1776, was a printer and
bookshop owner. He printed the 'Gazette frangaise d'Amsterdam & de la Haye'. He
too was sympathetic to the Representant cause.
5. Jean and Isaac Bardin were bookshop keepers.
6. Pierre LuIlln, 1712-1789, Professor of Law 1740-56, member of the Petit Conseil,
Secretaire d'Etat, 1762-1781, Syndic 1782. He was later a member of the Negatifs.
Jean-Pierre Crommelln, 1739-1751, Professor of History, 1739-1751, member of
the Deux Cents, Minister of Geneva to the Court of Louis XV 1763-68. He was also
a rigid Negatif.
7. The 24 were: De Luc and his two sons, Marc Chappuls and Marc-Conrad
Chappuls, DuvIllard Ore, Combefort, MoIllet, Des Arts Ore, Jacques Vleuss-
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eux, Antoine Joly, Serment, Babault, Duroverray, VIgnIer, Melly, Pelineau, Fe
dit Delisle, Frarin, de Ferney, Berard, Floumoy-Balaxert, Claviere son and F.H.
d'Ivernols. All those emphasised had acted as delegates in 1737-8, which shows
the consistency of leadership. The other interesting feature is that the Bourgeois,
like the patriciate, was developing political families, such as the De Lucs - father
and both sons and the Chappuis brothers, and Joly whose father had been in-
volved in 1734-8. For the De Luc family see Appendix IV.
8. As French Resident, Hennin had arrived in Geneva in December 1765; he subse-
quently married a Genevan from one of the patriciate families and had close links
with the Negatifs. Even on his arrival in Geneva, however, he was not inclined to
side with anyone but the Negatifs.
9. Gaspard Joly,(1718-?) a member of the Deux Cents since 1752, became a
member of the Petit Conseil in 1768, was twice a Syndic, 1780 + 84. His brother
Denis was one of the 24 elected leaders of the Representants in 1766. Louis [?]
Jaquet was a Captain in armed army of Baden-Durlach who carried out various
functions for the state without payment and who obtained the right from the Petit
Conseil to sign his name 'de Jacquet'.
10. Jacques Mercler,1726-1798, a member of the Deux Cents who had remained in
Geneva and had been involved in contacts with the leaders of the Reprdsenfanfs.
He was elected Procureur-General in 1768-70.
11. Jean-Pierre Trembley, 1704-1785,a member of the Deux Cents and previously
Syndic 3 times in the years 1755-1763. Although a Negatif, he was very moderate
and wished to avoid any strengthening of Rend) inierfe y ante in The city. Jacob
Vernet, 1698-1789, a pastor, theologian, professor at the Academy, he had a long
friendship with Voltaire, which later turned sour over disagreements concerning
Calvinism, and was partly instrumental in d'Alembert's article in the Encyclopedia
Vernet was a moderate Representant
12. Jacques Vieusseux, 1721-1792, cloth merchant, one of the 24 Commissioners,
Procureur de l'hOpital 1775. In 1782 one of the leaders of the Representants. Jean
Flournois became a member of the Deux Cents in 1770, a member of the Conseil
de SOrete in 1782, of the Commission revolutionnaire 1794. Etienne Claviere (d.
1793), became a member of the Deux Cents in 1770, a leader of the Repre-
sentants, exiled with Vieusseux and Floumois in 1782, and later deeply involved
in the French Revolution.
13. Philip 2nd. Earl Stanhope (1714-1786). His mother, Lucy, was the sister of
Robert Pitt, the father of William Pitt, Earl Chatham (1708-1778).
14. Chevalier de BeautvIlle, Lieutenant-General and Ambassador of Louis XV to the
Swiss Confederation, a man not sympathetic to the Bourgeois cause.
15. Jean Jalabert, d. 1768, Syndic in 1765 and therefore continued in the post in
1766.
16. Jean-Louis Grenus, 1711-1782, Syndic 3 times between 1758-1768. Jean-
Antoine Guainler was a member of the Petit Conseil, and was a Syndic 3 times
between 1772-1780.
Chapter VIII
1. Jean Cramer, 1701-1787, Professor of Law, 1721-1738, he left to join the Dew(
Cents and Petit Conseil, and was Syndic 6 times. This is the Cramer who was later
to be removed from the Petit Conseil in 1776. He was an ultra-Negatit
2. Isaac Cornuaud (1742-1820), watchmaker, Natif, bookkeeper and teacher of
arithmetic, writer, orator and a man who worked for the French cause in Geneva.
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He was a 'nature enthousiaste mais, absolument depourvue de scrupules, intrigant,
venal.' Karmin, op. cit., p. 52, f.52.
3. Jacques-Antoine Du Roveray (1747-1814), lawyer, one of the leaders of the
Representants, member of the Deux Cents from 1775, Procureur-General 1779-
1781, when he was dismissed from both his post and his seat in the Deux Cents at
the behest of France. Exiled in July 1782, he spent the remainder of his life
between Paris, Geneva and London, where he died.
4. Jacob Vernes, 1728-1791, pastor at St. Gervais from 1770, exiled in 1782, co-
author with J. Roustan of Abrege de l'histoire de Geneve, Representant. Salomon
Reybaz, 1739-1804, pastor, then Geneva's Ambassador to Pads and collaborator
with Mirabeau, at this stage a Representant. David Chauvet, 1738-1802, pastor
1765-1770, resigned and entered politics, became a Bourgeois in 1770; sat in Deux
Cents 1782, on the Security Commission April-July 1782, exiled, Representant.
Julien Dentand, 1736-1817, in Deux Cents 1770, Auditeur 1773 1 Petit Conseil
1778, Syndic 1780, Representant. Jean Louis Gourgas, 1738-1819, elected to the
Deux Cents in April 1782 and Petit .Conseil, Representant. Later left Geneva for
Boston, U.S.A.
5. Robert-Guillaume RIlliet, 1719-1806, a member of the Deux Cents 1752, the Petit
Conseil in 1767, Syndic in 1770, 1st. Syndic 1774. His wife's mother was a
Chapeaurouge, therefore it was no surprise that he was an ultra-Negatif.
6. Joseph Des Arts, 1743-1829, originally a Representant, elected as such to the
Petit Conseil in 1776, became a Constitutionnaire, in part because of his marriage
into the Chapeaurouge family, and was excluded from the Petit Conseil in 1778.
Much disliked by the Representants because of his change of party.
7. Jacob de Chapeaurouge, 1720-1783, the son of the previous Jacob, he was a
member of the Petit Conseil, he had been Syndic in 1776 and was an ultra-Negatif
who became one of the leaders of the Constitutionnaires after 1777. He preferred
French intervention in Geneva rather than any compromise with the Representants.
8. Jacques Dunant (1740-1802), in the Deux Cents 1770, Procureur-General 1777,
Syndic 1785. A Constitutionnaire who found it difficult to work with the Repre-
sentants on the commission for the revision of the laws.
9. Jean-Louls Michell, 1745-1806, an officer in the French Army, he was a Negatif
who preferred to reach a settlement between Genevans.
10. Aml Lullin (1748-1816), member of the Deux Cents, member of the Petit Conseil
1781-1792, Syndic 1790, negotiated the Treaty of Carouge, 1792. At this time he
was a young and very determined ultra-Negafif and after 1777 was one of the most
important Constitutionnaires, believing there could be no concessions whatever to
the Representants.
11. Horace-Benedict Perrinet-Des Franches, Resident of Geneva in Pads, had
succeeded Necker in 1777 and remained in post until 1785. He was a determined
Constitutionnaire, who came increasingly to represent their interests rather than
those of the government which had appointed him until the Constitutionnaires
returned to power in 1782.
12. Philibert Cramer, 1727-1797, a Constitutionnaire, he was one of the four to be
removed from the Petit Conseil in 1777.
13. Jacques Vieusseux 1721-1792, was related via his mother, Elizabeth Leger,
granddaughter of Antoine Leger (see Chapter V), to one of the early leaders of the
Bourgeois. He was one of the leaders in 1766-68 and was still echoing his great
grandfather's ideas in the Deux Cents in 1779. He became one of the Comite de
SOrete in 1782 and was exiled for life in July 1782. Gig, Les lettres iseditieuses'
anonymes, op. cit., p. 175 ft. 123.
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14. Gabard de-Vaux, French chargé d'affaires to Geneva April 1778-May 1781,
succeeding Hennin.
15. Frederic de Chapeaurouge, Jean-Jacques Dunant, Aml Lullin, Marc-Alexandre
Puerari, Isaac-Louis Neville, Aml Millet, all members of the P.C., Guillaume
Fuzier-Cayla, Joseph des Arts, Pierre-Andre Rigaud, Antoine Saiadin de
Crans, Jacques Mercier, Francois-Andre Neville, Isaac-Robert RiIllet-FatIo,
Benjamin Saiadin de Crans, Jean-Frangois Saiadin and Horace-Benedict de
Saussure, all members of the Deux Cents, plus Mme. Rilliet-Fatio. De Saussure,
de Mercier and Saladin were released the following morning.
16. Jean-Louis de Bude-de Boissy (1729-1813), officer in the Sardinian Army. Selion,
probably Jean-Frangois (1707-1790), entered Deux Cents in 1752 and was also a
member of the LX from 1763.
Chapter IX
1. Jacques-Antoine Od ler, 1748-1817, involved with work on smallpox vaccination.
Jean-Jacques Choisy, 1736-1792, a lawyer, member of the Commission formed
by the political cercles in 1776, member of the Deux Cents, member of the Com-
mittee of Security, April 1782. Jean Johannot, 1748-1829, member of the Deux
Cents in 1782; later in France he became a Deputy to the Convention for Bas-Rhin.
Jacob Meynadier, 1724-1805, member of the Deux Cents 1775, member of the
'illegal' Petit Conseil April-July 1782; he refused to take the oath to the Edict of
Pacification; re-instated 1789, elected one of the members of the new Assembly
1793. Jean Barde, 1746-1819, had been one of the 24 Commissioners in 1766.
2. Gualnier (1716-1801), 1746 in the Deux Cents, Auditeur 1750, joined the Petit
Conseil in 1762, Syndic in 1772, 1776, 1780. Although a Islegatif, he was beginning
to have doubts concerning the advisability of what was being pushed through.
3. Jacques Grenus, 1751-1817, was an extreme Representant, after his return to
Geneva in 1789, he led a group which wished to see dramatic constitutional
changes, including political rights for most Genevans, a position he advocated only
after the French Revolution and which led to his further banishment in 1791. He
was prepared to see Geneva annexed by the French to achieve his political ends.
Jean Janot, 1754-[?], appointed to the Deux Cents in 1782, on his return to
Geneva, was to join the faction belonging to Grenus. Guillaume Ringler, 1727-
1809, a watchmaker, a member of the Deux Cents from 1775, was moderate and
popular in the city. Jean-Antoine Thuillier, 1728-1799, a Representant who had
been one of the Commissioners in 1766. EsaTe Gasc, 1748-1813, pastor and
Representant, went to Constance to the exiled Genevan community there. Return-
ing to Geneva in 1790, he resigned from the Church in February 1793, and became
an elected member of the National Assembly.	 .
4. Ami Melly, 1741-1804, 'ii est un des membres Representants [et etalt dansl le CC
[Deux Cents]; il fait beaucoup le raissonent...' BPU, Ms. 2469 Lettres de G-A. De
Luc a J-A. De Luc, 4.3.80, 91. His brother Andre, 1751-1812 was also involved in
politics and attempting to persuade people to go to New Geneva.
5. Etienne-Solomen Reybaz, 1737-1804, studied theology in Geneva, he left for
Paris in 1782, where he later collaborated with Mirabeau. Genevan Chargé
d'Affaires 1792, Permanent Minister 1794-6. He was a strong ReprOsentant and
was related to the Prevost family.
6. Isaac Pictet (1746-1823), British Chargé d'Affaires in Geneva 1792-1794. He
entered the Deux Cents in 1772, the Petit Conseil in 1790 and was Syndic 1792.
He was banished in 1794. His father had been a supporter of the Representants
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and the family had a reputation of supporting the Bourgeois and the British through-
out the eighteenth century.
7. John, Viscount Mountstuart, 1744-1814, eldest son of the Earl of Bute, he was
the the British Envoy to the Court at Turin 1779-1783, then Ambassador to Spain.
He was to die in Geneva in 1814.
8. Etienne-Alexandre Bousquet, 1756-1810, had refused to take the new oath to the
government, and, for this reason, may have been very carefully watched. He
eventually left Geneva, to return in 1789. From being a Representant, he had, by
1790-91, become a supporter of Grenus' idea that total equality should be estab-
lished in Geneva.
9. Etienne Dumont (1759-1829), Pastor in St. Petersburg 1784-1785, later a journal-
ist, tutor to Shelbume's son and Shelburne's librarian.
10. Jacques-Pierre Brissot (1754-1793), journalist, Deputy in the Legislature and in
the Convention, one of the leaders of the Girondin party. Guillotined. Honore
Gabriel, Marquis de Mirabeau (1749-1791), supporter of Constitutional monarchy.
11. Claude-Philippe Claparede, 1731-1803, a confirmed Constitutionnaire, he was
Syndic three times, 1778, 1786, 1791.
12. Antoine-Jacques Roustan, 1734-1808, became a pastor in 1759 and pastor at
one of the Genevan churches in London in 1764. On Ns return to Geneva in
he became a Bourgeois, pastor of a church in the city and was elected as a Deputy
in 1793. For him, men Re De Luc were too moderate and those like Grertus were
too extreme. He was also the co-author of the Abróge de l'histoire universe/le,
which, as a history of Geneva, the government would not permit to be published.
(Used earlier in this study under Ms. Rocca 12)
13. Horace-Bênedict tie Saussure, 1740-1799, Professor of Uatura( Sciences t 76'2-
86, Rector 1774-5, one of the founders of what was later called the science of
geology. He was the first man to climb Mont Blanc (3rd. August 1787). He was not
officially attached to any party, and moved from supporting a generally patrician
standpoint to pushing hard for a thorough revision of the constitution.
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